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ABSTRACT 
 
BONNIE A. LUCERO: Engendering Inequality: Masculinity and Racial Exclusion in 
Cuba, 1895-1902 
(Under the direction of Dr. Louis A. Pérez, Jr.) 
 
 
 This dissertation explains the rise of a culture of racial silence in a time of 
heightening racial exclusion in Cuba at the turn of the twentieth century. Employing a 
case study of Cienfuegos, a port city on the south-central coast of the island, I examine 
gendered articulations of inequality among Cuban separatists between the outbreak of the 
war of independence in 1895 and the inauguration of the Cuban republic in 1902. I argue 
that Cuban struggles for political power in the wake of the American military 
intervention (1898) and military occupation (1899-1902) fundamentally transformed 
separatist visions of citizenship, increasingly restricting its boundaries along racial lines. 
Separatists expressed racial exclusion in terms of masculinity. During the first 
years of the war, a discourse of racial brotherhood afforded inclusion to all men 
regardless of race or class. There were two key turning points thereafter. When Cubans 
entered the final year of the anticolonial struggle and especially after the American 
intervention, diverse groups of separatists struggled to secure access to political power. 
Hierarchical visions of masculinity stood in for racial inequality, resulting in the general 
exclusion of men of African descent from political power. The second transformation 
unfolded during the military occupation. Manliness, and by implication political power, 
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became increasingly contingent upon collaboration with American military authorities. 
Failure to cooperate with Americans supposedly equated with supporting black rule in 
Cuba. Collaboration with the Americans, however, meant preserving racial order and 
sacrificing the revolutionary promise of social justice. 
Manliness provided a strategy by which political elites could preserve the 
discourse of racial brotherhood which afforded them political legitimacy among their 
fellow separatists. Simultaneously, they were able to justify the racial exclusion that 
earned them the esteem of American military authorities. Poor and working-class black 
men and women appropriated this gendered language to protest social inequality, 
marking the consolidation of the discourse of racial brotherhood amidst a general silence 
on issues of race. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 “I notice negroes come into the plaza now, which was never allowed before,” 
wrote, Edwin F. Atkins, an American planter in Cienfuegos in January 1899.
1
 In this 
statement, he identified a crucial change in the way men and women of African descent 
inhabited the urban space in this central Cuban port city. This shift came at a pivotal 
juncture in Cuban history and race relations. Cubans had recently emerged from the war 
of independence against Spain (1895-1898) and entered the first year of the American 
military occupation (1899-1902). The anti-colonial insurrection transformed racial 
attitudes and challenged the very foundations of the colonial social hierarchy with a 
revolutionary discourse of racial brotherhood. Insurgents reportedly claimed there was no 
such thing at the black man or the white man, only the Cuban. The military ascension of 
black men to high-ranking positions in the Cuban Army seemed to corroborate the 
centrality of social revolution to Cuba Libre.
2
 
After the war, challenges to the racial order were particularly evident among 
Cuban veterans. Insurgents apparently showed little regard for racial etiquette, as black 
and white men gathered, consorted, and organized together, united by the bonds of 
military service. Atkins described the crowd gathered to greet revered insurgent chief 
Máximo Gómez on his visit to Cienfuegos in February 1899: “all the insurgents of the 
                                                 
1
 Edwin F. Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1926), 297. 
2
 Ada Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation and Revolution, 1868-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1999). 
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neighborhood came to the station to meet him, some four hundred and fifty, and only 
some half a dozen white men.”3 The Cuban army, which Gómez had commanded, 
became the ultimate symbol of the troubling racial opening occurring in the late 
nineteenth century, particularly the war. Atkins even disdained the behavior of white 
insurgents, who shamelessly presented their black lovers in public. “One dignified officer 
was seen marching with a negress on his arm (so the boys said) and everything was 
mixed.”4 The cross-racial alliance so loudly touted by the insurgents during the war, 
transformed the way black men and women occupied the urban space of Cienfuegos and 
how veterans of all colors interacted with one another. This worried some men with 
vested interests in preserving the racial status quo. 
 The racial anxieties emerging after the war provided a convenient pretext for 
realizing a historic American aspiration: the annexation of Cuba. After thirty years of 
armed anti-colonial struggle against Spain, Cuban separatists gained only conditional 
freedom as American military rule replaced Spanish colonialism. Americans had 
intervened on behalf of the Cubans, many believing the Cuban cause equally noble and 
righteous as the American Revolution. Yet, once in Cuba, American sentiments toward 
the Cuban separatists quickly changed. Imperialists and advocates of annexation pointed 
to several factors contributing to Cuban unfitness for self-government including the 
longstanding Spanish tyranny, the widespread economic devastation, and especially the 
unfavorable racial composition of the Cuban population.  These factors, they claimed, 
certainly implied a need for benevolent American tutelage. 
                                                 
3
 Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba, 300. 
4
 Ibid. 
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The length and outcome of the period of American rule were both uncertain. 
Instead of attempting to mold Cubans into American citizens, the American military 
occupation attempted to create a society in which Cuban political elites willingly favored 
American economic interests. In April 1899, General James H. Wilson, Commanding 
General of Matanzas and Santa Clara Provinces, wrote that the Cubans “should 
necessarily go through a period of tutelage, the length of which will depend altogether on 
their own behavior during the occupation of the island by the United States forces.”5 
Wilson underlined what became the core policy of the American military occupation: the 
political future of Cuba depended on the cooperation of the Cuban political elites with the 
commercial goals of Americans. 
Guaranteeing American interests in Cuba involved two main projects. First, 
Cuban political elites were charged with ensuring a stable workforce for American 
business. Sugar planters especially relied heavily on a cheap and obedient labor force, 
historically guaranteed by slavery and preserved to a large degree with the post-
emancipation racial order, at which the revolution had chipped away. Second, political 
stability was required to ensure consistent international trade. However, stability often 
entailed collaboration with American military officials and favoring wealthy (especially 
American) capitalists, rather than simply fostering a peaceful and democratic political 
realm. Both these goals relied on the preservation of the racial order. In public, Cuban 
political elites remained silent on issues of race. At the same time, they enacted policies 
aimed at preserving a racial order that placed men and women of African descent 
distinctly at the bottom of the social hierarchy. 
                                                 
5
 James H. Wilson to Alexander S. Strouss, April 16, 1899, Box 44, Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, James H. Wilson Papers, (Hereafter cited as LOC/MD/JHW). Emphasis mine. 
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This dissertation examines the paradoxical coexistence of racial silence with 
increasing racial exclusion in Cuban society at the turn of the twentieth century. To 
address this question, this study focuses on the political struggles of Cuban separatists 
and the personal experiences of poor and working-class black men and women during the 
war and the transition to sovereignty (1895-1902). The emphasis on the everyday 
personal experiences and interactions required a reduction in the scale of analysis to the 
local level. Therefore, the primary methodological approach used here is a case study of a 
medium-sized port city called Cienfuegos, located on the south coast of central Cuba.
6
 
I argue that the negotiations among various groups of separatists and American 
military officials resulted in a transformation of the agenda of the Cuba Libre from 
concern about social justice to struggle for political power in the emerging republic. The 
American military intervention in Cuba in 1898 fundamentally altered the course of the 
separatist movement by favoring socially-conservative veterans whose political 
legitimacy hinged on repression of blacks. Race-based social and political mobilization 
came to represent more than a mere threat to the social order; they emerged as the single 
greatest threat to Cuban self-government. 
                                                 
6
 This study finds methodological inspiration in microhistory and everyday life history. Both of these 
approaches to history imply the reduction of the scale of analysis, and a close analysis of human agency. 
Louis A. Pérez, Jr., argues that the increasing North American presence in Cuba over the course of the 
nineteenth century “served as a powerful force for change” and these cultural influences “were accepted as 
commonplace and thus became part of everyday life.” Louis A. Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, 
Nationality, and Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 27; Brad S. Gregory, “Is 
Small Beautiful? Microhistory and the History of Everyday Life,” History and Theory 38:1 (1999), 101; 
Dorthee Wierling, “The History of Everyday Life and Gender Relations: On Historical and 
Historiographical Relationships,” in The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences 
and Ways of Life, ed. Alf Lüdtke (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 157; Paul Steege, Andrew 
Stuart Bergerson, Maureen Healy, and Pamela E. Swett, “The History of Everyday Life: A Second 
Chapter,” The Journal of Modern History 80:2 (2008), 376; Lutz Niethammer, “Zeroing in on Change: In 
Search of Popular Experiences of the Industrial Province in the German Democratic Republic,” in The 
History of Everyday Life Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life, ed. Alf Lüdtke 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 279. 
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This project builds on nearly a century of scholarship on the American military 
occupation of Cuba and a growing body of literature on race, racism, and the struggle for 
equality. Both Cuban and American research on the American occupation has been 
defined by prevailing political currents in U.S.-Cuban relations at least since the advent 
of the Platt Amendment in 1901. Much of the scholarship in Cuba has approached the 
American intervention with a nationalist agenda, protesting the role of American 
imperialism in Cuba.
7
 To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of the 
Cuban republic, prominent nationalist historians like Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring and 
Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez published lengthy studies of the American occupation, 
characterized by a strongly critical tone against the intervention, its American 
representatives, and the Platt Amendment, which the Cubans had successfully abrogated 
in 1934.
8
 With the triumph of the 1959 revolution, scholarly accounts of the occupation 
continued in a similar nationalist vein, though usually emphasizing the role of class 
conflict and imperialism in shaping developments in Cuba.
9
 Post-1959 accounts tended to 
validate the Cuban revolution by protesting the injustices of American rule. 
After 1959, American accounts of the military occupation have attempted to 
explain how the Cuban Revolution emerged in a society the Americans had supposedly 
                                                 
7
 Robert Freeman Smith, “Twentieth-Century Cuban Historiography,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 44:1 (1964), 48-50. Also see David Healy, “One War from Two Sides: The Cuban Assessment of 
U.S.-Cuban Relations,” Cercles 5 (2002), 31-38. 
8
 Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, José M. Pérez Cabrera, Juan J. Remos and Emeterio S. Santovenia, Historia de 
la nación cubana. Tomo VII: cambio de soberanía. Desde 1868 hasta 1902 (Havana: Editorial Historia de 
la nación cubana, S.A. 1952), 73-104; Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, La Lucha Cubana por la República, 
contra la Anexión y la Enmienda Platt (Havana: Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de La Habana, 
Colección Histórica Cubana Americana, 1952), 41. 
9
 Instituto de Historia, Historia de Cuba, la neocolonia: organización y crisis desde 1899 hasta 1940 
(Havana: Editorial Félix Varela, 2004). 
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cured of its revolutionary tendencies. Scholars like James H. Hitchman and David Healy 
argued that the premature departure of American troops from Cuba in 1902 left Cubans 
inadequately prepared for self-government, which ultimately resulted in the success of 
the rebellious caudillo, Fidel Castro.
10
 Philip S. Foner, as a marked contrast, was much 
more sympathetic to the Cuban perspective, articulating a cogent critique of the 
occupation of Cuba as a founding moment for American empire.
11
 
While previous accounts tended to emphasize the homogeneity of Cuban and 
American “nations,” the scholarship of the 1980s began to uncover political 
fragmentation among Cubans during the occupation. A groundbreaking study in 1983 by 
Louis A. Pérez, Jr. transformed the field by employing both Cuban and American 
archival sources to study the political developments between 1878 and 1902. By 
emphasizing the interplay among different groups of Cubans, Pérez opened the door to a 
new generation of historians concerned with the social and cultural developments during 
the military occupation.
12
 Cuban historian Marial Iglesias Utset built upon this foundation 
with a seminal study of the material culture of Cuban nationalism during the 
occupation.
13
 
                                                 
10
 James H. Hitchman, Leonard Wood and Cuban Independence, 1898-1902 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1971), 212; David Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902. Generals, Politicians and the Search for 
Policy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 214. 
11
 Philip S. Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American imperialism, 1895-1902, 
2vol. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 672. 
12
 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1983). Also see his works exploring the cultural connections between Cuba and the United States, an 
important aspect of which emerged out of the American military occupation. Pérez, On Becoming Cuban; 
Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 2003). 
13
 Marial Iglesias Utset, Las metáforas del cambio en la vida cotidiana: Cuba, 1898-1902 (Havana: 
Ediciones Unión, 2003). Also see Raquel Vinat de la Mata, Las cubanas en la posguerra (1898-1902): 
Acercamiento a la reconstrucción de una etapa olvidada (Havana: Editora Política, 2001). 
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Strikingly absent from the scholarship of the American military occupation were 
studies centering the experiences of men and women of African descent. Studies of race 
abound for other time periods. Most scholars have addressed the struggle for racial 
equality either before or after the American military occupation. The early work of 
Rebecca Scott elucidated the process of gradual emancipation and struggles over the 
meaning of freedom in late-nineteenth century Cuba.
14
 More recently, she explored 
Atlantic definitions of freedom by juxtaposing the post-emancipation societies of central 
Cuba and Louisiana. Although this study does encompass the period of American rule, 
the longer durée approach centers on questions of post-emancipation freedom in rural 
Cuba, rather than access to citizenship among urban dwellers. In her study of the racial 
politics of the Cuban anticolonial struggle, Ada Ferrer argued that the Cuban revolution 
ultimately failed to overturn racism in Cuba, despite the persistence and entrenchment of 
racial brotherhood as a national patriotic discourse.
15
  
 The work of Scott and Ferrer demonstrated that black Cubans waged a protracted 
struggle for freedom and citizenship under Spanish rule. Although they did not gain full 
equality, they established a framework for protest and a legacy of struggle, gradually 
expanding their autonomy and rights. This trajectory laid an important foundation for the 
goals and strategies of Cuban separatists. They attempted to appeal to men of African 
descent by offering the fulfillment of their aspirations for equality within the Cuban 
army. Furthermore, it shaped the expectations of men of African descent during their 
service to Cuba Libre, empowering them to reclaim the promises of equality. The 
                                                 
14
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experience of war under the discourse of racial brotherhood led many men to believe that 
the trajectory of increasing inclusion and social justice would continue after the war. 
It did not. In contrast to the gradual expansion of rights for black Cubans in the 
late colonial period, stark racial inequality defined the early Cuban republic. Alejandro de 
la Fuente argued that the failure of the government to take direct action against racism 
contributed directly to the persistence of racial inequalities, especially in the sectors of 
education, labor and access to power in the twentieth century.
16
 Melina Pappademos 
corroborated the prevailing narrative of thwarted aspirations and narrowing citizenship in 
the early republic in her account of black political activism.
17
 These studies emphasized 
the failure to dismantle the structures of racism despite the persistence of the discourse of 
racial brotherhood, which supposedly attested that racism did not exist. 
The limitations of black mobilization were even reinforced by political 
fragmentation and socio-economic stratification among people of African descent since 
the military occupation. Frank Guridy explored the ways black Cubans and African 
Americans appropriated the transnational connections of empire to forge diasporic 
networks after the American military intervention.
18
 Even in his agency-driven narrative, 
the limitations of an implicitly racialized Cuban nationality become evident in the 
persistent emphasis on the culture of black respectability that led black elites to reject the 
Africanist cultural practices of the black masses. 
                                                 
16
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When considering the colonial scholarship and the republican scholarship 
together, a clear paradox emerges. A trajectory of expansion in rights for people of 
African descent in the late colonial period was transformed into a violent rejection of 
black inclusion and a frustration of aspirations for racial equality in the early republic, 
which continues to a degree today. Few studies have addressed this apparent 
contradiction. One of the closest approximations to a study of race during the American 
occupation was a 1983 conference paper by Cathy Duke. Therein, she argued that 
“American racial ideas and practices were imbibed and institutionalized” during the 
occupation, leaving behind “a legacy of racism unlike anything that had come before.”19 
This interpretation draws upon a history of scholarship arguing that American race 
relations were fundamentally distinct from and more virulently racist than Iberian race 
relations.
20
  
Few would disagree that Duke afforded Americans an exaggerated role in 
determining the Cuban racial climate. However, it is also difficult to deny that the 
American military occupation influenced the meanings of race in post-war Cuba to a 
degree. More recent studies have challenged the idea that the inculcation of American 
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10 
 
racial values produced ipso facto black disenfranchisement in Cuba. In her 1995 
monograph, Our Rightful Share, Aline Helg contended that “Cuba’s racial system was 
not a product of U.S. influence.”21 Helg addressed the first military occupation in two 
chapters discussing the “making of the new order,” and the “frustration” of black hopes 
for equality and political power in the Cuban republic, both narratives that span the 
period from 1899-1906.
22
 This declensionist narrative of black political power in the 
early republic has defined recent scholarship on race in early republican Cuba. 
Other historians have emphasized the role of military organization during the war 
in the formation of early-republican networks of political patronage.
23
 Orlando García 
Martínez and Michael Zeuske both juxtapose the prevalence of wartime discourse of 
racial brotherhood with the post-war disenfranchisement of men of African descent. 
According to Zeuske, most of leadership of the Cuban army concurred in the “ideals of 
Martí” until 1898. However, “under the impact of the Spanish-Cuban-American war and 
the first year of the occupation, the ideas of the high officials, many of who were white, 
shifted toward more opportunistic ends, making use of the positions of power obtained 
before.”24 The transformative moment was the American intervention, not because it 
brought American racism to Cuban soil, but rather because it set in motion a process of 
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transformation within the Cuban army. García identified a pivotal shift in the social 
composition of the Cuban army when wealthy sectors joined en masse following the 
announcement of American intervention. He charted the development of “two armies” 
within the military branch of Cuba Libre, one that fought for patriotic ideals, and the 
other group that joined for political power.
25
 Both García and Zeuske showed the 
marginal role of black veterans through surveys of political appointments during the first 
decade of the republic.
26
 These studies suggest that the revolution failed to transform the 
lives of black Cubans. 
This dissertation brings together studies of the American occupations and 
accounts of race to explain the coexistence of racial brotherhood with increasing racial 
exclusion in Cuba at the turn of the twentieth century. I build on these fields of study in 
two main ways. First, by examining the developments that informed the political shift 
Zeuske and others identified, this study shows how the political context of the American 
intervention and military occupation helped socially-conservative ideas to overtake the 
revolutionary agenda of social justice. Second, this study focuses on the consequences of 
the transformation of the goals of Cuban separatists for poor and working-class black 
Cubans, especially considering how they experienced and responded to these changes. 
While the electoral politics and policies of the ruling elite provide a framework for 
understanding the shift in visions of Cuba Libre, the protagonists of this study are not 
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political elites, but rather men and women whose exclusion from the political realm made 
their every private move a political act. In the words of feminist Carol Hanisch, “the 
personal is political.”27 
Microhistory and the Microcosm of Cienfuegos 
 
A microhistory of Cienfuegos can help cast light on broader national 
developments because the city and its hinterland reflect broader patterns island-wide. 
While smaller than Havana, Cienfuegos was nonetheless one of the most populous, 
prosperous, and well-connected Cuban cities because of its rich sugar economy and 
profound integration into Atlantic networks of trade and cultural exchange. Cienfuegos 
was a key port city for the Trans-Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century, and its 
expanding wealth and fertile lands attracted investment from all over the world, but most 
notably from American capitalists. Cienfuegos emerged as a product of the very forces 
that defined Cuban society in the nineteenth century: slavery and gradual emancipation, 
sugar plantation economy, American investment, and anti-colonial struggle. 
 
 
Map 1: Island of Cuba, 1898
28
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28
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The demographics of Cienfuegos closely resemble national patterns. In 1899, the 
population of Cienfuegos district was 59,128, and the population of the city proper was 
30,038. In the district of Cienfuegos, nearly half of the employed people earned their 
livelihoods from agriculture. In the city, the most common sectors of employment 
included domestic service, manufacturing, and trade. In the 1899 census, just over half of 
the population was classified as native-born white, while about 10% were foreign white, 
and just over 30% were of African ancestry. In almost every instance, the demographic 
data for Cienfuegos resembles that of national averages to a greater degree than does the 
data from Havana. This is especially noteworthy for the proportion of foreign-born 
whites. In Havana, the proportion of foreign-born whites was more than twice the 
national average, suggesting they wielded greater influence over Havana society than 
they did over other areas of Cuba. Considering that most studies of Cuba are based upon 
data collected in and about Havana, the demographic idiosyncrasies of that city might 
suggest a unique historical experience as well (See Table 1). 
  
14 
 
Admittedly, Cienfuegos is not without its own particularities. For example, the 
province of Santa Clara was one of the only regions to increase its populations between 
the census of 1887 and that of 1899. Moreover, the black population of that province 
increased by approximately 10 percent. For most other parts of the island, population 
decreases were far more common. Yet, the post-war demographic transformation of 
Santa Clara province does highlight a national redistribution of the population that may 
have resulted from the centrality of the province in the war of independence. Despite 
these differences, the demographic proportions of Santa Clara province and Cienfuegos 
district more specifically tend to reflect national trends, and can therefore provide a 
counterpoint to the Havana-centric nature of most studies of the island. 
 
Table 1: Populations Statistics by Race (per 100), for selected geographic zones, 
1899
29
 
 Native 
White 
Foreign 
White 
Negro Mixed Chinese 
Havana City 49.0 22.4 12.2 15.2 1.2 
Cienfuegos City 52.4 11.6 10.2 24.6 1.1 
Cienfuegos 
District 
54.5 10.8 12.6 20.1 2.0 
Cuba 57.9 9.0 14.9 17.2 .9 
Santa Clara 
Province 
60.3 8.4 13.6 16.3 1.4 
 
In Cuban historiography, Havana has often stood in for Cuba, even though the 
history of the island has been intensely regionalized. Nationalism has been a powerful 
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force in Latin American historiography.
30
 This concept relies on a unified national 
community, the nation, frequently represented by the capital city as the pinnacle of 
civilization and culture. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Cuba, where the bustling 
metropolis of Havana has loomed large over the rest of the provinces. The overwhelming 
emphasis on the nation, however politically convenient, tends to obscure the diverse 
historical experiences emerging from the peculiar socio-political conditions of each 
unique locality. 
Sub-national history offers a way to challenge the conflation of capital city and 
nation. Two approaches in particular, regional history and microhistory, provide a 
framework for a critical re-assessment of the role of place in historical narratives and the 
role of scale in historical research. Regional history is based on the idea that “region” is a 
hypothesis, rather than a given natural category.
31
 In microhistory, this critical 
perspective expands beyond place to encompass the object of analysis. Although 
microhistory often takes the form of a local, regional or provincial case study, it also 
permits transcending place and tracing one individual, family or commodity through time 
and space.
32
 By reducing the scale of analysis, sub-national history can help reveal the 
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multitude of chronological and spatial variation, while moving beyond the ideologically-
constructed naturalness of the nation-state.  
Cienfuegos is an ideal case study for approaching the problem of race in Cuba, 
because it is in many ways a microcosm of Cuban society at the turn of the twentieth 
century. A center of both Spanish loyalty and the early incursion of American capital, the 
regional economy was based on sugar and, consequently, on slavery. While its port 
opened the city to the world of Atlantic commerce, it is still small enough to make 
personal and micro-level analysis feasible in a way that it would not be in a place like 
Havana. The manageable size of Cienfuegos allowed me to get acquainted with many of 
the individuals, families and networks defining the black life in the city. In addition, the 
locality is endowed with a rich provincial archive and its transnational history has helped 
preserve the local history in the written record in numerous Spanish, American and 
Caribbean archives. The wealth of archival materials on the city and municipality of 
Cienfuegos has contributed to a burgeoning body of historical scholarship on the region, 
especially on the history of slavery, emancipation and black participation in the wars of 
independence.
33
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 I search for an explanation to the historiographical paradox of expanding rights in 
the colonial period and heightened exclusion in the Republic in the intensely local 
interactions and struggles of three main groups of people: poor and working-class men 
and women of African descent, white Cuban patriot-politicians, and American military 
officials. I argue that these three groups envisioned and sought to create fundamentally 
different societies after the war. One of the most significant divergences in their visions 
of Cuba Libre was the role of race in determining access to political power and 
republican resources. In their zeal to secure power from the hands of both their Spanish 
and American enemies, white Cuban patriots subordinated the ideal of racial brotherhood 
in practice and to quell fears that they would threaten the interests of wealthy plantation 
owners. Simultaneously, they upheld it as a patriotic discourse that ensured their 
continued patriotic legitimacy among their fellow separatists. Political elites devised new 
ways to explain racial exclusion, among which was a language of masculinity. 
 
Masculinity and the Measures of Citizenship 
 
Citizenship in Cuba, like in other Latin American republics, was a masculine 
realm at the turn of the twentieth century. The implicit gendering of discourses and 
practices of citizenship has not escaped the attention of historians in recent years, though 
historians have typically paid less attention to the links between masculinity and 
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citizenship than to the feminine exclusion from it.
34
 Fewer scholars have explored the 
relationship between masculinity and citizenship in the specific contexts of Latin 
America. “We need studies that concentrate on men and masculinities, on men as 
engendered and engendering beings in Latin America,” wrote Matthew C. Gutmann.35 
This project attempts to contribute to this nascent body of scholarship by employing a 
gendered analysis to explore the intersections of race, masculinity and class in their 
specific social and cultural context in Cienfuegos at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Citizenship is about defining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in a 
particular political community.
36
 This idea typically refers to the rights, responsibilities, 
privileges and duties of belonging to a particular nation-state. In this project, citizenship 
can be operationalized most effectively by equating it to access to political power, 
whether the right to vote or the ability to hold office. The first boundary of citizenship 
was gender. In Cuba, like in many emerging Latin American republics, one of the most 
important criteria necessary to become a citizen was being a man.
37
 Indeed, the idea of 
Cuban citizenship was born in the manigua, the almost exclusively male and intensely 
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multi-racial domain of the separatist military camps.
38
 Cuban ciudadanos, as the 
separatists often called themselves, fostered unity among the soldiers by constructing an 
inclusive Liberal citizenship that extended belonging to men regardless of race, class, or 
place of origin. The discourse of racial brotherhood became a rhetorical device to unify 
men across race and class under the political banner of Cuba Libre.
39
 Service to the 
Patria, in the form of joining the anti-colonial insurrection became a demonstration of 
two diverging, almost contradictory forms of masculinity: the violence of military combat 
and the gentility of self-abnegation.
40
 
The purpose of focusing on the evolving and diverging meanings of masculinity is 
to elucidate the ways race, as an unspoken category of difference, operated in the daily 
lives Cienfuegos residents, even when racial categories were rare in the language Cubans 
used to talk about inequality. I distinguish between the physicality of being a “man”—
masculinity—and the moral and normative aspects employed in constructing and 
differentiating between “good” men and men who fail to achieve the ideal—manliness. 
This distinction emerges from acknowledging that gender, its physicality, the discourses 
about it, and its outward display and embodiment are socially constructed.
41
 Masculinity, 
articulated during the early year of the war as appeals to a common manliness, masked 
                                                 
38
 The conception of Cuban nation emerged much before the outbreak of the wars of Independence. Josef 
Opatrný, Antecedentes históricos de la formación de la nación cubana  (Prague: Universidad Carolina, 
1986). 
39
 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba, 7. 
40
 John Charles Chasteen, “Fighting Words: The Discourse of Insurgency in Latin American History,” 
Latin American Research Review 28:3 (1993), 103. 
41
 Gail Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 
1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 18-19; Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990). 
  
20 
 
racial and class differences by deploying a seemingly more “natural” social ordering 
based on gender and honor. While it seemed to provide a theoretical basis for inclusion of 
all Cuban men, this form of inclusive masculinity actually encapsulated the inequalities 
of race and class. 
Hegemonic masculinity, the idea that there is certain way of being a man against 
which all men are measured, can explain the increasingly exclusive and hierarchical 
nature of Cuban citizenship during the transition from colony to republic.
42
 In this study, 
“masculinity” is used to refer to a system of thinking about how to be a man, usually 
encompassing the most basic physical definition of “man.” “Manliness,” on the other 
hand, is used to denote the realization or perceived fulfillment of the highest conception 
of what it meant to be a man as defined by the particular notion of hegemonic masculinity 
at that moment. This distinction can help explain how some “men” could be ineligible to 
enjoy the rights of citizenship supposedly available to all “men.” 
Constantly evolving in definition and deployment, dominant ideas of masculinity 
came to define inclusion, status and belonging within the emerging conception of Cuban 
citizenship. As visions and practices of masculinity changed, so too did the boundaries of 
citizenship. During the war, access to citizenship supposedly rested upon upholding an 
idealized patriotic masculinity, the highest virtues of manliness. The ideal Cuban man 
was “respectable,” “honorable,” values that implied a host of other qualities including 
chivalry, self-restraint, and self-abnegation, especially among middle-class men. More 
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virile forms of manliness most closely associated with the working class, however, 
became increasingly prominent in performances of masculinity amidst military conflict. 
The idea of valor, bravery, and military prowess accompanied the potentially more 
dangerous tendencies toward violence, sexual aggression, and even lawlessness. 
These competing ways of being a man had no explicit racial implications. In 
practice, however, the lines of inclusion and exclusion closely resembled racial lines, and 
the qualities of patriotic masculinity seemed to be applied more severely to people of 
African descent. Indeed, the virile working-class masculinity seemed to be acceptable 
only when enacted by whites. They were considered far too threatening if deployed by a 
black man. The association of blackness with hypermasculinity, a way of being a man 
that was so manly as to be threatening, in the very moment of political uncertainty would 
endure through the war and into the occupation. It provided the pretext for the campaign 
to exclude blacks from the rights of being a man, namely political power, because of the 
perceived threat to racial order and sexual morality. 
Thus, manliness as perceived under hegemonic masculinity emerged as an 
implicitly racialized (and classed) notion of how to be a good man. Being a good Cuban 
man, then, equated not only to upholding the values and customs of white middle class 
men, but the selective acceptability of performing male virility. Fears of alleged black 
hypermasculinity, in turn, emerged as a justification for an increasing emasculation of 
black men through political and physical marginalization. Moreover, the language of 
masculinity allowed political elites to avoid explicit reference to race when explaining 
racial inequality. Amidst a discourse of racial inclusion, racial exclusion persisted.  
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For the purposes of this study, it is possible to identify two main turning points in 
which definitions of masculinity shifted. The first transitional moment occurred between 
late 1897 and 1898, when participation in the insurgent army began to have direct 
political implications. Before late 1897, military service supposedly provided a common 
bond of brotherhood regardless of race or class. This relative equalization was sustainable 
because few immediate benefits were expected for individuals who served. This changed 
when a series of military defeats turned into a succession of military victories, bringing 
the Cuban army closer to what they viewed as an eminent victory over the Spanish. With 
the American military intervention the rank and file of the Cuban army swelled as men of 
diverse political tendencies sought to secure access to the political fruits of the separatist 
toil.  
As Cubans contemplated victory, the anxieties over who would wield political 
power after the war produced a readjustment of what it meant to be a man. Previously, 
service to the Patria, in the form of fighting in the insurrection, had been sufficient for a 
man to demonstrate his manliness. The increasingly evident political implications of 
claims to masculinity, however, necessitated differentiation among men “fit” for political 
power and men considered unsuitable for such office. The qualities of middle-class 
manliness, which included literacy, formal education, gentility, self-restraint, wealth, 
networks of patronage and the nebulous concept of morality, formed the basis of 
categorizing men into two main groups: the manly men who would occupy positions of 
political power and the men who failed to achieve manliness and thus were ineligible for 
political power. These characteristics provided an implicitly racialized and classed vision 
of citizenship, one that privileged educated urban men from prominent Creole families as 
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the standard by which all others would be judged. Although the Liberal ideal of national 
inclusion persisted, sectors of the population considered undesirable, in one way or 
another, were excluded from the rights of citizenship. There was a marked difference 
between being called a citizen and being able to exercise the rights that it supposedly 
afforded.
43
 
The second watershed for local conceptions of masculinity occurred around 1900, 
when access to and preservation of political power for civil authorities began to depend 
on cooperation and collaboration with the American military authorities. Service to the 
war and even belonging to prestigious local families were necessary, but no longer 
sufficient to demonstrate “fitness” for political power. In the political arena, masculinity 
among local ruling elites became increasingly defined as the ability to preserve order, 
which implied cooperation with American military authorities and repression of poor and 
working-class blacks. Ironically, the claims of white socially-conservative veterans to 
power rested upon the support of and submission to American military authorities. These 
veterans served as middlemen between an ever-more-narrowly defined Cuban citizenry 
and the American military, thereby defining the masculinity of the political elite in terms 
of their relationship to Americans. 
Under the occupation, political beliefs, especially attitudes toward Americans and 
policies toward wealthy property owners became increasingly significant in determining 
access to the rights and privileges of citizenship. Consequently, under American rule, 
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hegemonic masculinity became associated not only with whiteness, but also with social 
conservatism and pro-American attitudes. The central point of negotiation between 
Cuban ruling elites and American military officials became not whether or not Cuban 
citizenship would be narrowly defined, but rather how to articulate exclusion. While 
Americans resorted to race as a measure of masculinity,
44
 Cuban civil authorities 
observed the discourse of racial brotherhood by articulating racial exclusion in terms of 
masculinity. In other words, the defect was not the racism of society, but rather the 
faltering masculinity of the individual. 
The supposedly hegemonic masculinities operating in each of the three periods 
(1895-1897, 1897-1900, 1900-1902) did not preclude the development of dissenting 
visions of how to be a man. This project focuses most intensely upon the 
“counterhegemonic” masculinities that emerged during the military occupation. While 
political elites subscribed to and embodied shifting definitions of manliness to 
consolidate political power, poor and working-class men and women of African descent 
contested their political exclusion with two main strategies. First, they articulated a 
different vision of what it meant to be a man, one that often employed the discourse of 
racial brotherhood as its foundation. This was most common in the earlier years of the 
occupation. Second, they appropriated “hegemonic” visions of masculinity and 
transformed them into discourses that suited their needs and supported their causes. This 
became one of the dominant strategies for men and women of African descent to protest 
racial exclusion in a context in which explicit reference to race was deemed unpatriotic 
and dangerous. 
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A Note on Sources 
 
This study employs archival documents from over one dozen archives and 
libraries in Cuba, from Havana to Cienfuegos, and in the United States, from Mississippi 
to Massachusetts. The bulk of the materials informing this study come from four places: 
Cienfuegos, Havana, Washington, D.C., and Boston. In the absence of a solid collection 
of local newspapers from the time period under study, I relied on city council meeting 
minutes in the provincial historical archive of Cienfuegos (APHC) to identify key 
debates, political shifts, and social issues. Several important collections in the provincial 
archive allowed me to “meet” some of the men and women who would become the 
protagonists of this narrative. The personal papers of local female patriot Rita Suárez del 
Villar, especially the correspondence with key insurgent leaders of Cienfuegos helped me 
reconstruct the networks of power and patronage forming during the war, and even the 
ways these relationships persisted under American rule. 
The provincial archive also contained a variety of textual sources created by or 
referring to men and women of African descent. The records of several black recreational 
associations, religious societies and clubs provided a rare opportunity to access the voices 
and daily experiences of local black elites and, at times, those of poor and working-class 
people of African descent.  I was able to trace the lineages and generational trajectories of 
numerous black families by examining property transactions, loan agreements, and 
mortgages contained in the notarial records. For example, notarized power of attorney 
documents often provided specific information about the marital status and history, 
offspring, business relations, property ownership, and economic status of the participants. 
The two oversized boxes of unsorted papers pertaining to the port workers’ movement 
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provided a glimpse into the struggles of working-class men under American rule. The 
meeting minutes and books of members illuminated the ways in which unionized black 
stevedores negotiated the increasing state suppression of organized labor. By reading 
elite-produced sources against the grain and juxtaposing them with documents produced 
by black men and women, I crafted a narrative that privileges the voices of the latter. 
I focused my research on specific individuals related to Cienfuegos to navigate 
the heavily Havana-centric collections of the National Archives of Cuba (ANC). I 
explored the regional dimensions of the war through the personal letters and war diaries 
of insurgent leaders and soldiers operating in the central provinces, contained in the 
Personal Collection of Máximo Gómez. As well, I leafed through thousands of pages of 
personal correspondence concerning black leaders in Cienfuegos and occasionally a rare 
newspaper, newsletter, leaflet, manifesto, or pamphlet contained in the Acquisitions 
Collections, the Donations and Remissions, and the Papers of the Secretariat of 
Government. One of the most valuable resources was a collection of letters by Nicolás 
Valverde, a tailor, journalist and local black leader in Cienfuegos, including one issue of 
a publication dedicated to local race issues that he edited during the American 
occupation. By first getting acquainted with the local personalities, activists and political 
leaders in Cienfuegos in the provincial and parochial archives was essential for finding 
relevant local materials. 
In the National Archives of the United States (USNA), I consulted the military 
government of Cuba records and the records of the United States Army Overseas 
Operations. Both these extensive and underutilized collections provided resources 
documenting every aspect of life and society under American rule, from the suppression 
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of organized labor to the regulation of prostitution, to countless reports of assassinations, 
crime and banditry. Within the military government of Cuba records were the letters 
individual men and women, including widows, black veterans, Spaniards, and indigent 
farmers, who wrote to American military officials about the social conditions, poverty, 
and political anxieties of post-war Cuba. In addition, I used court martial records to 
uncover some of the violent conflicts between Cubans and Americans that were endemic 
in American-occupied Cuba. Another important resource in the United States National 
Archives was the records of the Spanish Treaty Claims, a bureaucratic organ created after 
the 1898 Treaty of Paris to administer the suits for reparations of American businessmen 
who suffered damages during the war of independence. The diverse array of documents 
and interviews conglomerated in this collection sometimes featured the voices of black 
veterans in depositions, and they proved invaluable for reconstructing life during the war. 
The Atkins Family Papers housed at the Massachusetts Historical Society were 
another pillar of this research. Edwin F. Atkins, a Boston merchant who owned the 
largest sugar plantation in Cuba, kept meticulous records about his sugar business, the 
political conditions of the island, the attitudes and behaviors of laborers, and his own 
commentary about the society more generally during and after the war. The abundant 
personal correspondence between Atkins and key military officials in Cuba as well as 
important political figures in the United States government reveal the perspective of one 
American businessman, who wielded a strong influence over military officials in 
Cienfuegos. The views of Atkins reveal broader patterns of thought regarding issues of 
race, political transition and Cuban self-government prevailing among a larger group of 
men involved in the sugar industry and commerce in Cienfuegos. These men (including 
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Emilio Terry, Elias Ponvert, the owners of Constancia Sugar Company, among others) 
usually had strong ties to the United States, including prolonged periods of residence, 
education, and often citizenship. I refer to this group as wealthy property owners. 
With these diverse primary sources, this study situates the local case study of 
Cienfuegos within a broader geographical and theoretical context. Employing the 
transnational scales of empire and Diaspora, this study illuminates national questions of 
citizenship within the local context of urban Cienfuegos during the transitions from 
Spanish colonialism to American empire to Cuban republic. Because this project 
privileges the continuing and evolving dialogue between the local, the national and 
transnational, it broaches the problem of scale defining studies of colonialism and empire. 
Chapter Outlines 
 
This study is structured into two main parts. The first part provides a survey of the 
war and post-war political context. In chapter 1, I argue that Cuban insurgents employed 
a discourse of masculinity in response to racially divisive Spanish propaganda, aiming to 
unifying black and white Cubans under the umbrella of patriotic masculinity. In chapter 
2, I show how this unity slowly began to disintegrate amidst military setbacks. Insurgent 
chiefs in central Cuba responded to critiques of their military inadequacies by targeting 
black Cuban officers, promoting racial hierarchy within the army. Although Cuban 
remained united as they approached victory, post-war images of the insurgents as black 
served to exacerbate existing tensions, and foment American reservations about 
supporting separatist political pretensions—the subject of chapter 3. In chapter 4, I 
examine the role of American political engineering in the gradual rise of conservative 
separatists to political power. 
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These chapters corroborate the conventional wisdom of black political exclusion, 
but advance two further arguments. First, American rule did not create racial 
discrimination in Cuba; rather, the racial thinking and anxieties of the post-emancipation, 
post-Reconstruction United States found resonance among certain segments of the Cuban 
population, namely, those with interests in the plantation economy. Second, although 
some veterans may have shifted their ideals to gain access to the political benefits of the 
occupying government, many veterans remained steadfast in their opposition to the 
occupation. Therefore, rather than an overall transformation of values among veterans, 
the American occupation contributed toward a conservative shift in Cuban politics, as 
American military officials supported the candidacy of conservative political hopefuls. 
While some historians have stubbornly persisted in their search for black political 
participation in the midst of explicit and pervasive marginalization, this study instead 
seeks to access the experiences and struggles of poor and working-class blacks outside 
the realm of formal politics. The second half of the dissertation examines dissenting 
visions of masculinity articulated by poor and working-class blacks and black veterans by 
studying the ways poor and working-class black urbanites experienced this political shift 
under American rule.  
The focus of chapter 5 is the conflicts between American military officials and 
Cuban civil authorities who advocated for absolute Cuban self-government during the 
first six months of the military occupation. This antagonism between civil authorities and 
American military officials erupted in two major public disturbances in May and June 
1899, both of which originated with violent confrontations between American soldiers 
and civilian employees and black Cuban veterans. Because civil authorities and police 
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intervened against unruly Americans, military officials condemned them as allies of black 
criminals and unfit for self-government. These two incidents consolidated the 
unacceptability of explicit white political alliances with blacks. Access to political power 
hinged not only on the rejection of black political power, but the active suppression of 
black urban authority. 
The remaining three chapters show a shift in the policies of civil authorities, from 
protecting local residents to suppressing them. Chapter 6 charts the rise in police brutality 
against poor and working-class blacks, beginning with the murder of black General 
Dionisio Gil. In this chapter, condemnations and commemorations of his death unveil 
dissenting voices against a hegemonic masculinity bent on violently excluding men of 
African descent. Chapter 7 examines the physical marginalization of urban black 
populations through the relocation of the tolerance zone from the city center to the 
outskirts of the city. The petitions of marginalized residents for improvements in their 
neighborhood based on paterfamilial honor suggest a gradual appropriation of hegemonic 
discourses of masculinity. Chapter 8 follows the rise of collective action as a source of 
power for working-class blacks, and the disintegration of the union under civil and 
military repression. An examination of the claims made by unionized stevedores reveals a 
unique deployment of discourses of respectability, formerly limited to white middle-class 
articulations of masculinity. Together these chapters center poor and working-class 
blacks in local history. 
By focusing on the experiences of men at women at the physical and social 
margins of urban life, these chapters present an alternative narrative of life under 
American rule. A period typically defined in the historiography by intense struggles for 
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political power in which black Cubans were largely peripheral emerges as a time in 
which black men and women actively demanded access to urban spaces, state resources 
and respectability. Black veterans claimed a share in post-war urban spaces. Poor and 
working-class black urbanites demanded infrastructure and sanitation in their 
neighborhoods after facing removal from the urban center to the hazardous health 
conditions of the western margins of the city. Black workers demanded a family wage, 
exacting concessions from some of the most powerful men in the city. Amidst physical 
and political marginalization, these men and women succeeded in appropriating 
prevailing state concerns of order and sanitation, employing the very same gendered 
language and arguments that white political elites had used against them, to secure 
improvements in their standard of living.  
The gradual subjugation of each of these successive claims to power by black 
men might appear to suggest the slow and silent death of the ideal of racial brotherhood. 
Instead, this project suggests that exactly the opposite was the case. The increasing 
avoidance of racial language in the protests of poor and working-class blacks in 
Cienfuegos shows that the myth of racial brotherhood was perhaps stronger than ever 
before. Although this ideal is often interpreted as a symbol of anti-racism, the pages that 
follow demonstrate that the discourse of racial brotherhood, which marked a fundamental 
continuity between the late colonial and early republican periods, actually helped foster a 
culture of silence on issues of race. Although this inclusive discourse may have afforded 
expanding opportunities for “those below,”45 it also allowed racial discrimination to 
thrive under a veil of patriotism. This dissertation explores that paradox. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Cowardly Spaniards, Heroic Cubans: 
Race and the Politics of Masculinity during the War of 1895 
 
 The late rise of a slave society in Cuba delayed the process of independence from 
Spain. The demise of St. Domingue as largest sugar-producer following the Haitian 
Revolution (1791-1804) catalyzed a sugar revolution in Cuba. Slavery quickly became 
the predominant form of labor on Cuban sugar plantations. Massive slave imports 
transformed the demographic composition of the island from majority white to majority 
black, generating anxiety among planters over possible slave uprisings. As most Spanish 
American colonies liberated themselves from Spanish rule, Cuban planters clung to the 
empire that provided relative safety from a slave revolt that would allegedly transform 
the “Pearl of the Antilles” into “another Haiti.” In essence, Cubans exchanged loyalty to 
the Crown for Spanish preservation of slavery. 
The decline of sugar in the East in the second half of the nineteenth century gave 
rise to a regionalized anticolonial struggle. Eastern patriots freed their slaves and formed 
a multi-racial army that became the basis for the emergent national discourse of racial 
brotherhood. Not until the official abolition of slavery in 1886, however, could the 
anticolonial war expand beyond the eastern extreme of the island to the central and 
western provinces where sugar cultivation still thrived. During the war of 1895, 
insurgents built upon the idea of colorblind patriotism employed during the first two 
wars, as black chiefs rose through the military ranks to positions of authority in the army. 
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The radical social agenda of the anti-colonial insurrection tested the ability of 
Spanish colonial administrators to maintain racial order. Spanish war-time propaganda 
sought to undermine the Cuban cause by depicting the insurrection as black uprising, 
beckoning back to the times of slavery in which Spanish rule supposedly delivered 
Cubans from racial disorder. By contrasting the alleged racial anarchy of the insurrection 
with the so-called racial order of Spanish rule, Spanish military officials bolstered 
support for their cause among the wealthiest sectors of society, while undermining 
support for the Cubans. The Spanish charge that the Cuban insurgents fomented social 
anarchy aimed to undercut the Cuban cause both domestically as wealthy whites were 
less likely to support the rebels, and abroad, as Americans were similarly less 
sympathetic to armed colored insurgents. 
Realizing the stakes of Spanish accusations, insurgent chiefs responded to the 
racialization of their struggle by attacking the manliness of Spanish officers and soldiers. 
Citing the cruel treatment of women and noncombatants, Cubans argued that the 
Spaniards were cowardly and dishonorable. In turn, insurgent discourse depicted Cubans 
as valiant and honorable, because they apparently protected women and treated their 
enemies with mercy. By attacking Spanish manliness, Cubans inverted the typical 
colonial discourse of a masculine colonizer and a feminine colonized. At the same time, 
they consolidated a supposedly united front against a common enemy by upholding 
manliness as a common feature of all Cuban patriots. 
 This chapter charts the emergence of a discourse of masculinity within the 
revolution through which insurgents articulated a new social hierarchy. Although the 
racial anxieties voiced in Spanish propaganda may have resonated to a degree with some 
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socially-conservative veterans, insurgents generally recognized that their success rested 
on the heavy participation of blacks. Because the insurrection held as one of its core 
values the ideal of racial brotherhood, and black participation deterred wealthy white 
support, insurgent chiefs were forced to abandon race as an explicit discursive tool. 
Instead, they inverted the Spanish visions of social hierarchy that delegitimized 
insurgents because of their supposed blackness, by deploying a discourse of masculinity. 
This discourse enabled Cubans to redirect Spanish racial critiques of the revolution into 
gendered critiques of Spanish colonialism. By silencing race and articulating hierarchy in 
terms of gender, insurgents bolstered the legitimacy of the revolution among men across 
the racial and socio-economic spectrum. 
  
Just Another Black Rebellion 
 
“Prepare yourselves soldiers, nine thousand oriental negroes are coming.”46 This 
message appeared on a sign posted on the dwelling house of La Flora, an estate on the 
Central Hormiguero just outside of Cienfuegos in late 1895. Between August and 
December 1895, insurgents in Cienfuegos benefited from the favor of the advancing 
eastern troops, as new recruits filled the ranks of the army in anticipation of the arrival of 
war heroes Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo.
47
 Like the Spanish sign suggested, the 
invasion from the east brought thousands of black insurgents to an “imminently Spanish” 
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zone, known for its heritage and loyalty to the metropole.
48
 With these men also came the 
values and regional history of revolution that had fostered the military ascension of black 
men into positions of military power and prestige in the eastern regiments. 
Spanish propaganda had long depicted anti-colonial struggle as race war, drawing 
on the fears of white planters who were often outnumbered by the masses of 
impoverished black laborers that produced tremendous wealth in the sugar economy.
49
 
Spanish General Camilo García Polavieja believed that blacks unanimously supported the 
revolution. In his memoirs, he recollected of the wars that “the majority of the colored 
race, when we broke their bondage, became separatists…”50 With the outbreak of the 
insurrection in 1895, Spaniards were vigilant about the activities of blacks, having 
conflated blacks with social and political radicalism. As early as the February 1895, 
Spanish military officials kept a close eye on the “attitude of the negroes in 
Cienfuegos.”51 Spanish preoccupations about the revolutionary tendencies of the 
numerous population of black in Cuba fueled propaganda depicting the revolution as a 
black uprising. Ironically enough, just as Spanish propaganda condemned the Cubans for 
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the racial composition of the insurgent army, Weyler himself traveled escorted by “a 
contingent of 600 cavalry soldiers of the colored race.”52 
Spanish propaganda employed race to delegitimize the Cuban insurrection. 
Racializing the insurgents served three main purposes. First, Spanish depictions of the 
insurgents as black aimed to mobilize racial fears among white Cubans to reinforce their 
loyalty to Spain and deter new enrollments in the insurgent army.
53
 Second, by portraying 
the insurrection as black, and regional, the Spanish government implied that it would fail 
just like the previous uprisings, namely those in 1868 and 1879, had. Finally, by 
depicting Cuban insurgents as black, Spain relied on discourses linking blackness to 
criminality to communicate the illegitimacy of Cuban demands. 
Spanish propaganda drew from two main currents in Cuban history: the series of 
black uprisings in Cuba after the Haitian Revolution, and prevailing understandings of 
the purpose of Spanish rule. As enslaved men and women overthrew the colonial yoke 
and severed the chains of servitude in St. Domingue, Cuban slaves saw inspiration for 
their own freedom struggles.
54
 At the same time, Cuban planters sought to expand slave-
based production to replace St. Domingue as the foremost global sugar-producer. The 
contradictory influences of the Haitian Revolution in Cuba meant a rapid expansion of 
slavery, and tighter control over slaves. Yet, the rapid changes in the scale of slavery in 
Cuba and the spread of ideals of liberty among Cubans, black and white, launched Cuba 
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into a series of slave uprisings, proving the necessity of Spanish military force in 
maintaining the social order and ensuring slavery as the basis for Cuban wealth.
55
 
At the same time as Creoles in mainland Latin America rose up to claim their 
rights as men and citizens, Cubans clung to Spanish rule as the guarantor for slavery and 
wealth. Gradual emancipation of slaves declared by 1870 meant that the very premise of 
Spanish rule in Cuba began to unravel. By 1886, slavery had come to an end, and the 
colonial pact between Cubans and the motherland had finally collapsed. Cuban 
insurgents, who from the early days of anti-colonial struggle had incorporated a discourse 
of racial brotherhood, thus found no reason to tolerate subordinate status. Many white 
planters, some Cuban, some foreign, however, were not so convinced of the 
dispensability of Spanish rule. The Cuban insurrection threatened to overturn a racial 
order that had been entrenched in Cuban society for centuries, and that benefited wealthy 
property-owners, whose wealth was earned on the backs of unskilled black labor. Spanish 
propaganda targeted these anxieties over societal change and social anarchy. 
Race provided a powerful metalanguage through which to harness anxieties 
stemming from the recent social transformations of emancipation and war to 
categorically undermine the Cuban cause.
56
 An article in the conservative newspaper 
Diario de la Marina in April 1895 depicted the insurrection as a vehicle for transforming 
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colored laborers into powerful chiefs.
57
 Other articles described the insurgents and black 
and barbaric, and claimed black insurgent chiefs refused to enlist white soldiers and 
sought to establish a black dictatorship.
58
 So pervasive was the racialization of the 
insurgent forces that it was considered a greater prize among Spanish forces to kill a 
white insurgent than a black one. Describing a sea of corpses left after one battle, a 
Spanish soldier, Paulino Castro Rodríguez, lamented that: “there was only one insurgent 
corpse, and his was a negro – a greater misfortune.”59 This perspective of Castro rested 
on the principal assumption that more insurgents were black than white. 
Spanish soldiers used racial epithets in their encounters with Cubans to insult and 
enrage their enemies. In Rodas, the Spanish entered the house of one pacífico, thirty-
year-old Desiderios Vida, who supported his mother, wife and children by working as a 
small farmer.
60
 “Thou art a Mambí. Come scoundrel. Tell us what thou knoweth of the 
Mambis,” Flint remembered the Spanish saying to Vida. “Calling them a traitor, a 
shameless one and a ñáñigo, they dragged him from his house and  took up their march, 
leading him, with his arms tied above his elbows, off among the cane fields, until he was 
lost to sight of his home,” where the Spaniards slashed him to pieces by machete.61 
According to Flint, “ñáñigo” was “a term of reproach,” originally referring to blacks 
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“addicted to mysterious voodoo practices.” The Spaniards often used this term to 
describe insurgents.
62
 
At the same time as Spanish propaganda directly employed racial descriptors, race 
also implied crime and criminality. For example, in July 1895, for example Agustín 
Luque, the Civil and military governor of the province of Santa Clara issued a decree 
condemning the insurgents: “The savagery of those who set fire, rob and kill in the name 
of “Viva Cuba Libre!” and the propagandists who dishonor the Cuban people, recruiting 
adepts to the hordes led by arsonists and bandits,” Luque declared, forced him to 
implement severe measures of control upon the population of the province to deter the 
insurrection.
63
 
On at least one occasion, Weyler publically denounced the insurgents as bandits, a 
label frequently associated with blacks because of the ties to vagrancy. This incensed 
certain white Cuban patriots like José B. Alemán. Responding to the Spanish allegations, 
Alemán wrote a 22-page letter to the Generalíssimo of the Cuban Army, Máximo Gómez 
“refuting the lies of the miserable Weyler tells of us, calling us bandits. I prove to him the 
falsity and calumnies of his assertion and qualification, reminding him of his [Weyler’s] 
crimes…”64 Prominent white insurgent chiefs like Alemán rejected the label of bandit 
because of its links to criminality and the implicit racial undertones. 
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Resonance of Spanish Propaganda 
 
Spanish propaganda seemed to resonate with some wealthy property owners. 
Planters in and around Cienfuegos emphasized the violent and destructive acts 
perpetrated by the insurgents, descriptions that echoed the reports of banditry before the 
outbreak of the war. Numerous Cubans who had acquired American citizenship reported 
the wanton destruction of their properties by insurgent forces in late 1895 and 1896. For 
example, Francisco Javier Terry, a member of one of the wealthiest families of 
Cienfuegos, reported to the American consul at that city that between November 1895 
and February 1896, some of his properties “have been burnt or otherwise destroyed by 
insurgents.” Damages amounted to nearly $100,000 Spanish gold.65  By May of the same 
year, damages amounted to an additional $157,000, and by January 1897 Terry claimed 
he losses totaling nearly $700,000.
66
 José Lombard y Leon, Juan Echemendia, and 
Antonio M. Jimenez, all of who owned plantations near Cienfuegos submitted similar 
appeals to the American consulate.
67
 These and other reports of the destructive and 
violent campaigns of Cuban insurgents suggest that Cuban-born American citizens who 
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owed sugar estates in Cienfuegos during the war viewed the insurgents as a lawless and 
largely illegitimate force. 
American planters in Cienfuegos were more vocal in their agreement with the 
racial components of Spanish propaganda. Osgood Welsh, the manager of Constancia 
estate, one of the largest sugar mills in the island, submitted to the Consul that insurgents 
had visited his estate and killed seven laborers. In his letter, he specified that the band of 
more than 150 insurgents who carried out this massacre of workmen included both black 
men and Chinese men. Welsh noted that he supplied this report so as to provide accurate 
information about “the method of warfare conducted by the insurgent Cubans.”68 
Edwin F. Atkins, a North American capitalist from Boston and the owner of the 
Cienfuegos-based Soledad estate, employed generalizations about the race of Cuban 
insurgents to condemn certain men. In describing the conditions of war, Atkins employed 
the same racialized discourse about the Cuban Army. He tended to distinguish between 
bad insurgents, mostly black, who were accused of committing wanton acts of 
destruction, and good insurgents, whites who were orderly, civilized and reasonable. He 
often accused black insurgents of committed the most violent and destructive atrocities 
during the war. In late 1895, Atkins claimed that black insurgents had destroyed his 
property. The destruction of “10,000 net tons, or about 10% of the crop” of cane “was 
done by a band of some 8 negroes, who said they were acting under the orders of one 
Rego, their chief. The insurgents were in force upon the neighboring hill and threatened 
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to kill any of our employees who attempted to put out the fires.”69 On many other 
occasions, Atkins attributed the greatest physical destruction and most egregious crimes 
to insurgents of color.
70
 
Like Spanish generals, Atkins based his ideas on prevailing beliefs that blacks 
possessed an innate criminal disposition popular during the late colonial period. Police 
preoccupation with Ñáñigos in the second half of the nineteenth century highlights the 
tendency to associate the poorest sectors of society with criminal behaviors common 
during periods of nation-building in Latin America.
71
 In Cuba, the obsession over black 
criminality coincided almost exactly with debates over the abolition of slavery, with 
advocates of slave emancipation arguing that black criminality stemmed less from innate 
racial traits, and more from the conditions of slavery.
72
 When Cubans faced another 
moment of liberation, anxieties about black criminality emerged once again, serving as a 
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powerful argument against the Cuban insurrection, and a justification for the brutal 
repression of alleged black criminals. 
Although the black insurgents carried out the destruction of property and 
threatened the workers, carrying out the orders of their white commanders, the blacks 
were considered more evil and lawless than were their white leaders. Atkins blamed 
black insurgents for the destruction of his properties, although he knew that white chief 
had ordered the same. “Our reports say that the larger portion of the insurgents are 
negroes: On the night of the 1
st
 inst, a band of insurgents appeared at one of our 
tenancies, under the command of a white leaders, who brought written order to destroy, 
which he showed to the man in charge, (Peter M. Beal) and American Citizen.”73 The 
written orders read as follows: “Destroy all sugar estates; burn their cane and defen[s]es 
at their factories, as well as destroy their railroad lines. Every laborer shall be treated as a 
traitor, who lends any assistance to these sugar factories. (signed) Maximo Gomez.”74 
Although Atkins asserted his general perception that most insurgents were black, the 
examples and evidence he gave suggest that the destruction was actually conceived and 
ordered by whites. 
Even though whites gave the orders, the worst insurgents were still the blacks, 
according to Atkins. Atkins vowed revenge against the black insurgents, using racist 
language in describing them and threatening to kill them: “Names of insurgents setting 
fires cannot be ascertained. It was often done at night by single negroes sent for the 
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purpose. Had we got near enough to recognize them there would be no nigger now.”75 
His vengeful attitude toward black insurgents suggests that Atkins believed blacks were 
more culpable for the destruction to his property than were whites. 
Atkins even legitimated and rationalized the orders of the white insurgents. 
Although Gómez had ordered the general destruction of property in late 1895, this was a 
strategy to provoke American recognition of the Cuban cause. Moreover, Atkins learned 
that “the insurgents said they had knowledge that the American property owners were not 
in sympathy with them. That the destruction of American property would lead to claims 
upon the Spanish Government, and consequent complications between the United States 
and Spain, which would lead to their recognition by the United States as 
belligerents.”76Atkins found a logical—if beneficial explanation for the change in the 
policy of the white insurgent commanders, Gómez and Rego: they were attempting to 
appeal to the United States for support, an end that Atkins judged beneficial to his goal of 
annexation.  
Atkins judged that the white insurgents were more benevolent than the black 
ones. He considered Sixto Roque del Sol, a white insurgent leader operating in the zone 
of his Soledad estate, as a decent man. Despite his violent rampages and destruction of 
property at Soledad, Atkins described him as “most courteous in every way.”77 After the 
war, Atkins observed that “S[i]xto Roque is now one of my respected neighbors, and 
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holds a civil office.”78 His description of one white insurgent, known as El Mexicano, 
also reflected favorable views toward white insurgents. In December 1895, el Mexicano 
appeared at the Colonia Naranjito, part of the sugar lands of Soledad, and set fire to the 
cane and buildings. “When he reached the batey orders were given to burn the whole of it 
including the dwelling house, however, after a little parley we got the dwelling house 
exempt, next the Mayoral got his house exempt,” recalled Atkins of the encounter with el 
Mexicano. The insurgents had apparently discovered the intention of the manager to 
place and armed guard to protect the estate, but the manager, Posada denied it. “He then 
asked Posada what guarantee we could give him and Posada answered he would respond 
with his head, orders were immediately given to stop burning, then the Mexicano[’s] son 
made the following remark: ‘Papa I told you so! If you had spoken to these people first 
you would not have burned a thing here.’”79 
While Atkins defended Roque, and praised el Mexicano, he despised Claudio 
Sarría, a black insurgent leader operating in the same vicinity, as pure evil. Indeed, he 
was one of the main reasons Atkins mobilized a private guard force on Soledad. In late 
1895, “a section under the command of black lieutenant Claudio Sarría burned in one 
night the entire town of San Anton, and almost all the cane of Soledad, and at the same 
time because all those families were left homeless and in the most absolute destitution, 
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they converted the friend who protected them into the enemy that pursued them.”80 
Atkins claimed that the insurgents began attacking his estate in November 1895.
81
 
After that attack, Atkins did make arrangements to arm a private guard force and 
to request Spanish guerrilla forces, irregular forces recruited to serve Spain in Cuba, be 
stationed on his estate. He wrote to Beal in February 1896, “The road is not safe any 
more [sic]: small rebel bands are becoming more and more lawless. When such imps as 
Claudio & Company can hang people up to the branches by the roadside at their will and 
pleasure, then it is time to get an anchor out ahead…Three flying squadrons of guerrillas 
are forming here. I understand after the troops clear our zone of the larger bodies of rebel 
forces, these guerrillas will operate against the smaller roving bands.”82 
Atkins did armed a force of 120-125 men
83
 after this encounter with Claudio 
Sarría, and placed as its leader a man with deep personal interest in revenge: “Our 
mounted force is really a fine body of men, mostly old hands here who have an interest in 
the place, for to them it is home and a living which they can’t find elsewhere now. They 
are fine riders, have good uniforms and are well mounted. Their captain, Vilariño, was 
our time-keeper formerly. He lived with his family in a little house on the place where he 
gained a little money in hauling cane, besides his salary. Claudio Sarría destroyed 
everything Vilariño had before our force was formed. Then Vilariño took command. You 
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should see these fellows make a dash at a hill.”84 So strong was the hatred of Sarría that 
Atkins continued to pursue him after the war.  
Nor was Atkins the only one who blamed blacks for the wartime destruction of 
property. The testimony of Manuel Caldazo Castillo, a train conductor at the central 
Hormiguero during the war shows the general outrage over violence toward whites, 
especially when perpetrated by people of color. During the invasion of Máximo Gómez, a 
“large number” of insurgents swept through Hormiguero, a sugar estate to the northeast 
of Cienfuegos bordering the town of Camarones. They approach the train conducted by 
Caldazo at the colonia La Luisa, and ordered all the men to disembark, gather wood, and 
set fire to the engine. “…when the engine and the men in it were arrested, the men 
[insurgents] went into the house which was there, and said – ‘Let all the men in here, go 
out, leave, at once,’ and as I went through the door, there was a negro outside who 
grabbed my hat, and, raising his machete struck at me. I lowered my body, thinking that I 
would be struck with the edge, but I was struck with the flat of it.” He struck each man 
who crossed his path. “The negro, who was a tremendous fellow, was on horseback, and 
as I passed he grabbed my hat, and raised his machete. I lowered my body at the instant, 
and the blow struck me across the shoulder.”85 Caldazo made it clear that only the black 
man struck at him, no one else. 
When interviewed, the white leader of that force, Higinio Piñeiro, a native of 
Camarones who joined the force of Alfredo Rego, testified that he never issued any 
orders to beat non-combatants, and did not permit such abuses. He also claimed not to 
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have seen any such abuses committed by his men, though he admitted that “I had to 
command the force in general, and was not in a position to see it.”86 Black insurgents also 
burned cane on Hormiguero. Witnesses to a cane fire on one of the colonias at Central 
Hormiguero, Antonio Betancourt Díaz attributed the crime to a black man: “It appears to 
me that that cane was burnt by a darky who was a small leader by the name of Rufino 
Cuelles [Cuellar?] I think he was also from Ciego Montero, and it was burnt by the 
people he brought with him also.”87 The incident as related by Caldazo, and the 
accusations of blacks burning cane suggest that in the minds of propertied whites that the 
black insurgents were the dangerous and irrational criminals, while the whites were 
justified in fighting for their political rights. 
The general perception of the Cuban Army was that blacks predominated, 
reflecting Spanish propaganda.
88
 Many people believed that all people of African descent 
sympathized with the insurgents. So suggested Enrique García, a white “cow-boy” in 
Horquita, a country village near the Constancia plantation.
89
 Even insurgents tended to 
agree with the generalization that blacks naturally sympathizes with the insurrection. One 
black insurgent, Carlos Betancourt, appealed to this belief when requesting the favor of 
Máximo Gómez in replacing his lost service papers, pleading, “I am Cuban, and as such 
fulfilling my obligation, my ideas and for the tradition of my race,” so that he could join 
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the Círculo de Veteranos de la Independencia. “It is my opinion that the union gives [us] 
strength, since divided we will not do anything today nor tomorrow.”90 
Atkins noted in November of 1895 that “by far the greatest portion of [insurgents] 
are negroes—I should say at least 80 per cent.”91 The observations of Atkins may have 
been slightly exaggerated. Certainly, black were among the first groups to rise up in favor 
of the revolution in Cienfuegos. The first insurgent groups were composed mainly of 
rural sectors included many men of color, many of whom initially commanded insurgent 
forces.
92
  These men can be divided into two main groups. The first group was composed 
of small land owners an shop keepers like the black storekeeper from Las Moscas, 
Benigno Najarro, who had reach the rank of lieutenant in the Ten Years’ War and José 
González Planas, a distinguished black veteran from Lajas. The other group was recently 
freed slaves from local Centrals, including black leaders like Valentín Sosa and Víctor 
Acea, who headed working-class men from Cruces and Palmira, Sarría who led former 
enslaved men from the Soledad Estate. Another group led by Tata Montes, represented 
local outlaws.
93
 Most of the insurgents joined in late 1895 and early 1896, with numbers 
again piquing with the entrance of the invasion force under Gómez and Maceo. There 
were, however, more white chiefs than black chiefs, a pattern that became more 
pronounced over the course of the war.
94
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Atkins was not the only American to link the insurrection to blackness. For 
example, when investigators of the Spanish Claims Committee interrogated Bibián 
Fernández, a black country laborer from Yaguaramas, they inquired about the racial 
composition of the insurgent army, specifically if it was composed mainly by people of 
color. He replied that he did not know. Then the interrogator asked him in as many words 
why he had betrayed his people by fighting for the Spanish: “How did you come to be 
opposed to your fellow countrymen, the colored people?” He answered: “Because I came 
into the use of right and reason, I knew my father with the Spanish arms in his hands.”95 
Pressing the point, the interrogator asked him if he had known Quintín Bandera, invoking 
a common belief among Americans that Bandera controlled all Cuban blacks. Fernández 
replied that he did not know Bandera.
96
 
By linking the insurrection to blackness, Spaniards, property owners and 
American investigators neglected to account for the substantial black population that 
remained neutral or that fought in favor of Spain. Many people of African descent 
remained neutral in the conflict. For example, numerous black colonos on Soledad 
continued to cultivate cane and did not take up arms during the war. For example, Juan P. 
Sarría, P. Sarría, J.P. Sarría, Felix Sarría, José M. Sarría, Antonio Sarría, and G. Sarría 
“all negroes and former slaves of either Rosario or Soledad estates,” all continue their 
contracts to Soledad in 1896.
97
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Race was no clear indicator of political affiliation during the wars. So argued one 
priest in Cuba, José Plá, in the 1880s. He attempted to use black military service for 
Spain to reconcile this perception of black support for the insurrection with his claim that 
they were loyal to Spain.
98
 Blacks actively fought on behalf of Spain in a number of 
black military regiments, including the Volunteer Corps of Engineers in all three wars.
99
 
One such example was Máximo Cuesta, who policed the streets of Cienfuegos during the 
war. The majority of people of African descent who defended Spain did so in the capacity 
of local guerrilla forces. The Spanish military commanders recruited formerly enslaved 
people, and people of African descent residing in the country districts around Cienfuegos 
to work as guerrillas, receiving orders from the Spanish generals. The mulatto corporal 
Francisco Álvarez Oliva initially joined a Spanish volunteer force before defecting to the 
Cuban Army in 1895.
100
 Luis Abreu, an African-born soldier who fought in the guerrilla 
of Caibarien, and Mateo Sarría, a black man and probable former slave of Soledad 
plantation, enlisted in the San Fernando guerrilla, illustrating the heterogeneity of the 
groups remaining loyal to Spain during the war.
101
 
Another example of a black country laborer who supported Spain was the mulatto 
Aurelio Garriga, a guerrillero in San Antón, district of Arimao.
102
 Garriga formerly 
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fought with the insurgents under the command of Alfredo Rego and José Camacho, 
operating in the zone of Sitio San Blas in Cienfuegos jurisdiction for two years and two 
months. He was a lieutenant of Cavalry under Camacho.
103
 He defected and joined the 
Spanish on September 26, 1897.
104
 There were numerous others like Aurelio. “Their 
soldiers served a while with the insurgents and then with the Spanish Guerrilla forces and 
then went home to rest, rotating in this way, and filling up the numbers on the 
payrolls.”105 More likely than just acting on a whim, these soldiers switched loyalties for 
practical reasons, and were sometimes even forced to do so by the circumstances of war. 
Wealthy planters and Americans more generally rejected the guerrilla forces, 
sharply criticizing the low social status of the men who composed that force. The 
American Vice Consul at Cienfuegos remarked that the “discipline and morals” of the 
guerrillas “are far below the class of the regular troops, and in fact made up of the worst 
elements.” They are “generally officered by reckless and careless men of their same 
class…”106 Atkins disparaged the guerrilla forces for their lowly racial and social 
composition. The guerrilla forces were “recruited from all classes—many negroes, 
mulattoes, and even Chinamen. The corporals in charge were many of them men of bad 
reputation and had been known as criminals.”107 The guerrillas were “composed of as 
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villainous a mob of jail sweepings as could be gathered anywhere in the world
 .”108 They 
“gave us more trouble than the insurgents.”109 “These forces were recruited from the 
lower classes of the population, and among them were many insurgents who had left the 
insurrectionary forces for a time and frequently returned to them. They respected nothing 
in the way of property, and we had no right to drive them away nor did we have any 
authority over them.”110 Atkins disliked the guerrilla forces in part because he could not 
wield complete control over them. 
Property owners on prominent sugar estates near Cienfuegos sought to create a 
force over which they could exert complete control. The owners of Hormiguero 
plantation, like other large sugar plantations in the area, employed a private largely white 
force with the sole task of protecting the estate. The “mobilized forces,” as they were 
called, armed whites to stand guard against insurgent raids to facilitate the continuation of 
harvest and grinding activities. On Hormiguero, only one of the men employed in the 
mobilized forces had possessed two of the major last names—Acea and Terry—
associated with slavery.
111
 The rest either had two last names indicating legitimacy and 
suggesting European ancestry, or one racially-ambiguous last name.
112
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Regardless of evident black participation on both sides of the conflict as well as 
black neutrality, Spanish racial propaganda transcended the battlefields of Cuba to 
influence American perceptions on the revolution. Racial anxieties fueled debates 
between advocates of American expansionism and anti-imperialists in the United States 
in the late nineteenth century. As Americans followed with great interest the 
developments in Cuba, Spanish racial propaganda seemed to corroborate the reservations 
of anti-imperialists, who argued that annexation of Cuba would prove undesirable due to 
the large black population.
113
 In early 1896, one New York newspaper claimed that 
“during the Cuban rebellion the fighting has been done mostly by the blacks. [General 
Arsenio Martínez] Campos said that the negros from the eastern provinces, who are 
largely of San Domingan origin, were by all odds the best material in the insurgent army. 
Gomez says that he depends upon his black troops”114 The emphasis on links to Haiti 
served to undermine the legitimacy of the insurrection in the eyes of many Americans. 
While many blacks served the revolution few men of the “respectable classes” 
pledged their allegiance. There were “few notable whites” involved in the conflict, 
claimed another American paper: “There are some Cubans of education and recognized 
position who are leaders in the insurgent army. These are men like Zayas, Bermúdez, the 
Núñez brothers, and Rego, who have shown themselves to be brave men, possessed of 
the courage of their political convictions and who sacrificed their all for love of country. 
But there are very few of this class in the field in proportion to the mass of blacks and 
mixed bloods.” In contrast to wealthy men during the American revolution, “the better 
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classes” of Cubans have “very little of that patriotic feeling,” and “there is little or no 
desire to have the rebellion succeed.” Reproducing the discourse in Spanish propaganda, 
the author pointed to white fear of black authority: “Educated people know that in that 
event they would have to face the ambitions of Antonio Maceo…” whose “untiring mind 
has dwelt for a long time on the scheme of amalgamation of the West Indian negroes into 
what is known as the Antilles League.”115 American media often drew upon Spanish 
propaganda labeling the insurgents as black to deter expansionist projects. Although the 
main goal of the propaganda was to reinforce Cuban loyalty to Spain, one of the 
consequences of Spanish propaganda racializing the insurrection was that the Cuban 
cause initially found little legitimacy in the United States early on. 
Other articles denied the cruelty of Spanish policies, one of the core accusations 
of insurgents lobbying for American support in New York. One newspaper article written 
by an anonymous American woman claimed that her informants informed her that “there 
is absolutely no truth at all in the reports [of Spanish cruelty]. If there is any cruelty it is 
on the side of the insurgents—not the white ones, of whom there are comparatively few, 
but the negroes and mulattoes. The stories of Spanish cruelty are made up out of whole 
cloth by the insurgents to enlist the sympathy of the American people.”116 According to 
this woman, American support for the insurgents was unwarranted. 
Americans may have initially shied away from supporting the insurgent cause, in 
part because the Spanish propaganda emphasized the racially unbecoming character of 
the Cuban Army. However, tides began to turn with the arrival of Valeriano Weyler to 
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Cuba. Silvestre Scovel, an American reporter from the newspaper The World, for 
example arrived to the insurgent camp of Fermín Valdés-Domínguez in January 1897. 
“To demonstrate the importance that the Cuban question has for the North American 
republic,” Valdés-Domínguez recalled, the reporter “indicate[d] that his newspaper 
spends 3,000 pesos weekly on the steamer that brings the news.”117 Scovel indicated that 
he wanted the news to “influence of make an impact on the opinion of the political men 
who deal with our issues” in the United States.118 
When Weyler replaced Arsenio Martínez Campos with as governor general of 
Cuba, his brutal policy of reconcentration provided the necessary ammunition for Cubans 
to combat Spanish propaganda with their own war of words. Recognizing they lacked the 
leverage necessary to criticize Spain in racial terms, Cubans employed a language of 
gender to criticize and delegitimize their enemies. Grover Flint, and America war 
correspondent in Cuba noted that the “atrocities committed by the Spanish guerrillas 
about Cienfuegos have been of such medieval ghastliness that no one every believed 
them and reports of them are handled gingerly by news editors.”119 This condemning 
description as well as the ardent rejection of this sympathetic propaganda in the 
American press by this anonymous American woman (above) shows that the war in Cuba 
had indeed captivated American audiences by 1896.  
The policy of Reconcentration and the frequent reports of Spanish abuses of 
noncombatant fueled increasing solidarity among Americans for their Cuban compatriots, 
                                                 
117
 Fermín Valdés-Domínguez, Diario de un Soldado, 4 volumes, transcribed by Hiram Dupotey Fideaux 
(Havana: Centro de Información Científica y Técnica de la Universidad de la Habana, 1973), III, 83. 
118
 Ibid., 94. 
119
 Flint, Marching with Gómez, 80. 
  
57 
 
who they likened to their forefathers of the American Revolution. Thus the arrival of 
Weyler in Cuba marked a watershed because it provided Cuban insurgents with an 
opportunity to criticize Spain and gain international sympathy for their cause. 
 
Cowardly and Effeminate Spaniards 
  
In response to Spanish propaganda racializing the insurrection, Cubans launched their 
own campaign with two inter-connected objectives, each revolving about politically-
charged conceptions of masculinity and femininity. First, just as Spaniards used racial 
epithets, like ñáñigo, to insult and delegitimize the Cuban cause, insurgents depicted 
Spaniards as unmanly cowards by exposing their abuse of women, children and 
noncombatants. Insurgents labeled pro-Spanish women as prostitutes, equating sexual 
transgressions to political infidelity. Second, they depicted themselves as virtuous, 
honorable and chivalrous men, by emphasizing their protection of defenseless women 
and merciful conduct with the enemy. Women loyal to the Cuban cause, were by default, 
honorable and virtuous, although these positive characteristics were reserved mainly for 
white middle- and upper-class women. 
Under Weyler, the policy of reconcentration provided the perfect ammunition for 
a campaign to challenge Spanish virtue and honor. Cuban chiefs described with disgust 
the Spanish cruelty and violence toward noncombatants under Weyler. One newspaper 
article in Las Villas, claimed that “the war is now assassination and robbery.” The article 
highlighted the injustice of Spanish treatment of rural dwellers, forcing them to pay 
property taxes, and subsequently destroying their property: “The pacífico is authorized to 
live in the countryside, but this is only to disguise the right to charge the high tax 
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imposed for the miserable estate.” After paying taxes and confronting additional fees to 
be able to maintain his small farm, the pacific then faced the Spanish army: “when the 
[Spanish] columns pass through his ranches, they burn them, forcing women to flee to the 
mountains, and the men and children either die [by being] burned alive in their homes or 
they leave them hanging from a tree, placing on them a sign on which they express that a 
Cuban chief of a known name—the first that comes to their minds—has given them 
death, as a perverse attempt to defame us.”120 The newspaper article included a 
commentary about Spanish cowardice: “The infamy [is] everywhere, [and] the cowardice 
[is] with the principal attribute of the armed defenders of the domination.”121 This link 
between defending Spanish rule and cowardice would continue to define insurgent 
discourse during the war. 
The American Vice Consul at Cienfuegos similarly depicted Spanish abuses, 
focusing particularly on the irregular “guerrilla” forces. The guerrillas are found “ranging 
the country and venting their passions and personal grudges on the inoffensive 
inhabitants. There as constant deeds of violence committed by them that shock every 
human sentiment.” For example, they imprison men without trial, “innocent peaceful men 
are charged from their homes and families are shot down at their own doors.” “It is 
evident,” he wrote, “that the war is becoming more ruthless and cruel,” and will soon lead 
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to a “reign of terror to the inhabitants of the town and country…” The Vice Consul 
expressed concern that these “outrages” drove many country people to join the 
insurrection to avoid further Spanish abuses.
122
 
Cuban separatists were periodically outraged when they received news of Spanish 
mistreated defenseless noncombatants. On one occasion, Spanish forces removed from 
their homes numerous noncombatants and hacked them to death by machete. Among 
these was 80-year-old José Capote, and an 11-year-old boy, Emilio Rodríguez. The same 
Spanish column killed 16 pacíficos near Cienfuegos, and abandoned another 4 near 
Cruces. As a result of the violent acts perpetrated by pacíficos, Alemán called for the 
augmentation of forces in Cienfuegos: “As such, I participate to you that the zones of 
Palmira, Camarones, Rodas, Abreus, and Lajas lack our forces,” being thoroughly 
occupied by guerrillas.
123
 
 Cubans were appalled by the policy of Reconcentration devised by Weyler on 
Cuban families. Francisco Carrillo, a commander in Las Villas, described the forced 
relocation of rural families into concentration camps at the peak of Reconcentration. The 
Spaniards “return to the towns with families and children and make them prisoners and 
then they abandon them in the towns without giving them resources, said families 
remaining in the most horrible misery and in the sad condition of starving to death or 
escaping to our camp.”124 On one occasion, Carrillo demanded that the Spaniards release 
the families from the town of Arroyo Blanco, which he was planning to attack if they did 
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not surrender. Despite the tears of the group of women held in the town, the municipal 
mayor denied his request. Carrillo characterized him as barbarous and fearful.
125
 The 
emphasis on defenseless families and children suggests that the role of father and 
chivalric protection of the family played a prominent role in insurgent conceptions of 
manliness and honor. 
According to insurgent leaders, the strategies of Spanish commanders revolved 
around attacking and killing pacific rural dwellers. J.W. Aguirre wrote of Spanish 
atrocities near Jiquiabo, just west of Sagua la Grande, in late 1896: “The enemy, like 
usual set fire to several houses of pacific residents.”126 Nor were his reports unique. 
Across the central provinces, insurgent leaders consistently reported that Spanish forces 
targeted rural dwellers by burning their homes, attacking families, and drawing the 
“blood of citizens.”127 Cubans pointed to Spanish mistreatment of noncombatants as a 
sign of cowardice. 
Whereas Spaniards were alleged to have willingly slaughter pacific rural dwellers, 
they were not as courageous in facing armed Cubans on the battlefield, according to 
reports during and after the war. Although Spanish forces outnumbered Cuban troops by 
the thousands in Cienfuegos, Spaniards were useless as warriors because they fled at the 
first sight of battle: “The enemy with much cavalry, but cowardly and fleeing terrified at 
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the first shots”128 When Spaniards did confront Cubans, they did so only the most 
advantageous terms. Press coverage of the war both at home and abroad depicted Spanish 
soldiers as “more devious than courageous,” providing proof of their lack of masculine 
honor. They often defeated Cubans “through trickery,” rather than by direct military 
confrontation on fair terms.
129
 
Cuban narratives of battle tended to emphasize the size of Spanish columns and 
their advantageous access to arms and provisions. In contrast, the poorly armed informal 
Cuban forces faced endless disadvantages. Cubans pointed to the inequity in numbers and 
provisions in battle as one more aspect of Spanish cowardice. For Cubans, Spanish forces 
showed their cowardice when they killed individual or small groups of Cubans by using 
large columns of well-armed professional soldiers. For example, the insurgent press 
reported in June 1897 that “a thick column” of Spanish forces murdered two Cuban 
sergeants:  “the braves of the miserable Ruiz realized many deeds that demonstrate their 
cowardice and the vile proceedings the soldiers of Weyler employ in this war of 
extermination” read one newspaper article.130 
In another instance, Spanish forces under Spanish Lieutenant Colonel Nicasio 
Mirabal stumbled upon two Cuban sergeants and killed them. “But they were not content 
with this,” continued the article. Perhaps more insulting than using a full column of 
Spanish forces to murder two Cubans was the deceitful way the Spanish chief presented 
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their death: “They gave them sepulture and left a paper where they made known that 
these insurgents had died in battle. These are the victories the soldiers of Ruiz achieve; 
they assassinated Carlos Aguirre and here they repeat the pacifying feat and like Quixote 
[quijotescamente] they say that they killed them in combat.
131
 The cowardice during 
combat, for many who supporters of Cuba Libre, reflected the dishonest objectives of the 
Spanish in Cuba.
132
 
The article juxtaposed the cowardice and deceit of the Spanish with the honor and 
sacrifice of the Cubans. One [of the victims] was Manuel Rojas y Barroto, and the other a 
young man of eighteen years Octavio Pérez, who the insurgent press labeled a “humble 
hero.” He was the son of Ángel Pérez, lieutenant colonel Chief of the guerrilla of the 
column of Molina.” At the beginning of the movement, the Asturian guerrilla chief 
promised to make all three of his sons into chiefs if they went with him to the war. “The 
mother, a very dignified Cuban, overheard with shame the proposition of her husband 
and with tears in her eyes told her sons that she would prefer to see them dead before 
dressed in the guerrilla uniform.”133 This woman exemplified the highest purpose of 
Cuban motherhood, “to instill in children love for the patria.”134 Her youngest child, 
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Octavo, convinced his brothers to join the insurrection, in the name of dignity and honor. 
The willingness to die for the Patria demonstrated the manliness of young Octavio, 
according to hegemonic ideals of Cuban masculinity, therefore making his death as tragic 
as it was heroic. “Over his tomb lies something more than the memory of his virtues; the 
ratification of this firm resolution to fight without truce nor tepidity [tibiezas] until 
achieving our freedom.”135 The celebration of martyrdom indicates that the insurgents 
placed a high value on loyalty and patriotism in definitions of honorable masculinity. 
While insurgent chiefs disdained Spanish treatment of pacíficos and considered 
Spaniards as cheaters for killing Cubans with unfair advantages, they found the Spanish 
treatment of women as especially heinous. Indeed, numerous instances of Spanish cruelty 
toward women. One local insurgent chief Sixto Roque del Sol, for example noted that his 
men washed their own clothing because “if you sent any of your clothes to be washed by 
some female friend, the [Spanish] soldiers would take vengeance on that friend.”136 
Spaniards even targeted mothers filled the Cuban and foreign press between 1896 and 
1897. In one bloody encounter with poor rural families, Spanish forces stormed the town 
after a devastating encounter with the Cuban forces under Quintín Bandera. Spanish 
troops set fire to ingenio Olayita, burning alive dozens of local residents, including at 
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least two girls, two women, and a woman clasping her child. Many of the bodies found 
were black and Chinese, and may have composed part of the plantation work force.
137
 
This tragedy, which became known as the Olayita Masacre, occurred at a plantation 15 
miles southwest of Sagua la Grande. 
Press coverage of the war often depicted Spanish soldiers as sexual predators in a 
war waged primarily against defenseless women and children.
138
 They would attack, rape 
and kill young women, while humiliating others by forcing them to dance naked in front 
of groups of soldiers. In one American newspaper, a reporter claimed that Spanish 
officers shoot down noncombatants, hand over women and girls to the tender mercies of 
soldiers, and murder mother, wives and daughters.”139 In United States Congressional 
debates, senators likened Spanish treatment of Cuban women to slavery, “selling them 
into lives of shame.”140 They also violated nursing mothers, slaughtering suckling babies 
and small children brutally.
141
 
 
Image 1: Artist rendering of Cubans burned alive by Spanish in Olayita Massacre
142
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In addition to direct physical violence against families and especially women, 
insurgent leaders condemned their enemies for disrupting family life and flouting gender 
roles more generally. One of the main examples of this was the Spanish policy of 
imprisoning women. Fermín Valdés-Domínguez protested: “more than the deportations 
and shootings of men, now the rigor has reached an extreme, by jailing women. In 
Cienfuegos, there are already many women in the jails.” He recounted another incident in 
which the Spaniards had cut the hair of one young woman, a deed that seemed to be 
prevalent in other areas of the island as well. “This is the culmination of their cowardice, 
he wrote.
143
 
In other cases, Spanish officers targeted the families of insurgents leaders. 
“Lieutenant Carballosa arrives today and tells me that the enemy took his family, leaving 
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him a paper so that he can present himself,” wrote José Braulio Alemán, a prominent 
insurgent leader in Las Villas, in his diary in June 1897. “Despicable ones wasting their 
time in hunting families!”144 As the policy of reconcentration hit the Cuban countryside 
with full force in early 1897, the families of numerous insurgent leaders came up missing, 
at the same time as pacific rural dwellers, mainly women, children and the elderly, faced 
disease and starvation in concentration camps. Insurgent leaders pointed to Spanish 
brutality toward the Cuban population as evidence of cowardice. In the eyes of many 
Cubans, real men would never treat defenseless women and families in this manner. In 
early 1897, Spanish forces detained the wife of Alejandro Rodríguez, a prominent 
insurgent general. In the impassioned line he later wrote to General Máximo Gómez, 
Rodríguez captured the sentiment of many Cuban soldiers and officers:  “How vile and 
cowardly are our enemies!”145 Insurgent chiefs pointed to Spanish persecution of Cuban 
women as the ultimate symbol of cowardice. 
Pointing out the cowardice of Spanish forces was one way insurgents crafted a 
moral strategy amidst military challenges. Insurgents used masculinity as the plane of 
judgment for honor, as opposed to race, which the Spanish had successfully employed to 
delegitimize the insurrection. Insurgent chiefs based their own conceptions of manliness 
on three main values: patriotism, sacrifice, and chivalry. Spaniards failed on all three 
fronts, perhaps their most offensive deed was the abuse of Cuban women. Not only did 
this constitute a violation of the chivalric duty of a man to protect women, but it also 
allowed an opportunity to contrast the valor and morality of Cuban women with the 
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effeminacy and malice of Spanish men. Although both figures represented a form of the 
“feminine,” the inborn femininity of the Cuban woman showed a “natural” morality, 
while the artificial “feminization” of the Spanish male presented his behavior as 
pathological and degenerate.
146
 
 
Dueling in Defense of Women: Chivalry and Insurgent Honor 
 
While much of insurgent discourse harnessed examples of Spanish cowardice to 
undermine Spanish honor, in extreme cases, the actions of Spaniards threatened the honor 
of Cubans. The protection of women was a central pillar of insurgent masculine honor, 
which ironically privileged a value that so many men had forsaken by leaving their 
families behind to join the revolution. The personal sacrifices of many insurgents in their 
decisions to join the war effort perhaps made Spanish persecution of non-combatant 
women even more egregious. Amidst shifting definitions of masculinity in the late 
nineteenth century, military men sometimes felt compelled to defend violently their 
honor. Duel provided men an honorable outlet for a violent defense of masculine honor, 
while still upholding values of self-control central to military codes of conduct.
147
 
Despite the insurgent conception of self-control as a core tenant of masculine honor, 
Spanish abuses of women constituted such a flagrant violation of honorable warfare. This 
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violation threatened Cuban manhood to a degree that compelled some insurgents to 
submit to their “passions” and challenge their adversaries to a duel. 
The writings of insurgent chief José B. Alemán cast light on the role chivalry, 
understood as the obligation to protect Cuban women, played in crafting a hierarchy of 
masculinity during the war. In his diary in April 1897, he wrote an unflattering 
description of Valeriano Weyler, the architect of reconcentration: “That man [has] to be 
crazy, as that is the only way to explain why he wastes time killing cockroaches letting 
the mice live.”148 In May 1897, he wrote of particularly offensive crime that occurred a 
month earlier. Spanish troops in Villa Clara under “the miserable Spanish chief José 
García Aldare” had chased a defenseless Cuban woman and her child, laying siege to 
them as she cloistered herself and her small child in the mountains. “This woman’s only 
crime: being Cuban and dealing, (as families welcome the Revolution [must] deal) 
without protection nor refuge.”149 More offensive than attacking a non-combatant, was 
attacking a non-combatant woman and mother. 
Upon learning of the crime, Alemán wrote the most odious letter, which he later 
copied into his diary. In the letter, Alemán employed abusive epithets and enraging 
insults to induce the Spanish chief to accept a duel. The insults challenged the manliness 
of the Spanish general in three ways. First, he claimed that using an entire army of armed 
men to hunt a defenseless mother and her child was cowardly. Second, he targeted the 
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virility and sexuality of the general by calling him a homosexual. Third, Alemán called 
the mother and wife of his enemy prostitutes, forcing the General to either accept the 
shame implied in the insult or the responsibility of proving his masculine honor by 
defending his mother and wife. The continuous affronts to the manliness of the Spanish 
chief elucidate the ways in which insurgent leaders harnessed prevailing conceptions of 
masculinity and honor to delegitimize the Spanish forces. 
Alemán used these series of affronts to the manliness of the Spanish General in 
order to induce him to accept a duel. one of the only ways to redeem his honor, in the 
eyes of Alemán. “For once, be a man,” he wrote haughtily. “Show me that the Spanish 
know how to be men of honor. Show the nobility that Spanish chiefs praise. For once, be 
honorable.”150 As part of the challenge Alemán even revealed his location, the same 
“theatre of your crimes and robberies.”151 In so doing, Alemán preemptively undermined 
any Spanish victory by providing yet another advantage to his enemy. Asserting his own 
manly virility, Alemán threatened to publish his letter in American newspapers if García 
Aldare did not accept the duel, “like a glove hurled in your face, that with intention, I slap 
you and spit [on you.]”152 
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Alemán charged that the Spanish General had failed to fulfill the standards of 
honorable masculinity by cheating, conniving, and cowardice on the battlefield. “If you 
were a man of honor you will propose a duel, leaving to your choice the weapons and 
conditions, even though it is you who has offended me,” wrote Alemán in the opening of 
his letter. “…but you are the author of a vile assassination realized on the persons of 
Captain Agramonte and his men near Ciego de Ávila, and it would be a dishonor for me 
to beat a coward.”153 He undermined the military achievements of the Spanish general by 
labeling them as murder (rather than battle). By juxtaposing two visions of death—the 
duel as honorable and the murder as cowardly—Alemán asserted that the only way for 
the Spanish general to prove his manliness was by accepting the duel. 
Alemán emphasized the inequalities between the Cuban forces and the Spanish 
Army as a way to valorize the Cuban efforts and to undermine the legitimacy and fairness 
of any Spanish victory. “Your columns always rejected in ‘El Quino’ with my escort 
[escolta], reinforced with 20 or 30 men, even though you were two or three thousand 
strong, you waited, coward, until I left there to occupy the place with six thousand men 
that [made] you blush with shame; as if it were the demonstration of your impotence.”154 
Alemán drew parallels between military honor and male virility. That the Spanish general 
would not engage in direct confrontation with the Cuban forces was tantamount to 
admitting his own frailty as a man. 
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References to Spanish cowardice in combat with Cuban soldiers served as a 
backdrop against which to compare Spanish treatment of women. Worse than avoiding 
direct battle with the Cubans, García Aldare actually targeted defenseless women. 
Alemán argued that Spanish treatment of women made them worse than murders and less 
than cowards: “…it is a deed of a bitch [mujerzuela] to bring six thousand men [to 
occupy ‘El Quino’], what name deserves [the deed of] using so many armed [soldiers] to 
kill, as you said, a defenseless woman, full of cholera, who is more dignified, has greater 
patriotic heart and more civic value than you. Die of shame!”155 Attacking an honorable 
woman, rather than protecting her, was a patent violation of codes of chivalry, upon 
which masculine honor was in part based. Ironically, by describing the Cuban woman in 
terms of citizenship (civic value), Alemán both presented a progressive notion of 
inclusive Cuban identity while implying that the war had forced the disintegration of 
proper femininity. Although the maternal behavior of the woman in protecting her child 
proved her nobility and honor according to prevailing standards of proper gender roles, 
her bravery and cunning were decidedly masculine characteristics. Alemán used 
contradictory descriptions of the femininity and masculinity of this women to highlight 
her defenselessness before Spanish forces, while also being able to compare her worth to 
that the of the Spanish. Alemán insulted the manliness of the Spanish chief by comparing 
him to a woman, up to whom he could not even measure. 
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By comparing the bravery of the Cuban woman to the cowardice and trickery of 
the Spanish chief, Alemán attacked Spanish manliness. “You situated her for four days, 
hundreds of your drunken soldiers surrounded the small mountain, and that woman, ready 
to take her own like before falling prisoner to your rabble, knew with her daughter (who 
barely started to talk) survive four days  without shelter nor nourishment, and finally out 
maneuver [you] at the place.”156 Alemán again highlighted the disparity in power 
between the Spanish perpetrator and the Cuban victim. This time, however, the 
comparison was even more exaggerated. Six thousand armed Spanish soldiers were not 
as honorable as one defenseless Cuban woman. References to the preference for suicide 
over succumbing to suffering sexual dishonor by Spanish soldiers showed that this 
woman with the “ideal of Cuban womanhood bearing sacrifice and suffering 
heroically.”157 Because of her patriotism and sacrifice, she was far braver and more 
honorable than Spanish soldiers. It also “Miserable ones, for a woman who has no other 
shame than being Cuban, you use six thousand bayonets and when you hear our bullets, 
you cower and flee, even when you only have 200 Cubans in front of you.”158 Alemán 
implied that Spaniards attacked women because they were too cowardly to confront 
Cuban men. 
Spanish cowardice in confronting Cuban men symbolized Spanish impotence. 
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Alemán challenged the sexuality and virility of the Spanish chief by calling him a 
homosexual: “You shall see, fagot, how Cubans know how to punish the valiant 
Spaniards who burn the homes of Cuban families and chase women and children to slay 
them; the work of the noble children of the Spanish excrement. I am at your orders, 
miserable gachupín.”159 Alemán may have been aware of the mass arrests of 
homosexuals in the Cuban capital during the war as part of a crackdown on groups in 
which black supposedly predominated.
160
 Like Spanish generals, Alemán sought to 
neutralize his enemy by labeling his sexuality as pathological, thereby undermining his 
manhood. Other insurgent leaders targeted Spanish sexuality by describing them as 
effeminate. For example, Fermín Valdés Domínguez recalled a conversation with Serafín 
Sánchez during the war in which they discussed “the needs of men of Government, 
Loynaz’s lovers and other things, without forgetting General Rosas who with his 
cowardice and effeminate manners gave us material to laugh a bit at his expense.”161 As 
the polarization between heterosexual normalcy and homosexual deviance began to take 
greater shape in the nineteenth century, sexuality became a powerful tool to condemn an 
enemy.
162
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By linking the cowardly act of hunting women to sexual deviance, Alemán 
depicted the Cubans as the defenders of moral righteousness and proper gender norms. 
Furthermore, labeling his enemy as homosexual worked to highlight the effeminacy of 
Spanish leaders,
163
 thus uncovering an interesting paradox in his reasoning: Alemán 
sought to defend his honor as a Cuban man by protecting honorable Cuban women. At 
the same time as he valorized the Cuban woman for her bravery, Alemán used 
effeminacy as a weapon against his enemy. He therefore harness two opposing 
conceptions of femininity to celebrate Cuban women and chastise Spanish men. 
 
Masculine Honor and Female Sexual Virtue 
 
In one of the most potent passages in this letter, Alemán attacked the manliness of 
the Spanish chief by defaming the sexual propriety of his mother and wife. “If you still 
have not decided, I infer you on the honor of your mother, on that of your wife the 
offense of calling them prostitutes, being yourself beyond cowardly, ruffian, poor 
gentlemen and swine!”164Not only did the characterization of these women as prostitutes 
imply physical corruption and moral perversion of these women, it also indicated the 
effeminacy of the man whose charge it was to care for them: the Spanish General. If his 
women were prostitutes, the Spanish General had failed to fulfill his duty as a man to 
protect and defend female honor. By labeling the two most important women to the 
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Spanish general as prostitutes, Alemán compared their dishonor and moral licentiousness 
with the honorability and virtue of Cuban women. 
Alemán was not alone in labeling the female supporters of Spain as prostitutes. 
Indeed, Máximo Gómez himself used similar language when dealing with two female 
traitors near Minas in Puerto Príncipe. Cuban soldiers detained two women leaving the 
town late at night. Summoned by General Gómez, these two women explained that they 
did not know that entering town was prohibited, and that one of them had a sick child 
there. Apparently, Gómez did not believe her, and proceeded to interrogate the alleged 
mother. “How can a woman, weak as she is, go at night, knowing she is violating an 
order talking or dealing with the enemy? Is this the deed of an honorable Cuban woman 
or is it the proceeding of a prostitute?”165 Gómez drew on prevailing gender ideals 
specifying the natural place of the woman was the home to question the behavior of the 
female suspect. Because she was outside the home at night, and in violation of an 
insurgent military order, she transgressed gender norms, sexual codes, and showed little 
respect for the Cuban cause. Similar to the wife and mother of García Aldare, this woman 
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failed to uphold the norms of proper Cuban womanhood, defined as self-sacrifice in favor 
of the Patria.
166
 
Although the epithet of prostitution implied more moral defamation and 
delegitimization of the enemy, it also suggested figurative infidelity and transgression of 
the prevailing norms of femininity and sexual honor. Because insurgents defined both 
masculinity and femininity in terms of contribution to the nation, all those who did not 
actively commit to the cause failed in as men and as women. For men, failing to 
contribute meant being an effeminate coward, while for a woman, refusal to support 
Cuba Libre was equated with the worst moral transgression possible: prostitution. By 
labeling enemy women as prostitutes, Cuban insurgents linked supporting the enemy to 
criminality. 
 While Spanish men and women failed to uphold proper gender roles, Cubans 
presented themselves in terms of the highest virtues of their respective gender. For their 
part, Cuban men displayed valiance and honor on the battlefield and their self-abnegation 
and sacrifice. These values enmeshed masculine honor in the patriotic cult of death, in 
which Cuban men were required to submit their lives to the cause of independence. 
Women expressed honor mainly through their roles as wives and mothers, namely 
“resignation to the death of men in the service of patria and acceptance of the attending 
emotional loss and material impoverishment.”167 According to one Cuban patriot, the 
historian can never be sure who to judge as more patriotic: “…the man, who for political 
ideal abandons his estate and family to run the risks of battle; or the woman who remains 
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resigned, prisoner of the fever of the nostalgia, in the abandoned and insecure home, 
where everything speaks to her of the object of her illusions.”168 Fittingly, the 
manifestation of these gender roles encouraged male display of virility through military 
bravery and exploits, and female chastity and abnegation. These sexual values situated 
Cuban honor in decidedly white, middle-class culture, providing a stark contrast to 
Spanish dishonor—effeminacy in men and sexual licentiousness in women. 
Male honor hinged on fearless confrontation of unfavorable odds and probable 
death on the battlefield. Cuban insurgents showcased their manliness by comparing their 
valiant acts with Spanish cowardice: “And so long as they pretend to fulfill their sad 
mission, the sacred ideal of Liberty united us who do not know how to run away from 
dangers and following the order of the Chief of War, realize valiant acts that oblige 
Weyler’s battalions to retreat to the towns, leaving behind the damnations of their victims 
and bringing as a trophy hundreds of wounded, without counting those who at the foot of 
the burned and violated home have found deserved sepulture.”169 Despite the 
considerable military disadvantages informal Cuban forces faced in their confrontation 
with the professional Spanish army, they still upset their enemies. 
Cuban insurgents at times emphasized the uneven circumstances of battle by 
claiming that the defeated rifle-toting Spaniards with simple machetes. The battle of Mal 
Tiempo, a small settlement neighboring the town of Cruces, in December 1895, was a 
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prime example of the prowess of the machete-wielding Cuban man. Often recognized as 
a decisive turning point in the war, when Cuban forces resoundingly defeated their 
enemy, Mal Tiempo became a symbol of Cuban honor and bravery because historians 
have upheld the myth that Cubans gained victory using the machete rather than firearms. 
For this and other battles, “the machete came to serve as a shibboleth for Cuban bravery 
and Spanish incompetence.”170 Claiming victory by machete seemed much more 
honorable than the actual guerrilla tactics Spanish soldiers observed of their Cuban 
opponents, who preferred to shoot into lines of Spanish troops from afar and hidden 
rather than face direct battle.
171
 Victory over the enemy even when confronted with 
substantial obstacles was proof of their superior masculine honor. 
When faced with defeat, the only honorable option for a Cuban soldier was 
suicide. Suicide before surrender was celebrated a core component of Cuban manliness 
because it represented to ultimate sacrifice. “Exemplary death served to deepen the 
intransigence central to the purpose of liberation, to situate each generation between 
ancestry, to whom a debt was owed, and posterity, to whom an obligation was due.”172 
Insurgent leaders, for example, celebrated the suicide of Juan B. Zayas, considering him 
valiant for killing himself before falling in the hands of the enemy.
173
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Image 2: Artist Rendering of the Battle of Mal Tiempo
174
 
In addition to demonstrating manliness through military victory and willingness to 
die for the cause, Cubans emphasized their mercy in dealing with the enemy, and their 
protection and friendly relations with the country people, especially women. For 
example, Alfredo Rego, an insurgent chief in the zone of Cienfuegos, boasted about his 
military victories during a campaign around Ojo de Agua, a small country town on the 
outskirts of Cienfuegos. Rego led his men into battle against 64 soldiers of the Batallón 
Canarias at the Ingenio Cantabria, subsequently turning to take the fort of Ojo de Agua. 
Taking 16 prisoners at Cantabria and another 14 at Ojo de Agua and losing only two of 
his own men, Rego proudly detailed his exploits. 
He wrote to Máximo Gómez that when he turned in the prisoners in Ojo de Agua, 
the entire town fell to its knees: “The town, I don’t know how to compare it. The women, 
the children, the elderly, everyone gave me repeated vivas.” Even the enemy combatants 
celebrated the actions of Rego: “Once inside of this [town], this was to be seen. The 
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teniente coronel del Valle embracing me; the officers of the line troops and marines did 
the same.” The prisoners were filled with gratitude and love for Rego: “The prisoners, all 
hanging from my neck, soaked me with their tears, to the point that their lips covered my 
face, kissing me.”175 
Remembering the spectacle, Rego wrote that he had to compose himself “to be 
able to send them to their cuarteles, pronouncing among other words, the ones that 
follow: ‘Now you have had the chance to meet the nobility of the Cuban people. This act 
that I have just realized I do it without other end than to comply with my conscience. This 
is what it demands of me and my good decision will not carry any act in this life that is 
not great, noble and decorous.’” The townspeople greeted this speech with warmth: “A 
viva did escape from the those Spaniards, a viva that was answered by all and then 
discovering myself I exclaimed ¡Viva Cuba! viva that was also answered by a great 
number of the spectators.” “In that town, we were received, offering me a banquet that I 
did not want to accept.” 176 Rego asserted his masculine honor by highlighting his 
military victories, his liberation and protection of women and children, and his charity 
and gentility toward the enemy. 
Insurgents even upheld their respect and protection of women in encounters with 
the enemy. The story of one female prisoner of the force of Enrique Loynaz del Castillo 
exemplifies the ways in which Cubans represented their treatment of women to bolster 
their masculine honor. A pair of vanguard soldiers presented Loynaz with a “young and 
well-dressed” woman and two men, claiming to be her brother and brother-in-law. “I 
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interrogated them as they walked alongside my horse. She insisted that she had a child, 
gravely ill, and that she had gone out in search of tubers or plantains so as not to die of 
starvation.” Loynaz was skeptical: “I objected to the woman that the makeup on her 
cheeks contrasted with her supposed affliction that the illness of her child should have 
caused her.”177 By calling attention to the makeup the woman wore, and implying that 
she lied, Loynaz enmeshed her in images of prostitution and immorality. 
Despite the incorrectness of the woman, Loynaz remained gentlemanly: “Not 
asking to disrobe the lady, for the sake of respect, the saddle of the horse was taken off in 
search of possible indications of guilt. I did not delay in finding, inside it, a Spanish pass 
[salvaconducto], in which those individuals were recommended to the transit authorities 
‘for their valuable service’” Loynaz immediately ordered the men hung, but he vacillated 
on how to deal with the female enemy. “The woman well deserved the same punishment; 
but it was so hard to order it.”178 
He called one of his officers, Lieutenant Colonel [José Caridad] López. “Without 
waiting for my word, he told me: ‘Lieutenant Colonel, don’t put me in the position of 
hanging a woman.’” Loynaz conceded, ordering López to keep her prisoner with his 
force until they saw a place to leave the spy. “The woman, prisoner of her panic, fell to 
her knees by my side, asking for mercy and swearing that the pass was to save her from 
the Spanish.” Although the woman pleaded for mercy, “a soldier pushed her back in line 
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to continue the march.”179 Loynaz proved his commitment to the revolution by remaining 
firm in punishing the spies, while proving his chivalry by not sentencing the woman to 
death. 
Cubans were forced to present themselves as the morally righteous and upright 
ones in stark contrast to the corrupt and immoral oppressors. While Máximo Gómez 
officially encouraged merciful treatment of enemy captives, his officers did not always 
comply. Quintín Bandera for example, was known for his harsh treatment of the enemy, 
and other insurgents chiefs were known to force captives to dig their own graves and 
hack them to death with machetes.
180
 Despite the brutal realities of war, however, Cuban 
insurgents emphasized their honorable conduct and downplayed instances of 
transgression to uphold the moral righteousness of their cause. They did this by 
exemplary punishments to offenders, thereby proving their intolerance of brutality and 
dishonor. 
 Upholding insurgent morality required strict military discipline. When insurgents 
failed to respect women, they faced severe punishment. In one case, Cuban officer Mane 
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Dominguez faced military tribunals for grave insults to the Lieutenant of Sanitation, and 
for insults and threats to burn down the house of “a poor old woman”181 In another 
instance, an insurgent soldier accused of raping one women, was sentenced to be hung.
182
 
Celebrating masculine honor by protecting country people, showing mercy toward female 
enemies, and maintaining strict standards of morality, Cuban insurgents presented 
themselves as defenders of morality. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As Spaniards and Cubans clashed violently on the battlefield, they also engaged 
in an impassioned discursive war. While Spanish propaganda labeled the insurgents as 
black criminals and ñáñigos, the Cubans fought back by depicting the Spaniards as 
cowards. Cubans found in Spain a clear enemy under the rule of Weyler, and attempted 
to undermine the Spanish cause by depicting the men as effeminate and the women as 
prostitutes. Insurgents harnessed the policy of reconcentration, a powerful example of 
Spanish abuses of noncombatants, as proof of the cowardice of their enemies. Even more 
egregious from the perspective of the Cubans was the Spanish abuse and murder of 
women and children further evidence of the faltering masculinity—even effeminacy—of 
Spaniards. 
The early successes of the insurrection and the westward expansion of the 
Invasion force of Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo bolstered the cohesion of the 
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insurgents against a common enemy. The Battle of Mal Tiempo, when eastern forces 
penetrated the zone of Spanish fortification to achieve a resounding military victory in 
December 1895, became a symbol of all the virtues of insurgent masculinity. Between 
the outbreak of war and the first months of the rule of Weyler, insurgents of all colors and 
nationalities put forth a united front against the Spanish, under the banner of racial 
brotherhood. Indeed, Cuban propaganda labeling the Spanish as effeminate was forged 
against an implicit backdrop of honorable Cuban masculinity. Mambises were everything 
that Spaniards were not: patriotic, valiant, scrupulous, and most importantly, chivalrous. 
The polarizing propaganda effectively homogenized Cuban soldiers, officers and chiefs 
under the umbrella of a glorious Cuban manliness, downplaying the divisions of race and 
class. 
Although much of Cuban discourse and propaganda portrayed an image of unity, 
fragmentation festered just below the surface of the supposed raceless Cuban masculinity. 
When the tides of the war began to shift in favor of Weyler, unity gave way to 
competition and dissent. Diverging visions of Cuba Libre came into direct conflict as 
separatists competed for military ascendency amidst a series of defeats. Conflict over the 
role of social hierarchy within the insurrection revealed dissent against the implicitly 
white and middle-class manliness that white insurgent leaders like Máximo Gómez and 
José B. Alemán had applied to the diverse group of men in the Cuban Army. The next 
chapter examines the diverging visions of Cuban masculinity and the subsequent 
reconfiguration of masculine honor in the second half of the war.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Insurgent Masculinities: 
The Invasion, Black Officers, and Regionalism 
 
During the first half of the war, insurgent chiefs fomented unity among Cubans of 
diverse backgrounds with a discourse of racial brotherhood. They expressed this cross-
racial alliance in a language of masculinity, by depicting the Spanish as effeminate 
cowards in contrast to the altruistic, self-sacrificing, chivalrous Cuban man. The 
consensus on white, middle-class masculinity celebrated by insurgent chiefs of central 
Cuba prevailed especially during reconcentration. This policy targeting noncombatants 
seemed to corroborate insurgent depictions of the extreme immorality and cowardice of 
their Spanish foes. At the other extreme, Cuban patriots upheld a positive image 
themselves by deploying an equalizing and unifying notion of masculinity. Hierarchy and 
divisions played a relatively insignificant role in characterizing the diverse army, or so 
the homogenizing discourse made it seem. 
The draconian policies and military campaigns of Valeriano Weyler quickly 
turned the string of insurgent victories associated with the Invasion in 1895 and early 
1896 turned into a series of defeats between late 1896 and 1897. Although insurgents 
articulated a supposedly unified Cuban masculinity in anti-Spanish propaganda during 
the early war, setbacks on the battlefield exacerbated social frictions already existing 
within the Cuban army, and fomented tensions among different groups competing for 
power. Concerns over the inactivity and defeats of insurgents in the central provinces 
highlighted the failures of central chiefs to uphold military honor, patriotic values, and 
  
86 
 
chivalry, all key indicators of the unified insurgent masculinity. Racial and regional 
frictions converged in the floundering military campaigns of the central provinces with 
the realization that not all insurgents upheld the righteous manliness purportedly 
characterizing all Cuban patriots. The label of majá served to denigrate the manliness and 
prestige of insurgent chiefs who faltered on the battlefield. The highest leaders of the 
insurrection including Máximo Gómez employed this label liberally to describe the 
insurgents of the central provinces, who experienced a series of military defeats in late 
1896 and early 1897. 
Amidst this affront their honor, white insurgent chiefs sought to re-assert their 
own manliness by denying their culpability in the military defeats and contesting racial 
implications of the Invasion. While the invasion had imported the radical social agenda 
which carried many eastern blacks into positions of authority, white insurgent chiefs 
sought to reinforce the racial hierarchy that had continued to prevail to a much larger 
degree in the central provinces during the war. White insurgent chiefs in the central 
provinces blamed the stagnation of their military campaigns on groups who seemingly 
threatened the white monopoly on power and military prestige, the whiteness of 
hegemonic masculinity—such as the allegedly hypermasculine black officers. These 
central insurgent chiefs sought to reinforce racial hierarchy through a language of 
masculinity, bolstering their own and undercutting that of black officers. 
One way in which Cuban insurgents justified claims to positions of power within 
the army was by depicting certain groups of soldiers as either inadequately masculine due 
to their military failures, or pathologically masculine pointing not to their aggressive 
sexual behavior. In a series of court-martial trials, central insurgent chiefs deposed 
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officers who challenged the vision of white middle-class respectable masculinity. They 
usually targeted two main groups: blacks and orientales, men, often black, who had 
arrived in the central provinces with the Invasion Force and had taken command of local 
regiments. 
The series of court-martial trials revealed profound fragmentation within the 
Cuban army, that had was supposedly unified under a discourse of patriotic masculinity. 
On top of the already existing racial tensions within the regiments of the central 
provinces, the Invasion catalyzed regional antagonism. Regionalism, especially the 
profoundly different historical experience of the economically stagnant and rebellious 
eastern zone and the prosperous and largely Royalist central provinces, embodied 
diverging understandings of the role of blacks in the insurrection. The court-martials in 
late 1896 and 1897 suggest that white insurgent chiefs of the central provinces rejected 
the eastern vision of patriotism that celebrated black leadership. What before had been a 
universalizing feature of Cuban military service, became a basis for hierarchy and 
castigation of men who strayed from the socially-conservative vision of Cuba Libre that 
had begun to emerge in the civil branch of the war effort and resonated in the central 
provinces.  
 
Masculinity and Majasería during the “Spiritual Crisis” 
 
Difficulties on the battlefield that characterized the experience of the Cuban Army 
between late 1896 and early 1897 began to expose racial tensions in the Cuban forces 
operating around Cienfuegos. In the central provinces, especially the area around 
Cienfuegos, Cuban forces were largely incapacitated in the face of the heavily reinforced 
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fortified zone protecting the zones of cultivation of three of the largest sugar factories in 
the island. (See Map 1). José Lacret Morlot reported practical stagnation amongst troops 
in Cienfuegos, a critical Spanish stronghold, which he judged required a more active 
force to ensure the success of the revolution. The Brigade of Cienfuegos “does not meet 
the conditions to penetrate the zone of ingenios, as in four months that will have passed 
since I am here, he has not done it at all and in appreciation it is that he cannot do so 
because of his scarce armed force and being in that zone protected by more than 1500 
guerrillas who at the first [sign of] fire gather to protect themselves. In this zone of 
ingenios, perhaps the richest in the Island, there is need for a strong contingent that to 
invade by fire and flame…”183 The need for a vigorous campaign in this area rife with 
wealthy plantations contrasted greatly with the realities of the insurrection in that area. 
Image 3: Spanish Blockhouse, Cienfuegos
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Map 2: Fortified Zone of Cienfuegos
185
 
 
 
 
According to numerous insurgent leaders, the abundance of majases in the zone 
of Cienfuegos highlighted a dismaying, and downright dangerous lack of morality among 
the soldiers. Cuban leaders employed the label of majá as an affront to the manliness of 
soldiers they perceived as unworthy of leadership positions. Forces in Cienfuegos during 
the early days of the war were often labeled as majases, or soldiers who do not fight. 
According to American war correspondent Grover Flint, “They get their name from a 
huge snake, called ‘Maja’ that kills chickens and destroys hen’s eggs. It is a big, 
dangerous-looking reptile, but perfectly harmless.”186 The image of the majá, or soldier 
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who does not fight, emerged as an affront to the military prowess of insurgent chiefs in 
the central provinces, thereby placing in question their manliness. 
Cuban leaders entering Cienfuegos in late 1896 and early 1897 frequently 
commented on the inadequate zeal of their revolutionary compatriots operating in that 
zone. Coronel Rafael Cabrera, commissioned by the Inspector General for the 
organization of a force, classified the forces of Cienfuegos as lazy and incompetent. 
“With regard to the organization of the infantry,” he wrote in December 1896, “I should 
say to you that in the Brigade of Cienfuegos it will be pretty difficult because here where 
the majases abound.” When recruiting people in the surrounding mountains to join the 
Cuban army, Cabrera noted significant “immorality,” as “all of the lazy men, find 
protection with the military chiefs of Cienfuegos, who say that they belong to their 
forces.” Cabrera requested a roster of the men enlisted in the brigade to the he could 
“moralize this and punish the people who contribute to the immorality and try to flout 
superior orders.” He noted that central chiefs like Colonel Alejandro Rodríguez 
repeatedly had failed to cooperate with him in reforming the brigade.
187
 
 When José Lacret Morlot described the forces of Cienfuegos as if they were 
bandits: “it is incredible,” he wrote. The chiefs and officers of the Brigade of Cienfuegos 
“were marauding about of their own free will without regard to the responsibilities they 
had to their Patria…” He ordered that these men submit to a new chief, the Brigadier 
Pérez.
188
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 Cándido Álvarez, who operated a regiment in Havana and Matanzas, claimed that 
in the province of Santa Clara “the war was not known until my arrival there with the 
Regiment.” He found blame in the incompetence of the chiefs: “No wonder, because the 
majority of the chiefs that have come to figure that using the instinct of conservation, we 
will never arrive to a happy end the redemption of our aggrieved Patria, until today with 
all types of calamities.” Only the leadership of one man seemed to redeem these men 
from their lack of commitment to the revolution: “Live with the belief, General, that if it 
were not for the Brigadier Alejandro Rodríguez of Cienfuegos, and for this subordinate of 
yours, whole months would pass without having a shot fired at the enemy, which in truth 
says very little in honor of the Liberating Army.”189 
By February 1897, many insurgents and even some officers went hungry and 
faced shortages of supplies incapacitating their military functions. Máximo Gómez and 
José B. Alemán called it the “spiritual crisis,” while Fermín Valdés-Domínguez referred 
to this period as the “dark month.”190 “We must conquer everything by blood and force. I 
believe, too, that those who survive this vindicating war will be few,” he wrote in late 
February.
191
 
Cienfuegos forces failed to fulfill their roles as Cuban men when they fled 
Spanish attacks instead of facing them head on. Captain Pino, “an ox-eyed, middle-sized 
man, with flowing dark moustachios [sic] and a sad agree-with-you-perfectly-sir-I-am-a-
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blackguard manner,” who commanded thirty men, was one such example.192 “Without a 
blush,” Pino told Flint the story of his near-capture by the Spanish the day before. He and 
his mulatto assistant Chicho, fleeing from the enemy, fell to the very back of the force as 
their horses gave out. Chicho sacrificed his life protecting Pino, urging him to hide in the 
swamp grass, just as the guerrillas approached hacking the valiant mulatto aid-de-camp to 
death. “In a moment, the guerrilleros were upon Chicho, and he fell from his saddle under 
blows without a word. Half a dozen guerrilleros urged their horses in pursuit past the 
arroyo. Others stopped to ‘calentar la sangre’ (warm their blood) with a hack at 
Chicho’s body, causing a blockade in the narrow trail behind.”193 “‘There must be 
another ñáñigo about here,’ shouted an officer, pushing past the files and galloping by. 
‘No, my Captain,” said one of the guerrilleros, “it is the horse of one whom I shot myself 
from the saddle some distance back.’ Then one of them took Chicho’s belt and machete 
as souvenirs, and the guerrilla move on.”194 Although Flint ultimately judged both 
soldiers as cowards for fleeing Spanish attack, the mulatto was more valiant because he 
faced death without fear, while Pino hid in the underbrush shamefully. 
 Other reports of the immorality among Cienfuegos forces focused on the leisurely 
lifestyles of some insurgents, who preferred an easy life to sacrifice for the Patria: Pepe 
Aguiar “was a thickset, bullet-headed young man, of genial bearing, but not a very 
soldierly character, for he always seemed to be foraging on his own account, or making 
love to peasant girls near the town by night, and sleeping by day when his force courted 
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ease in the woods. As a sample of his discipline, the prefect and I once rode into his camp 
at midnight without being challenged.”195 Another case of demoralization was the black 
Major Aniceto Hernández. “The prefect had found in the woods remains of cattle killed 
without his knowledge, and I was with him when he tracked down and discovered the 
perpetrators, and he found them to be members of Anicet[o]’s force, who maintained a 
little prefecture of their own in the forests, where they lived in lawless ease and did no 
fighting.”196 
So disheartening were the reports of the disorganization and incompetence of 
Cienfuegos forces that General Máximo Gómez, himself, came to the camp of Major 
Hernández, to scold the forces about their inactivity. “There the old General gave them a 
lecture that made them wince more than the steel of the Spaniards. Every man of them 
felt that the eye of the great war chief was on him personally. He had heard, he said, that 
they had been machete, cut up, and made to run like sheep by a small Spanish guerrilla. 
He had travelled the entire length of the Island, and had never heard of such a disgraceful 
thing before. He would put them, he said, in the future where they would have to 
fight.”197 According to Flint, Gómez gave instructions to divide this force and to put these 
men in places of danger as often as possible. “As for Anicet[o] himself, he must have 
overslept, for he was captured by Captain Pineira of the Lajas Guerrilla and shot in the 
town of Las Lajas.”198 
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Part of the problem, according to insurgent chief Alejandro Rodríguez, was that 
the men in power were selfish, seeking advancement for themselves, rather than for the 
Patria. “The ambition and unmeasured pretensions of the large part of the chiefs, 
accustomed until today to do whatever they desire, because of the weakness of General 
Aguirre […] hiding the resources that exist that they esteem are private property and not 
of the Patria.”199 
Another problem was the regionalism among forces in the zone of Cienfuegos. 
With the invasion from the East, many oriental leaders remained to command local 
troops in the central provinces, especially Cienfuegos. Born in Sancti-Spíritus, Rodríguez 
briefly commanded the Cienfuegos Brigade, later transferring to the division of Havana 
and Matanzas. Local leaders rejected the leadership of the “invaders,” he claimed: 
“because they are so localist that they see as an intruder and usurper of their rights the 
person who comes from another locality, trying with calumnies and false information to 
lead the operation astray and to create difficulties so that it fails and thus making it seem 
that they are the only ones apt to fill the first place…”200 Just as he had refused to 
cooperate with Cabrera in his investigation of the brigade, Rodríguez faced resentment 
from his men, which he understood to have originated from him hailing from a different 
part of the island. 
Rodríguez felt firsthand the fierce regionalism of soldiers in the Brigade of 
Cienfuegos: “The acts of brigandage realized by the chiefs in the west of this division 
encouraged by the impunity, surely because you do not know of these facts, constituting 
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each one of them a separate group and practicing themselves to not obey anyone and 
being disposed to reject by force the chief [who] commands them, complaining those and 
the others that resources are not sent to them and orders and strange chiefs are, when 
here, there are so many, according to them, who could fill all the posts, is another 
difficulty.” Perhaps most disheartening to Rodríguez was the way his soldiers silently 
rejected his command, rather than confronting it openly: “All this is done in a deaf 
[sordo] way with a smile on the lips, observing the best ways [mejores formas] but trying 
to take advantage of a mistake [descuido] to stab in the back [herir en la espalda] No one 
dares do anything in my presence. You know that I have more than enough valor to 
punish whoever would do that; but it is the same deaf war [guerra sorda], lowly and evil 
swine of the other localities that wears at my patience, saddens me, and embarrasses me. 
Could it be possible that men who abandon their homes and are disposed to lose their 
lives cannot also sacrifice to the Patria their pretensions!”201 
Insurgent chiefs from Cienfuegos placed a high value on the patronage networks 
that connected to local populations. Alfredo Lewis, a native of Cienfuegos and insurgent 
chief claimed that his military success rested upon his relationship to rural farmers: “I am 
not worth anything,” he wrote to Máximo Gómez, “but in my town, in this Cienfuegos, I 
have great relations with the honorable class of farmers, the true patriots of Cuba.” His 
influence among the farmers allowed him to rally greater support for the revolution. 
“They listen to me and they go where I bring them, trusting, and I, convinced that they 
will go only where honor and duty take them,” he wrote of Cienfuegos farmers-turned-
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patriots.
202
 At the same time as Lewis articulated the importance of connections to the 
local population for insurgent suggests, he also alluded to a distinct definition of 
patriotism. In contrast to the vision of patriotism prevailing among eastern insurgents, 
Lewis emphasized the centrality of the honorable (white) farmer to central definitions of 
patriotism.
203
 
 
Race and Regionalism in Visions of Patriotism 
  
The consolidation of the rebel forces and the enforcement of morality in 
Cienfuegos in the wake of the invasion campaign transformed the social dynamics of the 
Brigade. The invasion campaign brought an influx of thousands of eastern soldiers and 
even catapulted eastern chiefs into the leadership and ranks of the local forces. Many of 
these chiefs and soldiers were blacks. For example, in February 1896, 200 soldiers of the 
Brigade of Cienfuegos transferred to the infantry commanded by black eastern chief 
Quintín Bandera, while José Camacho Yera, a black chief from Santiago occupied 
another leadership role in the Brigade of Cienfuegos.
204
 Moreover, local country residents 
from Cumanayagua, Palmira, Camarones, Cruces, Lajas, Cartagena, Yaguaramas, Abreus 
and Rodas joined the insurrection en masse, resulting in a predominance of black rural 
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farmers in the army.
205
 Approximately 80 percent of blacks in the Brigade of Cienfuegos 
joined the army in the period between February 1895 and February 1896.
206
 
 In contrast, the pattern of white leadership in the Brigade continued intact. Whites 
like Alejandro Rodríguez, Rafael María Cañizares and Joaquín Rodríguez commanded 
the insurgent forces in Cienfuegos and the surrounding countryside. Claudio Sarría was 
the only locally-born black man to reach a position of command in the Brigade of 
Cienfuegos by mid-1896.
207
 The socially-conservative tendencies persisting in the 
leadership of the Brigade of Cienfuegos conflicted with the ascension of black eastern 
chiefs resulting from the Invasion. 
Between mid-1896 and mid-1897, the insurrection languished in the central 
provinces. Morale among the mambises reached new lows as prominent insurgent leaders 
met their deaths on the battlefield. The deaths of Serafín Sánchez in November 1896 and 
of Antonio Maceo and Panchito Gómez Toro in December 1896 marked a turning point 
in the war.
208
 The year 1897 showed the highest death rates, with nearly half of all 
wartime deaths in the Brigade of Cienfuegos and the Invasion force occurring during that 
year.
209
 The insurgent forces of Cienfuegos suffered the loss of General José María 
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Aguirre the chief of the brigade in January 1897.
210
 Desertions increased, reaching 
“alarming” proportions.211  Máximo Gómez noted a high number of deserters emanating 
from Santa Clara province between February and May 1897.
212
 Alejandro Rodríguez 
ordered the capture of several deserters from his brigade in June 1897.
213
 
Both black and white officers in late 1896 and early 1897 faced significant 
obstacles to fulfilling their orders to destroy sugar estates and prevent cane grinding due 
to lack of resources and heavy Spanish fortifications. For example, in September 1896, 
José B. Alemán complained of the “very active” enemy operations around Cienfuegos, 
the enemy “columns being very numerous.”214 Alejandro Rodríguez wrote to Máximo 
Gómez in December 1896 of the difficulties his forces faced in confronting the enemy. 
The enemy “continues his operations; because in this zone since my arrival and even in 
the rainy season they have not ceased to operate.” He assured Gómez that his forced were 
preparing to destroy the sugar mills in the vicinity “that is to say, trying to,” as the 
constant rains impeded the fires.
215
 By mid-1897, Colonel José Pérez informed General 
Francisco Carrillo that we would be unable to confront the private militias on the sugar 
estates because he lacked ammunition.
216
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 Insurgent chiefs like José B. Alemán, Francisco Carrillo, and Alfredo Rego 
pointed to the incompetence of certain black officer as the root of recent military failures. 
At the core of the accusations was the charge of immorality, a broad concept that 
encompassed a range of misbehaviors from laziness to sexual misconduct to banditry. 
The solution proposed by several insurgent chiefs was strict discipline and punishment of 
offenders. Cuban historian Orlando García Martínez noted that “in the very brigade of 
Cienfuegos, the Brigadier Alfredo Rego showed himself to be drastic with some chiefs of 
the black race who committed indiscipline.”217 Rego wrote to Máximo Gómez declaring 
that, “you will like my Infantry. They are well-disciplined, contentment and much union 
reigns among them. I have had to be at the beginning somewhat severe to the extreme of 
having to shoot Commandant Matos and his brother, and also Captain Ramon Sarduy and 
I demoted two officers.”218 Rego seemed to equate discipline with severe punishment of 
black officers. 
In the same period, the black insurgent Captain Claudio Sarría faced court-martial 
for demanding money from Damián Machado, a Chinese contractor of Central 
Soledad.
219
 Sarría denied the charges, but the military tribunal convicted him and 
demoted him to the rank of private. Writing to Máximo Gómez, he underscored the 
injustice in his conviction. “I went to the revolutionary camp on the first day of August in 
1895. I have been unjustly demoted […] being until today a captain, and having served 
the fatherland as a brave soldier.” Sarría saw himself as a true son of Cuba, having 
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devoted himself to the struggle for independence, only to be thanked by unjust accusation 
and unfair punishment: “I write this so you can see how I have always been serving the 
fatherland with the necessary honor of a son of Cuba, and that is it completely unjust 
what they have accused me of, as the call to do justice for all said, is historic.”220 It seems 
the insurgents leaders began to believe the reports of managers of Soledad estate 
depicting Sarría as a destructive and barbarous bandit, rather than a freedom fighter, as he 
saw himself.
221
 
 Desiderio Matos, also known as “Tuerto” (one-eyed) Matos, faced death for 
accusations of banditry in 1897. Matos had made his living as a bandit roaming Santa 
Clara province in the 1880s and 1890s, but proclaimed his support for the revolution in 
1895.
222
 Flint earlier described Matos as one of the good insurgents: “There are some 
good insurgent forces, however, one of them under the command of Desiderio Marto 
[sic], a tall one-eyed man who made the forests near Yaguaramas his headquarters, with 
something less than one hundred men, half infantry.”223 Yet his good reputation among 
that American war correspondent was insufficient to redeem him in the eyes of his white 
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compatriots. Avelino Sanjenis shot Desiderio “Tuerto” Matos and a brother in 1897 for 
an act of vandalism.
224
 
 In late 1896, José B. Alemán, as sub-inspector of the Liberating Army, initiated a 
campaign to end immorality among insurgents in the central provinces. This campaign 
culminated in a series of court-martials of black veterans after his election as the 
Inspector General of the Liberating Army under the provisional government of 
Bartolomé Masó. Born in 1864 in the central Cuban city of Santa Clara, Alemán was a 
pivotal figure in the separatist movement in the central provinces. Alemán joined the 
insurrection in 1895, after making his living as a young journalist in the 1880s. After the 
war he became one of the most vocal advocate for independence in Santa Clara 
Province.
225
 
In late 1896, he sought to punish a black officer, Juan Benítez Benítez for “very 
grave misdemeanors of military insubordination, negligence, abandonment of the service 
and falsifying public documentation.”226 In a letter to Gómez, Alemán wrote of the 
incompetence of the black colonel: “With the sincere [ingesta] frankness of the 
fulfillment of my obligation, I see myself required to indicate to you as I do the 
insufficiency of the Colonel Benítez, who does not know how to read or write, and is 
incapable of give rise to this Brigade.” Alemán claimed that the reputation of Benítez 
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highlighted his unsuitability for insurgent leadership. What is more, “and this fact 
influences strongly against him, Benítez was as a pacifico a kidnapper, and a life sentence 
[in jail] weighs over him, which takes away prestige to earn sympathy among the good 
elements who aide the Revolution in the villages.”227 Again making use of the language 
of masculinity, Alemán argued that the insubordination of Juan B. Benítez threatened his 
prestige as a military man: “It constitutes a pattern of ignominy for the said soldier who 
has stained his name with the perpetration of several very grave misdemeanors.”228 
Alemán continued to clash with black officers. In April 1897, a dispute between 
José B. Alemán and black Colonel José González Calunga highlighted the tensions in 
claims for power and influence between black and white insurgents in the central 
provinces. The conflict emerged when González refused to comply with orders Alemán 
had given him. González responded that he respected no other orders than those coming 
from General Máximo Gómez. He sent Lieutenant Colonel Reyes, also black, to present 
the complaint to Alemán. Alemán rejected what he perceived as insubordination by 
González, writing to Gómez, “indignant,” to complain about “the rude, ignorant and 
incorrect man.”229 He lamented that many black officials did not know “their place”: 
“Disgracefully, those brutish colonels, who are not decent people, nor do they know how 
to read or write, and [are] stupid, racist, and animals, abound in this revolution. How I 
have suffered having to see them—I do not speak to them—such simpleton[s] that [they 
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do] not even know what Patria is, nor what is shame nor honor.”230 Alemán harnessed the 
colorblind discourse of José Martí to condemn the black generals as unpatriotic because 
of their attention to race. 
 For Alemán, the lack of respect for his authority by the black officials was 
offensive. He vowed to force these colonels to acknowledge his superior authority, or he 
would resign.
231
 In essence, Alemán gave Gómez an ultimatum between retaining men 
like him—educated, intelligent, and honorable, and defending men like González, who he 
claimed, represented black hunger for military power and leadership. 
 Gómez was sympathetic to the unfavorable descriptions of the black colonel, but 
he suggested that they did not know any better. Although González Calunga was “a 
courageous and honorable man,” Gómez rote, “he is not a man of clear intelligence and 
never owing to evil but rather to excess zeal would he commit inconvenience like what 
he has obliged you to present in your very just claim.” He encouraged Alemán to forgive 
González. Gómez reassured Alemán of his valuable service as Inspector General, and 
encouraged him to “forgive your comrade for his indiscretion.”232 Gómez reminded 
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Alemán that patriotism entailed collaborating across racial lines, as well as looking past 
the innate inferiorities of the black soldiers in support of the revolution. 
 In May 1897, Máximo Gómez reflected negatively upon the celebrated black 
Chief of the Brigade of Remedios, José González Planas. Referring to a report by 
Francisco Carrillo, Gómez wrote: “It seems that the Chief of the Brigade of Remedios is 
a valiant man, but not very energetic. And I believe it, as it justifies the surprise the 
Spanish have given him…” Gómez recognized the contrast in the report Carrillo gave 
and the previously untarnished record of service of the black chief: “it is to be lamented, 
as his name was pretty high for his anterior triumphs, but you know that the latest 
victories are the ones that have the most shine, and no good soldier should neglect [his 
duty] to avoid a[nother] Waterloo.”233 Previous military achievements, according to 
Gómez, did not exempt González from intense scrutiny thereafter. 
By March of the following year, Gómez again wrote of the complaints against 
González: “You do not know that complaints that arrive to me from those people about 
the Brigadier González. Complaints may have originated from agitation by a former aide-
de-camp, José Nodarse, who defected to the Spanish in early 1898. The Spanish general 
Marcos García had encouraged him to use his considerable influence among the few 
white soldiers under González to undermine the authority of the black officer. He 
complied by sending defamatory letters to white soldiers under the command of 
González
234
 When news reached Gómez, he lamented the “Vandalistic deeds, as they go 
around the ranches shooting pretending to be Spaniards, to rob the families; imagine what 
                                                 
233
 Quoted in Máximo Gómez to Francisco Carrillo, May 11, 1897 in Cartas a Francisco Carrillo, 160. 
234
 Sartorius, “Limits of Loyalty…,” 251. 
  
105 
 
a horrendous crime. It is necessary to cut it out at its root.” According to one of these 
reports, the infantry of Remedios “is not as brave a lion as it is made out to be.”235  
Gómez wrote that “more are the torments they cause us than [they cause] the 
Spaniards.”236 
 The series of complaints, trials and court-martial cases brought against black 
insurgents between late 1897 and 1898 highlight a struggle for power within the Cuban 
army. In the early days of the war, when the brigade of Cienfuegos was neither organized 
nor consolidated, the structures of power and military hierarchies were in flux. With the 
invasion of Gómez and Maceo from the east, they began to organize the forces of 
Cienfuegos, sometimes under eastern black leadership. This provoked rejection among 
white insurgent leaders, who sought to claim military power on par with their social 
status before the war. As Cubans contemplated victory, a substantial influx of the most 
privileged members of Cienfuegos society flooded the brigade, bringing with them their 
ideas of social hierarchy and claims to power. The complaints against black soldiers 
specifically highlight a re-negotiation of the social hierarchies within the revolution. 
Nowhere is this renegotiation of racial and regional power starker than in the case of 
Quintín Bandera. 
 
Race, Masculinity and the Limits of Political Legitimacy: The Case of Quintín 
Bandera 
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In May 1897, Juan Massó Parra, an insurgent leader who later defected along with 
an entire regiment to the Spanish forces, brought news to the General Command that 
Quintín Bandera was living with a concubine in the hills of Trinidad.
237
 Máximo Gómez 
wrote: “There are, among other sad news, that comes to me from Trinidad, [reports] that 
Quintín Bandera, not only is over there, executing his plans [designios][…] of majasería 
with a concubine,” but also that he has written to decent people “demanding sums of 
money with threats.”238 These accusations led to a court-martial of Bandera in which he 
was found guilty and stripped of his command and soldiers. The trial and punishment of 
Bandera was a key moment in which white and black expectations of their roles and their 
future in Cuba Libre clashed. 
While black officers like Bandera tested the limits of their military authority, 
whites protested against expanding black leadership. Even though black military 
ascension was theoretically justified and validated in the discourse of racial brotherhood 
defining the Cuban cause, whites defined this so-called equality not as social and political 
parity between whites and blacks, but merely as the cooperation among black and whites 
within an already established racial hierarchy. Whites laid claim to military leadership by 
asserting their manliness, while pointing to the failures and transgressions of masculine 
honor of certain black leaders that threatened their privileged position in the military 
hierarchy. 
The ability of a man like Quintín Bandera—uneducated and unpretentious—to 
reach a position of power and prestige within the Cuban Army scared many white 
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centrales, or insurgents from the central provinces. The Sugar Revolution in Cuba at the 
turn of the nineteenth century gave late rise to the plantation complex in that island. 
Substantial American capital investment and the highly fertile soils of the so-called 
llanura roja (red plain) fostered the continuing prosperity of the western and central 
provinces while the Eastern provinces languished with primitive technology and 
declining fertility of the soils.
239
 Declining productivity in the eastern provinces by the 
mid-nineteenth century had undermined the institution of slavery early on, while two 
anti-colonial wars had further chipped away at the colonial racial order.
240
 Not only was 
the East demographically blacker than the central provinces, it was also associated with 
black rebellion.
241
 
In contrast, Cienfuegos was at the very core of the prosperous Cuban western and 
central sugar economy. Americans including Edwin F. Atkins, Elias Ponvert, the owners 
of Constancia Sugar Company and many others had poured capital into this flourishing 
region, reinvigorating the institution of slavery in the nineteenth century. Cienfuegos 
became home to three of the largest, most technologically modern sugar mills in Cuba—
Soledad, Hormiguero and Constancia—all of which relied heavily upon enslaved labor 
up until the abolition of the institution in 1886. The continuing prominence of slavery in 
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Cuba up until the 1880s reinforced racial divisions, as central Cuba exhibited a stricter 
racial hierarchy than eastern zones like Bayamo and Santiago. 
The demographic and developmental differences between the eastern and central 
provinces crystalized during the Invasion from the East. In this pivotal military campaign, 
eastern army headed by numerous black chiefs marched into Santa Clara, and some of the 
black officers established their arenas of operations in the central provinces. Bandera was 
one of these men who marched into the central provinces at the head of a contingent of 
oriental black soldiers. One American officer described his 200 “orientales” as “a ragged 
line of nearly naked blacks on foot,” who “wore hats of all shapes, with frayed brims, and 
without brims, while some were all brims and no crown.”242 This unsightly image of the 
orientales diverged from the way some men envisioned the liberating army, and by 
implication the nation. 
Some whites in Las Villas rejected black authority. Cosme de la Torriente 
commented on the leadership of Bandera in Las Villas: “Undoubtedly, given the 
conditions of Quintín, he will not be very convenient in Las Villas.”243 Serafín Sánchez 
took this insight into consideration when he overturned the order of Antonio Maceo, 
placing Bandera in charge of the Second Division: “The leadership of the 2nd Division 
was vacant, as even though Antonio Maceo named the blackman Quintín Bandera to fill 
it, Serafín Sánchez did not comply with the order, interpreting that way the desires of the 
white insurgents of Las Villas, who thought it ‘inconvenient for the cause of command 
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the BLACK GENERAL in this territory.’”244 It was no coincidence that the black general 
Bandera was charged for his behavior in Trinidad, a city singled out by American 
military officials for its racist tendencies and continued segregation in 1899.
245
 
 
Image 4: “One of Quintín Bandera’s               Image 5: “Quintín Bandera 
‘Brave Orientales’”246                 and his mule”247 
 
        
 
 
While many Cubans perhaps subscribed to the ideal of racial brotherhood, many 
whites in the central provinces thought that allowing blacks to occupy positions of 
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leadership took this concept too far. Insurgents chiefs of the central provinces were 
forced to balance the socially-conservative tendencies of certain chiefs and potential 
recruits with the necessity of black participation to securing victory. They may have been 
particularly sensitive to the Spanish propaganda condemning the Cuban cause based on 
the participation and leadership of blacks. Spaniards focused on Bandera as a particularly 
egregious example of the insurgents fomenting social anarchy by encouraging black 
leadership. 
The case of one Spaniard who joined the insurrection under Quintín Bandera 
demonstrates the racial anxieties at the core of insurgent negotiations of military 
hierarchies after the invasion from the east. The Spaniard enlisted “for the best honor of 
the class, to lend services in the band of the black man Quintín Bandera, who quickly 
made the white VillaClaran feel the full weight of his great and natural rudeness, treating 
him like, after all, a person whose clumsy conduct proved his moral disregard deserved,” 
observed one Spaniard.
248
 This man had dishonored his country not only by defecting 
from Spain and joining the insurrection, but by joining a band of “bunch of shabby 
oriental negroes.”249 By supporting the insurrection, this Spaniard argued, his defected 
compatriot supported the social anarchy embodied in black military leadership. 
The man deserved such punishment for his disloyalty, according to the Spanish 
observer. He “went not for a short time, trotting by foot and breaking guineas and 
maniguas in those lands, opening the way, stroked and comfortable, of the mule on which 
the black chief was mounted,” wrote the Spaniard, depicting the insurrection in terms of 
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savagery. His poor compatriot obliged the orders of Bandera “until, his body [was] 
lacerated and his spirit thinned.” He entered the encampment of Máximo Gomez “and 
asked him, exposing his suffering and his condition as a career man, for another position 
of less fatigue, in harmony with his technical knowledge, for him to serve the 
revolutionary cause.” Gómez denied this request claiming that everyone was a majá!250 
While Gómez was unsympathetic to the lowly position of the newly enlisted Spaniard, 
his compatriot observed that it represented an abuse of the social order. 
Gómez may not have minded the abuse of a lowly Spaniard, the racialized 
propaganda bothered other white insurgent officers, who envisioned the cause of Cuba 
Libre as pure and honorable. Maintaining social hierarchy, as Alemán suggested in his 
letters complaining of black insubordination and immorality, was integral to upholding 
the honor of the insurrection. Some insurgent chiefs saw the lofty military aspirations of 
Bandera as a threat to the internal hierarchy, and thus a potential menace to the honor, 
stability and success of the Cuban cause. To debunk Spanish racial propaganda, insurgent 
leaders had to prove the moral purity of Cuba Libre. One way they sought to demonstrate 
moral purity was by configuring a leadership that exemplified the better classes, 
understood as educated, honorable, white men, and downplaying the participation and 
leadership of lower elements, who like Bandera, tended to be uneducated, rustic, and 
above all black. 
Insurgent leaders worried that the leadership of a man so far outside the normative 
standard of masculine honor would undermine the image of purity of Cuba Libre. Cuban 
manliness hinged on a paradoxical understanding of morality that privileged virility in 
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military exploits while simultaneously prescribing sexual abnegation. The fact that 
Bandera maintained a concubine in war undermined his allegiance to the Cuban cause 
and put into question ability to sacrifice his own personal pleasures for the benefit of the 
war. “We should not permit,” wrote Gómez to Francisco Carrillo, “…that the purity of 
the Revolution be stained anymore nor that its glorious flag be dragged through the 
mud.”251 Gómez worried that the immorality of insurgent chiefs would discredit the 
movement for independence: “All this,” he lamented, “that the Spanish know, they will 
take advantage of it […] The morality of the war, as if to say the soul, its secret power, 
grows ill and weak, a bad growth that I try to ward off, but that men without virtues, the 
one[s] that one needs to possess in a job like this, cannot seem to understand; and 
tomorrow they will dare to say: ‘I was a fighter for Cuban independence’ when they had 
not been able to be constant and correct warriors.”252 The sexual behavior of the officers 
determined military outcomes while reflecting the morality of the Cuban army more 
generally, and more importantly of the cause of independence. 
The spectacle of the extra-marital sex between Bandera and his concubine 
differed from the semblance of legitimate marriage carried on by some black generals, 
like José González Planas, for example.  “The brigadier is a blackman of pure race, he 
has recently married a young little mulatto girl [pardita jovencita]. I do not know if they 
have married by law; but at least the keep up appearances and […this] is the most that we 
can demand with respect to morality from certain elements.”253 Adherence to the sexual 
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values of middle-class white society was crucial to assuring legitimacy and acceptance in 
a white man’s world. 
Although Gómez emphasized the centrality of sexual morality in upholding the 
purity of Cuba Libre, it appeared to be enforced more strictly for certain groups. Bandera 
admitted to keeping his concubine in battle, and this may have legitimated his 
conviction,
254
 but numerous Gómez and other high-ranking insurgent chiefs 
acknowledged identical sexual escapades among white officers and soldiers. Fermín 
Valdés-Domínguez, for example, highlighted the unwarranted leniency of Calixto García 
toward officers enjoying lives of luxury including sex with multiple different women. 
Reflecting on the transgressions of certain eastern officers such as Brigadier Bonne, 
Lorencito, Portuondo and one Andrés participated, Valdés-Domínguez related bitterly: 
“they all eat well and have women and go from retreat to retreat and from mountain to 
mountain within occupying themselves with going to whip the soldiers.”255 None of them 
faced punishment: “Calixto knows all this and he consents, lets the small ones do it, and 
claims that it can be changes and sold and other immoralities of the style.”256These white 
officers lived the same “immoral life” as did Bandera, but suffered no consequences. 
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Máximo Gómez knew of at least two other white chiefs who at the same time as 
Bandera maintained concubines: “I feel sad in this summer or spring campaign,” wrote 
Gómez in his diary and “my sadness consists in the torment that some immoral and 
disorderly Chiefs have given me, like Quintín Bandera, even José María Rodríguez who 
has tucked himself away in the hill with women. Even Enrique Loynaz [del Castillo], 
giving with this a bad example and not seconding my efforts.”257 Gómez communicated 
his disappointment to the chief of the fourth corps, Francisco Carrillo: “Mayía and 
Loynaz and even you figure into this problem…,” he wrote. “Mayía set up camp in 
‘Quemado,’ I believe, with a concubine, Loynaz abducted a girl and is living with her; 
after it is added, that he abused a prefect because he did not send milk and he violently 
took the mother cow and brought it to his ranch.” Gómez did not hold a high opinion of 
Rodríguez, calling him “misguided,” and observing that “until now he has been given 
everything, without having being able to do anything serious to make the Spanish respect 
him.”258 Gómez against linked sexual impropriety to military failures, while suggesting 
that earning the respect of Spaniards was a key concern in military strategy. Neither 
Loynaz nor Rodríguez faced charges, however, suggesting that white sexual 
transgression, it seems, did not result in the tarnishing of honor. 
It appeared that challenging the sexual conduct of respected men was somewhat 
taboo. Valdés-Domínguez voiced his accusations gingerly, so as not to offend the dignity 
of men of his similar social and racial background: “and this is not to say that the chiefs 
who are around there are cowards or rotten, but that they lack time to think about the 
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problems, and it should be noted that there is not one of them who is content with one 
lover, all of them have various [concubines] and in each house it is a rubric that they have 
stores and dispatch and commerce.”259 Interestingly, Bandera was considered a coward, 
while Loynaz and Rodríguez, who transgressed in the same manner were not cowards. 
At the same time as Rodríguez freely exercised his sexual freedom without 
sanction, he criticized Bandera for his sexual transgressions. In a rare direct articulation 
of racial tensions, Rodríguez linked sexual impropriety, blackness and poor patriotism, 
calling Bandera and his men “a bunch of Negroes and bandits taking care of Negresses” 
(negros y bandidos cuidadores de negras).
260
 With this description of Bandera, his 
behavior and his men, Mayía suggested that there was no place for privileged black 
women in Cuba Libre. At the same time, he implied that there was a sexual double 
standard for whites and blacks. While whites could flout sexual norms and values by 
maintaining concubines, blacks acting in similar ways were immoral and criminal. 
Although he may have used a strong condemnation of Bandera to cover his own 
shortcomings, he more likely expressed a value that prevailed among his peers: that 
whites should have more sexual privilege than blacks. 
There seemed to have been a history of personal grievances between Rodríguez 
and Bandera. In one letter to Máximo Gómez, Bandera recounted one such incident. 
When Rodríguez came across “some women mounted on mules, he asked who they were 
and they told him they were with Bandera and his people had a squad protecting them.” 
In turn, “he ordered them to collect the squad and asked to borrow one of the mules for 
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three days and this is that date that he has given it back, and he insulted the individuals of 
the squad, sending some of them to the infantry saying that they were bandits and other 
expressions…” Bandera used this example to request to be removed from the command 
of Rodríguez: “it is impossible to continue under the orders of this chief, who orders me 
[to do] nothing and so insults my prestige.”261 
Some insurgent leaders disputed the racial caricature employed by Rodríguez. 
Fermín Valdés-Domínguez defended eastern blacks against his accusations, claiming that 
he condemned “oriental officers who have reached a high position among us for their 
bravery and honor, just because they were poor and humble and because they were 
black.”262 Valdés-Domínguez certainly made no apologies for Bandera, either, claiming 
that his actions must be punished under “the holy principles of dignity and patriotism.”263 
Yet there was no room for explicit racism. 
Unsurprisingly, and despite the general knowledge that Mayía Rodriguez 
maintained concubines during his campaigns, Loynaz wrote in defense of himself and his 
white comrade-in-arms—but not in defense of Bandera—in the years after the war. 
Describing the reflections of Gómez on his immoral behavior during the war, Loynaz 
wrote that these words were “hurtful and erroneous.” In defense of Mayía, Loynaz wrote 
that he “never had women in the war, not in Trinidad, or in any place.” Loynaz had to 
admit his own faults: “In my case, I recognize my fault, if in one or another love-affair, I 
can be accused my twenty-five years. But my fault would not be greater than that of other 
                                                 
261
 Quintín Bandera to Máximo Gómez, May 4, 1897, Box 7, File 996, ANC/FPMG. 
262
 Valdés-Domínguez, Diario de un soldado, IV, 47. 
263
 Ibid., 129. 
  
117 
 
illustrious—not excepting the very Máximo Gómez—to whom in the somber vicissitudes 
of a war of pains and privations, were not missing the angelic hands that cured the 
wounds of the body and those of the spirit, and embalmed with generous devotion the 
rare hour[s] of fleeting rest.”264 
Loynaz admitted that Bandera had maintained women during the war: “he did 
have one in other days, only in the service of the kitchen and for laundry—that I know—
he had two, when I found him in the camp of Veguita on June 25, [1897] the date and 
place where I substituted his command over his infantry by order of General Mayía 
Rodríguez.”265 If upholding the moral righteousness of the insurrection had provided the 
motive for the court-martial of Bandera, it was certainly ironic to send Loynaz, a man 
who admitted his own moral transgressions during war, to substitute Bandera.
266
 
Although Loynaz did not defend the sexual relationship, he did justify the 
decision of his compatriot to disobey orders: “The disobedience of Bandera only 
consisted of the argument not to sacrifice his troops ‘in the slaughterhouse of 
Matanzas.’”267 Upon the arrival of Loynaz at his camp to collect the troops, Bandera 
“demonstrated the greatest gentility and patriotism.” He explained to Loynaz: “I have not 
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wanted to disobey the Authority; I just wanted to reason; because that contingent that cost 
so much work to get together, is now going to the slaughterhouse.” “This force here 
could have fought, but there will die,” continued Bandera, a prediction that became 
reality in the disastrous battles of El Relámpago and El Plátano in late June and early July 
1897.
268
 Loynaz observed that “the old freedom fighter seemed to me greater in his 
patriotic resignation.”269 After detailing a series of skirmished, he remarked bitterly: 
“And General Gómez represents us in the hills with women.”270 
The decision to persecute only Bandera indicated a divergence in the expectations 
of certain groups of men. The impunity afforded to Loynaz and Rodríguez suggested that 
transgressions of sexual honor did not threaten the prestige of white men. At the same 
time, the sexual conduct of black men, particularly those in positions of power, was 
severely policed and transgressions intensely punished. 
At stake in policing black sexuality was demonstrating to skeptics that the Cuban 
insurrection did not seek to overturn the racial order. In order to win over those who 
feared the racially transformative aspects of the revolution, it was necessary to prove that 
black insurgents were “under control,” and still respected white authority and moral 
righteousness. Bandera did not comply. He was a “rustic man,” an uneducated country 
dweller who reflected more accurately the imperfections and weaknesses of the majority 
of the rank and file than he did keep up the illusion of white middle-class perfection with 
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which many of the officers identified.
271
 Even the black officers like Antonio Maceo had 
prided themselves on their education, refinement and culture—that is, their distance from 
slavery and blackness. For example, portraits of Maceo emphasized his light skin, while 
Flor Crombet was celebrated for his knowledge of European languages and history. 
Black officers with little formal education like Bandera and Guillermo Moncada were 
often depicted a brutes, savages, and racists. Whites ridiculed Bandera, claiming that he 
and his men ran around with rings in their noses and wearing loin cloths.
272
 “The terror of 
the Spanish in Havana was Quintín Bandera, who they said brought a contingent of 
Haitian blacks with narigón and a thousand other insults.”273 The image of Bandera 
contrasted quite dramatically with that of more respectable officers of color, like the 
Maceo brothers, “in whom they [whites] had confidence as pure men.”274 
While the majority of the accusers at the court martial of Bandera were white 
men, in other instances black men from his same province of Oriente had also accused 
him of similar crimes. These men included Antonio and José Maceo, Guillermo 
Moncada, and Dimas Zamora.
275
 The fact that both blacks and whites complained about 
Bandera at first glance may seem to suggest that his court-martial did not reflect racial 
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conflict. Yet, upon closer examination, it seems that many of his black accusers abided 
by the same assumptions as did his white compatriots. 
The open defiance of the norms of white hegemonic masculinity by Bandera 
threatened the claim of black military men, like the Zamora, to honor and respectability 
among the predominantly white officer class. In a world in which race implied poverty 
and low social status, successful blacks sought to distance themselves from less-educated 
“rustic” blacks, as a way to prove their culture and civilization—in a word, their 
whiteness. Bandera was, in many ways, the opposite of the ideal black insurgent, who 
was only acceptable because he was “inoffensive” and did not threaten the main 
assumption that whiteness was best.
276
 Undoubtedly, because men seeking the respect 
and acceptance of white officers like Gómez and García came from the same place and 
displayed similar racial traits as men of lower education and status like Bandera, they 
worried they might be lumped in the same category as the latter, and thereby lose their 
respectability and distinction. Men like Zamora, in contrast to regional and racial 
allegiances, had a vested interest in persecuting Bandera, who they judged, tarnished their 
own reputation as negros orientales. 
Masculine honor became a prerequisite for political power. However, like social 
prestige, manliness was more readily available for certain groups than for others. The 
“political self-sacrifice” inscribed in joining an “insurgency offered a way for men to 
vindicate their claims to manliness and qualify themselves for leadership in an extremely 
public forum.”277 Black access to manliness depended on an explicit disavowal of 
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stereotypes of the sexually insatiable black male who threatened the sexual honor of 
white women. The type of masculinity supported by the Revolution was “not too 
aggressive or sexualized but ascetic and austere—a self-sacrificing manhood that serve as 
example to others.” Part of this manhood rested on the ability of men to resist sexual 
temptation, a sacrifice that instilled in them more political and spiritual authority.
278
 A 
significant part of performing black respectability and upholding the norms of white 
masculinity involved respecting sexual taboos. Maintaining good morality was especially 
important considering the widespread Spanish propaganda depicting the insurgents as 
barbarous blacks, including unsubstantiated reports that black men raped white women 
during the war.
279
 To earn the respect of their white compatriots, black veterans had to 
forgo sexual contact with white women. In contrast to the confrontational demeanor of 
Bandera were the expectations many white Cubans had of their black compatriots. Black 
soldiers and officers were supposed to be modest, docile, and submissive—in a way, less 
masculine—while white officers could transgress social and racial boundaries with little 
or no consequence. 
Sexual transgression provided a motive for persecuting Bandera for violating the 
implicit expectation that blacks would aspire to imitate white middle class customs while 
respecting the color-line. Although other black insurgent chiefs had also maintained 
concubines during the war, the women were invariable black. For example, José Maceo 
kept two or three “mulaticas,” and one of his concubines Agripina Barroso Lazo, known 
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as “La Negra,” followed him long enough to have his child.280 In contrast, Bandera had 
already trespassed against racial etiquette by marrying a blond Spanish woman he had 
met in the Baleares during his exile after the Guerra Chiquita.
281
 
Bandera also had a history of flouting the racial line, causing considerable 
scandal, for example, in 1896 when he asked one white woman to dance. When she 
declined, he denounced her, claiming “you do not dance with me because I am black,” 
and emphasizing the importance of “patriotism, republican equality and valor.” The result 
was considerable “disgusto” among the people present.282 Perhaps the most threatening 
aspect of the nonconformist sexual behavior of Bandera was that it challenged the 
manliness and virility of white men. Bandera flouted prevailing standards of sexual 
honor, and challenged the virility of white men, by showcasing the sexual allure of 
military power and prestige. At the same time, Bandera offended prominent black 
officers, many of whom had come from relatively privileged backgrounds. 
Bandera not only violated racial etiquette by flaunting his inter-racial desires, but 
he also publically rejected any hostility toward these advances through a language of 
racism. By employing a language of race to point out instances of racial discrimination, 
Bandera called attention to the fallacy of the discourse of racial equality, thereby 
undermining one of the main premises of the Revolution. In 1893, the celebrated Cuban 
patriot José Martí articulated this sentiment in an article published in the newspaper 
Patria: “What should the whites think of the black man who becomes vain from his 
                                                 
280
 Ibid., 66. 
281
 Abelardo Padrón, General de tres guerras (Havana: Editorial de Letras Cubanas, 1991), 341. 
282
 Tomás Savignón,   int n  andera: el mam   sacri icado   escarnecido (Havana: Ministerio de Defensa 
Nacional, 1948), 10-11.  
  
123 
 
color? To insist in the racial divisions, in the racial differences, of a people naturally 
divided, is to impede the public and individual venture, which can only be obtained by 
bringing people together.”283 In essence, Martí demanded silence on issues of race, in 
favor of the illusion of national harmony. At the same time, however, he stripped one of 
the most effective tools for combating the racism that continued to plague Cuban society: 
the language of race. Within this framework, any effort by blacks to organize against 
racial discrimination or even to use the language of race was “vilified as a threat to 
national unity and could thus be repressed.”284 
Although the utopian discourse of racial brotherhood provided an appearance of 
harmony within the revolution, black insurgents, and particularly black officers found 
themselves in a delicate positions. One the one hand, black officers were living proof of 
the meritocracy upon which the revolution was based. On the other hand, however, the 
very discourse they justified with their military ascension incapacitated them to articulate 
instances of discrimination in a language of race—even if they plainly understood the 
discrimination they faced originated from racial prejudice. 
Officers of color who appeased these double standards by adopting the norms and 
behaviors of hegemonic masculinity gained greater sympathy among their white 
comrades. For example, Lino D’Ou, black insurgent officer from Santiago, referred to 
fellow colored officer José González Planas, as “that great Cuban with a dark complexion 
but a white soul.” According to D’ou, “he was gentlemanly and good, modesty and 
fairness were the norms of his life, and that is why he quickly captured the esteem and 
                                                 
283
 José Martí, “Mi Raza,” Patria (New York), April 16, 1893. 
284
 Helg, Our Rightful Share, 106. 
  
124 
 
affection of everyone who knew him.”285 González was selected as the judge for the court 
martial of Bandera, despite his lower rank of lieutenant colonel.
286
 He confronted a 
similar situation as Bandera after the war. When at a dance, a white woman asked her 
male companion to introduce her to González, and hint that she would like to dance with 
him. González politely declined: “It will be the first time that I will not oblige a lady but 
it is impossible for me, señorita; I have to decline such  high honor: I do not know how to 
dance…,” he is reported to have answered. González declined despite being known to 
love dancing. “Even when a white woman took the initiative, González refused to 
transgress social boundaries, refused to use the prestige he had acquired in war to remake 
or manipulate social distinctions. As with his mistress during the war, González acted 
quietly, inconspicuously.”287 In the case of Quintín Bandera, the reality that a black 
officer could attract a white woman had already been confirmed by his second marriage 
to a Spanish woman prior to the war.
288
 
As a black insurgent chief, Bandera was supposed to serve as an example of the 
justice and moral righteousness of Cuba Libre. Instead, he publically exposed instances 
of injustice through a language of race. Because the illusion of racial brotherhood was 
upheld by an almost violently enforced silencing of race language, the ways Bandera 
chose to articulate injustice seemed to undermine the credibility of racial brotherhood 
within the Revolution. Bandera did not face sanction for maintaining a woman in camp; 
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too many other insurgent chiefs, both black and white did the same with no penalty. His 
sexual behavior may have provided an excuse and a way to persecute him for his militant 
racial ideas, and to deem credible once more the discourse of racial brotherhood.
289
 
The trial of Bandera was also a powerful warning that racial collaboration did not 
mean the disappearance of racial hierarchies or racial boundaries in intimate relations. 
With the ascension of black men into positions of power, the white hegemony on male 
honor began to disintegrate. The presence of black chiefs in the Cuban army triggered 
fears among white men that white women would chose black men as their partners over 
less successful white men, due to financial and status considerations. Moreover, if 
military success was a qualifier for political power, black protagonism in the war would 
mean black political leadership, a radical social transformation for which many whites 
were not prepared. Rather than articulate these anxieties through a language of race, 
white insurgent leaders sought to uphold the discourse of racial brotherhood by again 
silencing race as Martí had suggested in 1893. Sexual honor became one of the main 
weapons in the arsenal of white separatists to defend a social order that privileged 
whiteness. 
The double standard of masculine honor and dishonor enforced and legitimized 
racial exclusions without ever explicitly mentioning race, allowing the reality of racial 
discrimination to coexist with the discourse of racial equality. Manliness became a 
surrogate for race. White insurgents used sexual morality as a weapon to punish racial 
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transgressions, employing stereotypes of black sexual immorality to justify their 
inadequacy for leadership positions. The court-martial of Bandera not only highlighted a 
battle over what kind of person was capable of leadership and decision-making, as 
historian Ada Ferrer adeptly notes.
290
 
 
Concubines, Mambisas, and the Allure of Cuba Libre 
 
At the same time as insurgents policed black sexuality to make their cause 
palpable to socially-conservative elements, they also sought to project Cuban women as 
white and morally righteous to solicit international support. Instead of demonstrating 
manliness through sexuality, codes of insurgent masculinity emphasized the protection 
and salvation of women—chivalry. Kristen Hoganson has argued that the crisis of 
masculinity in the United States and the rise of the new woman in the late nineteenth 
century forced American men to intervene on behalf of Cuban women, “assuming the 
role of rescuer could win them [American] women’s esteem.”291 But before Americans 
could consider rescuing Cuban women, Cuban insurgents had to project a desirable 
image of the Cuban femininity to counteract Spanish associations of blackness. To 
compel Americans to support the Cuban cause, it was necessary to represent Cuban 
women as white, middle-class damsels in distress. 
Cuban insurgents, black and white, seemed to claim that Bandera keeping a 
concubine in battle undermined Cuban manliness by boasting the military prowess of 
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women. This “defiled the moral and male purity of the rebel cause.”292 Contesting 
prevailing ideals of chivalry, Bandera claimed that his concubine even fought with the 
soldiers. His compatriots viewed this proclamation with disgust. When Dimas Zamora 
read this letter he scoffed that “it seemed like a lie that a man to give prestige to a 
concubine would sink himself with such a clumsy and punishable declaration, that not 
only offends the General in Chief but also the old man worthy of more respect.”293 
Máximo Gómez also disapproved of women in the field, “calling it an ‘escándalo’”294 
The trial of Bandera was not a conflict over the presence of women in the 
insurgent camps. It was a struggle over what kind of women should represent Cuba, and 
over what kind of man could have access to those women. Cuban narratives of the war 
tended to corroborate the image in the American press, that American intervention in the 
war was necessary in order to help protect white Cuban women from the cruelties of the 
Spanish and the atrocities of war.  
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Image 6: “Sometime in the future”295
 
Image 7: “The Cuban Melodrama”296
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Image 8:“The Duty of the Hour”297
 
At the same time as his compatriots disdained Bandera for keeping a woman in 
his camp, they accepted the presence over other women. The participation of women—
mambisas—in battle alongside men was not altogether unheard of. Women such as Ana 
Betancourt weaved in an out of the manigua, while the patriotism of Mariana Grajales, 
mother of the Maceo brothers, is often lauded for her selfless contribution to the 
Patria.
298
  Numerous women’s groups also emerged in support of the Cuban cause, 
including the Club “Cubanita” of Cienfuegos and the Association of Women Protectors 
of the Revolution.
299
 Flint observed that “Interesting stories have been published about 
Amazons in the Cuban field, but Madame González was the only one it was my fortune 
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to meet.” Flint recounted the story of this woman, known by her maiden name of Paulina 
Ruiz, who accompanied her husband, Captain Rafael González, in battle under the 
command of Manolo Menéndez. Ruiz, the symbol of white middle-class womanhood, 
was appointed the flag captain by Pancho Pérez, and killed two guerrillas with the swing 
of her machete in the front lines of one skirmish.
300
 She had participated in at least ten 
battles before then, and had never been wounded. Máximo Gómez was scandalized when 
hearing the story of Ruiz, and ordered his soldiers to keep her and other women away 
from combat zones.
301
 He preferred more domesticated roles for Cuban women. 
 
Image 9: Sketch of Madame González, a Mambisa
302
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Understanding the danger in portraying white Cuban women as savage warriors, 
Flint explained away the transgressions of separate spheres ideology by claiming that the 
mambisas were mostly black women, “who have followed their husbands, sharing the 
hardship of the always moving camp and the chances of a stray bullet. They carry 
machetes, as tools rather than as weapons, wear bloomers, even trousers, and sleep in 
hammocks or on bits of rubber cloth on the hard ground, but they do not fight in the 
skirmish line with rifle or shotgun, like the men, for they form part of the 
impedimenta.”303 One example of this pattern was the freeborn black woman Faustina 
Heredia of Yaguajay, who followed her soon-to-be-husband into the war.
304
 In contrast to 
the story of Paulina Ruíz, Flint argued black women rather than white women 
transgressed of proper gender roles by becoming amazons. 
The role of the white woman, though equally patriotic, was more domestic, 
consequently, ore respectable. Insurgents used the image of the honorable white woman 
to highlight the virtues of the Cuban cause. Celebrated mambisas such as Marta Abreu 
represented Cuba to a foreign audience as white, affluent, and respectable. In Cienfuegos, 
the distinguished Cuban patriot was Rita Suárez del Villar, also emerging from an 
affluent white elite family. 
These women, considered dignified representatives of the Cuban cause for their 
sacrifice and efforts to ameliorate the conditions of the Cuban troops, not to mention their 
implied chastity, contrasted starkly to the dark, dishonorable, and unrefined figure of the 
concubine. By maintaining a concubine in battle, Bandera undermined the respectable 
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image of Cuban womanhood, unapologetically accepting and promoting sexual 
licentiousness and dishonor. This posed a serious problem for insurgent discourse 
vilifying the Spanish woman as a prostitute, and glorifying the Cuban woman as a chaste 
mother or wife. By sanctioning Bandera and upholding the white mambisa as a symbol of 
Cuban womanhood, insurgent leaders attempted to expand the appeal of Cuba Libre to 
international allies and more socially-conservative sectors of the Cuban populace. 
 
Demographics and Divisions within the Cuban Army 
 
Between late 1897 and the end of the war, the Cuban army transformed its image 
from one of murderous hordes of black bandits to one of heroic patriots and chivalrous 
men. In the process they secured greater legitimacy both at home and abroad. Insurgent 
successes in late 1897 turned the tide of the war. With the substitution of Valeriano 
Weyler with Ramón Blanco as Governor General and the announcement of political 
Autonomy, Cubans could taste victory. The Spanish declaration of Cuban autonomy 
catalyzed a shift in the rank and file of both the Spanish and the Cuban Armies. Some 
men, especially those favoring Autonomy on the Cuban side defected to the Spanish side. 
Máximo Gómez noted in early February that “with the implantation of the new regime, 
some men have deserted the Separatist Camp, betraying their Fatherland and their flag.” 
These defectors, he judged, were not even men, but rather “bastards and cowards; who 
cannot resist the tests of abnegation…”305 A prominent example of a defection from the 
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Cuban ranks is Juan Massó Parra, who along with the men under his command, deserted 
the Cuban army in January 1898.
306
 
At the same time, autonomy signaled to many Spanish troops an imminent defeat. 
The morale of the Spanish troops waned and soldiers deserted in large numbers and even 
refused to continue fighting by early 1898.
307
 Walter B. Barker, the United States Consul 
at the central Cuban city of Sagua la Grande noted that the Spanish troops exhibited an 
“extreme indifference” regarding the outcome of the war.308 So could former 
noncombatants and even Spaniards, many of who flocked to the army to ensure a part of 
the spoils of war.  The intervention of the United States on behalf of the Cubans 
transformed the nature of the Cuban Army, creating “two armies in the Brigade” of 
Cienfuegos.
309
 In the period before the American intervention the Brigade of Cienfuegos 
had been composed in large part of rural sectors among which people of color had 
predominated. However, inscriptions in 1898 show a predominance of wealthy white 
urbanites.
310
 As historian Ada Ferrer put it, the new recruits, though a diverse group, 
“reached more consistently into the upper echelons of Cuban society than had earlier 
waves of recruitment.” This was reflected in the high proportion of urban professionals 
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including doctors, pharmacists, students, and even planters who joined the insurrection in 
1898 in Cienfuegos.
311
  
The leaders of the Cienfuegos Brigade were, for the most part, all white. This 
became even more pervasive with news of the United States declaration of war against 
Spain in April 1898, as white educated urbanites joined the insurrection en masse, 
anticipating a prompt victory. The civil branch of Cuba Libre also favored educated 
white elites as officer by offering higher ranks based on education level.
312
 The advantage 
of education in ascending the military hierarchy mostly favored whites.
313
 After the 
United States declared war on Spain, the composition of the Brigade of Cienfuegos did 
change substantially, favoring white educated urbanites, especially in the high-ranking 
positions, despite their late inscription. 
The sudden influx of men from sectors typically associated with socially-
conservative beliefs exacerbated existing tensions within the Army. In 1898, 174 men 
enlisted in the Brigade of Cienfuegos.
314
 New recruits included advocates of autonomy, 
who were notoriously weary of black social mobility, and some men who had actively 
fought for the Spanish in years or months past. For example, Francisco Veitia, a 22-year-
old barber from Santa Clara was a Spanish volunteer before joining the insurrection in 
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May 1898. Florencio Cuellar, a shoemaker from Esperanza also served as a Spanish 
volunteer before joining Higinio Esquerra in July. Jacinto Pérez formed part of the 
Guerrilla of Manacas before enlisting in the Cuban army in August.
315
 Men who joined 
the Cuban army after April tended to represent the more privileged sectors of local 
society in stark contrast to the more humble composition of the recruits before 1898.
316
 
Among the men who enlisted in the Brigade of Cienfuegos, Higinio Esquerra noted 6 
merchants, 5 students, and other educated and skilled men including physicians, 
professors, pharmacists, planters, mechanics, artisans, sugar masters, students, among 
others.
317
 Enlistment for the privileged “new” patriots marked a moment of equalization 
with men of lower social status. 
The transformation of the Cuban army produced competition over military 
leadership, perceived to be the key to political power in the emerging republic. “New” 
patriots struggled to distinguish themselves from the masses in the Cuban army. The 
values of self-abnegation and restraint formerly at the center of insurgent visions of 
masculinity fell to the background as the race for military promotion commenced. “The 
illustrious enlistees of the Cienfuegos elite marched to the manigua, then, more to 
legitimize a participation that would ensure secular interests and positions in the future 
nation, than for the genuine patriotism” of earlier fallen heroes, wrote Cienfuegos 
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historian Orlando García Martínez.
318
 Despite their recent arrival into the Brigade, the 
privileged “new” patriots experienced rapid ascension into officer positions, ranks which 
poor, rural, multi-racial enlistees had not been able to reach in three years of battle. For 
example, Juan Pedro Avilés Simón, son of the wealthy merchant and owner of the Avilés 
and Leblanc Company, enlisted in the Cavalry of Yaguaramas in late February 1898. By 
March, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant, and he subsequently served as an 
assistant to General José Rogelio Castillo.
319
 In the Brigade of Cienfuegos, one man 
enlisted in late May 1898 and reached the rank of lieutenant by the end of the war. There 
were at least 5 men who joined the insurrection in 1898 who reached the rank of first or 
second sergeant, and one who reached the rank of sub-lieutenant.
320
 The criteria for 
military promotion included formal education and literacy, two qualities implicitly linked 
to whiteness.  
Although the insurgent leadership eventually responded by issuing an order 
mandating that all men who enlisted after April 1898 should retain the rank of soldier, the 
rapid ascension of “new” patriots had begun to accentuate already-existing divisions 
within the army.
321
 At the same time as many of these infidelities were forgiven and 
seemingly forgotten, white insurgent leaders severely punished black officers for being 
traitors. Among those who paid with their lives, were the Lieutenant Colonels Cándido 
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Álvarez, “Cayito,” Vicente Núñez and the Commandants Joaquín González and Antonio 
Espinosa.
322
 These apparently contradictory patterns of treatment for “old” and “new” 
patriots seemed to have produced tensions within the Army. 
Proponents of racial equality and advocates of racial hierarchy debated who 
would wield political leadership in the emerging republic. Although the majority of the 
Cuban Army—the poor, rural, and multi-racial masses—stood behind the ideals of the 
March 1895 Manifiesto de Montecristi, many of the new enlistees had more personal 
objectives in joining the war: they joined to defend their interests as urban property 
holders and men of influence, and consolidate their role in the leadership of Cuba Libre. 
Some insurgent chiefs questioned the loyalty of the new recruits. Máximo Gómez, for 
example, wrote to Francisco Carrillo on February 28, 1898 less than two weeks after the 
explosion of the battleship Maine, voicing his skepticism about the new sectors 
incorporating into the Army: “It is like I have always said. ‘The better part of these well-
read men, as we mountain people say, have come to the war, but do not carry the 
Revolution inside…”323 These private interests, they would find out, conflicted in many 
ways with the egalitarian discourse that had defined—though imperfectly—the rebel 
cause up until then.  
At the same time as privileged white urbanites incorporated in record numbers 
into the insurrection, celebrated Cuban patriot Rita Suárez del Villar began to consolidate 
a patriotic woman’s club in Cienfuegos, the Club “Cubanita.” This club headed by 
women of some of the most prestigious families of the city, worked to provide relief, 
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supplies, medicines, clothing, shoes and other provisions to the Cuban forces. Although 
the efforts of Suárez del Villar have often been recognized as playing a pivotal role in 
boosting moral among the Cuban troops, this club tended to distribute supplies to 
immediate family and friends, favoring the same privileged white Cubans. Among those 
who wrote to the Club for supplies were men who after the war occupied the top 
governing positions in the province: José Miguel Gómez, civil governor of Santa Clara 
province after the war and later president, Jacinto Portela, mayor of Palmira, Alfredo 
Lewis, who served on the Cienfuegos city council, Arturo Aulet, Cienfuegos police chief 
in 1907, Eligio A. Brunet, who worked for the Captain of the Port, and Enrique Loynaz 
del Castillo, who became a diplomat. 
Few people of African descent maintained correspondence with Rita. In January 
1898, Carlos Trujillo wrote to Suárez of a “young man of color called Joaquín, of your 
same last name.” Joaquín had grown up with Suárez and her family, indicating that he 
had been a slave or servant of that family. “This comrade,” wrote Trujillo, “finds himself 
in a very bad state of clothing and other useful things and he let me know of the desire he 
had that you would send him a change of clothes to fight against the weather.” He 
suggested the Suárez send the clothes to him, with a note “for Joaquín.” Trujillo 
mentioned that Joaquín had been injured during the war and “still suffers somewhat from 
the wound.”324 
By April, it seems that no clothing had arrived for Joaquín. Trujillo again wrote 
requesting the favor of Suárez: “If you could send a pair of shoes, number 42 and a 
change of clothes and anything you like to Joaquín, I will thank you, as he has lost 
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everything and I want him to see that we do not have privileges.”325 Even if white 
insurgent leaders wanted to provide their black troops with provisions, the Club 
“Cubanita” seemed to foment divisions and inequalities by provisioning the wealthy 
whites preferentially. By providing supplies to only the most elite members of 
Cienfuegos society, the Club reinforced colonial hierarchies within the insurrection. 
Many of the recent enlistees, and those supported by the Club “Cubanita,” would 
go on to obtain positions of power and leadership in local government after the war, 
being viewed by the Americans as the more reasonable and trustworthy class of Cubans. 
Placing these men in power largely disenfranchised the majority of the Cuban Army who 
had fought for not only independence, but also for social justice, for three and a half long 
years. The split in Cuba Libre led to the consolidation of the power and authority of these 
wealthy white urbanites during the first years of the republic at the expense of the ideal of 
equality. 
 
Conclusions 
  
While Cubans consolidated cross-racial unity against a common enemy early on, 
the turning tides of the war, especially the series of decisive defeats and subsequent 
demoralization of the forces in early 1897 fostered tensions among the insurgent forces. 
With the invasion from the East, Gómez and Maceo brought thousands of eastern troops, 
many of whom were black, into the zone. The invasion reconfigured the military 
organization of the central provinces, introducing eastern chiefs, like Bandera, to lead 
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central regiments. Whereas prior to the invasion, Cienfuegos forces were often 
considered inept and labeled as majases, undermining the masculine and military honor 
of white elites in charge, the invasion helped consolidate the Brigade of Cienfuegos, and 
enforce a stricter code of morality among the men. 
The construction of a patriotic East as opposed to an immoral and inept central 
zone threatened the prestige of white central insurgent chiefs. In Cienfuegos, where the 
consolidation of the Brigade had introduced oriental and black insurgent chiefs to a 
predominantly white-led zone, white insurgents rejected demographic change and shifts 
in the power structure of local forces. Between 1896 and 1897, whites brought numerous 
accusations, trials and court-martials cases against black officers, many of whom faced 
demotion, and even death. These cases demonstrated a re-organization of power within 
the Brigade of Cienfuegos, as white central chiefs targeted black leaders to as a way to 
perform a stricter code of discipline and morality to contest the characterization of central 
forces as majases. At the same time, white central insurgent leaders advocated a different 
vision of the social order than the one they saw in the invasion force. Instead of accepting 
black leadership that had come with the invasion, they reinforced racial hierarchy through 
distinctions in manliness, pointing to blacks as immoral and lacking military honor. 
 At the same time as whites claimed to embody the highest level of masculinity—
manliness—black insurgent chiefs such as Quintín Bandera articulated alternate 
masculinities. Bandera threatened the white monopoly on manliness by publically 
maintaining a sexual relationship with his concubine during the war. By showing that 
black military prowess opened the possibility for black access to women, Bandera 
threatened white sexual privilege and virility. In his trial, white insurgents equated access 
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to women and sex as tantamount to access to political power. Seeking to reinforce the 
racial hierarchy within the insurrection to cement their preferential access to political 
power after the war, they persecuted Bandera as an example to other black insurgent 
leaders that they had to respect white privilege and racial equality despite a discourse 
disavowing these inequalities. While the ideology of raceless nationality may have some 
men provided an opportunity to contest inequality,
326
 the case of Bandera shows that it 
also placed severe restrictions on the ways men—especially black men—could protest 
prejudice. 
After major military setbacks in late 1896 and early 1897, the tides of the war 
again turned in favor of the insurgents by late 1897. The Spanish concession of 
Autonomy confirmed Cuban suspicions of a weakening imperial hold on the Pearl of the 
Antilles. The announcement of American intervention in 1898 catalyzed the massive 
enlistment of educated white urbanites, who gave impetus to already existing racial 
tensions within the military hierarchy. Although Cuban forces managed to retain 
sufficient unity during the war, the shifting power dynamics and demographics of the 
Cuban Army in the wake of the American military intervention in foreshadowed the 
intense struggle for political power in the emerging republic. 
Indeed, the demographic and socio-economic shift in the rank and file of the 
Cuban Army resulted in two significant consequences that would define Cuban politics 
after the war. First, it exacerbated the division between the military branch of Cuba Libre 
and the civil branch, represented by the Cuban Revolutionary Party in New York. 
Second, the shift gave rise to new voices within the Cuban Army, melding socially-
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conservative ideas of the recently enlisted Autonomists and pacíficos with the 
revolutionary political and social agenda of the insurrection. According to Cuban 
historian Orlando García Martínez, this shift “gave greater space for the rise of clienteles 
within the very liberating Army, erected on top of the familiar relations and the 
coexistence in the redeeming trench.”327 The next two chapters examine the ways 
competing groups of men residing in and around Cienfuegos struggled to turn their 
particular visions of Cuba Libre into reality under by defining and re-defining who would 
have access to political power. These political battles hinged on diverging conceptions of 
the relationship between independence and racial equality.
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CHAPTER 3 
From War Heroes to Bandits: 
Criminalization and Emasculation of Veterans in Post-war Cuba 
 
 During the first months after the cessation of hostilities, Cuban soldiers remained 
under arms in the countryside of Cienfuegos. The Americans had prohibited the 
victorious army from marching into the cities, fearing revenge attacks upon the Spanish, 
who still occupied the cities. Although the formal combat had subsided with the surrender 
of the Spanish army on August 12, 1898, complaints of rural crime emanated from the 
countryside. Violence and disorder allegedly continued to pervade the Cuban 
countryside, threatening the lives of rural residents and endangering economic recovery. 
The chaos of the post-war countryside, to some rural residents, was reminiscent of a 
pattern of crime that was all too familiar to Cubans during the colonial period: banditry. 
In post-war Cuba, banditry became a politically-charged word that encompassed a 
wide range of crime, violence, and rural protest, from the theft of a loose chicken by a 
starving family to alleged conspiracies to overthrow the government. Wealthy property 
owners were at the forefront of complaints about rural crime. This was a group that 
American military officials claimed consisted of two main populations: “intelligent 
planters” and “many Spaniards.”328 These property owners identified two main strains of 
banditry: crime against property and personal violence. On the one hand, the prevalence 
of theft, robbery, and other petty crime suggested that some veterans and country 
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dwellers resorted to extralegal methods to ensure the subsistence for themselves and their 
families. On the other hand, violent crime including murder, beating, mutilation and 
intimidation, suggested that the political rivalry between separatists and supporters of 
Spain that defined Cuban society during the war persisted after the cessation of 
hostilities. 
 Banditry became intimately tied to fears of separatist rule after the war. Some 
opponents of the separatist movement claimed that insurgents were the key perpetrators 
of rural crime, an assertion aimed at delegitimizing separatist claims to political power. 
Because the Spanish had famously characterized the Cuban insurgents as bandits, the 
claim that veterans were the perpetrators of rural crime resonated with the long standing 
beliefs and served the future aspirations of wealthy property owners, particularly those 
who opposed the separatist movement. Nevertheless, opponents of Cuban rule had to 
convince more than their fellow wealthy property owners of the evils of the insurgents; 
they had to persuade Americans, who had intervened on behalf of the separatists, 
supposedly because they believed that the separatist cause and its proponents were noble. 
Wealthy property owners employed reports of crime to modify American 
perceptions of insurgents so as to influence the definition of political eligibility during the 
first months of the military occupation. Although some crime certainly existed in the 
countryside after the war, these reports often featured hysterical, often-sensationalized 
claims of widespread social unrest, large-scale organized crime, and race wars, with little 
empirical foundation. They pointed to the alleged racial composition of the army, which 
some claimed was 80% black, to corroborate their claims, amidst prevailing racial 
ideologies linking blackness to innate criminality. By depicting the Cuban war heroes as 
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perilous bandits, opponents of Cuban rule exploited American anxieties regarding the 
racial composition of the Cuban army and the deleterious effects of the war on the racial 
order. As a result, they undermined Cuban claims to military honor by emphasizing the 
pathological and threatening aspects of insurgent masculinity. They converted veteran 
status into a symptom of a dishonorable lifestyle based on pillage and plunder. 
Undermining the claims to citizenship of Cuban veterans bolstered the political 
clout of opponents of Cuban rule. By linking blackness and crime to Cuban veterans, 
wealthy property owners articulated a version of masculinity founded on the exclusion of 
men of African descent. Wealthy property owners effectively mobilized the specter of 
racial crime to secure concessions from the military government, including American 
troops to protect rural properties, permission to hire private armed guards, and the 
disbandment of the Cuban army. What is more, certain property owners, namely those 
with an interest in the annexation of Cuba to the United States cited rampant rural crime 
as evidence of the need for a deeper and more sustained American presence in Cuba. 
According to James H. Wilson, this group included a broad spectrum of the “better 
classes” in Cuba: “All of the Spanish planters and all of their foreing [sic] residents of the 
island desire immediate annexation to the United States. It is also safe to say that the 
many of the leading natives desire the same,” he wrote in early 1899.329 Although Wilson 
certainly may have overestimated the desire for annexation, his statement suggests that 
the political posturing toward the United States depended in large part on wealth, with the 
wealthiest people favoring annexation. 
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The diverging perceptions of crime in post-war Cuba reflected disparate political 
agendas among men contending for power and influence over the future of the island. 
Cuban separatists demanded immediate and absolute independence. Wealthy property 
owners and Autonomists, men who had supported home rule and opposed absolute 
independence, feared that independence would lead to financial ruin at the hand of 
supposedly reckless and irresponsible Cuban separatists. These differences over the 
political future reflected competing understandings of the role of people of African 
descent in Cuba. The social implications of independence were grave, according to 
opponents of Cuban rule: They feared the breakdown of the colonial social order—that is 
the caste-like system that virtually equated race and wealth with status, upon which their 
wealth and status relied. They imagined that the social anarchy embodied in the separatist 
cause would lead to black rule. 
Foreign property owners and wealthy Cuban planters, many of who had been 
naturalized as American citizens, were at the forefront of the movement to preserve the 
social order after the war. They sought to keep blacks laboring in countryside. On the 
other hand, competent white men—representatives of the propertied classes, and usually 
not separatists— would administer the government and ensure order and prosperity. 
Foreign property owners and wealthy Cuban planters attempted to enforce this vision of 
Cuban society by immobilizing the Cuban army—a groups of radical men they perceived 
as the main threat to the social order.  By criminalizing and racializing the Cuban army, 
opponents of Cuban rule sought to delegitimize separatist access to political power after 
the war.  
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Rural Destitution and the Roots of Crime in the Countryside 
 
After the war, rural families and veterans of the war struggled to make ends meet 
in the devastated Cuban countryside. General James H. Wilson, the Commanding 
General of Matanzas and Santa Clara Province, described the countryside of Santa Clara 
province between his tours in April and May: “The towns were found defended by 
trenches, obstructions and blockhouses, as in the Province of Matanzas. The country 
outside of the towns has been devastated—not one farm-house or hut, as far as my 
observation goes, has escaped destruction. Horses, cattle, pigs and fowls were driven off 
or killed, and the people herded into the towns.”330 According to the data collected by 
Wilson, livestock was reduced from 304,000 to less than 66,000, about one-third of 
which had been imported since January 1899.
331
 
Reconcentration, emigration, and war casualties had reduced the population 
substantially, and those who remained, faced destitution. Death rates in the city of 
Cienfuegos even increased after the war, reaching 473 in November 1898, up from 
around 300 per month during the war.
332
 Wilson estimated that about one-seventh of the 
population had perished during reconcentration.
333
 In Santa Clara Province alone, there 
were 22,000 widows, 33,000 orphans, 2,600 sick, 4,500 helpless, and 44,000 destitute 
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people requiring temporary or partial support.
334
 Some of these destitute people were 
collected into public charitable institutions. Other impoverished and ill people gathered at 
the public dispensaries and free clinics established by local philanthropists and doctors, 
like José María Landa.
335
 Yet, these were insufficient to provide for the thousands of 
people afflicted by the war: “Words fail to describe the utter misery of the wretched, 
starving inmates,” wrote Frank J. Ives, Major and Chief Surgeon of the U.S. Volunteers 
of the destitute overcrowded into the charitable institutions of the Department of 
Matanzas and Santa Clara.
336
 
Initially, the United States military provided aid to the indigent country people in 
the form of food rations, medicines and even shelter. The Americans established free 
dispensaries for medicines and supplies in Cienfuegos, Lajas and Cruces.
337
 Because of 
the efforts of the American military, “the hollow-cheeked, hungry and forlorn faces of 
children [were] no longer seen…,” reported Major Ives.338 (See Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Rations Issued to Destitute in Cienfuegos, January-June 1899
339
 
 January February March April May June Total Total for July 
1899-June 1900 
Abreus     4,000  4,000  
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Buena Vista     2,000  2,000  
Camarones     3,000  3,000
340
  
Ciego Montero   5,000 200   5,200  
Cienfuegos 4,000 62,700 18,100 27,200 4,000 14,800
341
 
130,800 18,400 
Cruces  10,000   6,000  16,000  
Fomento     2,000  2,000  
Hormiguero 3,000  2,000  2,000  7,000  
Lajas      6,000 6,000  
Palmira  4,000 5,000 2,000 4,000  15,000 4,000 
Parque Alto 3,000      3,000  
Rodas   2,000  1,000  3,000 4,500 
Santo Domingo     1,000  1,000 6,300 
Soledad 2,000 2,000  1,500   5,500  
Total 12,000 78,700 32,100 30,900 29,000 20,800 203,500 23,200 
 
Although some Americans initially celebrated the benevolent and humanitarian 
efforts of their government in “saving” the Cubans, but the distaste for dolling out charity 
soon became apparent in the reports of military officials and the negative press coverage 
of charity projects. In the 1899 census, 57% of the population of Cienfuegos district was 
“without gainful occupation,” and the numbers were even higher in the city of 
Cienfuegos, were nearly two-thirds of the populations remained unemployed.
342
 Despite 
the considerable hardships veterans and rural families faced after the war, American 
authorities asserted that charity would promote dependency and laziness among poor 
Cubans. For example, Wilson wrote that “while we are fostering a habit of dependence 
upon paternal government by actual charity or by employment in public works, we are at 
the same time weaning the laborer from his habits of toil in the fields; taking from him 
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the independence whose benefits we are constantly preaching.”343  American press 
echoed this sentiment. “The distribution of Government rations to the poor rather tends to 
demoralize them and to prevent them from seeking employment,” read one article on the 
conditions at Cienfuegos.
344
 The emphasis on work implied a negative view of indigent 
Cubans as lazy and dependent, rather than industrious and competent. 
Cuban authorities, too, lamented the pitiful state of the lower classes. They turned 
to employment as a solution to poverty and a path to rebuilding the country. The survival 
strategies of indigent veterans in post-war Cuba had deep political implications. On the 
one hand, charity was a disgraceful vice, an affront to insurgent masculinity. On the other 
hand, veterans who had previously resorted to raiding and pillaging to maintain their 
forces seemed to confirm the common association of banditry with veterans after the war. 
Insurgent chiefs turned to formal employment as a solution to dispel perceptions of 
Cuban dependency and to redefine Cuban manliness from warriors to respectable 
breadwinners and heads of household. 
In glorifying formal employment, Cubans seemed to echo the paternalist tone of 
the American military authorities. “In these moments, we are poor receiving charity from 
the American nation,” one reporter wrote in the newspaper, La Nación.345 “But this state 
of things,” continued the article, “if it is permitted and tolerated in these moments in 
which we have just finished a devastating struggle, will surely not be dignified when we 
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can usufruct the goods of our very fertile soil.”346 The article closed with an emphatic call 
to return to work, voiced in terms of patriotic duty. “To work! It is our obligation to think 
of the lives of our children, of the dignity of the Cuban name. To work! Since with it 
nations grow rich and great and rise higher in international life.”347 Cuban authorities and 
the press simultaneously responded to negative American visions of their population and 
attempted to solve the post-war problem of poverty by promoting work as a source of 
dignity and independence. 
The call to return to work was especially aimed at people of African descent, who 
had long comprised the principal source of labor fueling the Cuban sugar industry. Cuban 
planters relied on black labor to produce their wealth and maintain their social and 
economic privilege. Autonomists, annexationists and even members of the civil branch of 
Cuba Libre called for men to return to work, placing special emphasis on the reinforcing 
the colonial distinctions relegating blacks to inferior social positions. For example, 
Bartolomé Masó, who had been elected President of the Provisional government of Cuba 
in 1897 declared that “our negroes will work as before [the war] in the cane-fields, and I 
see no reason to anticipate trouble from them.”348 Masó, who opposed American rule, 
reassured property owners and Americans both that Cuban rule would not threaten the 
existing social order. 
American officials tended to agree with the call to return the masses to work, but 
sometimes recognized the need for assistance. Although American military officials 
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criticized charity, Captain William Wright reported that “a large class of inhabitants are 
too weak to work and should be rationed.”349 He also recommended that the tax on beef 
be removed to lower the prices and make to more affordable to the “needy classes,” 
advice that military officials did not heed leading to further crime.
350
Additionally, Wilson 
advocated for the establishment of and agricultural bank to assist farmers in re-
establishing their livelihoods in the countryside. He reported that “after more than three 
years of war, persecution and starvation, the mass of the people are tired of fighting. They 
are anxious to go back to work, become self-supporting and enjoy the tranquility of an 
independent domestic life.” Eager to convince his superiors of the necessity of an 
agricultural bank, Wilson asserted, “I am so convinced of the futility of approaching the 
problem of reconstruction from any other direction that, although the Division 
Commander has deemed it impracticable at the present time, I must again urge the 
necessity of some action to relieve the wants of the agricultural population, and to put 
agriculture on a sound basis with the least possible delay.”351 Although Wilson continued 
to urge American military support for the relief of Cuban farmers, no such agricultural 
bank was established. 
Without assistance to reestablish their farms, one of the only options for veterans 
and rural dwellers after the war was to return to the sugar estates. Edwin F. Atkins, an 
American and owner of one of the largest sugar estates in Cuba, and perhaps the epitome 
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of what Wilson meant by an “intelligent planter,” wrote to Wilson that all of the small 
country towns are “almost entirely dependent upon our property for the employment of 
inhabitants and support of the population.”352 Some veterans, as poor as they were, 
refused to return to work on the estates, perhaps because of the dangers that had defined 
that work during the war. Both insurgents and Spaniards had brutally punished laborers 
for alleged collaboration with the enemy.
353
 
The call to return to work after the war also neglected certain aspirations for 
social mobility among veterans. Laboring for the large sugar estates doomed most 
workers to a life of poverty and dependency. Wilson acknowledged that day labor 
eliminated all possibilities for social mobility: the “natural disposition [of large ingenio 
owners] will be to resort to a scale of wages which will give the ordinary laborer not 
more than sufficient to supply his daily needs.”354 Veterans in search of work knew this 
and resented the expectation that they would work for pennies after emerging from the 
war as heroes. Wages for unskilled labor were usually around 40 cents per day. Black 
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Cubans usually occupied the lowest-paid unskilled jobs, such as field labor, while 
Spaniards dominated the higher-paying semi-skilled jobs, and Chinese usually held jobs 
“requiring close attention rather than mechanical skills.”355 Surely veterans could not 
return with their heads bowed to the cane fields where they had toiled like slaves, even as 
slaves, before the war.  
The expectation that blacks would return to the fields, and resume pre-war labor 
patterns, would serve to signal the restoration of the pre-war social order and race-labor 
hierarchy. When blacks refused to return to the fields, they were labeled them as 
vagrants, bandits and, threats to Cuban society. Wealthy property owners and American 
onlookers assumed that disenfranchised veterans would wither resort to charity or make 
their living was by preying on the countryside. One newspaper article published in the 
United States claimed that many Cubans want work, “but to loot is their delight.”356 
Another newspaper described the state of the Cuban countryside: country people were 
“terrorized by bandits.”357 
The call to go to work to preserve Cuban dignity and greatness voiced in Cuban 
newspapers in early 1899 may have resonated among some country people hoping to 
regain a sense of normalcy and routine, but it did not account for the difficulties in 
realizing this feat. The forms of employment American and Cuban officials indicated for 
relieving the poor may have aimed to promote the economic recovery, but they certainly 
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did not provide independence and self-sustainability for workers. The diverging visions 
of recovery between Cuban and American authorities and the indigent themselves arose 
out of different understandings of poverty and freedom. In rural Cuba, recently formerly 
enslaved men and women often purchased small plots of land and livestock as a way to 
provide for their subsistence independent of working on sugar estates.
358
 By prioritizing 
the economic privilege of the wealthy by reinforcing the social hierarchy through 
occupational stratification, American and Cuban authorities reduced the possibility for a 
reconfiguration of social hierarchy by forcing poor rural residents to work for the large 
estates. As a result, poor rural residents faced fewer options for social mobility as the 
colonial sugar economy and its accompanying social stratification became re-entrenched 
in post-war Cuba. 
The failure to develop a comprehensive response to the needs of the rural poor 
contributed to crime in the countryside. Wilson had originally based his argument for the 
establishment of an agricultural bank on the idea that it would put thousands of 
uneducated country people to work, implying that they would no longer pose a threat to 
the order of the countryside: “only in this way can employment be afforded to a large 
class of laborers which has never been educated to anything but plantation work, and has 
not at present the means with which to work small farms independently.”359 The 
destitution of the countryside and the refusal of Cuban and American authorities to 
provide assistance to farmers exacerbated the condition of many farmers and veterans 
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after the war. These conditions may have helped foster the rural crime against which 
planters protested. 
In June 1899, Wilson observed that “Whatever disorders may hereafter occur, I 
am sure may be ascribed mainly to the lack of sufficient and profitable occupation for the 
people.”360 Widespread rural poverty certainly correlated with certain types of post-war 
crime, especially stealing. As one prisoner in the Cienfuegos jail noted, “being poor is the 
worst crime of which a Cuban could be guilty.”361 In the words of historian Louis A. 
Pérez, Jr., “The continued presence of 50,000 Cuban officers and soldiers, under arms, 
with lines stretched out across the interior countryside, in various states of destitution, 
had chilling implications.”362 Indeed, crime statistics collected in May 1899 showed that 
robbery was by far the most common form of crime in Cienfuegos.
363
 (See Table 3.)  
 
Table 3: Crimes of Prisoners in Cienfuegos Jail, May 1899
364
 
Alleged Crimes In Cienfuegos Jail 
Assault 8 
Robbery 28 
Attempted Robbery 7 
Homicide 4 
Murder 5 
Stealing 4 
Arson 1 
                                                 
360
 Wilson, Annual Report, 1899, p. 86. 
361
 Manuel Romero Ortega to General Leonard Wood, July 6, 1900, Box 100, File 3673, USNA/MGC/RG 
140/ E 3. 
362
 Louis A. Pérez, Jr.,  Lords of the Mountain: Social banditry and peasant protest in Cuba, 1878-1918 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), 63. 
363
 J.H. Hysell, “Report regarding jail at Cienfuegos,” May 22-26, 1899, Box 8, File 4074, USNA/RUSA/ 
RG 395/E 1331. 
364
 Ibid. 
  
157 
 
Threatening Police 2 
Counterfeiting 3 
Shooting 1 
Horse Stealing 2 
 
To a certain extent, Wilson was right in pointing to widespread destitution as the 
root of crime. In May 1899, an article appeared in a local Cienfuegos newspaper claiming 
that the war had produced anarchy in the countryside. This disorder subjected “the rural 
inhabitant of Cuba to the same outrages as those originating in the horrible state of 
Mexico, at the end of the war of independence, as a natural sequel to the popular 
commotions of the desolating struggle that did away with the public wealthy of the 
country and created hordes of bandits and desperate hungry [people].”365 This and other 
“alarming reports” of crime that appeared in Cienfuegos newspapers suggested an 
abundance of poverty-related, often-petty crimes.
366
  
The pattern of poverty-related crime also emerged in law enforcement reports. 
Rural Guardsmen in Cienfuegos and the vicinity frequently pursued so-called bandits, 
accused of petty theft and robbery. For example in May 1899, rural guardsmen captured 
two thieves, who had previously been involved in a series of robberies, including that of a 
horse and 29 pesos at Horquita near Rodas.
367
 In August 1899, rural guardsmen capture 
the mulatto Agripino Sardiñas y Moreno, and the negroes Cayetano Yznaga and 
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Francisco Arruebarrena, who stole some animals by force at Abreus.
368
 The type of 
crimes most frequently reported by plantation owners and rural guardsmen alike 
suggested that much of rural crime stemmed from the problem of post-war economic 
destitution, exacerbated by the failure to develop an adequate system of relief for the 
poor.  
 
Beyond Banditry: Violent Crime and Political Rivalry 
 
However plausible poverty may seem in explaining rural crime, the simultaneous 
prevalence of violent crime suggests that rural destitution was not the only cause of 
crime. The politicized nature of violent crime suggests that severe tensions between 
separatists and supporters of Spain continued to define Cuban society after the war. 
Stories of physical violence, threats, and murders peppered local, national and 
international newspapers during American military occupation, especially in the first 
year. 
As the mutilated corpses of Spaniards emerged in country ditches, these stories of 
political violence assumed a new life in the various local periodicals and in the letters of 
opponents of Cuban rule. Anxieties about violent retaliation for war-time offenses 
catalyzed widespread hysteria about the possible implications of Cuban rule for those 
who had remained neutral or supported Spain during the war. The physical results of this 
persisting political fragmentation emerged not in actual crime statistics, but rather in 
reports of the condition of the countryside. 
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Spanish soldiers, volunteers, guerrillas, and Cubans who remained “neutral,” did 
face a certain degree of violence after the war. In January 1899, General A. Castellanos, 
commander of the Spanish forces at Cienfuegos informed American military officials that 
“acts of violence have been committed in various localities n S.C. province against 
individuals who lately served in the Spanish irregular forces.
369
 Later that same month, 
Spanish merchants in Cruces wrote to General John C. Bates, the Commander of 
Cienfuegos, requesting that “American soldiers preserve better order,” and to “guarantee 
the lives and interests of the Spaniards.”370 
By March, George P. Barker commanding the 6
th
 Ohio Volunteers reported 
numerous cases of Cubans killing ex-guerrillas in Santa Clara province. One of the 
assassinations he related involved a Cuban shooting a guerrilla who, during the war, had 
killed a Cuban and attempted to sell his flesh as meat. Another was hacked to death, 
others shot, and one killed in a drunken brawl.
371
 In early May 1899, the New York Times 
reported the mutilation and murder of a prestigious Spaniard:  “According to a dispatch 
from Cienfuegos, Jicotea Pérez, a Spaniard of high character and standing disappeared on 
Sunday, and to-day his body was found near the city, terribly mutilated with 
machetes.”372 This story emphasized the political nature of the killing: insurgents had 
slayed a Spaniard, suggesting that no Spaniard was safe. 
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The perpetrators, authorities alleged, were responsible for a number of other 
crimes in the same vicinity: “The crime is attributed by the authorities to the same band 
of outlaws that burned the cane on Constancia Plantation. Bandits in the same district 
attacked the Plantation Unidad, owned by Mr. Cullerach,
373
 and the Plantation Ángeles, 
owned by Francisco García, but were finally repulsed by the rural guards. These killed 
two members of the band who have not been identified, and a third who was recognized 
as Alfredo Rodriguez, a well-known brigand, largely responsible for disturbances in 
Santa Clara.”374 Like this one, most reports of rural crime emanated from the large sugar 
estates: Constancia, Hormiguero, and Soledad. 
Civil authorities in Cienfuegos acknowledged that significant animosity between 
separatists and former supporters of Spain persisted after the war. Spanish guerrilleros 
were irregular pro-Spanish troops gathered from among the Cuban population. They were 
generally “persons who could be counted upon to accomplish any sort of ‘dirty’ work not 
relished by regular troops.”375 The negative feelings Cuban separatists held against 
guerrilleros were reflected in certain violent acts against men who had supported Spain 
during the war, and correlated especially with violence on the large sugar estates, which 
had maintained their own private guards to combat the insurgents. For example, a store 
clerk was murdered at Soledad in August 1899.
376
 The same month, one of the estate 
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superintendents had his horse shot out from under him, narrowly escaping death, while 
several other assassinations had occurred in that period as well.
377
 
If they did not become victims of outright violence, some supporters of Spain 
faced threats of violence and even banishment. In the town of Aguada de Pasajeros, in the 
jurisdiction of Cienfuegos, one ex-guerrillero, Alfredo López Miró, complained of 
outrages committed against. In July 1899, municipal police officers, José Marrero and 
Ramón Barrios, asked López to leave town.
378
 The mayor of Aguada, José Vidal, 
explained that López was asked to leave because he “boasted of all kinds of infamies 
committed by him, proud of his manliness by often saying everywhere that ‘he himself 
and alone was able to kill twenty Cubans who had fought for the revolution.”379 The 
police arrested his two brothers and insulted them, calling them “criminal assassins that 
they ought to kill, because they had said that in case of war with the United States they 
would be on the side of the US in order to kill Cubans.”380  
López claimed that Cuban authorities targeted him because of his political 
allegiance during the war. “All these outrages have been brought about by the fact of my 
having belonged to the Spanish Army during the war…” After earning “8 crosses of 
honor in recompense for my faithful services,” he took “command of the local Guerrilla 
force of Colon as Lieutenant Commander, which I held until the end of the war, without 
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having during the whole time, assassinated anyone, as I was accused of doing…” López 
denied the accusations that he was an “assassin,” though he admitted that he had killed 
some Cubans during the war: “The only part of ‘assassin’ that I played was in compliance 
with the duty that my position demanded, to fight them incessantly, and having my 
conscience clear and there being no reason why I should be persecuted…”381 López 
claimed that “persecutions in the said town of Aguada are of frequent occurrence, it being 
a pity that said District should lose its tranquility as it is one of the most rich and 
prosperous of the Island.”382 The violence toward Spaniards and former supporters of 
Spain after the war pushed some Spaniards to seek protection with Americans, against 
Cuban separatists, who they portrayed as bloodthirsty and violent. 
While the majority of the victims of post-war political violence appeared, from 
the intelligence provided by plantation owners and press reports, to be white, Cuban 
veterans also sought revenge against blacks who had supported Spain. Based on the 
prevailing assumption that the insurrection enjoyed widespread support among black 
Cubans, the decision of any individual of color to remain neutral or to support Spain 
constituted a particularly egregious offence to Cuban separatists. One man, Máximo 
Suárez experienced this double standard of patriotism first hand when a group of Cuban 
insurgents attacked him in April 1899.
383
 Whether black or white, men who had 
supported Spain during the war had come under attack during the first months of the 
military occupation. 
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Although a certain level of political violence persisted after the war, the number 
and intensity of the reports seemed to place a higher degree of political significance on 
these crimes than they warranted. Amidst a torrent of hysterical reports of crime, some 
local civil authorities and even American military officials began to doubt the veracity of 
certain alarming claims. By mid-May, Civil Governor José Miguel Gómez wrote to 
Wilson requesting that details of banditry and rural crime be suppressed and not provided 
to the local newspapers.
384
 The Chief of the Rural Guard of the Province of Santa Clara 
also accused the newspapers of publishing false reports of disorder.
385
  
 Wilson reported that while there were incidents of disorder before American 
troops arrived to Santa Clara, they ceased immediately upon his orders: “At first they 
shows a disposition to wreak vengeance on Spanish subjects resident in the island, and 
especially those who had been active as Spanish volunteers; but this was immediately 
repressed by my orders.”386 He claimed to have cured Cuba of racial tensions with his 
announcement that “so far as the United States was concerned, the past must be regarded 
as a sealed book” and that “the rights of all, without respect to race or allegiance, to 
pursue their occupations without interference from any quarter, must be considered as the 
supreme law of the land.”387 He reported that “perfect peace and tranquility prevail 
between all classes, colors and races…”388 “The principal cities and towns of Santa Clara 
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Province—are today absolutely clear of epidemic disease, orderly, and free from 
violence, rowdyism and licentiousness,” he reported in July 1899.389  
The level of crime in Santa Clara province was “no greater than might occur in 
any well-governed country,” reported Wilson in June 1899.390 Some reports of banditry 
turned out to be fictitious upon investigation. For example, in August 1899, Guillermo 
Hernández, a resident of the countryside surrounding Ranchuelo reported that “a party of 
25 men, negroes armed with short [shot] guns and machetes and mounted,” marauded 
through the Bonachea estate. They claimed “not to abuse anybody, but wander in such a 
manner because they find no work.”391 Orestes Ferrara, the acting Civil Governor of 
Santa Clara Province ordered Emigdio González Solo, the inspector of the government 
police, to the Bonachea estate to investigate the alarming charges. Of the dozen people 
interviewed, none had any idea of a group of armed black bandits passing through the 
estate. Moreover, when military officials interviewed the author of the letter, they found 
that he was illiterate, and “he assures not to have authorized anybody to write said letter, 
adding that the facts denounced in it are absolutely false.”392 Like this one, numerous 
alarming reports of rural crime turned out to be false after investigation, suggesting that 
the specter of crime served purposes other than desire for law and order. 
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According to some country dwellers, rural crime after the war paralleled the 
levels of banditry that had typically characterized the countryside under Spanish rule 
Rural crime had pervaded the Cuban countryside in the nineteenth century. As one 
Cienfuegos residents noted, “In a certain period prior to the breaking out of the war, 
highway robbery took certain proportions in the provinces of Havana and Santa Clara, 
which became alarming, but due to the efficacious measures taken by General Señor 
Polavieja, was finally reduced to almost insignificant conditions, although it did not 
totally disappear.”393 Clearly, rural crime was not unique to the post-war period. 
Some American investigators also seemed to downplay the significance of the 
crimes. In November 1899, the mayor of Paradero, a small town near Lajas, intercepted a 
group of thieves attempting to steal six oxen from a “lonely potrero,” called Los Corrales. 
“The men were rejected by us and fired to us while running away,” reported the ward 
mayor, Manuel Gómez. The mayor of Camarones, Jorge Rodríguez went out to 
investigate, and stated that the incident reflected only “cattle thieves of the lowest kind,” 
and not banditry.
394
 By avoiding the label of banditry, Rodríguez depoliticized the 
incident of robbery. This curious reaction on the part of the civil and military authorities 
to reports of crime highlights a divergence in the ways in which Cuban civil authorities 
and local property owners viewed crime, and harnessed discourses of order and disorder 
to further their political objectives. 
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Clearly, the specter of rural crime had assumed new importance with the 
American military occupation in 1899. Early on, Cuban civil authorities recognized the 
political implications of crime: it became a symbol of their unfitness to self-govern, and 
therefore an impediment to the goal of independence. Reports of violence against 
Spaniards and marauding armed blacks tended to undermine the image of stability and 
order the Cuban civil authorities needed to cultivate in order to gain independence.  
 
Crime in Rural Cienfuegos through American Eyes 
  
Planters in and around Cienfuegos suffered severe financial losses and even ruin 
as a result of the war. Citizens of the United States, whether American-born or 
naturalized, documented millions of dollars of damages to their estates, hoping that these 
records would help them secure indemnification. Andrés L. Terry and estate 
administrator Francis Egerton Webb claimed over $611,000 in damages to their 
properties of the deceased Antonio E. Terry in Cruces and Cienfuegos.
395
 Constancia 
Sugar Company of New York claimed nearly $4,178,000 in damages.
396
 Hormiguero 
Central Company assessed their damages at nearly $769,000.
397
 Others property owners 
claimed smaller but still substantial losses. These included Luis Mayoline, Manuel Antón 
                                                 
395
 Andrés L. Terry vs. United States of America, Case 90, United States National Archives, Spanish Treaty 
Claims Commission, Record Group 76, Entry 352 (Hereafter, USNA/STCC/RG 76/E 352);  James P. 
Wood, Final Report of the Spanish Treaty Claim Commission (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1910), 32-35. 
396
 Constancia Sugar Co vs. United States of America, Case 196, USNA/STCC/RG 76/E 352; Wood, Final 
Report, 48-49. 
397
 Homiguero Central Company vs. United States of America, Case 293, USNA/STCC/RG 76/E 352; 
Wood, Final Report, 64-65. 
  
167 
 
Recio de Morales, Gabriel M. Landa, Domingo J. Álvarez, Carlos J. Marsillán, María 
Sánchez de la Torre, Emilio Fernández Cabada and Ynés, Ambrosia, Nicolás, and 
Antonio Suárez del Villar, Victor Virgilio Vila González, Victoria Fowler de Cabada, 
Patricio Ponce de Leon, Agnes de Béquer, Joeseph R. Lombard and María Josefa 
Sánchez de Lombard.
398
 
Image 10: “Looking Forward” 399
 
 As a result of their extreme financial losses during the war, wealthy American 
planters and some Cuban planters with American citizenship in Cienfuegos sought to 
prevent further losses after the war. Preventing further financial losses meant securing a 
stable and submissive labor force and securing effective protection from rural crime. The 
Cuban army, they concluded, presented the biggest threat to both of these goals. The 
continued mobilization of the Cuban army in the hinterland of Cienfuegos after the war 
                                                 
398
 Wood, Final Report. Also see USNA/STC/RG 76/E 352. 
399
 J.S. Pughe, “Looking forward,” Puck, November 1, 1899, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs 
Division. 
  
168 
 
represented a most militant rejection of dependency on the sugar plantations by men who 
had formerly constituted the laboring classes. It also represented, to some planters, the 
persistence of the lawlessness and destruction that had prevailed during the war, and by 
implication, a threat to their economic interests. 
 
Edwin F. Atkins, perhaps the most vocal advocate for wealthy foreign property 
owners, harnessed the specter of rural crime to influence politics, with the ultimate goal 
of ensuring his economic interests in Cuba. Born in 1850 in Boston, Massachusetts, 
Atkins traveled to Cuba for the first time at the age of 16 in 1866, to accompany his 
father, Elisha Atkins, on a business trip in connection with his sugar-importing firm. 
Within two years, Atkins began working for his father, reaching partnership in the firm 
by 1874. Although the business began as simple importation of sugars, conditions arising 
from the Ten Years’ War (1868-1878) proved favorable for Atkins to begin acquiring 
property in the 1880s. With a series of debts and foreclosures enshrining the sugar 
industry in Cienfuegos after the war, Atkins took possession of the Soledad estate, 
formerly owned by the Sarría family, as payment for the debt by the local Cienfuegos 
merchant and business partners, the Torriente brothers. By taking advantage of other 
foreclosures between the 1880s and 1890s, Atkins gained ownership of an expansive 
swathe of territory in the central south coast of Cuba around Cienfuegos, lands which 
contributed cane to one of the largest sugar mills in the country, the Central Soledad. 
 The insurrection (1895-1898) cost Atkins millions of dollars in profits in his sugar 
business. He claimed over $82,000 of damages to his personal property in Cienfuegos, 
and nearly $248,000 of losses on the properties owned by his business, Edwin F. Atkins 
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and Company.
400
 Insurgents destroyed his buildings, sabotaged his infrastructure, burned 
his cane fields and even killed the workers. They prohibited him from operating his mill. 
In order to continue operations at Soledad, Atkins mobilized a private guard force to 
watch over the workers, another added expense. By the end of the war, Atkins had 
developed a strong aversion to most Cuban separatists, a feeling that persisted after the 
war. 
After the war, Atkins sought to neutralize the Cuban army, which had done so 
much damage to his properties during the war, and which he feared would continue to 
threaten his wealth during peacetime. He used his status and connections to high-ranking 
politicians to influence American military authorities and the American press articulating 
concern over rampant rural crime. He maintained constant communication with civil and 
military authorities regarding the banditry around his Central Soledad. 
Wealthy planters, both American and Spanish, demanded that American forces 
take action to protect property against bandits. As early as September 1898, Atkins, Hugh 
Kelly, members of the Hormiguero Sugar Company and others wrote to President 
William McKinley, requesting American troops be furnished to protect American 
properties in Cuba.
401
 By January 1899, an anonymous Spanish merchant begged Bates, 
on behalf of the “Spanish element” of the town of Cruces, to send American forces to 
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maintain “better order.”402 Instead of meeting these demands, Bates ordered planters to 
disband private guard forces on their estates, shortly after he took control of Cienfuegos 
jurisdiction on January 1, 1899.
403
 Bates ordered the disbandment because Cubans 
complained about the private guard forces: “the Cubans were much irritated at my 
maintaining a private guard composed of Spaniards.”404 This meant that land owners had 
no legal forms of armed protection against rural criminals. 
Atkins quickly responded to the lack of armed protection of his properties by 
renewing his request for military protection. Atkins attempted to convince Bates that the 
countryside was too unsafe to disband private guard forces because “they were needed 
for the protection of our property, particularly our cattle, without which we could not 
continue work.”405 Atkins legitimized his concern over rural crime by juxtaposing the 
order of the cities under American rule with the disorder of the countryside, under Cuban 
rule. In March, he noted that “…the back country towns are entirely under the control of 
armed insurgents, principally blacks, who are collecting taxes and managing affairs quite 
independent of other authority. These are less disposed to disarm as time goes on and less 
disposed to return to work.”406 Insurgent rule in the countryside begot social anarchy, in 
contrast to the order that prevailed in the cities under American military control: “All is 
quiet in the cities, but in back country towns, many outrages are committed, which in 
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most cases do not come to the knowledge of the officers.”407 Country towns near his 
estate were “full of insurgents and idlers who go about every night followed by a mob 
crying ‘down’ with everything that doesn’t please them,” he recorded in his diary.408  
Atkins presented the armed insurgents as both a threat to order and to the 
economic prosperity of the province. “We can’t get enough men to run the estates,” he 
wrote. “It is a queer condition of affairs when people go hungry or beg rather than work. 
The officers here are learning something about these people every day, and there are few 
who disagree with me.”409 The murders and other crimes committed by insurgents 
reduced the countryside to a state of chaos, almost as severe as that which prevailed 
during the war: “The insurgents are killing the guerrillas who in turn are taking to the 
woods in small bands for safety. In my opinion there will be bad times and we shall have 
to arm again if forces are withdrawn and I trust this will not be the case.”410 For Atkins, 
the presence of American troops was necessary to maintain order in Cuba. 
According to Atkins, the blame for rampant rural crime fell squarely upon the 
insurgents, many of who had terrorized his estate during the war: “The insurgents were 
roaming about the country; they were in great measure destitute of food supplies and 
clothing, and we were exposed to pillage had we not continued to maintain our own 
private forces.”411 Atkins claimed that if relief efforts waned, destitute Cuban soldiers 
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would subsist on the backs of wealthy planters: “If friends of the insurgents now in camp 
at Santa Rosa exhaust their means of supplying food for the camp before our government 
provides for them, we may have to contribute in order to save our oxen.”412 Atkins drew 
upon the reputation of insurgents as thieves and bandits to bolster his case that military 
authorities had to take action to prevent crime, while undermining the separatist claims to 
political power. 
When the specter of destitute soldiers failed to convince the Bates of the necessity 
of private guards, Atkins turned to race as a tool for enhancing the danger the insurgents 
posed. He pointed to a supposed problematic demographic transition resulting from the 
war: “The native born white population is reduced to a small minority, and for this the 
Sp[anish] Am[erica]n War is largely accountable. The blacks suffered much less being 
the stronger race, and the Spaniards still less, as they got most of what was available in 
the way of food.”413 The black population of the province of Santa Clara did increase 
substantially after the war, but whites still accounted for over two-thirds of the population 
(See Table 4). This was one of the few provinces whose total population increased 
between 1887 and 1899, and the increase in the black population likely resulted when 
insurgents from other parts of the island and even from abroad settling in the area after 
the war. Still the proportion of blacks to whites in Santa Clara was lower than the island-
wide average. 
The alleged demographic problem posed a threat to order and prosperity in the 
countryside. Atkins emphasized the criminal potential of black veterans, an attempt to 
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appeal to American fears of a black uprising. The situation “is not all one could wish here 
and the insurgents, particularly the negroes do not show a disposition to give up their 
arms or go to work; labor is scarce and uncertain.”414 At the same time as Atkins 
complained that veterans refused to work, he employed hundreds of men on his estate 
and exported large quantities of sugar.
415
 His complaint of a labor shortage may have 
been due to his particular vision of who he wanted to employ in which positions, judging 
that “competent men” were lacking among the “native population.416 Although his claims 
were inaccurate or exaggerated, Atkins successfully provoked anxieties among American 
military forces by suggesting that a substantial black population would jeopardize order 
in the province. 
 
Table 4: Proportion of Blacks and Whites before and after the War
417
 
 Island of Cuba Province of Santa 
Clara 
Cienfuegos District 
 Black White Black White Black White 
1887 32.4 67.6 20.6 79.4 - - 
1899 32.1 67.9 29.9 70.1 32.7 67.3 
Difference -0.3 +0.3 +9.3 -9.3 - - 
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Note: Chinese were included in the white count, following the pattern in the 1887 census for comparative 
purposes. Black includes categories of “black” and “mixed.” 
 
A hearty presence of American troops in Cienfuegos, Atkins claimed, could help 
control the dangers of armed veterans. “Here everything is quiet, the Am[erica]n troops 
being in control in the town and insurgents (still armed) in the country. The insurgents, 
comparatively few in numbers, and frequently, if not generally officered by blacks, are 
behaving as well and better than might be expected.”418 Atkins suggested that insurgents 
would refrain from unruly behavior due to their fear of American troops. In one 
American newspaper appeared an article claiming that violence prevailed where 
American troops were lacking: “Brigandism is on the increase in the country, and a reign 
of terror prevails in town where no United States soldiers are quartered.” Further, the 
author stated that “the so-called bandits are mostly negroes who came from the East with 
the Cuban army of invasion. They have taken full possession of the towns outside of the 
railroads, and are living there during the day and robbing at night.”419 Some American 
newspapers propagated the idea that order in the countryside depended upon the presence 
of American troops, often explicitly citing Atkins as a key informant. 
Atkins began to criticize the insufficiency of the military government in fulfilling 
their peacekeeping mission.
420
 Atkins was convinced that if the Americans saw the 
condition of the countryside with their own eyes, they would support his request for 
troops to defend his estate: “I requested the General before he issued any order to send 
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one of his staff officers to the estate to investigate the conditions of the neighborhood.”421 
Bates sent Captain William Wright, who Atkins guided through his estate and the 
surrounding country.
422
  
After his journey through Soledad and the adjoining towns, Captain Wright wrote 
a lengthy report revealing the destitution of the countryside and the diverse survival 
strategies employed by the insurgents. Some of his observations alarmed him. He noted, 
for example, that “a Cuban negro lieutenant, with 15 men of similar color is stationed” in 
the town of Guaos. He received orders from Lieutenant Colonel Machado of the 
command of Higinio Esquerra. There were about 400 insurgents cultivating vacant fields 
on the outskirts of that city. Other insurgent chiefs turned to taxing the local population to 
sustain their men, as did “a one-eyed Cuban lieutenant of villainous countenance.” He 
and other chiefs levied the tax to sustain the men in policing the town, which Wright 
noted was almost completely neglected. Wright suggested that insurgents find work at 
Soledad, but note that some insurgents refused such a path because they were waiting for 
a payout by the United States.
423
 The standing army of Cuban insurgents with military 
experience and armed with Mausers and Remingtons posed a threat to rural property, and 
potentially challenged the omnipotence of the military occupation. 
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Image 11: Higinio Esquerra
424
 
 
Wright focused mainly on the problem of the armed insurgents camped near 
Soledad, but he did not discuss any specific instances of crime in the vicinity in his 
report. Cattle stealing and sheep killing continued in the zone of Hormiguero estate, 
though he did not note any around Soledad. He noted that it was most likely due to the 
exorbitant price of meat.
425
 Nevertheless, he recommended “that a detachment of 10-15 
men be stationed on or near this estate as evidence that the U.S. troops have assumed 
control of Cuba and that depredations such as cane burning and cattle stealing will not be 
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tolerated.”426 Atkins and Wright resolved to request a contingent of American troops be 
stationed on the estate to replace the private forces, and Bates complied. 
Other property owners around Cienfuegos also requested American troops to 
protect their estate. One such petitioner was José de la O. García, the owner of a sugar 
plantation called Don Pelayo. He wrote to Bates in March 1899, requesting a permit to 
carry arms and hire two armed guards to escort him through the countryside, a feat that 
he claimed was impossible without such protection. He gave the names of several 
prominent property owners in Cienfuegos as “guarantors” of his “respectability,” 
including Edwin F. Atkins, Esteban Cacicedo, and Elias Ponvert.
427
 Oliver Agramonte, 
the manager of the American-owned Juraguá estate. Agramonte complained of a “small 
detachment of Cuban troops” stationed near his estate, who were “more detrimental than 
useful.” He claimed that “we are compelled against our will to furnish them quarters, 
clothing and food, not daring to refuse their demands for fear of their deviltry.”428 
Agramonte requested that Bates send troops to protect his estate. American troops were 
dispatched to sugar mills across Santa Clara in early 1899.
429
 
When the withdrawal of the U.S. Volunteers was announced in April 1899, 
Atkins feared that American military protection of private estates would end, again 
exposing white property owners to the whims of black veterans. Atkins and other wealthy 
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property owners like Agramonte in the countryside of Cienfuegos pushed for permission 
to maintain private armed guards, as they had during the war. The objectives of both 
planters and military officials seemed to converge in a new policy regulating firearms. 
Wilson argued that there had “been too much of that sort of business – of people carrying 
arms and running around and shooting promiscuously.”430 Although Wilson agreed that 
weapons for hunting purposes should be allowed, he stated that these should be kept at 
home, “and not worn at all times and places.” Although he sought to disarm the general 
population, Wilson allowed estate owners to arm private guards beginning on June 13, 
1899.
431
 He noted that the men hired as guards must be “of the character satisfactory to 
the civil authorities,” and that arms could only be held with special permit.432  
The concession of arms permits to private guards resulted in a wave of 
militarization of the countryside, as estate owners hired armed guards to protect their 
properties. By June 1900, the number and placement of private guards had expanded to 
include posts throughout the countryside in every municipal district in Cienfuegos 
jurisdiction (See Tables 5 & 6). The rapid expansion of private guards once again placed 
the responsibility for protecting rural property on wealthy white property owners, relying 
on their own discretion about that constituted a threat and how they would respond. 
  
Table 5: Private Armed Guards in Cienfuegos, June 1899
433
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Término 
Municipal 
Number of 
Armed Guards 
Abreus 81 
Cruces 0 
Hormiguero 49 
Lajas 22 
Rodas 10 
Total 172 
 
 
Table 6: Armed Private Guards in Cienfuegos, June, 1900
434
 
Término 
Municipal 
Finca Owner/Administrator # of 
Guards 
Cienfuegos Potrero “Arroyo del Medio” Francisco Socorro Cartaya López 2 
 Ingenio “Santa Rosalía” Manuel García Blanco 1 
 Ingenio “Preserverancia” Miguel Díaz Pérez 8 
 Ingenio “El Indio” Roberto Ponce de Leon (Admin) 4 
 Ingenio “San Lino y Lequeibro” Hermenegildo Montalvo y Agustín 
Goytizolo 
15 
 Colonia “Guarral Grandá” Manuel Antón Recio 4 
 Finca “Consolación” Leonardo Cáceres 4 
 Finca in Barrio “Manacas” Vecinos el Barrio “Manacas” 3 
 Finca “Mascota” Lázaro Díaz 4 
 Colonia “Delicias” Manuel Fernández 2 
 Fincas “Diamante” y “Caimanera” José Bú 1 
 Finca “La Vega” Tirso Mesa 1 
 Fincas “Limones” y “Arizá” M. Acea, E. Cacicedo, J. Capote y Pita 16 
 Ingenio “Dos Hermanas” Nicolás Acea 11 
 Central “Manuelita” Javier Reguera (Admin.) 9 
Rodas Colonia “Santa Marta” Sres Castiñeira y Compañía 1 
 Colonia “Santa Isabel” Idem. 1 
 Colonia “Santa María” Idem. 1 
 Central “Parque Alto” Sres. Fowler y Compañía 11 
 Colonias “Damují,” “Cristina,” “Alava, 
 y “Aguardiente” 
Jesús Capote Mati 5 
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 Colonia “La Victoria” Juan Bautista Capote 2 
Lajas Ingenio Central “San Agustín” Agustín Llorente Díaz 7 
 Ingenio Central “Santísima Trinidad” Idem. 7 
 Colonia “Covadonga” y “La Luna” Idem. 2 
 Central “Caracas” Idem. 20 
 Finca “San Joaquín” Joaquín Martínez Alonso 1 
 Finca “Santo Tomás” Tomás Velasco 1 
 Colonia “La Legua” Cándido Blanco 1 
San Fernando Ingenio Central “Portugalete” Idem. 6 
 Ingenio Central “Hormiguero” Idem. 10 
 Colonia “Carmita” Manuelito Lurarraga 1 
Abreus Central “Constancia” Idem. 50 
Cruces Pueblo de Cruces Vecinos del Pueblo de Cruces 1 
 Colonias “Mercedes,” “Josefita,” y 
“Manuelita” 
José R. Quirós 3 
 Ingenio “Dos Hermanos” Sres. Fowler y Compañía 4 
 Ingenio “San Francisco” Idem. 3 
 Central “Andreíta” Idem. 2 
Cartagena Colonia  “Conucos de las Castas” Florencio Alemany 1 
 Finca “Artemisa” Saturnino Martínez 2 
 Colonia “Santo Tomás” Manuel González Dieg[u]ez 2 
 Colonia  “San Antonio” José María Capote 2 
 Finca “Santa Rosa” Alberto Gou 1 
Total   233 
 
Emasculation and Disbandment of the Cuban Army 
 
As wealthy property owners attempted to regain the monopoly on violence after 
the war by arming private guards, the specter of armed blacks still presented a menace to 
the consolidation of this control. The guns the insurgents continued to wield in the 
months after the war, the symbols of their military honor and evidence of their legitimate 
citizenship, came to represent the most visible threat to rural order from the perspective 
of some wealthy property owners. Stripping Cuban veterans of their Remingtons and 
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Mausers would not only eliminate the immediate threat of insurgent crime and challenge 
to American military rule, but it would also strip veterans of the most material claim to 
military honor. Disarming the Cuban Army effectively emasculated veterans by 
destroying the relics of their claims to citizenship. 
Among the most eager to disband the insurgents was Atkins. He pushed to disarm 
the Cuban veterans to further secure his properties, claiming that public law enforcement 
was insufficient. “The General in command has not a dollar at his disposal to establish a 
rural guard which in my opinion (and I think in his) is the only way to get insurgents to 
give up their arms if this is not accomplished soon, here will be trouble,” Atkins 
complained. “What is needed is some unarmed civilian to act with General Brooke in 
such matters, and power to decide without reference to Washington, except as far as 
regards a general policy.”435 He demanded the immediate disbandment of the Cuban 
Army, arguing that the insurgents were at the bottom of rural crime.  In April 1899, 
Atkins claimed that violence by armed veterans was imminent: “The insurgents are still 
armed and prepared for a row and I cannot see that any progress is being made in 
disarming, for this reason I am undecided yet about leaving.”436 In May, Atkins again 
voiced his unease that the insurgents had still not laid down their arms: “Insurgents are 
still under arms and it looks as if they intended to remain so. If troops are withdrawn 
there is sure to be trouble.”437 American troops, Atkins argued, were the only thing 
keeping Cuban soldiers under control. 
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Atkins compared the situation of political tensions in Cuba with the one that had 
prevailed in the newly emancipated 13 colonies after the American Revolution: “The 
hatreds aroused by the late conflict are also operating upon a class of whites who are 
likely to return to Spain if they find themselves left to the tender mercies of those native 
insurgents with who they have been in conflict. It is remembered what was the fate of the 
Tories in the period of our own revolution at the hands of a far more enlightened and less 
revengeful people than is that which is now striving to take to itself the government of 
Cuba.”438 Atkins argued that the political revenge killings proved that Cubans were unfit 
for self-rule, because they did not protect whites from crime. 
As the military government sponsored a census of the Cuban Army to be 
conducted by the Polish-born Cuban General Carlos Roloff, Atkins demanded that 
American military officials and policy makers in Washington act more quickly to disband 
the Cuban army. By March, Roloff estimated that 4,769 Cuban soldiers remained in arms 
in the countryside of Santa Clara province.
439
 The infamous $3 million deal negotiated by 
General Máximo Gómez furnished the funds with which Cuban soldiers each would 
receive $75 for their services during the war in exchange for turning in their weapons. 
Certainly, the continued presence of the United States after the defeat of Spain, 
and their attempt to disband the Cuban army, was unnerving for many veterans. 
“Whatever feeling of political unrest there may be in this province at present,” reported 
Wilson, “is due solely to the suspicion fostered by agitators and by the newspapers, that 
we do not intend to live up to the voluntary pledge contained in section 4 of the Joint 
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Resolution of Intervention…”440 Many American officials, perhaps unlike Wilson, did 
not intend to live up to this promise, viewing it as yet another impediment to Manifest 
Destiny.
441
 
In the weeks leading up to the disbandment, fears emerged over the possible 
disorder that would result from the terms of the payment of the Cuban soldiers. The 
concurrence of a wave of public disturbance in Cienfuegos city and the entrance of 
Cuban soldiers from the country seemed to corroborate the presumed connection between 
insurgents and crime, and fed fears of black discontent and imminent racial violence. 
Some towns took precautions by segregating celebrations and festivities.
442
 For example, 
the labor disturbance of May 15 involved a definite racial component as black laborers 
challenged white American military authorities. Just days before the San Juan Day riot, 
Major Bowman reported that bout 200 destitute Cuban soldiers had entered the city to 
collect their money.
443
 Bowman ordered that 500 rations be distributed among the 
veterans, hoping to appease them. 
Rumors circulated that certain individuals were encouraging the soldiers not to 
accept the $75 offered as payment in exchange for turning in their weapons. Local 
newspapers propagated this fear in several articles, citing discontent among veterans 
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regarding the terms of disbandment.
444
 Manifestos encouraging soldiers not to accept the 
payout circulated in the province of Santa Clara in May and June 1899. For example, one 
manifesto issued to the “Valiant Army of Las Villas” arrived to the office of the military 
governor in May 1899. It began: “Our destiny may force us once more to leave the 
blessed hearth for the sad but glorious path of war, which makes one great in life and 
imperishable in death.”445 The manifesto ordered Cuban soldiers to be ready for battle 
under “our redeeming flag,” suggesting that the objective waging war anew would be to 
gain full independence for Cuba, instead of military rule. Wilson also received news that 
there were reports of signs posted throughout Cienfuegos aimed at discouraging the 
soldiers from accepting the money, though he later denied this vehemently to General 
Brooke.
446
 
Some American military officials feared that violence would ensure if troops were 
allowed to congregate in the cities. The military order giving instructions for the payment 
of Cuban soldiers specified that “large bodies of men are not to be assembled at one time. 
As a rule the number should not exceed one Cuban regiment.”447 Ebenezer Fenton, an 
American officer in Cienfuegos, feared disorder the following day with the payment of 
the Cuban soldiers: “Tomorrow when the Cuban Army get[s] their money there may be 
trouble if some movement is put on foot to prevent these men from carrying arms.”448 
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According to Fenton, these Cubans were thirsty for American blood: “They are swearing 
vengeance on all Americans. The situation is serious.” Fenton requested a private guard: 
“Have a guard at my place at night for protection of self and Government property.”449 
While disbandment angered some insurgents, others reluctantly accepted this fate, 
as a necessary concession to secure eventual independence. Many of the insurgent chiefs 
encouraged the disbandment as a step toward peace. Local insurgent leaders including 
Francisco Carrillo and José de Jesús Monteagudo carried out the orders to pay the 
troops.
450
 Supporting the American project for disbanding the Cuban Army also 
legitimate certain insurgent leaders for their collaboration with the occupying 
government. Máximo Gómez was known, and despised among some circles, for his 
conciliatory attitude, urging Cubans to eliminate the “causes” for the American 
occupation.
451
 In the judgment of Gómez, and other high profile Cuban politicians like 
Gonzalo de Quesada and Tomás Estrada Palma, Cubans would have to cooperate with the 
American occupation in order to secure their goal of independence.  
Wilson viewed the cooperation of insurgent chiefs as a sign of positive disposition 
toward Americans. Insurgents in Cienfuegos were “well behaved,” he reported in June 
1899.
452
 Wilson was so confident in the good behavior of the Cuban veterans that he 
initially judged that there was hardly a reason to have a strong rural guard force after the 
war, because peace reigned: “This guard formerly patrolled the countryside constantly, 
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but such patrolling hardly seems necessary now, the country being at peace and no 
bandits to cope with.”453 American military authorities condoned the rural guard largely 
to humor the country people, who “would feel more secure in their work if they knew 
there was a rural police constantly on the lookout for law-breakers.”454 Military officials 
in Cienfuegos rightly identified a pervasive anxiety among wealthy property owners in 
and around that city. 
Although he endorsed the policy of disarming Cuban soldiers in his official 
reports, Wilson tended to empathize with the Cuban soldiers, many of whom were not 
content with such a meager sum of money and disgruntled that they were required to turn 
in their weapons—the symbols of their victory. Wilson expressed his outrage in many of 
his personal letters.
455
 For “the life of me, I cannot see why the Cubans should not be 
permitted to take their old Remingtons and Mausers home, and use them for the defense, 
or the ornamentation of their palm-thatched, and hand them down undisturbed to their 
descendants as a loved and honored memento of their service in behalf of Cuban 
freedom,” Wilson wrote to his a military colleague in late May.456 “I do not know how 
this strikes you, but I do not believe that if you had fought for four or five years, as these 
people have fought for the independence of their country as against the brutal domination 
of Spain, you would be willing to give up your gun to anybody, no matter what might be 
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the argument or the inducement offered,” he continued.457 Wilson articulated with 
startling clarity the dilemma many Cuban veterans faced: they either had to surrender the 
symbols of their military honor, or submit to the possible consequences of defying 
American authority. Either option required Cuban veterans to undergo a discursive 
emasculation, as insurgent visions of manliness based on military honor became 
subordinated to narrow visions of what it meant to be a good man articulated by wealthy 
property owners and supported by American military authorities. 
Despite the immense challenges of poverty and pride, many Cuban soldiers came 
to the city to collect their meager sum. Many of soldiers entitled to the $75 payment were 
unemployed and in desperate conditions. Wilson was correct that many would not come 
to collect their money—but this was not because they were employed. Many did not have 
the means to travel from their homes to the city to collect their money. Some did not even 
have enough money for purchase train fare to come to the city.
458
 Other soldiers never 
made it to the city to collect their money due to illness or disability. Florencio Valdés, for 
example wrote to the Governor General of Cuba on September 20, 1899 explaining that 
he could not collect his money because he was in the country sick.
459
 General Carlos 
Roloff wrote on behalf of one disabled Cuban officer, Joaquín Castillo, requesting he be 
furnished transportation to return to his home in Santa Clara province. The wounds he 
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sustained during the war inhibited him from earning a living.
460
 Others came to the city 
on foot or horseback. By the end of June, the majority of the Cuban army had been 
disbanded, and white property owners had achieved their goal. 
 
Conclusions: Crime as an Argument for Political Exclusion 
  
The cessation of hostilities between Spain and the Cuban separatists did not bring 
peace to the Cuban countryside. Although formal combat subsided, crime persisted after 
the war, just as it had in previous periods. Yet, it assumed new meaning in American-
occupied Cuba, as Cubans, Spaniards, Autonomists, property owners, and American 
military officials struggled to convert their political agendas into reality. In an epoch in 
whiteness was a precondition for citizenship and self-government, Cuban separatists 
struggled to reconcile the perceived racial composition of their force and the racially 
heterogeneous Cuban population with their goals of independent government. Wealthy 
property owners, however, were quick to undermine Cuban pretensions to power, 
pointing to the specter of anarchy and social disorder that would follow Cuban rule. 
 Allusions to pervasive rural crime and banditry became one way property owners 
sought to foster deeper American involvement in local affairs while promoting greater 
support for propertied interests among the local ruling elite. The specter of rampant rural 
crime drew on racial anxieties and gendered conceptions of honor to undermine insurgent 
claims to citizenship by portraying them black criminals and vagrants. Black criminality 
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became conflated with insurgent criminal tendencies, and Cubans, in turn, were portrayed 
as dishonorable and unmanly, undermining insurgent claims to political rights based on 
military honor. By attacking insurgent manliness, wealthy property owners attempted to 
make veterans ineligible for political power, a measure they believed necessary for the 
protection of propertied interests. 
Labeling veterans as blacks, furthermore, contributed to growing sentiment 
among American authorities that insurgents were children rather than men, and 
consequently yet unprepared to enjoy the benefits of citizenship. By writing to military 
authorities with sensational and often fictitious tales of black crime, opponents of Cuban 
rule, like Atkins, played into American racial anxieties stemming from their own 
experience in Reconstruction. These men build upon the foundation that the Spanish had 
laid during the war, depicting the insurgents as blood-thirsty black hordes. Connecting 
the Cuban Army to blackness and crime helped wealthy property owners obtain 
concessions from the military government including detachments of American troops to 
guard large estates, permits for armed guards, and eventually, the disbandment of the 
Cuban Army. 
With the disbandment of the Cuban Army, wealthy property owners had 
elaborated their vision of Cuban society, one they shared with American military 
officials. Stripping them of the very symbols of their military victory, American military 
officials enacted a ritualized emasculation of Cuban veterans by forcibly submitting them 
to American military authority.  The virtual erasure of Cuban military honor also implied 
a narrowing vision of political eligibility. Cuban veterans were unfit to hold political 
power because they were mostly black and innately disposed to criminality, and if they 
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were white, they supported black rule, Atkins and his allies claimed. Because the Cuban 
Army from their perspective represented the possible inversion of the racial order, Cuban 
veterans could not be entrusted with the reins of government. 
At the same time as disbandment of the Cuban Army eliminated an alleged source 
of crime in the countryside, it opened the possibility for veterans to access the city. The 
mass movement of Cuban veterans from the countryside to the city to receive their 
payment and turn in their weapons may have served the ultimate goal of disbanding the 
army, but it had the unintended consequence of catalyzing a flood of destitute veterans 
into urban spaces, disturbing the social order. Numerous black veterans remained in the 
city after collecting their money, and many settled in the historically black neighborhoods 
in the southwest corner and the port-side district of Marsillán. The influx of these 
veterans fueled the rise of black claims to authority in urban spaces that had previously 
been defined by the colonial social order. 
The paradoxical consequences of the disbandment of the Cuban army American 
rule seemed to intensify the direct conflict between two visions of the future of Cuba. On 
the one hand, many veterans demanded the fulfillment of the goal that they had fought 
thirty years to achieve and that Americans promised to help attain in the Teller 
Amendment: absolute and immediate independence. On the other hand, wealthy property 
owners, Spaniards and Autonomists argued that Cuban rule would transform the island 
into another Haiti. The only way to ensure the protection of the wealthy and to preserve 
the social order was to perpetuate American rule. The next chapter examines how this 
conflict shaped the political landscape of Cienfuegos during American rule.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Annexation or Black Republic: 
Radical Patriots, Autonomists and Annexationists in the Struggle for Political 
Power 
 
Emerging from the war, the relationships among the major players—Cubans, 
Spaniards, and Americans, took a dramatic turn. The opinions of American soldiers and 
officers regarding the Cuban separatists had rapidly shifted from one of respect for a 
noble cause to disdain for a racially-heterogeneous rabble they called an army after the 
military intervention in April 1898. The specter of rural crime allegedly perpetrated by 
these patriot-bandits seemed to corroborate the increasing American disdain for their 
accidental allies and fostered a growing alliance between Americans and opponents of 
Cuban rule. American contempt for Cuban separatists translated into a reluctance to grant 
them the full rights of citizenship, including suffrage and especially political leadership, 
after the war. Americans, thus, initially left intact the war-time political appointments of 
Autonomists and Spaniards. 
Americans soon realized, however, that denying political power to Cuban 
veterans would threaten the military government. The Teller Amendment declaring 
American commitment to Cuban independence as well as adamant demands by Cuban 
separatist for access to political power forced Americans to support separatist political 
pretensions. Cuban veterans argued that their military service was the ultimate 
demonstration of their manliness. Because the separatist discourse of racial brotherhood 
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extended citizenship to all men, military service thus entitled Cuban veterans to 
citizenship and the political participation that it implied. 
American military authorities responded to these criticisms by beginning to place 
respectable white veterans in a wider array of local positions of power. Still, they sought 
to preserve the social order that the insurrection allegedly jeopardized. They proposed to 
accomplish this goal by limiting political rights to the so-called “better classes,” a group 
to which the allegedly criminal masses of the insurgent army could not pretend to belong. 
Based on their experiences of the American Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Indian 
Wars, American military officials reasoned that supporting the political pretensions of 
whites would help restore the racial order disrupted during the war. White Cuban 
veterans collaborated to a certain degree in preserving the arena of political leadership as 
a white space. They often justified black exclusion by pointing not to racial inequality, 
but to shortcomings in the patriotic masculinity of blacks, including lack of education and 
perceived class allegiances. 
White veterans, however, held diverse and often conflicting views about the 
future of Cuba Libre and about the presence of the Americans. Race, as it turned out, was 
not an accurate indicator of political allegiance. Cuban veterans shared the desire for 
political power, but they disagreed on the type of society they would create once in 
office, a difference most pronounced in the extent of social change they supported, and in 
the way they articulated their demands for independence. Two key groups emerged, both 
vying for political power. One group developed a more radical social and political agenda 
that actively relied on the support of blacks and advocated immediate independence. 
Another group, including socially-conservative white veterans and especially separatists 
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of the civil branch of Cuba Libre in the New York-based Partido Revolucionario Cubano 
(PRC), judged that collaboration with the Americans would be the most expedient way to 
gain independence. This group tended to be more socially-conservative, supporting the 
preservation of the colonial racial hierarchy and approaching the military occupation with 
collaboration rather than antagonism.  
This latter group became the new ally of the occupying power. These men more 
closely approximated the category of the “better classes,” which came to mean men who 
celebrated the American presence and actively sought to preserve the social hierarchy. 
This platform became the standard for eligibility to political power—a judgment 
Americans tended to view in terms of race. Whereas advocates for immediate 
independence were labeled as pro-black, collaboration with Americans became 
associated with the maintenance of the racial order and the protection of white privilege. 
Men who did not support collaboration with the occupying officials were depicted as 
radicals who favored black rule. This, regardless of the degree of accuracy in the claim, 
made advocates of immediate and absolute independence, even if they were white, 
ineligible for political power from the point of view of Americans. Cubans turned to the 
concept of masculinity to explain this increasing exclusivity of political leadership. 
Under American rule, the masculine ideal upon which eligibility for citizenship 
was measured began to change. Whereas during the war, patriotic masculinity subsumed 
racial and class hierarchies, the negotiation between Cuban separatists and American 
military officials gave way to a highly politicized conception of what it meant to have 
access to citizenship, and hence, what it meant to be a real Cuban man—un verdadero 
cubano. The ideal man became someone who could effectively navigate the contentious 
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political situation of the military occupation while still defending the goals of Cuba 
Libre. This was a tall order, one that proved to be unfeasible. Gradually, access to 
political power increasingly rested upon appeasing American military authorities, who 
often controlled elections. Consequently, some Cuban political hopefuls began to 
distance themselves from the more radical elements of the revolutions. Eventually, 
collaborating with Americans became a strategy through which certain Cuban political 
elites sought to consolidate their political power. They sought to address both American 
military officials and radical separatists by claiming that collaboration with the 
Americans was the most expedient route to independence. 
 
Antagonism among Allies 
 
The United States entered Cuba as an ally of the separatists. This posture was 
initially reflected in the press with sympathetic accounts of Spanish cruelties and Cuban 
suffering, images that also bolstered the idea that Americans had “saved” Cuba from 
Spain. “They found in one of the rooms a blood-stained rope. The walls and floor were 
discolored with dark splotch, which apparently were caused by blood,” read one 
American newspaper article in early January 1899. The gory description depicted the 
office of the Spanish military courts and the rooms “where political prisoners were 
tortured to extort confessions from them” in Cienfuegos.461 The overwhelming tone of 
sympathy in this article might seem insignificant, especially considering that the 
Americans were allies of the Cubans. Yet American military forces quickly abandoned 
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their alliance with the Cubans in the months after the war, presenting a paradoxical and 
exceedingly tense relationship between the Americans and the Cubans in Cienfuegos. 
Cuban separatists had to fight for access to political power after the war. 
American military officials seemed to have befriended their enemies in the months after 
the war. When the American military authorities under Major W. P. Duzenberry, of the 
second Illinois Volunteer Infantry, entered the city of Cienfuegos in early January 1899, 
they allied themselves with Spaniards and opposed Cuban political power. For example, 
Captain Amando Paggi of the Cuban Army requested permission “to parade 500 Cuban 
soldiers at the ceremonies of raising the stars and stripes.” Duzenberry denied this request 
because he was “convinced that the relations were too strained between Cubans and 
Spaniards to render such a course either desirable or safe.”462At the same time, the 
Spanish Commander, General Ernesto Aguirre de Bengoa offered the services of his 
Civil Guards to perform police duty in the city. Duzenberry accepted, an indication of his 
developing relationships and collaboration with local Spaniards.
463
 He “made many 
friends among the leading citizens of Cienfuegos, one of whom afterward sent him the 
gift of a handsome Spanish flag as a memento of this interesting and memorable 
occasion.”464 The collaboration with the Spanish and distrust of the Cubans was common 
among military officials in Cienfuegos during the early occupation. 
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The rapport American military officials developed with their Spanish counterparts 
in Cienfuegos contributed toward a prolongation of Spanish rule in that city. During the 
last year of the war, the Spanish government had granted Cuban autonomy. With that, 
Autonomists and urban non-combatants, who called themselves pacíficos took possession 
of local government on January 1, 1898.
465
 John C. Bates, who would become the 
military commander of the city in January 1899, left intact the final appointments made 
under Spanish rule, favoring Spaniards and autonomists over separatists. As early as mid-
January, the official policy required that Bates take “fitness intro consideration first,” 
before giving preference to Cubans.
466
 One of the only developments that pushed Bates to 
change the political status quo was the resignation in early January of nearly all the city 
council members. Military officials had to make “the necessary appointments, pro 
tempore,” to replace those who had resigned.467 Thus the city council was one of the first 
institutions of local government to replace Autonomists with Cuban veterans, or at least 
men who had sympathized with the Cuban cause. José Antonio Frías, who had been 
active in the Partido Revolucionario Cubano in New York during the war and was a 
close political ally of future president Tomás Estrada Palma, was appointed mayor on 
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January 31, 1899. He filled the rest of the vacancies with other prestigious white 
separatists. 
Cuban veterans in the city council helped accelerate the transition from pro-
Spanish to Cuban authority. By February 7, the city council named Lieutenant Colonel 
Joaquín Oropesa as Chief of Municipal Police. The city council noted that this 
appointment would be beneficial because Oropesa had been the Chief of Cavalry of 
Cienfuegos “from which the forces from with which said Police Corps is being 
organized.” The leadership of Oropesa in the Police force would be “highly advantageous 
because of the familiarity Oropesa has of this personnel and because of their habit of 
rendering services under the orders of the said Chief.”468 Oropesa built his force from 
other Cuban veterans.
469
 
With the departure of Spanish troops from Cienfuegos in late February, some of 
Cubans replaced autonomists in some of the most pressing sectors of government and 
administration.
470
 American military officials explained in the annual report of 1899 that 
“the Cuban army became an active factor in the control of civil affairs” after the 
evacuation of the Spanish from Cienfuegos in February 1899.
471
 On February 28, the city 
council appointed numerous other Cuban veterans to occupy a wide range of positions in 
government and public administration. Among those appointed were Lieutenant Abelardo 
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Hernández as Administrator of the Cemetery, Colonel Doctor José Núñez y Rodríguez to 
the Agricultural Bank project, Lieutenant Colonel Rafael B. Jiménez and Captain 
Abelardo Rodríguez as special police officers, Francisco Borges as Head of the Infectious 
Diseases Hospital, Feliciano Villar as Master of the city council House, among others.
472
 
Other appointments included Rafael Casals as Chief of the Section of Urban Police, 
Pablo Hernández as Jail Inspector, and Gonzalo García Vieta as General Director of 
Sanitation, who later became mayor.
473
 
During this time, the military authorities also began to consolidate the Rural 
Guard under the leadership of prominent white veterans. Cuban veterans had been 
performing rural police duty in the countryside of Cienfuegos after the war without pay 
or rations.
474
 While Bates was content to allow veterans to continue without 
compensation for their rural guard duty, José de Jesús Monteagudo, a prominent white 
veteran of Santa Clara was instrumental in pushing for the formalization of the Rural 
Guard, helping secure pay and equipment for numerous Cuban veterans.
475
 
Most of the men who found employment in the rural guard were white. Higinio 
Esquerra, who had commanded the General Cuartel of the Brigade of Cienfuegos during 
the war, commanded the District of Cienfuegos. Although Esquerra was not part of the 
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educated urban elite, he was a celebrated war hero, and most importantly, commanded 
the confidence of wealthy Cienfuegos residents. He hired his subordinate officers and 
patrolmen from the ranks of his Brigade. Andres Dorticós, who was the Secretary for the 
Cienfuegos Rural Guard, for example, enlisted in March 1896, and finished the war as a 
lieutenant in the Brigade of Cienfuegos. Ramon Cordovés Cabrera, who was in charge of 
the zone of Cienfuegos, Caunao, and Los Guaos, enlisted in June 1895 and  served as a 
commandant in the Headquarters of the Second Corps. The other officers placed in 
charge of the major zones of the jurisdiction of Cienfuegos were also white veterans.
476
 
The rural guard was predominantly white, but initially was composed of about 
20% people of color in the Province of Santa Clara.
477
 American military officials judged 
that the black rural guardsmen were better suited physically for the job, but were 
mentally inferior to the whites
478
 Whites were also better suited, they thought, for the 
ultimate goal of preserving racial order, a preference reflected in a subsequent plan to 
improve the quality of the men employed in the rural guard.
479
 Of course, there were 
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some exceptions to the general practice of hiring white leaders. One such exception was 
the black General José Gonzalez Planas who became Chief of the neighboring districts of 
Remedios and Sancti-Spíritus.
480
 
Born in the city of Santa Clara in 1850 to a Cuban mother and an African-born 
father, González began his service to Cuba Libre in 1869 with his enlistment under 
insurgents Generals Ignacio Agramonte and Máximo Gómez during the Ten Years’ War 
(1868-1878). After finishing the war at the rank of Commandant, González began 
developing his social network in Cienfuegos and its vicinity as a farmer, founding in 
Lajas the society of Color La Fraternidad. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1895, 
González incorporated into the Cuban Army again in July in Cienfuegos, and later served 
under Serafín Sánchez. By April 1896 he was promoted to the rank of General of the 
Brigade of Remedios, finishing the war as General of Division. 
The appointment of González as Chief of the Fourth District, paved the way for 
the employment of a few other black veterans in positions of power, but largely preserved 
the pattern of white leadership. González did hire his son, Eloy González Pérez as the 
Commander of the Vueltas post.
481
 He also hired prestigious white men, including Julio 
Cepeda Echemendía, a lieutenant coronel in the Narciso López Cavalry during the war.
482
 
The irony was perhaps not lost on American military officials when González Pérez 
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emerged as one of the leaders of the Partido Independiente de Color just a few short 
years after serving in a force charged with warding off black uprising. 
Despite his distinguished service during the wars of independence, there was great 
opposition to his appointment to a position of authority within the Rural Guard. 
According the American military officials, González “appears to be a shrewd man and 
has a good record as a leader in the war.” They also noted his “considerable influence 
among the colored people.” Perhaps due to his perceived preference for black veterans 
reflected in the employment of his son Americans reported that “there appears to be some 
prejudice against him because of his color.”483  The prejudice this American official cited 
highlights a broader preference for white men in positions of power in the months after 
the war. 
 
Americans defend Spanish Authority 
 
Although the city council, police, rural guard, and some subordinate 
administrative positions had fallen into the hands of Cuban veterans, Spaniards and 
Autonomists continued to occupy numerous important government posts. Americans 
sought to retain civil servants who wished to continue serving, except in “cases of great 
emergency.”484 Bates reasoned that these men would probably be most capable of 
maintaining order: 
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“These officials as a class were generally worthy and capable men, sincerely interested in the 
maintenance of order, in the reconstruction of civil government and in the re-establishment of 
industry and commerce. In every instance that came under my observation they performed their 
duties loyally and faithfully, maintaining perfect order, as far as was within their power, relieving 
suffering and want in their respective jurisdictions.”
485
 
 
These observations led Bates to retain the men in their positions during the first months 
of the military occupation. 
Spaniards and men who had supported Spanish rule continued in their positions, a 
development the Americans actively supported. For example, in March 1899, Cienfuegos 
residents protested the appointment of a foreign citizen, Trinidad Martínez, to an 
unnamed city office, classifying him as “an enemy of Cuban as well as the 
Americans.”486 Another example was Juan Venancio Schwiep, a native of Cienfuegos, 
served in multiple judicial posts during the war, including the Judge of Remedios and the 
High Court of Santa Clara.
487
 Americans promoted Schwiep in October 1898 to the 
position of Deputy Attorney of the High Court of Santa Clara, based on his record of 
protecting American citizens from “the most bloodthirsty extremists of this country,” 
who were “inciting the mob to commit outrages.”488 In January, Schwiep wrote to 
General Bates requesting to be maintained in his position. Bates granted this request 
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despite reports that Schweip was “not held in high repute here,” that “his ability and 
integrity are both questioned,” and he was reported as a Spanish sympathizer.489 
 Schwiep remained in office until mid-August 1899, when General John R. 
Brooke, the military Governor of Cuba, removed him. Schwiep wrote American military 
officials protesting his removal in compliance with Military Order 149. Schwiep 
petitioned for reinstatement, pointing to the promise military authorities made “that all 
public officers, natives of Cuba would be kept in their offices, provided they maintained 
their allegiance to the United States under oath, and promised to fill out everything she 
ordered or commanded.”490 Schwiep commented that the promise had been kept for some 
sectors of government, such as the Finance Department in which all the employees had 
been maintained. “Many Cubans who have occupied offices for years past have been left 
in oblivion, and other who obtained their after a hard contest in Havana eight years ago 
have seen their efforts abolished and their futures destroyed, and more sadly yet to see 
theirs chairs occupied by without experience of the world and judicial affairs.”491 Most 
disconcerting of all, was the fact that Schwiep had been removed after demonstrating his 
loyalty to the United States, while others who had not protected American remained in 
office.
492
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Some military officials recognized the continued presence of Spaniards in 
positions of power undermined the purported goal of the occupation to deliver the 
Cubans from Spanish tyranny. “With some honorable exceptions the selection of the 
Judges has been most disgraceful; the country was expected new men of better history 
and has felt a great deal disappointed in seeing so many of the judges of the old gang of 
‘Weyler and Blanco’ reappointed to the high places for which they have been 
designated,” wrote James H. Wilson, military governor of the Department of Matanzas 
and Santa Clara.
493
 “If the fountain of justice is polluted to start with, the result cannot 
but be unfortunate for the country,” he noted.494 Wilson also recognized that political 
change had to encompass all branches of the government. Still, “the old gang,” as Wilson 
called Spaniards and supporters of Spain, continued to wield influence in the 
administration of local affairs. Certainly, this was the case for Schwiep. After “due 
consideration,” military officials appointed him to the Fiscal Department, continuing a 
pattern of supporting pro-Spanish men in positions of power.
495
 
American complacency toward the post-war political order irritated—even 
insulted—some Cuban veterans. José de Jesús Monteagudo was particularly vocal about 
his disdain for the favoritism of General Bates. Born in 1861 in the city of Santa Clara, 
Monteagudo was an ardent defender of Cuban independence. Beginning the war as a 
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Captain with his enlistment in October 1895, he steadily climbed the ranks until obtaining 
the high command of General of Division in the Second Division of the Fourth Corps, 
which operated in the zones of Villa Clara, Sagua la Grande and Cienfuegos. Such a 
high-ranking official would certainly have expectations that his power during the war 
would translate to real political power in Cuba Libre. 
Like many Cuban veterans, Monteagudo disliked that those named by Bates to 
occupy the important government posts were Spaniards and guerrillas, “whose hands not 
at all clean of Cuban blood, are put to represent the Government of the United States.”496 
That Bates would keep these men—enemies of the Cuban cause—in office demonstrated 
his enmity toward Cubans. As evidence for the “blatant hostility toward us Cubans,” 
Monteagudo cited the absence of Cubans from the men Bates appointed to public office: 
“until now, that we are already in February there are not any individuals of the Cuban 
forces placed in public posts by General Bates: the majority of the employees of the 
Spanish Government continue working.”497 
A disappointed Monteagudo wrote to his compatriot and member of the PRC, 
Gonzalo de Quesada in February 1899 that “in Las Villas, in essence, the politics of caste 
and the jealous domination that the Spanish governors practiced has not changed; the 
only thing that has changed is the person who practices it.” Monteagudo judged that the 
situation was “unsustainable, because it is irrational and dangerous.”498 Monteagudo 
offered his services and those of his men to perform rural guard duty, a service many 
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veterans had already been performing without pay since the cessation of hostilities. Bates 
refused.
499
 Monteagudo expressed his disappointment with the reaction he received: 
“…disgracefully, I did not find in General Bates the resolved, intelligent, and thoughtful 
man who should represent the Government of Washington.” He continued, describing the 
unflattering attitude against Cubans which he noted in Bates: “I only found the orderly 
military man, the irresolute and untrusting politician, the man dominated by prejudices 
and preventions against everything Cuban.”500 
While many of the “old gang” remained in power, numerous new appointees 
during the first months of military rule were “recent patriots.” Recent patriots were men 
who had either remained neutral or had fought for the Spanish for the majority of the war, 
but joined the insurrection during the last months, usually after April 1898 with the 
declaration of war on Spain by the Americans. Many of these men supported Cuban 
Autonomy during Spanish rule, and had rejected the revolution for its radical social 
agenda. The late inscription with the insurrection was probably as a strategy to gain 
access to the spoils of victory. With a combination of the political beliefs and socially-
conservative agenda, these men tended to favor the American presence as a guarantor of 
social order and political stability, values that made them prized allies of the occupation 
government. 
Cuban veterans, who had devoted the last three years—often their entire lives—to 
the war effort viewed the appointment of recent patriots to positions of power as a 
betrayal of their cause. “No one could deny to us that in the reign of terror, in that 
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memorable period in which we dignified Cubans would not even dare salute each other, 
for fear of prison, disenfranchisement or assassination,” read one newspaper article 
published in February 1899, “many Cubans joined our ferocious enemies, and making 
common cause with them, were the most implacable [enemies] we had, even though 
many hid it hypocritically.”501 The men who once fought for Spain “are today the first 
real patriots, the ones who try to make us believe that they were always good and never 
traitors. But now it is time to take off the masks…”502 This article reflected tensions 
dividing “new” and “old” veterans based on the perceived longevity of their loyalty to the 
cause of independence. 
The story of one man, Francisco Paradela y Gestal, exemplifies the potent 
struggles for political power based on diverging conceptions of loyalty and patriotism. 
Paradela had supported the Spanish during the war, and in 1899 was the Administrator of 
the Railroad Company. In his position of power, Paradela favored Spanish workers over 
Cuban workers, paying the former more, and even firing many of them “who were an 
infinite number of years with [the Company], lending very good services and without a 
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single mark [on their records]”503 That is the story in broad strokes,” of Paradela, “and 
today trying to forget all of this [history], wants to figure as a virtuous patriot, to whom 
we say ‘you are a fraud, and we don’t believe you.’”504 Patriotism became a necessary 
credential for legitimate access to power, though veterans contested the legitimacy of the 
claims to loyalty to Cuba Libre articulated by recent patriots. 
As Spaniards, Autonomists and recent patriots ascended to positions of power, 
American military officials themselves also assumed some positions of civil authority, 
further displacing Cuban veterans. The prime example in Cienfuegos is Captain Walter 
B. Barker, who filled the post of Captain of the Port.
505
 In another instance, American 
General Simon Snyder ordered Colonel George Leroy Brown of the 4
th
 Tennessee, who 
had headed American forces Cienfuegos in late 1898, to act as governor of the district of 
Trinidad, a position the caused tension with local residents.
506
 One local official told 
General Wilson that “the Cubans were indeed grateful to the Americans, and that the 
latter would need only to understand the Cuban, but that they would find them much 
easier to lead than to drive.”507 This position, common to many Cuban veterans, reflected 
a delicate balancing act between gratitude and contempt for Americans. Among more 
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radical veterans, American usurpation of political power was the source of direct 
confrontation between Cubans and Americans. 
With the post-war political transition incomplete, some veterans began to 
recognize parallels between American military policies and the attitudes of wealthy 
planters. Monteagudo resented that Bates—a supposed ally of Cuba Libre—came under 
such strong influence of the enemies, the Spaniards and the wealthy American 
businessmen and merchants, Edwin F. Atkins, the Ponvert family and Mac Kullogh 
(McCulloch). Some of these men, especially Atkins, were annexationist, advocates of 
annexing Cuba to the United States, often justified as a way of fostering economic 
prosperity. Bates acted “as if everything that our enemies tell him were axiomatic truth,” 
Monteagudo wrote to Quesada.
508
 Monteagudo rightly pointed to a very different vision 
of who should be in power, held among wealthy property owners, many of them backed 
with American capital, and most of whose wealth relied on access to the American 
consumer market. At the same time as Monteagudo petitioned for expanded authority for 
Cuban veterans, wealthy property owners begged Americans to appoint men who would 
defend their interests. They feared that Cuban rule would signify a descent into total 
social anarchy and consequently economic losses for them, certainly made their opinions 
known to military officials in Cienfuegos. 
 
“Bricks Without Straw”: The Menace of a Cuba for Cubans 
  
                                                 
508
 José de Jesús Monteagudo to Gonzalo de Quesada, February 17, 1899 in Academia de la Historia de 
Cuba, Archivo de Gonzalo de Quesada, II, 91. 
  
210 
 
Edwin F. Atkins was one of the most vocal opponents of Cuban rule. An 
American businessman and owner of Soledad estate, Atkins had long been in 
communication with the American military officials in Cienfuegos attempting to ensure 
that propertied interests would receive priority after the war. He feared that the official 
policy of favoring veterans for government positions would lead to continued rural crime 
and destruction of property as had prevailed during the war. Writing to General James H. 
Wilson, the commander of the Provinces of Santa Clara and Matanzas, Atkins wrote in 
dismay that he did not agree with the policy of hiring Cubans in local government: “It is a 
most difficult thing to find suitable men for such positions as long as you are confined in 
your selection to certain classes of the population as I understand to be the case.”509 For 
Atkins, the problem was that the best men for public employment would not accept the 
jobs because they feared the foreseeable end of American rule would also bring the end 
to their employment: “The best people here will not accept office, knowing well that as 
soon as American authority is withdrawn, they will be turned out if not driven from the 
country by the irresponsible elements.”510 According to his vision, the demise of Spanish 
rule had threatened social order and economic prosperity by allowing for the rise of an 
insurrection based on destruction and social radicalism. 
Cuban separatists did not represent propertied interests, Atkins was certain. He 
contended that Spaniards and Autonomists concurred in his assessment that the 
insurrection would spell the demise of the social order, upon which his sugar business 
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depended. “The insurgent independent party (wishing to be rid of American control) 
represents no property interest as a class, and their control of affairs is equally feared by 
the Cuban property-holders, Spaniards, and foreigners,” Atkins wrote in early 1899.511 
He feared that Cuban veterans would not be sufficiently vigilant in defending his interests 
as a wealthy property holder: “I do not wish to criticize any individuals but upon general 
principles, the selection of Officials from a class of people who do not represent property 
interests and are not in accord with the views of property owners, could hardly be 
expected to lead to a permanent good government.” It was critical, thought Atkins, to 
choose the right people to fill the positions to ensure stable government: “The skeleton 
form of Government can be made, but is it likely to stand? It seems to me to be the old 
question of ‘Bricks without Straw.’”512 By appointing the “wrong” people to power, 
Americans risked the disintegration of the entire government. 
Beginning during the first months of the military occupation, a coalition of men 
including foreign property owners, Autonomists, ex-Spanish soldiers and supporters, and 
American military officials collaborated to undermine insurgent claims to political 
power.  General Wilson acknowledged that Spaniards in the Department of Matanzas and 
Santa Clara actively sought annexation: “So far as they have made their opinions known, 
they favor either a direct annexation, or an active protectorate, which shall ensure a stable 
and peaceful condition of affairs.”513 Wilson claimed that a large number of other 
merchants and planters held similar views. These the preference for annexation among 
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the wealthiest members of Cuban society highlights their reluctance to accept Cuban rule. 
One of the principle reasons propertied elites opposed Cuban rule was that they tended to 
conflate Cuban independence with the specter of black rule. With the example of the 
Haitian Revolution a century earlier, planters feared that the radical social agenda of 
Cuba Libre would propel men of African descent to positions of political leadership. At 
very least, Cuban independence disrupt the social order enough to emancipate blacks 
from their historic fate as a cheap, pliable labor source and thus was a potent threat to 
their prosperity. 
The disdain of separatist political pretensions resonated with the ways military 
authorities approached the transfer of political power. The racial composition of the 
population of Santa Clara certainly alarmed some American military officials. Even the 
slightly more moderate-minded General Wilson commented that “…one-third of the 
population is African…” and they are caught “in a partially developed stage of political 
and moral evolution...”514 Wilson believed that American rule could help improve the 
Cuban population, but ultimately disdained Cuban desires for independence. “The 
common people have been made to believe that there is some magic or some solid 
substance in the idea of ‘Cuba Libre y Independiente,’” wrote a skeptical General Wilson 
in May 1899.
515
 Like Wilson, many American military officials conflated low social 
standing with demands for Cuban independence, consequently delegitimizing this 
political platform. 
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At the same time as they dismissed Cuban demands for independence, Americans 
could not reject wholesale the idea of a Cuba for Cubans. Although American military 
authorities also doubted the competence of the Cubans, they also recognized that the 
legitimacy of the military occupation rested on one key promise: the Teller Amendment, 
which presented the American military intervention as a commitment to Cuban 
independence. This forced military officials to support separatist political power, at least 
in theory. As a result of the fierce struggles over political power during the first several 
months of the occupation, American military officials recognize that the success of the 
military occupation depended on a delicate balance of support from three main sectors: 
Cuban separatists, wealthy property owners, and the old political elite. In an attempt to 
reconcile these opposing political factions, American military officials began to 
distinguish among the different political demands among separatists. While some 
veterans demanded absolute and immediate independence and often relied on support 
from the black masses, others were willing to collaborate with the Americans and 
explicitly upheld the interests of wealthy property owners. 
Race emerged early on as one of the key characteristics upon which Americans 
judged eligibility for political power. Men like Martín Morúa Delgado tried to place some 
men of African descent in government posts, such as porters, cart drivers, and watchmen, 
according to former runaway slave and veteran Esteban Montejo. However, “when the 
army was dissolved, the black liberators could not remain in the city. They returned to the 
countryside, to the sugar, to the tobacco, to whatever, except the [government] offices.” 
Traitors and guerrillas, he claimed even had a better chance of securing these Jobs. “The 
very General Maceo would have had to hang many people in the hills to have been able 
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to lead in some [post].”516 It is evident that military officials appointed almost exclusively 
white men to positions of political power in the first months of the occupation. Indeed, 
this pattern prevailed across the island, with few exceptions. However, racial anxieties 
and perceptions of American racial attitudes also shaped the decisions of white veterans, 
and eventually came to define their political trajectories. 
It is no mistake that the white veterans of the Cienfuegos city council were the 
same men who denied employment to their black compatriots. When explaining 
exclusion, however, white veterans avoided explicitly racial arguments. This would have 
gone against the patriotic ideal of racial brotherhood. Instead, city council members 
pointed to shortcomings in the manliness of the individual, as measured against the 
standard of white, middle-class norms. Formal education was one of the key qualities of 
this hegemonic masculinity. For example, one American officer claimed that Cubans 
assessed citizenship, at least in part, upon education. “An uneducated man is unfit to be 
free,” he repeated a supposedly popular refrain.517 Although education seemingly had 
little to do with race, both literacy and formal education were substantially lower among 
men and women of African descent than they were among Cuban-born whites. About 72 
percent of people of African descent could not read, while only 49 percent of whites 
found themselves in a similar condition.
518
 Even enforcement of the education standard 
tended to be more stringent for men of African descent. 
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The case of Martín Reinoso, shows with unequivocal clarity that racial 
considerations factored heavily in who was named to important posts. At the same time, 
it shows that racial differences seldom provided the rationale for this exclusion. Reinoso, 
a black veteran of the Cuban Army petitioned to the city Council in April 1899 for a 
position as meat inspector. He argued that he should fulfill this vacancy because of his 
service as veterinarian of the Brigade of Cienfuegos under Higinio Esquerra. Síndico José 
Fernández Álvarez opposed his petition, claiming that “not possessing Mr. Reinoso the 
corresponding professional title, it is understood that however meritorious the services he 
rendered to the Patria were, as they undoubtedly are according to the recommendations 
he presents from various Generals, it is not possible to legally accede to his desires.”519 
The city council voted to deny the request brought by Reinoso. 
Reinoso was a distinguished personality in the black elite of Cienfuegos. He was 
later a member of the Liberal Party, president of the elite black social club Minerva, and a 
member of Center of Veterans of Cienfuegos.
520
 Yet, this prestige and his long tradition 
of service to the patria were insufficient to qualify him the position he coveted after the 
war. While it is difficult to determine the precise reasons the city council denied him the 
position, the city councilmen claimed to have rejected Reinoso because he lacked formal 
educational credentials. Yet, this explanation becomes less credible when the educational 
backgrounds of certain white veterans named to other important posts are considered. For 
example, Higinio Esquerra lacked formal education, yet he was still deemed capable of 
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exercising the supreme authority over the Rural Guard of Cienfuegos.
521
 City council 
members determined that his dedicated service to Cuba Libre and his elite status in the 
black community of Cienfuegos did not give Reinoso sufficient status to inspect meat. 
With the continued exclusion of blacks from political power and government 
employment, black veterans began to mobilize. Atkins noted in February 1900 that “there 
is a growing feeling among the negroes against the white Cubans, who, they say have 
robbed them of all the spoils of war.” According to Atkins, black Cubans focused their 
criticism on white veterans, many of who enjoyed gainful employment or political power 
after the war and perpetuated the racial exclusion in those positions. “This feeling does 
not prevail against either the Americans or Spaniards as far as I can find; against the 
Cubans the negroes are very outspoken.” He claimed that the black veterans were 
“beginning to organize,” and “were it not for the restraining influence of the presence of 
troops, there might be trouble.”522  As black veterans began to criticize post-war racial 
exclusions, opponents of Cuban rule cited their protests as potential threats to order, thus 
further justifying their political exclusion. 
  
Not All White Veterans are Equal: Searching for “the better class of men” 
  
White veterans who ascended to positions of authority in local government after 
the war perpetuated a racially exclusive vision of civil authority, by appointing men of 
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their same or similar socio-racial backgrounds.
523
 Yet, white veterans pursued widely 
diverging approaches to governance and disparate attitudes toward the American military 
officials. American military officials quickly learned—through trial and error—that the 
color line was insufficient to determine the political positions of Cuban veterans. 
Americans also concluded that the political exclusion of black veterans from the most 
important posts in local government was insufficient to ensure the preservation of the 
racial order. Americans and opponents of Cuban rule viewed even political patronage 
networks linking white politicians to black veterans as a threat to the racial order.  
Shortly after assuming command of Cienfuegos, Bates appointed José Antonio 
Frías to replace Autonomist mayor Pedro Modesto Hernández. Frías seemed to meet all 
the preferred criteria to hold office: he was wealthy, white, had supported the insurrection 
and wielded substantial influence over a broad spectrum of the urban population. It soon 
became apparent, however, that Frías allied himself too closely with the masses, leading 
to repeated conflicts with military officials, including heated confrontations after two 
riots in May and June 1899. After failing to subdue a labor strike in February 1900, 
Military Governor Leonard Wood forced Frías to resign. His successor was the deputy 
mayor, Leopoldo Figueroa, a Cuban veteran of similar social standing as Frías. Born in 
1858, Figueroa was educated in Spain, where his father had been exiled. He was trained 
as a pharmacist and joined the insurrection in 1896, fought as lieutenant colonel under the 
command of José Miguel Gómez, and finished the war as a commandant in the Sanitary 
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Corps.
524
 Yet, Figueroa was somehow different. He built his political reputation upon an 
explicit alliance with propertied interests, cooperation with military authorities and 
suppression of the urban masses. After all, he was the favorite of annexationists such as 
Atkins in the 1900 elections.
525
 Figueroa delighted military officials to such an extent that 
they supported his candidacy. 
American military officials sought. One strategy the Americans employed to 
ensure the political victories of candidates who pro-American, socially-conservative 
candidates, like Figueroa in the elections of 1900 was to restrict suffrage based on 
property, literacy and wealth requirements. Many American military officials based their 
perceptions of the Cuban political situation upon the experience of Reconstruction in the 
American South.  General Wilson reflected on his service as Commander of the 
department of Georgia during the first year of Reconstruction: 
“An important departure from these in the matter of the franchise may perhaps be deemed 
advisable, for while it has long been the belief of many thoughtful Americans that there is less 
danger to the state in investing the ignorant man with suffrage than in depriving him of all 
influence in government, in the light of our own experience of the last thirty-five years, a contrary 
view may well be maintained. It certainly will be easier to gradually extend a franchise based on 
an educational test, as it is found desirable and safe to do so, than to attempt, later, to impose 
restrictions upon a suffrage, which may prove to have been granted without due consideration.”
526
 
 
Wilson compared the situation military government officials in Cuba faced with the 
conditions confronted by military governments in the United States South during 
Reconstruction, calling on his experience as Commander of the Department of Georgia 
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during the first year of the Reconstruction.
527
 In this case, Wilson reasoned that simply 
being a man, in the most minimum physical sense, was insufficient to acquire the right of 
suffrage. A man needed the racialized and classed attributes of manliness, the most 
honorable and noble way of being a man. 
Apparently, Wilson articulated the beliefs of a great many of his peers. Military 
officials imposed suffrage requirements including literacy and property ownership. The 
requirement of manliness as opposed to raw masculinity conflicted with the insurgent 
discourse of racial brotherhood, which supposedly deemed all patriots as manly. Despite 
the recommendations of General Wilson, Cubans veterans rejected the notion of 
restricted suffrage. City councils throughout Santa Clara province, including many small 
towns near Cienfuegos like Lajas and Abreus, petitioned to General Diego Tamayo, the 
Secretary of State and Government, to allow universal suffrage in the 1900 local 
elections.
528
  
One of the main points of contention surrounding the suffrage debate was the link 
between military service and citizenship. Cuban veterans, black and white, at least in the 
months leading up to the 1900 elections, seemed to conceive of military service as a 
sufficient indicator of manliness. Esteban Montejo, a former runaway slave who fought in 
the Cuban army recalled that the discussion of “whether or not the blacks had fought” 
after the war. “I know that 95% of the black race participated in the war,” he remembers. 
“Then they began to say that it was 75%. Well, no one criticized those words. The result 
was that the blacks remained in the cold. Brave and fierce alike on the streets. It was not 
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right, but it that is what happened.”529 While the numbers Montejo cite can be disputed, 
his message is abundantly clear: military service was the premise for access to 
citizenship, but it seemed to be insufficient for blacks. 
Black veterans, who were disproportionately affected by limited suffrage, also 
voiced their protest. They argued that their military service made the eligible for suffrage. 
In February 1900, a group of black veterans issued a manifesto directed to the “colored 
liberators in Santa Clara Province,” in which they discussed the issue of restricted 
suffrage. Black activists resented the restriction of suffrage on the basis of “talent, titles, 
ability, [and] smartness,” because during the war, these qualifications did not exist: 
“when good hands were needed to manage the Cuban machete, then there were no classes 
or difference—nor was anyone required to know how to read or write.”530 The authors of 
this manifesto argued that restricting suffrage would contradict the socially-equalizing 
principles of the revolution. 
Although the manifesto was directed specifically at black veterans, the argument 
encompassed a broader expanse of the population. The authors attempted to construct 
alliances with other excluded groups, most notably working men: “The suffrage seems to 
have been restricted for the purpose of depriving the large majority of colored and 
working people of their electoral vote. It is therefore unfair to attempt this restriction.”531 
The authors of the manifesto argued that the contributions to the Patria made by both 
black and working men qualified them for access to political rights. “The working man, 
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just the same as the colored man, was an important factor of a triumph whose benefits 
neither are enjoying.”  They argued that workers were eligible for suffrage because they 
had contributed indirectly to the revolution: 
If the Cuban workman did not give his blood, he gave his money to aid in the purchase of war 
material; if he did not depart from his wife and children, he did leave them without any food in 
order that he might provide medicine for his sick and wounded brethren; if the Cuban workman 
did not face the fire of an army, he was, in turn imprisoned, banished to unhealthy foreign climates 
or machete in the darkness of the night!
532
 
 
Black veterans attempted to establish a common cause with workers, regardless of race, 
by highlighting the parallel experiences of contribution to the revolution and exclusion 
from suffrage. By including the working man within the same manifesto as black 
veterans, the authors avoided an argument for inclusion based solely and exclusively on 
the grounds of race, thereby reducing the chances the protest would be considered 
threatening or offensive by whites. Significant protest prompted Americans to waive the 
property and literacy requirements for veterans of the war of independence to make them 
eligible for the vote, though the restrictions still significantly curtailed black suffrage 
among non-veterans.
533
 
Suffrage restrictions imposed by the occupation government for the 1900 
elections did not quell fears that blacks would assert the right to vote and obtain political 
influence. One merchant and annexationist from Guanabacoa, a town near Havana, 
begged General Wood to rescind the order allowing veterans to vote, claiming that it 
would result in “vagrants, thieves, ñáñigos, bootblacks, newspaper vendors, pimps, and 
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other men of bad character,” who “less civilized than the Tagalogs,” into office.534 Some 
wealthy property owners rejected black access to political power. For example, in April 
1900, one anonymous resident of the country town of Palmira, near Cienfuegos, alerted 
military officials of a black landslide in the upcoming elections, then just one month 
away. A self-described “foreigner addicted to the American Government, who looks to its 
greatness, power and justice, and who would wish the Intervention would last for many 
years for the peace,” the anonymous resident warned that Morúa was plotting a black 
takeover of the island. “I advise you that the black man Martín Morúa Delgado, secretary 
of the Ayuntamiento, is an enemy of the Americans of the Intervening Government,” he 
wrote, reinforcing his earlier affirmation of loyalty to the Americans.  “A furious racist, 
he has alarmed the white people. It is said that as soon as the Intervening Government 
ceases, they, the Negros will govern,” the writer proclaimed of Morúa.535 Here the 
anonymous writer attempted to show the necessity of prolonged American rule, and the 
desirability of annexation as a preventative measure for black rule in Cuba. 
With Morúa in power, the anonymous writer claimed, the whole town of Palmira 
was under siege by people of African descent. It was dangerous, he explained, to have 
blacks in government because they would soon take over: “Here, the negro Morúa 
governs because the mayor [Jacinto Portela] does what he says.”536 Even if they did not 
occupy the top position, blacks would take control of government, by appointing other 
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blacks to important positions. Many important positions were occupied be blacks, 
threatening the stability and order of the town: “all the police are blacks, and the school 
teachers do not know anything, black regidores.”537 The anonymous writer assumed that 
American military officials—many of whom had experienced similar social changes 
under Reconstruction—would sympathize with his anxieties over black rule. 
The anonymous writer claimed that the veterans worked in collaboration with the 
blacks. According to him, the mayor Portela had nominated his brother, Manuel Portela 
as inspector of the elections, placing the office in the house of his brother, and this would 
ensure that everyone voted for them, the veterans, and the blacks.
538
 He begged for the 
establishment of a contingent of American troops in Palmira to keep order and allow for 
free voting, because if not, then the veterans and the Negros would continue to control 
the elections.
539
 “There is a division in this town, that Morúa has fomented that will have 
grave consequences, and the Intervening Government know it and will not put remedy, so 
the whole town awaits your [General Wood] wisdom and power.”540 
Although suffrage restrictions severely limited the number of Cubans eligible to 
vote, it did not result in the desired end of electing annexationists. “I predicted that the 
elections would result in the selection of the same men then in office, or of men of similar 
character. This prediction has been fully verified, and it is to be noted that in every 
instance the Mayor and Councilman elected are Revolutionists who either actually served 
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in the field, or actively aided the Insurgents with their money and influence.”541 In 
addition, one black senator, Martín Morúa Delgado was elected in Santa Clara 
Province.
542
 The successes of the revolutionary party in the 1900 elections sent a clear 
message to the military government: it would soon have to fulfill the conditions of the 
Teller Amendment.
543
 
The National Party secured success in many instances, but the Americans had not 
left control over such an important city as Cienfuegos up to chance. Wealthy property 
owners and military officials had already endeavored in a bit of creative political 
engineering as a precaution against the victory of radical veterans in municipal posts. 
General Wood harnessed his personal friendships with Atkins in Cienfuegos to secure 
Figueroa as mayor in the elections, just as he had “labored diligently behind the scenes in 
behalf of conservative pro-American candidate” across the island in the months before 
the election.
544
 
Atkins happily cooperated with Wood. He used his “influence in support of a very 
respectable man whom he wished to elect as alcalde of Cienfuegos,” as Wood requested. 
“I sent for one of the alcaldes de barrio, and told him my wishes,” Atkins wrote in his 
memoirs. “He told me to have no anxiety; the man I suggested would be elected.” When 
asked how the man proposed to secure the mayoral victory for the desired candidate, he 
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replied that “they would take possession of the ballot boxes and destroy the ballots of the 
opposition candidates.” Atkins proclaimed thought that this was a “magnificent idea and 
worthy of Tammany Hall,” the political society that controlled elections in New York at 
the turn of the century.
545
 Figueroa, representing the Unión Democrática Party was 
elected, marking the success of the plan. 
While electoral fraud secured the victory of socially-conservative pro-American 
Figueroa, candidates perceived as having a radical social agenda faced defeat. This was 
certainly the case for José B. Alemán, a prestigious insurgent chief nominated by the 
National Party in the September elections convened to select Constitutional Convention 
delegates.
546
 Although Alemán belonged to the white urban elite, his radical political 
beliefs attracted the support of many black veterans, resulting in his fall from grace with 
military authorities. In one speech he gave in August 1900, Alemán was reported to have 
said, “To war, Cubans to war for our independence. When that has arrived, there will be 
no longer any but Cubans in post offices and customs houses.” In the same speech, he 
declared equality between blacks and whites. One American military officer reported that 
he “informed the negroes that they were as good as the whites.” This kind of radical talk 
was alarming to American officials, especially Wood, who wished “to avoid making 
Cuba into a second Haiti” in the September elections for the constitutional 
conventions.
547
 Alemán would later corroborate the worst of American fears when he 
became one of only eleven delegates to oppose the Platt Amendment in 1901. 
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With vigorous political maneuvering, Wood assured that the “better class of men” 
had emerged victorious in Cienfuegos.
548
 He could not prevent all radicals from attending 
the Convention, however. With an electoral victory, Alemán represented Santa Clara at 
the convention. The preoccupations expressed by Wood show the conflation of political 
radicalism, especially separatist demands for immediate independence and opposition to 
American rule, with social radicalism, namely their connection to and patronage with 
blacks. Indeed, the electoral victory of so few radical separatists like Alemán, showed 
how white veterans lost political favor by relating themselves to blacks. For Wood, like 
many American military officials, the political privileges of citizenship were for white 
men who supported American rule and could preserve social order. This led to an 
increasingly narrow vision of male eligibility, which encompassed only politically and 
socially-conservative white men of wealth. 
 
The Specter of Black Rule and the Limits of Cuba Libre 
 
Despite the successful (though fraudulent) election of Figueroa, the pattern of 
National Party victories in the 1900 elections compounded existing anxieties and 
discontents among populations that had not supported the insurrection. Autonomists 
detested the outcome of the 1900 elections, because it brought to power radical veterans 
and even people of African descent despite the precautionary measures of restricted 
suffrage. One Autonomist wrote to anonymously to the military authorities criticizing the 
outcomes of the 1900 local elections. “What delirium!” he exclaimed. “How is it possible 
                                                 
548
 Ibid. 
  
227 
 
to think that [immediate independence] is the real patriotism, when even the most obtuse 
[person] knows that given out deficient education, our bad habits [resabios] and our 
formidable racial antagonism that dominates us, that we would go straight and quickly to 
the abyss!”549 This anonymous author revealed a sentiment that was widespread among 
Autonomists and Spaniards with the first round of elections: the authority of Cuban 
separatists, and the legitimacy of their claims to public office were far from universal. 
 
Image 12: “Good Government vs. Revolution”550
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Image 13: “Save me from my friends”551
 
Many Autonomists similarly rejected the few black political gains in the 1900 
elections. Many of these men, after all, had avoided joining the insurrection because of its 
radical social agenda. For example, Antonio Govín, a prominent autonomist of Matanzas 
was reported to have audibly disparaged the support afforded to black General Quintín 
Bandera in a political rally in August 1900. When the crowd gave Bandera a “viva,” 
Govín said “in a depreciative tone,” that “we weren’t missing anything but this” (No nos 
faltaba nada más que esto). “It’s natural. Bandera is black,” the newspaper reporter 
explained.
552
 Rafael Montoro, another autonomist claimed, “I frequently hear in all public 
places the colored race saying---‘Wait until the Americans leave then they will see who 
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are the people with the most rights to govern the country.”553 The specter of black 
uprising demonstrated the necessity of continued American rule to maintain order.  
Some Spaniards residing in Cienfuegos also protested black participation in 
national government. One ex-Spanish Volunteer, Javier Medina Escalona, wrote to the 
American military officials in late 1900, targeting another prominent black political 
figure who supported Cuban independence, Juan Gualberto Gómez. “The colored race is 
working hard under the direction of its Chief Juan Gualberto Gómez,” he declared. This 
writer identified Gómez, a mulatto politician and patriot, as a threatening figure, agitating 
the black masses to revolution. By November, he again wrote imploring the military 
authorities not to “lose sight of Juan Gualberto Gómez, leaders of the colored race of the 
Island.”554 “He has given instructions,” he wrote ominously. By connecting Gómez to a 
potential black uprising, this former Spanish Volunteer highlighted the danger of 
allowing people of African descent in positions of political authority.
555
 
Reports of revolutionary activities of Gómez and other black separatists, aimed to 
undermine the legitimacy of black political participation by linking black political power 
to the inversion of the racial hierarchy and to Negro rule. For this reason, the accusations 
brought against Gómez are at once ironic and illustrative. At the national level, the black 
politicians Martín Morúa Delgado and Juan Gualberto Gómez at once had to uphold 
white bourgeois values by downplaying any racial agendas and rejecting blackness and to 
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reinforce their authority among the black masses by claiming to speak for them and 
uphold their interests.
556
 This predicament set the stage for their inability—or 
unwillingness, considering it might result in rejection by their white political patrons—to 
address directly issues of racial inequality on the national stage. 
The socially-conservative positions some black politicians took on race issues in 
the early republic highlights the paradox of their position in national government. For 
example, during the first months after the war, Martín Morúa Delgado declared that the 
revolution had solved the race problem: “The social question […] is a question perfectly 
resolved by the Revolution. This has conquered the liberty of Cuba. From the beginning, 
it has been the freedom of Cuba that has been pursued, not the liberty of any particular 
social class.”557 Morúa envisioned the extension of the ideology of racial brotherhood 
into Cuban society after the war: “Justice, as such, in the future proceedings will be 
consummated in the work of the Revolution. Those soldiers who entered the cities from 
the [battle]fields, brought […] the democratic spirit that they had witnessed in the war 
encampments, and nothing and no one would be capable of countering that spirit of 
equality and justice that informed the Program of Montecristi and confirmed the 
fundamental prospect of the Revolution.”558 Morúa praised the equalizing power of the 
revolution to such an extent that in 1910 he ushered in the Morúa Law, prohibiting race-
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based organization. In other words, if there was anything that Morúa was not, it was the 
conspirator for black rule that Medina claimed. 
Indeed, Medina was one of the most vocal advocates for annexation. In a series of 
anonymous letters
559
 to the Military Governor of Cuba, he warned military officials of an 
impending black uprising between October 1900 and April 1901. Like the Autonomists 
Govín and Montoro, Medina disparaged the idea of black political participation. Medina 
used fears of a black uprising during the tense period between the 1900 elections and the 
upcoming Cuban Constitutional Convention to foster an expanded American presence in 
Cuban political affairs. His series of letters reflected a prevailing assumption about the 
meaning of the American occupation of Cuba: annexation, or at least the prolonged 
American presence in Cuba, he reckoned, would help keep blacks out of the political 
arena, and ensure the social order. 
Seeking to appeal to the racial fears of American military officials, Medina 
depicted the perils of the recent nationalist electoral wins as the precursor to racial 
uprising. Medina used two key racial symbols to greater involvement by the United 
States in Cuban political affairs. First, he alluded to the unsavory image of decorated 
black veteran Quintín Bandera, as a way to foment racial division among independence-
minded Cuban veterans. Second, Medina used the image of Haiti to rally white support 
for the pre-war racial order and to undermine the Cuban claim to sovereignty. 
 
Image 14: Quintín Bandera
560
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Medina drew on the decidedly negative views among white veterans in 
Cienfuegos of one of the most controversial and fear-inducing black veterans, Quintín 
Bandera. Although Bandera was originally from the east, he had become a recognized 
figure in Cienfuegos because of his leadership of a column in the invasion of the West, a 
military campaign led by Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo in early 1896, often 
identified as a critical turning point in the war leading to insurgent victory. Bandera was 
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indeed unemployed as Medina wrote his letters, though not for wont of searching for 
work. Initially he was granted a nominal post as forest inspector, but soon his position 
was terminated and he was removed from payroll without his prior knowledge.
561
 Despite 
persistent requests for work and assistance, Bandera could not secure work. Instead he 
traversed the country collecting donations for his subsistence, apparently by selling ads 
for newspapers.
562
 His state of unemployment consolidated already negative views of 
Bandera among high-ranking white veterans, acquired during the war. Medina claimed 
that his travels through the Cuban interior were revolutionary activities, rather than a 
search for subsistence: “Quintín Bandera goes from village to village […] preparing the 
terrain for rebellion,” wrote Medina to General Wood in early October 1900.563 Medina 
effectively harnessed ongoing debates about vagrancy characterizing the discussions of 
wealthy planters and military officials during the occupation to condemn the unemployed 
black man as a criminal. Indeed, the very mobility Bandera attained from his 
unemployment further served to condemn him. 
Medina emphasized the militaristic character of the alleged uprising. Medina 
wrote of the weapons available to the black revolutionaries. They had acquired artillery, 
60,000 Remingtons, 10,000 bayonets, boxes of grenades, pots of shrapnel and other 
weapons and munitions used by the mobilized forced and volunteers and auctioned by the 
Spanish government at the end of the war. Moreover, “in all the country towns there are 
                                                 
561
 Quintín Bandera to Máximo Gómez, October 13, 1904, Box 25, File 3265 (new 3526), Archivo 
Nacional de Cuba, Fondo Personal Máximo Gómez (Hereafter, ANC/FPMG).  
562
 “Quintín Bandera,” June 7, 1903, Box 26, File 3308 (new 3589), ANC/FPMG. 
563
 Javier Medina Escalona to General Leonard Wood, October 10, 1900, Box 114, File 5583, 
USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
  
234 
 
arms deposits under the care of determined insurgent chiefs,” he claimed. Bandera and 
the black rebels reportedly relied on an extensive network of black collaborators 
throughout the countryside. 
The military organization of the men of African descent was also alarming to 
Medina. “The element of color, whose tendencies are racist, and are very united, work 
with much activity in plain daylight,” he alleged.564 “It is an undeniable fact that the 
revolutionary movement will have a racist character,” he wrote to General Wood.565 
Medina pointed to the “black belt” of Cuba, which he defined as the provinces of 
Santiago, Santa Clara and Matanzas, “where the colored race is most numerous and is 
already organized” as the source of the rebellion.566 “There are a type of Chief of Zones, 
with the majority of the personnel disposed to be called being of the colored race,” he 
reported to General Wood.
567
 He labeled Bandera, as “the Chief of the colored forces of 
[Las] Villas,” who would lead over 1,000 men to rise up immediately against American 
rule.
568
 Within 3 days, Medina claimed, Bandera could gather 7,000 men “who will meet 
in the town of La Sierra or in Cumanayagua at the foot of the hills.”569 These country 
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towns had been revolutionary strongholds during the war, and would again serve as the 
headquarters of the impending armed black uprising.  
While Medina relied heavily on the racial anxieties surrounding the figure of 
Bandera, he also argued that the alleged uprising would constitute a direct threat to 
American rule in Cuba. In his visits to Cienfuegos, Bandera had observed the 
infrastructure of the American military installations and was actively plotting an attack, 
Medina claimed. “He [knows] all the details: number of the force, vigilance and the rest. 
He knows also that 500 men can be defeated in the encampment, or restrained on the 
docks, after verifying the disembarkation to save the population. In Cienfuegos there are 
many interests to safeguard and defend.” Medina recommended that Americans dispatch 
a war ship to the bay of Cienfuegos: “We must be preventative, General. The forces are 
few.”570 Medina emphasized the overt planning of the black insurgents to overthrow 
American rule, thereby connecting black veterans again to anti-American sentiment. 
Medina linked the supposed black uprising to the political fate of Cuba by 
claiming that the revolutionaries would respond to the Constitutional—the mechanism 
through which Cubans would determine their relationship with the United States and their 
political future. “The radical elements are awaiting with special interest the result of the 
convention, and await definite instructions from General [José B.] Alemán before taking 
positive action.”571 Medina harnessed prevailing perceptions of Alemán as politically 
radical and an ally of blacks to link desires for immediate independence to black rule. By 
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emphasizing the involvement of white Cuban veterans in the black rebellion, he appealed 
to Americans to retain military presence in Cuba to protect against black rule. The 
revolution, Medina claimed, would likely take place in February or March 1901, a period 
that would coincide with the initial discussions surrounding the Platt Amendment.
572
 
Image 15: “Here you are”--Caricature of American views of Cuban Independence573 
 
 
 
Medina certainly caught the attention of military authorities, who called for an 
investigation of the “conditions” in Santa Clara province. The supervisor of police noted 
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particularly tense race relations in late November and early December 1900: “In 
Cienfuegos considerable hard feeling exists between he blacks and whites, without 
distinction as to the politics or individual revolutionary records.”574 He confirmed that 
Bandera was indeed in Cienfuegos “collecting contributions” to fund “a war against the 
Americans.”575 He claimed that a “complete state of agitation exists in the province of 
Santa Clara, hard times are being felt and there is a general feeling of inquietude.”576 
Armed gangs abounded throughout the province, numerous kidnappings had occurred for 
ransom, and at least one murder was reported in the second half of November 1900.
577
 In 
the neighboring town of Caibarien, “considerable discontent among the ‘niggers.’”578 
Like Medina, the supervisor of police emphasized the connection between the black 
uprising and the events of the constitutional convention.
579
  
 The police report seemed to have insufficient effect, however, and Medina 
bolstered his campaign to consolidate American influence. By February 1901, Medina 
began to identify a trans-national consolidated black movement in the Caribbean. “It is 
said in Jamaica, the Caiman Islands, and other English islands close to the[se] coasts that 
several thousand Negros will come to take part in the war. They will also come from 
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Haiti, and from what I have found out, they are collaborating with this last Republic.”580 
The claim that Jamaicans and Haitians, generally labeled as black, would join in the 
revolt threatened to transform Cuba from a white island into another black republic. This 
was a menacing thought for white foreign property owners who feared that black rule 
would lead to the mass persecution of whites and their dispossession from wealth and 
property as happened during the Haitian Revolution a century earlier. The United States 
government would have to stay to preserve order. Medina recommended that they 
conserve the fortifications and trenches constructed during the late war, and even prevent 
the entry of livestock, except the exact amount necessary for consumption. By harnessing 
the same language as Wood has previously employed, Medina appealed to the greatest 
fears of American military officials, that Cuba would become another Haiti. 
Some American military officials viewed the seemingly sensationalized claims of 
Medina with skepticism. Wilson recognized the political interests motivating his please 
and those of other property owners, including Atkins. Wilson noted that property owners 
reported crime to delay the withdrawal of American troops. “There are a few, principally 
the owners of large estates, who are urging delay and would delay indefinitely so long as 
the measures proposed do not lead positively to the realization of their wishes,” reported 
Wilson in 1900.
581
 Certainly, the annexationist agenda seemed to inform the arguments 
men like Medina and Atkins made in favor of American rule. 
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At the same time, other Americans noted a broader resonance of the racial 
anxieties and political desires articulated by Medina. “The Spanish Element and the 
Cubans of good judgment are of the opinion that the withdrawal of the American Army 
from this country will bring its entire ruin,” wrote one American investigator in February 
1901.
582
 Certainly, this included wealthy property owners like Atkins.  “The man who has 
any property is deadly afraid of the colored patriot with his box of matches. […] under 
certain conditions there may be grave danger of burning. This, I find, is what is 
threatened,” Atkins wrote in April 1901.583  Apparently, only the “radical element” was 
in favor of immediate withdrawal. Medina claimed that the “reasonable classes” shared 
his views, and the investigator apparently agreed. Reasonable classes, then, became 
defined in terms of the annexationist political position. 
Other opponents of separatist political power identified Bandera alongside other 
black separatists as prominent threats to order in Cuba as well. One Cuban-born 
annexationist proposed to expel Quintín Bandera, Isidro Acea, and Juan Gualberto 
Gómez “and other agitators [perturbadores] and pernicious men from the Country.” 
Urging Wood to crush prominent black veterans, he exalted that “there is a need in Cuba 
for an American Weyler.”584 Like Medina, this annexationist sought a stronger American 
presence in Cuba. However, the fact that he was a native of Cuba allowed him to employ 
the discourse of patriotism to defend his position. 
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 The rejection of Bandera and all that he symbolized also appeared among an 
unlikely population. The implications of the link between the alleged black uprising 
planned by Bandera and the transformation of Cuba into another Haiti were certainly 
clear to some black men in Cuba. William George Emmanuel, the self-proclaimed 
“Representative of the Africans of the Island,” wrote to General Wood in June 1901 
seeking to dispel the presumed role of Bandera as the leader of blacks. He charged that 
Bandera and Vicente Watisola,
585
 another black man, who he alleged was from 
Cienfuegos, were trying to recruit Africans into their uprising. They are “going from 
town to town inciting the Africans not to repatriate to their native land, but to turn out on 
the fourth of July to proclaim the independence of the island,” he wrote. Emmanuel 
begged Wood to issue an order deterring Africans from joining Bandera, affirming 
African loyalty to the occupation government rather than to the men like Bandera, who 
Medina claimed exerted total control over the black population.
586
 Emmanuel seemed 
aware of the prevailing assumption—touted so loudly by Medina—linking blacks to 
political and social radicalism. 
By depicting black veterans as anti-white, and anti-American, Medina sought to 
demonstrate the necessity of American rule for ensuring the safety of property interests. 
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Fears of Cuban radicalism and hysteria over the possibility of racial equality de-
legitimized the concept of racial democracy and made impossible the participation in 
Cuba Libre of people of African descent on equal terms as whites. These fears became 
even more salient as the 1901 elections, in which suffrage would be universal, 
approached. The specter of a black uprising had consequences beyond inspiring fear over 
black political participation. By implicating white veterans in the black uprising, Medina 
confirmed the worst fears of military officials. Radical white veterans were just as 
dangerous as black veterans. Military officials approached the 1901 elections with even 
greater determination to secure the victories of conservative candidates. 
  
Unrestricted Manhood Suffrage in the Elections of June 1901 
 
In Cienfuegos, the quest of military officials to support conservative political 
candidates translated into renewed support for Figueroa against several National Party 
candidates. This was no easy feat, especially considering that universal suffrage 
enfranchised the urban populations that had been most negatively impacted by the 
political projects Figueroa had developed over the last year. One of his key achievements 
was a campaign to make the city center more “respectable,” by relocating certain 
populations to different parts of the city. Plagued by rumors of corruption and accusations 
of embezzlement, Figueroa could not secure re-election in June 1901. While numerous 
urban residents favored the mayoral campaign to “cleanse” the city center, the policies 
had negatively impacted hundreds of poor and working-class residents, among who were 
many blacks. Moreover, accusations of embezzlement, corruption and fraud marred the 
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Figueroa administration. The shift from restricted to universal suffrage contributed to the 
defeat of Figueroa in the municipal elections of June 1901. 
The elections were marred by “a great number of personal incidents,” marking the 
onset of the politics of “caudillaje” in Cienfuegos.587 The new mayor was Gonzalo García 
Vieta, a doctor and veteran of the Cuban army entered office.
588
 Military officials 
lamented the victory of such a radical candidate, who had direct political ties to blacks. 
“The situation here is extremely unfortunate,” lamented Captain Barker days after the 
election. “With Figueroa as alcalde good order would have been maintained,” he wrote. 
Vieta, one the other hand, despite his good qualities, had one major flaw: he relied on the 
support of the masses. “As I have repeatedly stated to you Dr. Vieta is a very popular and 
conscientious man,” wrote Barker. “I believe he is comparatively if not strictly honest, 
but his principle support is from the rabble; for instance, on his ticket are four negroes for 
councilmen. This fact alone creates serious fear among the property holders, who are 
almost unanimously supporters either openly or tacitly of Figueroa.”589 Political support 
                                                 
587
 Rousseau and Díaz de Villegas, Memoria descriptiva, 278. 
588
 Antonio Tomás, “Statement that several men belonging to the Republican party have threatened to kill 
Leopoldo Figueroa, and that on behalf of his family he request protection for him,” June 6, 1901, Box 169, 
File 1846, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3; Leopoldo Figueroa, “States the Board of Scrutiny refuses to count the 
ballot there one by one, they resolving to make the scrutiny of the certificates of the electoral boards,” June 
10, 1901, Box 169, File 1846, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3; Captain F. S. Foltz, “Report on progress of the 
Junta in making the count, as well as on the general situation,” June 22, 1901, Box 169, File 1846, 
USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3; Esquerra, Hernández, Trujillo, and other residents of Cienfuegos to General 
Leonard Wood, “Complaining of the anarchical condition prevalent in said city in consequence of frictions 
arising from the elections between the rival candidates,” June 5, 1901, Box 169, File 1846, 
USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3; Juan Suárez, “Letter referring to the incidents that have taken place at 
Cienfuegos on occasion of the elections,” June 7, 1901, Box 169, File 1846, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3; 
Joaquín de la Peña, “Protests against the legality of the recent elections in the Municipality of Cienfuegos,” 
June 14, 1901, Box 169, File 1846, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3, Walter B. Barker, “Wires in regard to the 
situation in Cienfuegos in connection with the election frauds at that place,” June 12, 1901, Box 169, File 
1846, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
589
 Walter B. Barker to General Leonard Wood, “Report on Election situation there,” June 10, 1901, Box 
169, File 1846, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
  
243 
 
from blacks condemned Vieta in the eyes of Barker. Certainly, his alliance with ex-mayor 
José Antonio Frías, the radical separatist known for his antagonism against Barker, did 
not help his reputation with Americans and other men skeptical of Cuban rule. 
Opponents of Cuban rule condemned proponents of absolute and immediate 
independence in large part because of its perceived racial composition of that group. The 
National Party, known for continuing to oppose the Platt Amendment, condemning 
Máximo Gómez for alleged “annexation talk,” and favoring Bartolomé Masó for 
president, was perhaps the most worrisome.
590
 Alejo García, a Cuban-born annexationist 
who wrote to General Wood in August 1901, claimed that the National Party was 
“composed of blacks and mulattos in the majority and vicious corrupted whites who 
desire absolute Independence to live by stealing from honorable men.”591 Even though 
Vieta was not a member of the most radical Cuban National Party, but rather of the more 
moderate Republican Party, his political alliances with men of African descent seemed 
equally problematic for Americans. 
The controversy caused by the electoral victory of Vieta over Figueroa erupted 
into accusations of fraud and voter intimidation. Barker also accused Vieta supporters of 
terrorizing local residents to ensure they voted as they were told. Frías informed him that 
“one Sixto Roque, a ‘war hero’ and known as Lieut. Colonel in the revolution” had 
received concessions from the Figueroa administration, which funded a road built to his 
house in exchange for political support during the elections. Roque denied that he 
supported Figueroa and assured Frías that “if he said nothing that on the day preceding 
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the election he would turn out and control his district for Vieta, which he did.” Barker 
reported that a Spanish merchant had informed him that Roque had been “terrorizing the 
country,” influencing the elections.592 
The defeat of Figueroa proved worrisome to wealthy property owners and 
American military authorities alike. “I did not realize until it became a fact,” lamented 
Barker, “how deeply the better classes of people irrespective of nationality regretted 
Figueroa’s defeat.” Military authorities pressed the local board of scrutiny to review the 
election results concerning the fraud and placed Colonel Hugh L. Scott in charge. When 
it was clear that Figueroa could not be upheld as the winner, Barker urged his superiors to 
offer him “some State position,” this “being so much in the interest of decency and 
manliness.” Vindicating Figueroa would serve as “a justification of him in the eyes of the 
people, which would be much appreciate by himself and friends.”593 Military officials 
forced Vieta resign by late July 1901. Replacing Vieta was Higinio Esquerra, the 
celebrated insurgent chief and former Chief of the Cienfuegos rural guard, who the 
Department Commander, General Wilson had long held in high esteem. Esquerra held the 
office of mayor until 1902, as the struggles over influence over the city council, political 
appointments, and hiring of important municipal positions including the police force 
continued to define the municipal government for the remainder of the occupation. 
The struggle against men like Frías and Vieta and the support of men like 
Figueroa shows that the Americans sought to promote men who favored a collaborative 
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relationship between the civil and military authorities, and proved themselves adamant 
defenders of the propertied classes. In making this assessment, the networks of political 
patronage mattered. Whereas Americans condemned Frías and Vieta for their 
connections to blacks, they celebrated Figueroa, whose administration had defended the 
interests of the wealthiest residents while suppressing poor and working-class blacks. 
The infighting emerging out of the 1901 elections highlighted the intense struggle 
for political power as Cubans drew closer to the inauguration of the republic. American 
support for the candidacy of conservative-leaning politicians like Figueroa helped foment 
divisions among separatists vying for municipal offices. The fierce struggle between 
political candidates in 1901 and afterwards, moreover, suggested to some opponents of 
Cuban rule that separatists were not at all fit to wield political power: “The craze of the 
Cubans is to be employees of the Government or City Councils,” wrote one Cuban-born 
annexationist criticizing what he perceived as a desire among the separatists to live off 
the state rather than rebuilding the country.
594
 
 
Conclusions: Cuban Independence as Black Rule 
  
During the first months of American rule, Cuban veterans sought to consolidate 
political control over local affairs as the spoils of war. Although many Cuban veterans 
expected an immediate transfer of authority in 1899, many faced disappointment as 
Americans retained Spaniards and Autonomists in positions of power. Prominent 
veterans rejected the apparent alliance between their enemies and their allies. Americans 
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soon recognized that distributing political power to Cuban veterans would be a necessary 
cornerstone of occupation policy. 
 Yet, not all veterans were made equal, despite the discourse of racial brotherhood 
that had prevailed during the war. The majority of political appointees were prominent 
white veterans, often from the wealthy, propertied and educated classes. By appointing 
wealthy whites to office, Americans sought to ensure propertied interests, assuming that 
whites would favor racial order and hierarchy. It became apparent, however, that not all 
white veterans favored American rule. In the first round of elections, Americans sought 
to favor pro-American and annexationist candidates by restricting suffrage through 
property, wealth, and literacy requirements. Although the first elections excluded the vast 
majority of Cuban men, especially those belonging to the poor and working classes, the 
revolutionary party had unexpected successes, electing independence-minded candidates 
and even some black candidates to national, provincial and local offices. 
 Property owners sought to challenge the electoral victories of radical candidates 
by linking political radicalism to social radicalism. During the build-up to the 
Constitutional Convention and the June 1901 elections, annexationists, Autonomists, 
Spaniards, and American property owners fabricated hysterical accounts of black 
uprisings, implicating prominent black veterans and even black politicians. Ultimately, 
these pro-American men forged between black rule and Cuban independence forced a 
conservative swing in local politics in Cienfuegos that undermined radical separatists in 
favor of socially-conservative veterans. Essentially, manliness, which equated to access 
to political power, became increasingly defined as the willingness and ability to defend 
propertied interests by any means necessary. The rise to power of socially-conservative 
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veterans in municipal government in Cienfuegos would have real consequences for poor 
and working-class black men and women, which the subsequent chapters will explore in 
detail.
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
The Color of Disorder: 
Black Veterans, Law Enforcement, and the Ordered City 
 
 
 In the summer of 1899 American quartermaster employees clashed with local 
residents in the areas of densest black settlement in Cienfuegos: the portside 
neighborhood of Marsillán and the red light district in the southwest corner of the city. In 
each instance, Americans engaged in disputes with local residents. When police arrived 
to restore order, the conflicts only grew worse, escalating into full-scale riots. Riots like 
these were not unusual during the first months of the American military occupation, as 
Cubans and Americans tested the limits of each other’s authority. 
One of the most significant sources of conflict was the enforcement of order in the 
city. Americans sought to enforce their authority over civil affairs by providing impunity 
for drunken and disorderly Americans and subduing the unruly Cuban protesters. Cuban 
civil authorities, in contrast, continued their quest to legitimize their own authority and 
competence for self-government through nationalist posturing and defiance against 
American control. Americans and Cuban civil authorities competed for authority over 
local affairs, each advocating a different concept of what order meant and how it should 
be enforced. 
Diverging understandings of race were at the center of the competing visions of 
order. Americans reluctantly accepted white Cuban veterans as the new authorities after 
the war, but they were unwilling to submit to black authority. For the most part, this was 
not a problem in the administration of civil affairs, as white separatists, and to a lesser 
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extent, white Autonomists filled the vast majority of public employment and government 
positions. The police force, however, provided one critical exception to the general 
pattern of employment of white veterans and disenfranchisement of black veterans. 
According to the Americans, the racially-heterogeneous police force impeded the 
enforcement of Cuban civil authority during the occupation. 
Americans charged that the racially-heterogeneous police force was incompetent 
and liable to ally itself with the masses based on racial and class similarities. This 
tendency had already manifested with disruptive consequences in the support of certain 
local authorities for the claims to property, horses and livestock of many black veterans 
in the country towns surrounding Cienfuegos.
595
 In the city itself, the willingness of the 
police to defend militant black workers, veterans, local residents and even prostitutes 
against the self-proclaimed representatives of civilization—the Americans—seemed to 
corroborate these suspicions. This alleged alliance exacerbated the existing tensions 
between Cuban and American authorities. In the numerous instances in which drunken 
and rowdy American soldiers and civilians created public disturbances, police perceived 
as black—or at very least as insufficiently white—faced disdain, disrespect and resistance 
not only from the drunken and rowdy Americans, but also from the military authorities. 
Indeed, the police were just another part of the problem, and provided yet another 
justification for the American occupation. 
 This chapter examines two conflicts that resulted from American abuses of poor 
and working-class Cubans. In each instance, the conflict escalated when the police 
intervened to arrest the Americans, but were promptly disarmed and detained by 
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American authorities. Civil authorities representing the most “respectable” classes in the 
city came to the defense of the police and the masses against the Americans, causing 
disagreement and reproach between the two groups. These conflicts demonstrate a strong 
sense of unity across racial and class differences among Cubans against Americans in the 
first months of the military occupation. 
 
Agents of Order or Disorder?: Black veterans and the Defense of the Pueblo 
 
On the afternoon of Monday, May 16, 1899 municipal police and American 
soldiers engaged in armed confrontation in the predominantly black port-side 
neighborhood of Marsillán. Police approached the Office of the Captain of the Port as 
American civilian employees in the Quartermaster’s Department aimed guns at a crowd 
of angry laborers. Municipal police sought to detain the armed men, but instead, the 
Americans disarmed and arrested the police, and forcibly dispersed the crowd by 
brandishing their weapons and firing several rounds. This violent confrontation between 
municipal police officers and American Quartermaster employees reveals the peculiar set 
of tensions defining relations between Americans and Cuban veterans in the aftermath of 
the war: whereas Cuban veterans employed in the municipal police department perceived 
their role as agents of order, Americans saw them as sympathizers—even agitators—of 
the masses. 
The conflict began when American Quartermaster employees refused to pay the 
stevedores their daily wages, due to lack of available funds.
596
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many black,
597
 some veterans, gathered outside the office of Captain of the Port, 
demanding their wages. Employees of the Quartermaster Department, including the 
Cuban-born naturalized American citizen Eligio A. Brunet who had defected from the 
insurrection in 1897, emerged from within the office instructing the workers to 
disperse.
598
 They assured the worker that they would be paid the following day. The 
laborers were dissatisfied, however. The promise of future payment of money that was 
due to them now was unacceptable. Most workers in post-war Cuba had heard this all 
before: there is no money now, but maybe later there will be. Teachers, police officers 
and wardens, municipal and provincial government employees all complained not 
receiving salary for months, even years due to the war and the transfer in sovereignty.
599
 
 
Image 16: Captain of the Port (where stevedores protested) circa 1899.
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For the stevedores, the memory was more recent than the war-time shortages, and 
the need for cash more pressing. Just a few months earlier, in February, these men had 
faced a similar situation, in which the Quartermaster did not have sufficient funds to pay 
them. “A mob of several hundred have besieged my office for days and nights justly 
clamoring for their pay,” Walter B. Barker, the Captain of the Port of Cienfuegos wrote 
in February. Barker was sympathetic to the laborers that time, writing urgently to his 
superiors asking for funds and defending the workers.  “I can no longer face a starving 
people who have done work for the government and I need not say to you should be 
paid,” he fumed indignantly to his boss.601 Men of the working class, perhaps more than 
any other urban population, relied heavily upon their low wages to subsist in a war-torn 
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economy in which the high prices of food, medicines and other necessities made 
maintaining a family exceedingly difficult. 
Barker was less sympathetic in May than he had been in February, even though 
conditions for the working class had not improved much. Instead of defending their right 
to be paid for their labor, Barker and his employees blamed the conflict on the laborers 
for their militancy and aggressiveness. The laborers did not move from the Office of the 
Captain of the Port, even though several quartermaster employees instructed them to 
leave. “They refused to go off, saying that they wanted their money.”602 According to 
another witness, “they became angry, and they said they must have their money; that they 
needed it and that they were being cheated.”603 P. Alduncin and Luis Lewis,604 both 
employees in the Office of the Captain of the Port, failed to communicate with the 
laborers, Captain F. N. Thevenet, the chief clerk, tried in Spanish.
605
 “Some of these men 
demanded their pay, threatening violence i[f] not paid at once.”606 One of the laborers 
even drew his dagger. Thevenet responded by grabbing “a stick or piece of iron of some 
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description and went out and brandished it about telling them to leave.”607 The crowd 
retired to the next block between D’Clouet and Dorticós. 
The aggressive behavior on the part of the laborers was particularly disconcerting 
to Americans, many of who viewed the lack of deference and obedience by the laborers 
as a violation of racial etiquette. Certain black laborers confronted the Quartermaster 
employees directly, a menacing act from the perspective of a white U.S. Southerner 
accustomed to Jim Crow. One laborer in the crowd, the black man José Brunet, had been 
identified as one of the leaders of the mob. Brunet, “who was most violent,” “returned 
with his gun to enforce his demand for pay.” 608 He attempted to approach the door of 
Barker’s office.609 Brunet had enlisted in the Cuban army early on, in September 1895, 
and had risen to the rank of Sergeant 2
nd
 class in the Infantry Regiment “Gómez.” As he 
approached the door, an armed watchman, Ben Bane, “an American citizen, who was 
dressed with a blue shirt and yellow breaches and wears a light mustache,” fired three 
shots at Brunet.
610
 Bane claimed that he was protecting an unarmed employee against the 
armed labor leader.
611
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Whereas the Americans claimed that Brunet had approached the office, 
threatening them, the nineteen-year-old laborer swore that he left as ordered. Testifying 
about his involvement in the affair from his hospital bed, Brunet reported that he was shot 
as he was leaving the crowd, and that he did not approach the office: “…having the 
witness retired, on arriving at the street D’Clouet between Dorticós and Santa Clara the 
warden of the wharf with a club that had hit him on the head and afterwards with the back 
of the revolver…” He recounted a scuffle between himself and Bane: “the speaker took 
out the machete which he carried, hitting him on the arm with the intention of diverting 
the weapon with which the warden was aiming at him.” The warden fired twice. Brunet 
barely escaped with his life, one bullet striking him in the left leg. Brunet also sustained 
severe wounds on the top of his head and over his right eye due to the blows from the 
gun, requiring him to seek medical assistance.
612
 Brunet ran as far as San Fernando 
Street, where he encountered a police officer who helped him to the Hospital.
613
 
 Americans directed their investigation toward white witnesses. José recalled the 
presence of his colleague, the black man Antonio Sarría, who could corroborate his story. 
Having enlisted in December 1895, Sarría had served in the same regiment and obtained 
the same rank as Brunet: Sergeant 2
nd
 class in the “Gómez” Regiment.  Military 
authorities never pursued this lead. Andrés Herrera Fernández, a Spaniard from 
Santander, confirmed the brutal flogging of Brunet.
614
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After the scuffle between Brunet and Bane, Barker appeared before the crowd, 
using threatening language to disperse the laborers. Barker recalled that the crowd was 
stubborn and it was difficult to disperse them.
615
 When the “mob,” as the American 
officers called it, was about a block away from the office, they came across three police 
officers who attempted to mediate the dispute. When the police arrived on the scene, “a 
general street fight followed, in which one laborer was killed and seven persons were 
wounded, including three members of the police force,” as one American newspaper 
reported.
616
 
From the perspective of the Americans, the police acted as agitators who flouted 
their duty to restore order by collaborating with rather than suppressing the laborers. 
Various Quartermaster employees testified that Acosta and the other two armed men 
described as “wearing the Cuban uniform” were at the head of the crowd, and that the 
crowd was assaulting Americans. Under police protection, the mob grew violent. Lewis, 
who had been a revolutionary sympathizer during the war, testified that, “he saw that 
several [members] of the mob were assaulting Meza, who is employed in Captain 
Barker’s Department.” He told them to go home, but “several of them attacked him with 
knives and machetes.”617 By failing to suppress the mob completely, the police had 
contributed to the violence, according to Americans. 
While the Americans called upon the police to suppress the laborers, the police 
instead endeavored to arrest the Americans. With Barker and his employees brutally 
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beating the laborers, brandishing weapons and firing as laborers, police quickly 
determined that the Americans were the disorderly elements. One of these policemen, 
Gonzalo Acosta, recalled that after hearing shots fired, he saw a large crowd gathered at 
the corner from blocks away, as he made his round on D’Clouet Street between San 
Carlos and Santa Cruz Streets. Acosta had served in the Liberating Army, having enlisted 
in December 1895 and finished the war at the rank of soldier. Arriving on the scene, two 
“American civilians with drawn revolvers [were] aiming at the crowd”618 Officer Acosta 
“drew his machete and walked up to the two Americans who withdrew their revolvers.” 
Acosta attempted to tell the Americans to sheath their weapons, but the language barrier 
proved too strong. He remembered the ill-fated attempt at communication: “one of them 
said in bad Spanish that they belonged to the Captain of the Port’s office.” Officer Acosta 
detained the Americans, sheathed his machete, and turned to lead them to the office of 
the Captain of the Port. 
In view of the arrest of two quartermaster employees, employees of Barker 
quickly identified in the police the enemy rather than agents of order. Numerous 
Americans including chief clerk C. I. Walsh and E. S. Harrison rushed to the scene to 
help suppress the Cubans.
619
 Seeking to free his compatriots, Lewis attacked officer 
Acosta as he was leading the arrested Americans to the Office of the Port.  Lewis grabbed 
him by the arms, as the other two Americans took his machete and revolver away from 
him. The Americans “hoisted him up and carried him through the street with great 
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hollering to the Capt of the Port…” Along the way, the Officer Acosta experience brutal 
violence: “before arriving to said place the Americans with their revolvers and Mausers 
and the Capt[ain] of the Port with the handle of his revolver struck him on the head and 
on his body.”620 Seeing Acosta under duress, Federico Martí and Pablo Castellón, the 
other two Cuban policemen dressed in their Cuban uniforms, drew their machetes, came 
to assist him.
621
 
Assorted American quartermaster employees promptly disarmed and arrested 
Martí and Castellón, after they failed to accede to their demands. Barker ordered these 
two police to control the crowd. They “paid no attention but proceeded to move forward,” 
Barker claimed.
622
 Barker turned to stop the policeman by force, and was greeted with 
equal hostility: “When I attempted to stop him,” Barker reported, “he drew his pistol on 
me…”623 E. H. Harrison remembered: “I saw a Cuban soldier rush at Captain Barker with 
a machete, and I said to Capt. Barker ‘We will take care of him.’”624 With the help of 
Sergeant Franklin of the Signal Corps, they disarmed that officer. According to Charles 
H. Evans, “one of these armed Cubans drew his revolver on Captain Barker when I 
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immediately jumped behind him and threw both arms around him when Captain Barker 
seized this Cuban’s machete,” and Harrison confiscated the machete.625 
Barker and his employees used violence to quell the crowd and arrest the police. 
Both Martí and Castellón recounted the brutal treatment they received from them 
Americans. The Americans beat them with the butts of their guns, as they witnessed 
Barker carrying off their partner, Acosta.
626
 In addition to violently disarming and 
detaining the police, Barker and his employees brutalized the crowd. Domingo Simpson, 
an onlooker, recalled that Barker came out of his office after a commotion, and proceeded 
to beat with the butt of his revolver everyone in sight: “the captain of the Port came out of 
the office with revolver in hand beating everyone he found in his way to disperse the 
mob.”627 When the police failed to respond to the American demands, Barker and his 
employees used violence to assert their authority. By the end of the riot, Americans had 
disarmed and detained all the police who responded to the incident, and had used 
violence to disperse the crowd of unpaid, largely unarmed laborers. 
 
Who’s Disorderly Now?: Debating Responsibility for the Riot 
 
Although the riot had officially ended with the disbandment of the laborers and 
detention of the police, conflict continued to escalate. Civil authorities and American 
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military officials disagreed over who was at fault in the riot. Americans blamed the 
dispute on the failures of an incompetent and corrupt police force, while Cuban civil 
authorities admonished the Americans for overstepping their authority and abusing the 
police. The beating, disarming and detention of the police resulted in a tense encounter 
between Captain Barker and his employees on the one hand, and the Cienfuegos mayor, 
Pedro Modesto Hernández,
628
 and the Chief of Police on the other. 
American testimony describing the meeting between Barker, Oropesa and the 
mayor reveal diverging perceptions of who should wield authority over civil affairs. 
Barker clearly communicated that he thought the behavior of both men was inappropriate 
and unprofessional—symptoms of what Barker and other Americans saw as the natural 
incompetence and excitability of the Latin race, the very premise of the American 
military occupation. Americans exposed their perception of their own superiority in 
commentary about the disrespectful behavior and insufficient deference to Americans by 
Cubans. After “some little time after talking to him, he was very loud and insulting to 
Captain Barker,” recalled Eligio A. Brunet, an employee in the office of the Port, who 
interpreted during the conversation between Barker and Oropesa. He told Oropesa “that 
he must stop the rough manner of talking and listen to Captain Barker who was 
talking.”629 Another of Barker’s employees, P. Alduncin, noted that “During Captain 
Barker’s interview with the Alcalde and the Chief of police, the latter was extremely 
defiant.” He also testified that as the police chief left the meeting, he made some kind of 
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speech to the crowd: “as the [laborers] left with the chief of police he made a talk to 
them, which I could not hear, but I did hear the mob cheer him.”630 The disrespect for 
American authority and righteousness and the perceived alliance between civil authorities 
and the supposed lawless rabble underscored for Americans the dangers of entrusting 
self-government to the Cubans. 
Barker pointed squarely to the police as the culprits of the riot. He recognized the 
police as a problem when they seemed to intervene on behalf of the laborers. From his 
point of view, the purpose of the police was to repress the masses. He complained that the 
police officers were not helping to maintain order, but rather instigating conflict. The 
police, especially Acosta, were agitators, charged Barker. “There can be no mistake as to 
the character of this supposed conservator of the peace,” snarled Barker of Acosta in his 
report on the riot.
631
 Barker argued that the men employed in the police force did not 
meet the standards of “good character” outlined in the guidelines for hiring. 
The poor character of the police, Americans reasoned, required the military 
authorities to play a more expansive role in the administration of local affairs, especially 
the preservation of order. Instead of relying on police, Americans called in troops to 
patrol the town, warning of possible disorder and acts of retaliation. The Chief Surgeon 
urged the American forces to be vigilant against the “anti-American meeting,” led by 
José B. Alemán that would take place the evening of May 17.
632
 As a preventative 
measure, Barker ordered the police detained and ordered American troops to patrol the 
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town the night of the original disturbance to avoid further disorder, “as the Cubans 
threatened revenge.”633 Barker also ordered police Chief Joaquín Oropesa, to retain 
Acosta on duty in the station the following day to avoid further conflict. Oropesa defied 
him, however, when he returned the pistol to Acosta, and told him to remain inside the 
station, but that he could go out for lunch. 
Retaliation followed as predicted, seemingly supporting the low opinion 
Americans held of the character of the police. American precautions and authority proved 
just as ineffective in suppressing revenge attacks as Barker supposed municipal police 
were. Acosta left the station for lunch, and sought revenge against Luis Lewis, shooting 
several rounds at him. According to Barker, Acosta “was on the streets and did shoot and 
attempt to kill one of my head stevedores who was unarmed.”634 When going out of the 
office of the Port to pay the carpenters, Lewis encountered police officer Acosta, who “it 
seems had been informed that I assisted in disarming him.” Recalling the frightful 
encounter, Lewis testified that Acosta “walked straight up to me, drew his pistol, and 
fired at me three times.” Lewis avoided the shots and fled from his assailant: “After he 
fired the first shot I ran across the street to a tailor shop, he pursuing me and firing at 
me.”635 By attempting to avenge the abuses of the Americans against the police, Acosta 
corroborated a popular opinion that condemned him as “a leader in every demonstration 
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of whatever nature that takes place in Cienfuegos.”636 The violent retaliation, Americans 
reasoned, showed the true character of the police, while substantiating the need for 
continued military rule. 
While Cuban civil authorities did not explicitly defend the revenge attack, it did 
highlight the anger many local residents, across class and race, felt toward the 
representatives of military rule. At the same time as Barker thought the police should be 
deferential to him, many Cubans saw the violent interference in civil matters by the 
Americans as an insult to and abuse of local authorities. The Cuban civil authorities 
expressed outrage that the Americans would use force on an unarmed population, and 
perhaps worst of all, that they would attack and disarm the police. The Chief of Police, 
Joaquín Oropesa, charged angrily that these events “constitute a true abuse of the police 
whose prestige is under the safeguard of this Chief…”637 Mayor Hernández,638 in his 
letter to the provincial governor, used the exact same phrase to describe the events: “un 
verdadero atropello” (a true insult/abuse) to the police.639 Hernández also complained that 
Barker would not return the weapons he had confiscated from the police officers, 
suggesting continued antagonism after the contentious post-riot meeting. 
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Frustrated in their attempts to convince the Americans of their wrong-doing, civil 
authorities in Cienfuegos brought the matter to the attention of Orestes Ferrara, the Civil 
Governor of the Province of Santa Clara. Ferrara reported to Wilson that: “This 
government hopes you will pay particular attention to the matter, said city [Cienfuegos] 
being the only one where such scandals daily take place.”640 Indeed, there had been a 
history of violent encounters between Americans and Cubans in Cienfuegos. For 
example, on March 25, 1899, Edwin F. Atkins heard news “of a row at Caunao between 
some soldiers and the Cubans. The feeling between them is quite strong, and the soldiers 
are hoping for a chance to get at them before they go home. A spark would start a blaze 
now that might be hard to put out.”641 Indeed, tensions between Americans and poor and 
working-class Cubans had reached a boiling point by May. 
By arguing that Cienfuegos was the only place in which conflicts between 
Americans and Cubans occurred with such frequency, Ferrara was able to point to the 
behavior of Barker and his employees as both unacceptable and anomalous. That Ferrara 
identified the extraordinary level of violence and conflict in Cienfuegos suggests 
unusually tense relations between the Americans stationed there and the local Cubans 
with whom they rubbed elbows. Ferrara highlighted the culpability of these particular 
Americans while avoiding implicating the entire occupying project in the dispute.  
Days after the conflict, and after communicating with civil and provincial 
authorities, General Wilson came to the defense of civil authorities. After receiving 
complaints about the character and quality of municipal officials including the mayor, 
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Wilson replied that “so far as I am able to judge, the municipal authorities […] are well 
chosen and are fairly representative of not only the intelligence but the property of the 
country.” He continued by citing the example of the conservative leaning mayor of 
Cienfuegos: “Surely, Doctor Frías […] is a man of ability and culture. I have no doubt 
that his family have [sic] been large property holders.”642 By emphasizing the wealth and 
social standing of civil authorities, Wilson sought to dispel assumptions that they acted as 
agents of disorder. 
Moreover, Wilson seemed to agree that the behavior of Barker and his employees 
was inappropriate. Additionally, he lamented the behavior of many of the military men 
under his command. Under the rule of Bates, American military officials had grown 
accustomed to wielding unbridled power and authority over government. “The people 
have been drifting about without direction or guidance, captains and lieutenants have 
been figuring as governors of districts and custodians of the municipal funds.” Wilson 
remarked unfavorably at the behavior of military officials in Cienfuegos: “each little 
jackass seemed to feel he was called upon to command the people, manage their public 
business and supervise their daily duties.”643 His description offers a convincing 
explanation of the attitudes and actions of Barker, who viewed himself as the supreme 
authority with responsibility and control over civil affairs rather than just the port, as his 
position suggested. Examining American views toward Cuban civil authorities, especially 
the police can help explain why Barker assumed an expanded role for himself in 
Cienfuegos. 
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Agents of Order or Criminal Conspirators?: American views of the Police 
 
In the days after the riot, La Tribuna published an article celebrating the solidarity 
between civil authorities, police and local residents. The article encouraged civil 
authorities to be an example for the masses, imploring Cuban compatriots to “show the 
popular masses that it is not tolerating injustices, but protesting against them that will be 
able to become free men.” The article emphasized unity across class and racial lines, 
reminding his compatriots to not allow themselves to be divided because “power is in the 
union.”644 This union celebrated by La Tribuna proved problematic for Americans in 
Cienfuegos. 
Riots involving Americans and Cuban veterans occurred throughout the island,
645
 
but relations between these groups in Cienfuegos seemed especially tense. The tensions 
perhaps arose from the personal grievances many veterans had against Bates and Barker, 
who were said to be against Cubans. Moreover, numerous American soldiers would be 
court-martialed for unbecoming conduct, drunkenness, violence and brawls throughout 
the province of Santa Clara, and the numbers continued to grow over the first two years 
of the occupation (See Table 7). In Cienfuegos, the employees of the quartermaster 
department, who were under the supervision of Barker, were particularly egregious in 
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their treatment of Cubans, perhaps because they, as civilians, were not subject to military 
court-martial. 
As quartermaster employees clashed with Cuban civilians and police in 
Cienfuegos, Walter B. Barker, the boss of many of these disorderly civilians, emerged as 
a prominent defender of American defiance of Cuban authority. A native of Mississippi, 
Barker was the son of a distinguished Southern family. A second cousin of former 
President William Henry Harrison, Barker developed a prestigious military career, 
beginning with his service to the Confederate Army in the eleventh regiment of the 
Mississippi Infantry. In 1893, he was appointed United States Consul to Cuba in the 
north-central port city of Sagua la Grande. Subsequently he served in the regular army in 
Cuba, and later Japan.
646
 Perhaps no other aspect of his long history of military service 
shaped his views of Cubans greater than his armed struggle for the Confederacy. 
 
 
Table 7: Selected Crimes Committed by American Officers and Soldiers: 1899-1900, 
Department of Matanzas & Santa Clara
647
 
 Until July 31, 1899 July 1, 1899-June 30, 1900 
Crime Court 
Martial 
Summary 
Court 
Total Court 
Martial 
Summary 
Court 
Total 
Selling or losing 
Uniform 
5 10 15 11 10 21 
Absent without 
Leave 
54 371 425 48 694 742 
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Failure to Report to 
Duty 
20 534 554 66 886 952 
Drunk on Duty 35 77 112 38 160 198 
Desertion 21 1 22 41 - 41 
Drunk & Disorderly 29 273 302 47 299 346 
Conduct to the 
Prejudice of good 
order and military 
discipline 
68 82 150 84 629 703 
Disobeying Orders 
 
6 190 196 27 162 189 
Creating 
Disturbance 
- - - - 22 22 
 
Barker became known for his anti-Cuban sentiment and unfair, even abusive 
treatment, of Cubans, and defense of disorderly Americans. Certainly, he held 
unfavorable views of the Cubans upon arrival, which only grew steadily more virulent 
over the course of his service in Cienfuegos. He lamented that “the colored element is 
largely in excess of the whites,” because “the sole survivors” of Reconcentration “proved 
to be negros.”648 He likened the Cubans to children and Indians. “The Cubans remind me 
of our Indians, as you no doubt know the Indian was ever crying for a new Agent and 
more beef. The Cubans are ever clamoring for a new Governor-General, less work and 
more ‘dinero’.”649  Moreover, Barker thought that the Cubans were “stupid and densely 
ignorant,” “woefully deluded” and “lacking in executive ability” to an extent that “the 
present generation can never prove capable of self-government.”650 
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Barker particularly despised the Cubans for their failure to cooperate with the 
Americans. Shortly after the May riot, he wrote that the Cubans “must be given to 
understand that we are supreme in power and superior in management…”651 He lamented 
that “they persistently refuse to cooperate” with the Americans.652 In December 1899, 
Barker voiced his doubts over the competence of Cuban separatists to General Adna 
Chaffee. “Under the present Alcalde and Chief of Police serious trouble may be hatched 
in Cienfuegos any day. Neither of these officials possess [sic] a single attribute to qualify 
them for the position.” Barker wished to replace the civil authorities with other men in 
the city “who, if not thoroughly competent, would certainly administer municipal affairs 
with less friction and more progress.”653 The experiences of the Civil War, 
Reconstruction, and Indian Wars had a direct impact not only on policy, as scholars have 
suggested, but upon the attitudes and behaviors of individual military men, like Barker.
654
 
Cienfuegos exhibited some unique traits that may have been particularly 
distasteful to Americans, especially ex-Confederates like Barker. In contrast to cities like 
Havana, people of African descent found employment in the municipal police force of 
Cienfuegos, at least in the immediate aftermath of the war. The municipal police force 
was composed of Cuban veterans of different racial backgrounds, differing from the 
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predominantly white rural guard.
655
 In March 1899, 63 members of the Brigade of 
Cienfuegos were employed in the municipal police force of that city.
656
 At least four of 
these men were recognized as mulatto or black.
657
 In May 1899, the inspector of police 
described the personnel of the Cienfuegos municipal police as “fair,” and noted “quite a 
number of negroes.”658 Although some black veterans found employment in the 
municipal police force, the positions of leadership were filled by whites, reflecting the 
predominantly white officer-ship of the brigade of Cienfuegos. Nevertheless, the 
Cienfuegos police force, more so than government and the rural guard, reflected 
demographics of Cuba Libre. 
Blacks may have been able to secure employment in the municipal police force 
because of the pressure for a speedy organization and the lack of regular payment of the 
already low salaries. Whereas the payment of the predominantly white Rural Guard was 
normalized by mid-1899, and other white veterans came to occupy high-paying 
government posts, the multi-racial police force continued to face irregular payment in 
addition to growing tensions with the American presence of Cienfuegos.
659
 Some 
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veterans of color accepted work in the police, where they could at least continue to 
exercise some of the authority they had during the war, if not receiving regular pay. 
Even if the police had received they due pay, their salaries were widely 
recognized to be insufficient (See Table 8). The Cienfuegos newspaper El Siglo reported 
on the matter in 1899, requesting that salaries of Municipal Police be increased. By 
September of that same year, these requests had remained unanswered, prompting 
another article on the police force: “In previous numbers we lightly dealt with the excess 
[burdens] of service that the police had and how poorly paid they were, asking that the 
force that we esteem so important and necessary be augmented, and yet still nothing has 
been done in favor of this Corporation.”660 The neglect by local authorities of the 
municipal police force reflected the political corruption and nepotism characterizing 
access to public employment in Cienfuegos. While the police faced irregular and 
insufficient pay, pointed out one local journalist, “in the Municipality it seems that a 
different job is created daily for those recommended, who request it. […] We are not 
content with these proceedings and we ask aloud that this force, which is still deficient, 
be attended.”661 That the press advocated for an increase and regularization of police 
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salaries suggests a broader concern for the well-being of the police, and anxiety over the 
priorities privileged by the civil authorities. 
Table 8: Pay Schedules for Municipal Police of Santa Clara Province, Cienfuegos 
Jurisdiction
662
 
Position Pay (annual) 
Cienfuegos
663
 Palmira Rodas Lajas San 
Fernando 
Cruces Abreus 
Chief 1x1800 - - - - 1x1600 - 
Celador 3x900 1x720 1x600 1x480 1x600 1x480 1x480(?) 
Secretary 4x452 - - - - - - 
Brigadiers 4x514.28 - - - - - - 
Guards 
(Infantry) 
70x408 6x360 4x360 4x324 5x360 6x360 4x360 
Guards 
(Cavalry) 
20x500 - 2x408 2x396 2x420 2x408 2x432 
 
The low salary tended was accompanied by equally low impression of the quality 
of the police officers among Americans. General Wilson wrote in his 1899 annual report 
that “it is to be observed that the Cubans, as a rule, have not sufficient size, strength and 
self-reliance to make first class policemen...”664 The observation that the men employed 
in the police force were not “first class,” prompted military officials to mandate specific 
physical and educational requirements for employment. These included being “physically 
sound,” over 5’6” tall, between 25 and 35 years old, literate, “temperate,” and “of good 
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character,” which was to be determined by “citizens of good standing.”665 The moral 
judgments to be made by worthy, probably white men, about the fitness and adequacy of 
men for employment in the police force seemed to provide ample leeway for the 
exclusion of people deemed undesirable because of their race or political tendencies. 
Despite the suggestion to “improve” the population employed by the police force, the 
roster seems to have change little as of May, all of the police involved in the May riot 
having been employed in January. As well, the police involved in the next large riot had 
also been employed since the beginning of the year. 
 
“El cuento del foky, foky”: Black veterans confront American sexual privilege 
 
At around 4:30 in the afternoon on June 24, 1899, three American civilian 
employees strolled through the streets of Cienfuegos. It was a holiday, San Juan Day, and 
the town streets were bustling, as people of diverse racial and national backgrounds 
watched the parade, sipped beverages at the saloons, and enjoyed a variety of other adult 
entertainment. Three American quartermaster employees Campbell McDowell, the night 
watchman at the government lumber yard, and his two buddies, Andrew E. Fuller and 
Julian C. Baker, Campbell McDowell, joined the celebration after eating in a local café. 
As they strolled through the red light district in the southwestern portion of the city, 
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where festivities centered, they were captivated by the ladies in the window of one of the 
many brothels on Santa Clara Street. They decided to enter the house.
666
  
The prostitute denied the Americans entry into her house, as she was then 
occupied with another client. This enraged the three Americans, who likely expected 
unbridled access to Cuban woman, a presumption that deeply offended the residents of 
the neighborhood. They began banging on the door and forming a commotion outside of 
the brothel. McDowell insisted on entering the house: “The door was pushed onto us, and 
we did not enter. Then we saw they did not intend to let us in. We pushed the door and 
had just decided to go in when these Cuban police started across from the corner.”667 
Later in his testimony, McDowell admitted that they had kicked the door a few times and 
pushed it, in addition to knocking at the window and telling the prostitute to let them 
in.
668
 
The Americans became rowdy, attracting the attention of the crowd as they beat 
on the door of the brothel and started to harass one of the brothel clients, a Chinese man. 
One of the men accompanying McDowell, one Andrew E. Fuller, spared investigators a 
few extra details: “A couple of friends and myself were coming down Santa Clara street; 
we were not drunk, but we were feeling pretty good, and we were making quite a lot of 
noise, and we stopped at a house of prostitution and were jollying up the Chinaman.”669 
Baker depicted the encounter with the Chinaman in a more graphic manner: “We struck a 
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Chinaman down there and started to worry him.”670 The encounter with the Chinese man 
at the brothel caught the attention of the police. 
Witnessing the upheaval, three Cuban police officers, who were later described as 
“mostly negroes,” approached the Americans in an attempt to restore order. Fuller 
attempted to mediate between the police and his drunken compatriots, testifying that he 
“was talking to them, telling them we would get off the street.” The Americans were 
unable to convince the police, who placed the Americans under arrest. The crowd 
encircled the perceived troublemakers. Fuller recalled that “one little man came up; he 
was exciting and was shaking his fist. […] I took him by the arm and told him if he could 
go away I would explain to the police.” Just as Fuller laid his hands on that man, the 
crowd fell upon him. “Just then, someone grabbed me,” Fuller testified, and “That started 
a fight.” According to Fuller, the whole crowd turned against the three Americans: 
“Everyone was hammering on us for a few minutes,” Baker observed that “there seemed 
to be a lot of civilians interfering and I was hit.”671 Confrontation mutated into a full-
blown riot, as Cuban civilians intervened to punish the offenders. 
In the crowd were two black veterans of the Brigade of Cienfuegos, Esteban 
Montejo, a former runaway slave-turned-soldier, and the insurgent chief and terror of 
Soledad estate, Claudio Sarría. The disrespect and violence with which the Americans 
treated the public woman beckoned back to the days of the war when Spaniards were said 
to rape Cuban women indiscriminately. Now the Cubans faced a new occupier, the 
Americans. In Cuba, the American soldiers “arrived to the houses and saw a beautiful 
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woman in the window or in the door and they got close and they said: ‘Foky, foky, 
Margarita,’672 and in [they went]. I lived that in Cienfuegos,” remembered Montejo of the 
days under American rule.
673
 
Montejo, Sarría and other veterans had noticed the typical abuses of the 
Americans with Cuban women, and were determined to end their rampage. San Juan Day 
provided that opportunity. Cuban veterans in the crowd assumed the role of defenders of 
the neighborhood and the women against the new enemy, the Americans, just as they had 
done against the Spaniards during the war. The drunken deeds of the Americans incensed 
Montejo to such a degree that he and other veterans decided to punish the offenders. “In 
Cienfuegos, around the year eighteen ninety nine a group of mambises had to take up the 
machete to a few American soldiers who, rotten as they were, wanted to take
674
 all the 
creole women as if they were meat at the market.”675 Insulted by the assumed sexual 
privilege of the Americans, Montejo was determined to protect the local women against 
the new invader. 
Having noted the history of offenses of Americans against Cuban women, 
Montejo and a group of Cuban veterans vigilantly monitored the neighborhood on San 
                                                 
672
 “Foky, Foky,” or “Fuck-y, Fuck-y” seemed to be a phrase widely used in communication between 
Americans and prostitutes, pimps, or people perceived as having to do with the sex industry. Seemingly a 
perversion of the American expression and vulgar euphemism for sex “fuck.” Several Americans used this 
term in their court-martial trials to describe interactions with Cuban women and prostitutes. For example, 
“Court-Martial of James B. Hughes,” August 31, September 5, 1899, Case number 13738, 
USNA/CMR/RG 153/E 15. 
673
 Miguel Barnet, Biografía de un Cimarrón (Havana: Ediciones Ariel, 1966), 190-1. “Llegaban a las casas 
y veían a una mujer linda en la ventana o en la puerta y se le acercaban y le decían: "Foky, foky, 
Margarita", y para dentro. Eso lo viví yo en Cienfuegos.” 
674
 Cogerse=Take in a sexual sense 
675
 Barnet, Biografía de un Cimarrón, 190. “En Cienfuegos, allá por el año mil ochocientos noventa y 
nueve un grupo de mambises tuvo que cargarle al machete a unos cuantos soldados americanos que, de 
pillos que eran, querían cogerse a todas las criollas como si fueran carne de mercado.”  
  
277 
 
Juan Day. “With the story of the foky, foky, they screwed themselves. We found out 
about that business and we went to watch them. They dressed in yellow, well ironed, but 
[were] almost always drunk. Claudio Sarría, who had been a sergeant, gave the order to 
charge with machetes. And we went over there like fierce [warriors].”676 Montejo 
remembered the interaction that compelled him and his compatriots to act: “We watched 
and, sure enough, a small group began to mess around on one street near the wharf. They 
got into it with the women, they touched their butts and they laughed. I believe that 
[even] during the war I did not feel such a fire inside [me] as [I did] that day.”677 These 
black veterans extended their wartime authority to assume the role of informal policing 
against the new invaders after the war. The honor of local men depended on their 
effective protection of the women from threats and outsiders.  
McDowell told a harrowing tale of being beaten by the police and being abused 
by the crowd that had formed to observe the scandal: the police “pulled machetes and 
they hit us with the sides of the machetes. They beat all three of us with the flat of the 
machetes.” He claimed that the police gave no explanation, and a crowd had formed, and 
explained that in the next moment, “I was on the ground, I was sort of dazed.”678 
McDowell was drunk at the time of the affair, and it is quite plausible that in his state of 
inebriation he passed out with all the excitement, and “came to,” as he states, “on the 
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edge of the crowd.” He testified that he went straight to bed after escaping the crowd.679 
This incident shows similar defiance of Cuban authorities as during the May riot. 
As the police attempted to arrest the drunken Americans, wrestling them away 
from the mob, a carriage in which rode Captain Ebenezer B. Fenton, the Commissary of 
Volunteers, with a clerk of the Quartermasters Department drove past the crowd. Fenton 
ordered the carriage to halt, got out, and interfered with the arrest.  Fenton told them to 
get into the carriage, so that he could “rescue them,” as he put it.680 
The Americans resisted arrest, fighting and struggling to break free of the police. 
Thevenet, an American employee who accompanied Fenton in his carriage, and who 
spoke a little Spanish, recalled the way the crowd was “very much against” McDowell, 
Fuller, and Baker: “The only thing I could hear the mob say was that these men should go 
[to the police station] on foot […]The [American] men said they were ‘caibrones’ [sic] 
and swearing at them.” When asked what “caibrones” (cabrones) meant, Thevenet 
explained: “I understand it is the fix a man is in when somebody else is with his wife.”681 
They broke free of the police officers, and two entered the carriage, and “they whipped 
up the horses, and that they started on a full run through the crowd,”682 “knocking down 
some of the people, as they tried to stop it.
”683
 The third American, McDowell ran off by 
himself. As the carriage took off through the crowd, gunfire began. 
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In a futile attempt to halt the carriage and detain the fleeing suspects, several men 
sustained gunshot wounds, including one police officer. The police claimed that several 
shots came from the carriage, one of them wounding the policeman Epifanio Ordóñez: 
“the shot entered by the back and came out the front then a cigarette packet was in the 
pocket of my jacket and the ball went through that in coming out, Ordóñez testified.”684 
In response, Officer Garrido shot twice in the air in a futile attempt to deter the carriage. 
Ordóñez, who had been “on duty in the public woman’s ward,”685 testified that no shot 
had been fired before the shots that wounded him. 
Fenton requested backup to “restore order,” calling in American troops stationed 
at the nearby railroad station. Fenton was convinced that the Cubans wanted to kill him. 
“I do not exaggerate when I say more than fifty shots were fired and twenty of them at 
me,” Fenton wrote, referring to the moments after the carriage sped away with the 
Americans inside.
686
 “That the police tried to kill me is beyond a doubt,” Fenton 
continued.
687
 Moreover, one quartermaster employee from Mississippi, George L. 
Donald, confirmed that he had seen a colored man shoot at Fenton.
688
 Stopping the 
carriage a few blocks away from the mob, Fenton met Lieutenant George De G. Caitlin. 
Fenton requested that Caitlin mobilize the soldiers at the train station, who had been 
ordered to guard the money train containing the cash to pay the Cuban soldiers to 
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disband.
689
 These soldiers formed a picket behind the wall of the railroad station, firing 
upon the crowd.
690
 
One of the bullets exchanged entered a passing carriage, killing one man, Pablo 
Santa María. According to the driver of the carriage, Miguel Goicochea, his passenger 
Santa Maria, and his three children were on Arango Street. “We left the baseball game 
and drove down toward the railroad station. We drove through Santa Clara to Arango, 
then down Arango to near San Fernando; near San Fernando Street we heard shots and 
turned.” Miguel turned the carriage around, back toward Santa Clara, but it was too late: 
“between San Fernando and Arguelles Streets, he (Santa María) said to me, ‘I am 
dying.’” Miguel reported traumatically, that “the children were crying, I told them there 
was no danger.”691 As Miguel reassured, the immediate threat was over. But as blood 
drained from the limp body of Santa María, local residents recognized in this brutal 
display of American force a more omnipresence and persisting menace to the Cuban 
authority for which separatists had fought for thirty years. 
 
Public Disorder and the American Civilizing Mission 
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Civil authorities and military officials disagreed over who was to blame for the 
public disturbance, just as they had after the May Riot. A common feature of much of the 
testimony, especially that of Cuban government and law enforcement officials was the 
discourse of civilization and barbarism that permeated American judgments of Cuba. 
Americans argued that the riots had arisen because of the natural inferiority of the Cubans 
and their incapacity to manage their own affairs. Blaming the riots on the Cuban police 
exonerated the Americans, shifting attention away from the immoral activities of the 
quartermaster employees and upholding American claims to racial and moral superiority. 
At the same time, faulting the Cubans for the violence pointed to the continuing need for 
the American civilizing mission. 
One of the most immediate disputes between American and Cuban authorities 
was in assessing the blame for the death of the Spaniard Santa María, which for many 
local residents represented the death of the infant Cuban independence. La Tribuna 
labeled his death as an “assassination” by Americans.692 The American soldiers and 
officers denied the possibility that they were responsible for wounding Santa Maria, and 
the official narrative of events, produced by the Judge Advocate, H.C. Carbaugh, reflects 
this believe.
693
 Nevertheless, members of the crowd and police swore that the bullet 
entered the carriage from the direction of the American picket at the train station. 
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Regardless of whose bullet actually wounded Santa María, the Cubans were convinced 
that the Americans had killed one of their citizens. 
Similarly, American officials charged that Cuban incompetence had endangered 
the lives of American citizens. Major Bowman, of the 2
nd
 U.S. Infantry, attempted to 
justify Fenton in impeding the arrest of the three quartermaster employees. These men 
“were not convicts escaping from the law, and there can be no justification for the 
conduct of the police firing in the streets under the circumstances,” snapped Bowman. He 
implied that American lives were worth more than those of Cubans: “Endangering the 
lives of citizens, especially an officer of the United States Government, such men [the 
policemen] are unfit to discharge the responsible duties of their office.”694 He went 
further to demand that the Cuban police officers involved in the incident be fired: “And 
for the good name of your city, and Cuba, I urge upon you attention the necessity of 
relieving, discharging, the policemen who began this firing,” as if he, as an American, 
knew what was the best and necessary course of action for the mayor to take.
695
 
Americans also pointed to the Cubans as the first to fire their weapons, further 
implicating them in causing the right and supporting the case to disarm the incompetent 
men. “After careful investigation […] all evidence points unmistakably to one 
conclusion, that the firing was begun by the municipal police,” affirmed an American 
investigator. It is important to note that the official investigation, which was conducted in 
English by the military authorities, did not take place until several days after the date of 
the letter. Still, the American officer, assured of the veracity of his claims, demanded, 
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“Your police should not be allowed to fire in the streets of the city, they are too nervous 
and excitable to be entrusted with such power…”696 Major Bowman, like many American 
witnesses to the riot, judged the police as incompetent for having used weapons to 
contain the disturbance. 
American disdain for the Cuban police also emerged in their responses to the 
testimony given by police. The lengthy interrogation of Félix Rumbao, one of the first 
police on the scene of the disturbance, involved combative dialogue and repeated 
questioning on very specific details of his involvement in the riot. Below the transcription 
of the interrogation, appeared a note that completely dismantled his observations and 
undermined his credibility, labeling his testimony “almost absolutely worthless, or at 
least unreliable.” This man was “either stupid, frightened or did not know what he was 
doing; probably did not understand the value of an oath,” the note continued.697 
Investigators seemed to dismiss the testimony of one of the key eye witnesses to the riot. 
Many Americans in Cienfuegos had already concluded that the municipal police 
were unfit prior to the riot, and this shaped the way they approached police intervention 
in the affair. Like in the May Riot, Americans actually disarmed the police who were 
attempting to arrest the suspects of the disorder. This enraged authorities, who considered 
the detention of the police as an abuse of local authority.  First Lieutenant John L. Hines 
recalled the encounter between the mayor and Lieutenant Caitlin: “The Mayor was very 
much excited, shaking his finger in the face of Catlin, telling him it was a matter for the 
municipal authorities, and that he had no right to take any part in it. It was his place to let 
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the officer fire this shot and investigate after.”698 Clearly, Cuban civil authorities resented 
the abuse of the police, perceiving this as an affront to their authority over civil affairs. 
They defended their own authority by supporting the police against a common enemy. 
Americans interpreted the brusque way local authorities confronted the American 
military officials regarding the inappropriate behavior of their men as an unwarranted 
challenge to their authority. Hines found the mayor’s behavior disrespectful: “He was 
very much excited, and I resented his attitude toward Catlin, because Catlin was very 
cool and calm.”699 The mayor tried to explain his actions: “It is a custom of mine to shake 
my finger when talking (he indicated how he meant). The statement made by me to the 
Lieut. was that I thought there was no excuse for the soldiers to fire on account of a 
disturbance, whatever the occurrence. That it was an affair of the municipal police who 
would arrest offenders and proceed accordingly.” As each group struggled to assert its 
supreme authority over civil affairs, the composition of the police force came under 
intense scrutiny. Although the bonds of nationality bound civil authorities to the police, at 
least temporarily, Americans rejected the authority of police they deemed incompetent an 
inferior to themselves. 
 
Race and Incompetence in the Municipal Police Force 
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Public opinion reflected perceptions that “race feeling had occasioned” the San 
Juan Day Riot.
700
 Indeed, race became a powerful explanation for the incompetence of 
the Cuban police. The testimony of Americans who participated and witness this riot can 
help explain why these Americans rejected the authority of the municipal police, while 
casting list on the underlying reasons for the disputes between Americans and Cuban 
police. Americans described with disdain the racial composition of the police force, and 
connected the culpability of the police officers to their racial degeneracy. 
Many of the quartermaster employees were America southerners. Fuller and 
Baker were from West Virginia, Barker and Donald were from Mississippi. George 
Donald was also struck by the blackness of the police force. Donald testified that he saw 
“a policeman, a negro, not the blackest I have noticed on the police force, but he was of 
the color that I would call a negro, raised to shoot the carriage [full of Americans]. I 
knocked his hand down.”701 When further questioned about what he saw, Donald recalled 
that he “saw three policemen firing. I could identify two of them positively. They were 
what, in the Southern states, we would call negroes.”702 Almost as if using race as an 
argument for why this person was guilty, Donald stated: “When the carriage drove off the 
first man that fired was a negro policeman. I can recognize that man if I see him.”703 
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Assigning the blame to policemen, while labeling them as black, was doubly powerful in 
condemning the accused. 
Donald even flaunted his defiance of the police to the mayor. He infuriated the 
mayor to such a degree that that latter interjected: “So the police have no authority and 
you do not intend to comply with their orders?” Donald did not reply.704 Combined with 
his potently racialized testimony regarding the culpability of the black police officers, 
this exchange suggests that Donald may have expected sympathy from the mayor in his 
defiance of black authority. Unfortunately for him, the mayor affirmed national loyalties 
by defending the police, rather than focusing in on the racial differences. 
Other American witnesses suggested that even the white policemen were racially 
degenerate. Cornelius Cornell, testified that he saw a police officer fire “point blank” at 
Fenton. “He was a white man, he was pretty brown though.”705 William Thomas 
Jefferson, an African American civilian driver working for the military government from 
Georgia, seemed to disagree about the race of the officer to which Cornel referred. 
Jefferson identified three colors of policemen when asked who fire at Fenton’s carriage: 
“One of the colored fellows fired once, and the other fellow fired. They fired two or three 
shots. One was fired by the yellow fellow and one by the dark one, and probably one 
more.”706 Jefferson may have used the term “yellow” to refer to mixed or ambiguous 
racial ancestry of officer Garrido. The testimonies of Cornell and Jefferson suggest that 
Americans understood the shortcomings of the police in terms of the natural racial 
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inferiority of both black and Latin peoples. Apparently the racial makeup—the inclusion 
of blacks and the presumed inferiority of the Latin races—within the police force 
undermined their authority in the eyes of the Americans.  
These Americans expected more deference from people who they presumed were 
their social and racial inferiors. They may have anticipated similar levels of submission 
from the black and mixed-race Cuban police officers as they had grown accustomed to 
from poor Southern blacks in the United States. The deference which Jefferson, afforded 
his white compatriots highlights a divergence in the possible expectations white 
Americans had of race relations in Cuba, and the realities prevailing after an anti-racist 
war. When the white man Donald demanded he hand over his gun so he could join in the 
shooting outside, Jefferson acceded without protest and without questions: “I started 
down the steps, got to the foot of the steps and met a negro teamster [Jefferson], I think, 
he spoke English. He had a 45 Colt buckled around his waist, full of cartridges. I said 
‘Give me that.’ He began to unbuckle it. He said ‘Boss, take this; I saw them shooting at 
you a while ago.”707 That Donald expressed uncertainty over the nationality of Jefferson, 
by questioning his language skills, suggests that he may have equated blackness with 
Cubans. Although Jefferson corroborated this testimony, General Wilson suspected 
witness tampering and asked Jefferson if he had been coached.
708
 
Americans from non-confederate states also held expectations of deference from 
Cubans. McDowell, whose family was from Ohio and Kansas remarked at the racial 
composition of the Cuban police who approached him as he was attempting to force his 
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way into the brothel: “there were 5 or 6 police. Most of them were black and they sailed 
into us.”709 McDowell may have confused the black veterans with the police, because 
only two police approached the Americans at the brothel. 
The police, not to mention the laborers, did not offer the Americans the same 
deference and submission as did Jefferson. At the same time as the Americans disparaged 
the racially integrated police force, the veterans employed in those positions perceived 
their role as honorable and an extension of the authority and service they had rendered 
during the war. As police officers, they viewed themselves as the ultimate agents of 
order. Moreover, the preservation of military hierarchies and patronage networks from 
the war, in the police force led police officers to perceive—correctly, in theory—that they 
responded to their police Chief, Joaquín Oropesa, who during the war had been the chief 
of many of the veterans employed in the police force, and not to the American 
authorities. In essence, the police force, unlike the Rural Guard, responded to local 
authorities and not to military needs. These internal contradictions and tensions provided 
the context for a series of violent conflicts between white American soldiers and black 
Cuban police. 
The American expectation that Cubans, especially black Cubans, would defer to 
their authority conflicted with the leadership and authority Cuban veterans extended from 
the war into their positions as police. From the perspective of some quartermaster 
employees, the racial makeup and the lack of racial etiquette of the police condemned 
them as incompetent and unfit for duty. One American explained: “My idea is that we 
have got the wrong sort of policemen here, policemen who on any pretext draw revolver 
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or machete, when, as an American understands it, when somebody draws a revolver, 
somebody is to be killed.”710 The implication in this testimony was that it was 
unacceptable for black police officers to wield weapons, because they would use them 
irresponsibly. 
Americans perceived race as a bond that unified the police with the working class 
and poor—against people they deemed as respectable (whites). On top of a racially 
heterogeneous police force, was a large black working class residing within the city 
center. In fact, the Office of the Captain of the Port, where Captain Barker and his 
employees worked, was located within the historically black neighborhood of Marsillán, 
peppered with the humble abodes of black port workers and members of one of the most 
powerful labor organizations in the island, at the heart of which was the predominantly 
black stevedore union. Havana, for example, was home to a significant labor movement, 
including stevedores, but many of the labor leaders in Havana were white, and the police 
officers were almost exclusively white, by order of General William Ludlow.
711
 In 
Santiago, on the other hand, the police force was decidedly multi-racial, but the labor 
movement seems not to have been as effective in paralyzing commerce through strikes as 
stevedores in Cienfuegos were.
712
 Cienfuegos had both a black police force and a militant 
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black labor union, which Americans suspected would lead to collaboration between the 
supposed agents of order and the sector of the population judged as “lawless.”  
Some Americans in Cienfuegos shared these negative impressions of the police. 
They viewed the Cuban police as incompetent and in need of American guidance. “The 
natives are naturally a quiet, inoffensive people, easily controlled,” reported C.J. Stevens, 
of the 10
th
 Infantry. Americans, especially Stevens and Wilson observed that Oropesa 
was an ineffective chief, doubting his ability to “keep his force in hand.” Military 
officials had ordered the police to only use their firearms in case of emergency, “but on 
one occasion they became excited and used their revolvers unnecessarily and wounded 
and unoffending Chinaman.”713 Stevens attempted to explain the propensity to fire by the 
police in terms of the natural physical limitations of the Cuban man. “The Cuban being 
physically weaker than the American, has felt himself at a disadvantage and in 
consequence has been too prone to use his revolver.”714 The few incidents of police 
shooting in early 1899 combined with the prejudices Americans held against Latin and 
black races continued to inform their negative views of Oropesa and his men.  
 Barker and Stevens were not alone in doubting the capabilities and motives of the 
municipal police. Men who opposed the transfer of local power to the separatists, mainly 
Spaniards, Americans and some Autonomists, tended to depict law enforcement as 
criminals and persecutors of non-separatists. One anonymous man, who only identified 
himself as “A Mexican,” claimed that Cuban veterans in their capacity as police would 
persecute Spaniards, while turning a blind eye to infractions committed by their allies. He 
                                                 
713
 C.J. Stevens to Adjutant General, 6 May 1899, Box 7, No File, RUSA/RG 395/E 1331. 
714
 C.J. Stevens, “Report on the Municipal Police of the Department,” September 5, 1899, Box 21, File 
8062, RUSA/RG 395/E 1331. 
  
291 
 
protested the order issued by General Bates that the police would disarm the population 
and collect all the loose arms from the towns. Even though they knew of all the houses 
storing guns and the locations of the weapons caches, the police were sure to disarm only 
the Spaniards, because “that is what benefits them.” The Spaniards, argued the Mexican, 
many of who had served in the Spanish forces defending the city, should be allowed to 
maintain their arms, while the Cubans should not be allowed to maraud about “the towns, 
armed, as if they were in battle.”715 Many Americans, autonomists, Spaniards and other 
foreign residents in Cuba rejected separatist authority after the war, raising the stakes of 
consolidating power for those in office. 
These charges may have reflected the persistence of war-time political cleavages 
in forging and interpreting social alliances under American rule. Veterans were supposed 
to receive preference in employment, and in the police force of Cienfuegos, the 
employees represented a microcosm of the Brigade of Cienfuegos, operating under their 
war-time leader, Oropesa. Moreover, Cuban veterans, whether they obtained employment 
in the police force or among the day laborers, harnessed war-time social networks to 
reinforce their positions vis-à-vis the Americans. Many of the unpaid laborers had fought 
for Cuban independence, and recognized in the police force a group of compatriots, 
companions in arms. The fact that the police had also received intermittent salaries if at 
all, most likely made them sympathize even more with the laborers, to whom Barker 
unlawfully denied pay. The patronage relationships that seemed to link the agents of 
order to the agents of disorder concerned the Americans. Indeed, this was one of the 
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principal problems of employing veterans in positions of authority after the war: the 
structures of loyalty and patronage and the hierarchies of power in effect during the war 
would result in partiality in the administration of public affairs. 
From the perspective of some American officials in Cienfuegos, the inclusion of 
black veterans and the supposed racial inferiority of the Latin race more generally 
condemned the police force to incompetence. Because the police were incapable of 
preserving order, reasoned some Americans, the military would have to continue 
occupying the island to protect property interests, many of which themselves were 
American. The May Riot and the San Juan Day Riot demonstrated to Americans that 
their mission of pacification and civilization was yet incomplete, and that they needed to 
remain in Cuba. 
 
Turning the Tables on Civilization: Conflict and Discourses of Savagery 
 
As Americans viewed the San Juan Day riot as confirming the necessity of their 
civilizing mission in Cuba, Cuban civil authorities saw the riot as yet another example of 
the abuse and moral deficiency of an unwanted occupier. In the aftermath of the riot, 
Cubans called into question the very premise of the American military intervention: that 
Cubans were savage, uncivilized, and unfit for self-rule. Instead, Cuban leaders found 
these very same traits in the behavior of the occupiers. The violent encounter of San Juan 
Day functioned to expose the contradictions of the American monopoly on civilization, 
and to further undermine the legitimacy of the military occupation, at least among certain 
circles in Cienfuegos. 
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Civil authorities sharply criticized the actions of the Americans during the San 
Juan Day Riot, arguing that the lack of discipline, sexual and moral licentiousness, and 
wanton violence against an unarmed civilian population were acts of savagery. The 
mayor, for example, criticized the inappropriate and threatening behavior of the 
American officers. Immediately after the riot mayor Frías encountered Captain Benham, 
one of the parties to the disturbance, who threatened to “clear the street,” using the two 
companies under his command. Mayor Frías recalled that “there was no one present 
except myself and the American officers to hear what occurred, and the words were said 
to threaten me.”716 By threatening the civil authorities, the Americans exhibited “an 
attitude of domination or superiority,” that “too frequently characterized the behavior” of 
American regiments in Cuba.
717
 In so doing, they tarnished the supposedly benevolent 
mission of civilization they represented. 
If verbal disrespect were not enough, American soldiers and officers also shot at 
Cuban authorities. When the Chief of Police, Joaquín Oropesa
718
 approached the train 
station to investigate, the American soldiers shot at them. He retreated, and met 
Lieutenant José Antonio Álvarez, who spoke some English. He crossed the street and 
asked the American officer, Caitlin to cease fire: “That the firing should be stopped at 
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once, as it was something that should not happen in a civilized country.” The American 
officer ordered his men to stop firing, but the soldiers continued to shoot.
719
 
Police Chief Oropesa criticized the lack of control Captain Caitlin asserted among 
his men, who were called in to “restore order.” He related his confrontation of Caitlin 
after his men had shot into the crowd from their posts at the train station. After being 
repelled by the gunfire of the picket of American soldiers, “finally I succeeded to enter 
the courtyard and spoke to Captain Catlin to whom I questioned why they behaved so 
savagely against a defenseless people…”720 If the Americans, who upheld themselves as 
the model of civilization, were savages, then the legitimacy of the American occupation 
was severely tarnished. 
While Oropesa characterized the Americans as savages, the local press 
emphasized their incompetence, the same charge that Americans hurled at the Cubans. 
“Mr. Oropesa was compelled to struggle with an American sergeant to impede the firing, 
seeing as Captain Caitlin said that he did not order firing, to which the Chief of Police 
replied—that this was not discipline, that he was incapable of command.”721 Claims of 
American incompetence for command further undermined the premise of the military 
occupation by highlighting that Americans experienced the same failures as did Cubans. 
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Other newspaper articles focused on the immorality of certain Americans. One 
article posed a cogent question: What was Fenton doing near a brothel? Indeed, that is 
what his wife and acquaintances back home in the United States wanted to know when 
they saw newspaper reports of connecting Fenton to charges of drunken and disorderly 
conduct and presence in brothels. Fenton wrote to Commanding General of Matanzas and 
Santa Clara, James H Wilson, pleading that he intervene to correct the false reports: “I 
have the honor to request you, unofficially and as a personal favor, in view of the 
distorted press reports regarding my actions […] that you write a personal letter to 
General Henry M Duffield.” Fenton hoped that General Wilson would clear his name: 
“tell him that there are no charges or evidence against me of drunkenness or of being in a 
house of prostitution, or any disturbance connecting me with either drunkenness or 
visiting bawdy houses.” The newspaper articles about his involvement in disreputable 
activities were enough to “seriously interfere with my relations at home.”722 The charges 
of immorality against one of the key military officials in Cienfuegos did more than worry 
his wife. The accusations inverted the moral hierarchy by depicting the American as a 
licentious and drunken sinner—unfit indeed to instill in Cubans the values of civilization. 
The immorality of American men became a central theme in Cuban criticism of the 
American occupation, highlighting the contradictions of the American claim to 
civilization. 
Cuban men in Cienfuegos, regardless of color or occupation, viewed the 
American presence as a menace to their authority, and the abuses and impunity of 
drunken and disorderly Americans as a threat to their honor, though they acted on theses 
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suspicions to varying degrees. Indeed, in May and June 1899, Cubans were again united 
against a common enemy: the United States. Wealthy white civil authorities defended 
underpaid black police, who in turn came to the rescue of impoverished urban residents, 
including prostitutes. The bonds of patriotism uniting Cubans across racial and class lines 
caused antagonism between Cuban authorities and American military officials, who 
clashed as each defended his right to supreme authority. Yet, Americans worried that this 
alliance would cause more that tension with military authorities. The relationships of 
patronage forged during the war, and the patriotism that bound civil authorities to the 
defense of their population undermined the colonial social hierarchy that guaranteed the 
wealth of the few through the obedient labor of the masses. Indeed Cubanidad, 
Americans claimed, undermined the social order. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In May and June 1899, Cuban police intervened in local disturbances on behalf of 
impoverished local residents against Americans, the self-proclaimed representatives of 
civilization and order. Operating under the assumption of their moral and racial 
superiority over Cubans, American military authorities intervened in local affairs to quell 
local disturbances by violently suppressing the masses and disarming and arresting the 
police. Cubans vehemently protested the abuses of their authority, leading to a direct 
confrontation between Cuban civil authorities and American military authorities. Each 
side claimed to be offended by the behavior of the other, and each claimed that they were 
the best equipped to handle the disturbances. Each riot began with Americans abusing 
Cuban of the lower classes, workers and prostitutes, and ended with the most 
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“respectable” residents defending them against the Americans. Cubans had once again 
united against a common enemy: the Americans. Just like they had during the war, 
Cubans transcended the boundaries of race, class, and respectability to protect their 
fellow compatriots against the invader. 
Americans perceive the unity of Cubanidad as a threat their supreme control over 
local affairs. Yet, the conflicts were indicative of a broader problem: Americans stood 
little chance of dominating the island if the civil authorities responded to the needs and 
demands of the masses. According to the Americans, the masses were not only radical, 
but dangerous and unreasonable. Their patriotic demands for immediate independence 
and racial justice—the main goals of the separatist movement—proved to be too 
revolutionary for the future Americans imagined for Cuba. Although Americans initially 
expressed this apprehension in the form of direct confrontation and antagonism with the 
Cubans, they soon realized that social and political fragmentation just beneath the surface 
of Cuban unity provided the solution for winning over Cuban authorities. By linking the 
maintenance of racial order with the ability to self-govern, Americans drew upon the 
uneven adherence to the twin goals of the revolution, driving a wedge between those who 
favored independence more than racial equality and those who demanded racial justice as 
part of independence. The following chapters examine the deterioration of this initial 
unity binding separatists together against a common enemy. Cubans civil authorities in 
Cienfuegos changed their approach to American military officials, and the consequences 
this shift had for three principal groups they formerly protected: black veterans, black 
laborers, and the men and women associated with the vice district.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Subjugating Black Urban Authority: 
White Rule, Police Brutality, and the Demise of Racial Brotherhood 
 
However powerful during the riots of May and June were, the cross-racial, cross-
class alliance against American abuses of local authority soon began to show signs of 
turmoil. This cooperation between predominantly white Cuban civil authorities, the 
racially heterogeneous veterans of the police force, and the predominantly black residents 
of the urban peripheries had caused significant tension between Cubans and Americans. 
In a time when many Spaniards, Autonomists, and foreign residents, not to mention 
American military authorities, doubted the legitimacy of separatist authority, local 
politicians began to understand that continued alliance with the black masses jeopardized 
their claims to power. 
In the early days of the military occupation, Cubans like mayor José Antonio 
Frías, resented and vehemently rejected American intervention in civil affairs. The heated 
animosity resulting from the series of violent conflicts between Cubans and Americans 
did not, however, help consolidate separatist authority, but rather threatened it. The 
racially-heterogeneous municipal police force, depicted by critics as criminal conspirators 
rather than agents of order, was a key source of conflict between American military 
officials and Cuban civil authorities in Cienfuegos. American authorities disparaged the 
police, leading to a series of racially-motivated conflicts between the Quartermaster 
employees and the Cuban police. Americans interpreted the conflicts as yet another 
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symptom of Cuban incompetence for self-government. After the impassioned war of 
words following the San Juan Day riot, civil authorities concluded that antagonism with 
American authorities was unproductive and threatened to extend the period of military 
rule. 
Between June 1899 and the end of American rule, Cuban civil authorities in 
Cienfuegos transformed the ways they approached the American military presence. They 
attempted collaboration with the military government as a strategy to diffuse tensions 
with Americans, and ultimately to demonstrate their capacity to self-govern. 
Collaboration with American authorities required Cuban civil authorities to transform 
their relationship with urban residents. Instead of continuing to protect the people as they 
had in the early days of the occupation, the authorities began to see in the racially-
heterogeneous poor and working classes another enemy—the reason the Americans had 
not relinquished control over the island. Cuban authorities in Cienfuegos turned to the 
arms of government and law enforcement to suppress this social and political threat, 
leading to increased violence against the urban poor, among who were many black 
veterans. Collaborating with the Americans meant a fundamental transformation of the 
goals of Cuba Libre, as racial brotherhood was transformed into a critical component of 
the struggle for independence into the principle obstacle to achieving this goal. 
Civil authorities increasingly placated American criticism of the racial 
composition of the police force by transforming it into a repressive force. Through 
changes in personnel and policy, the police force was transformed into a more 
conservative white institution, a potent symbol of the Cuban capacity to maintain order. 
This transformation severed the ties binding the police to the urban working class and 
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poor, absolving civil authorities of the link to the unruly masses. As the police force 
transitioned from a protector of the people to a repressive force, the burden of repressive 
violence fell disproportionately upon the predominantly urban black masses. This chapter 
documents the transformation of the police force and several instances of police violence, 
showing that racially-motivated hiring practices had real consequences for residents of 
Cienfuegos.
723
 
 
“The Trumpet of Cuban Dignity”: Political Criticism in the Radical Press 
 
“In undefined political situations like the one the Cuban people are going through 
when the future fate of a country is doubted, lowly characters, men lacking honor who 
reduce their aspiration to support the faction with the highest probability of success, 
emerge like a disgusting mud from an overflowing river…” This passage appeared in the 
introduction of an article titled “Against all the Tyrants,” in the Cienfuegos newspaper La 
Tribuna, the self-proclaimed “trumpet of Cuban dignity,”724 between the May and June 
riots. The author likened the Cuban who collaborated with the Americans to a dog, who, 
“awaiting the scraps, licks the hand of the one who beats him, if he is willing to throw 
him a bone.”725 While the author of the above news article sharply criticized American 
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military authorities, who they claimed believed themselves “owners and masters of the 
land,” the weight of condemnation fell heaviest on Cubans who collaborated with the 
American military authorities.
726
 
The author, José B. Alemán, a prominent Cuban veteran, wrote the article in 
response to another article published in the New York Herald by a Cuban criticizing the 
radical content of La Tribuna. Alemán proudly assumed the title of agitator that his 
opponent had launched at him, claiming that he would continue to struggle tirelessly 
against the American tyranny and for the absolute independence of Cuba. In this article, 
Alemán highlighted a key division within what had seemed during the May and June riots 
as a unified coalition of Cubans against American abuses. Even though civil authorities 
rejected American presumptions of superiority and impunity, this position did not 
necessarily indicate that they favored immediate and absolute independence, as Alemán 
demanded. 
The radical press in Cienfuegos actively condemned American abuses of 
authority, and chastised Cubans perceived as collaborators of the military occupation. 
After the San Juan Day Riot, discontent regarding the response of civil authorities to 
American abuses again graced the pages of local newspapers, foreshadowing the 
widening gulf between interests of the masses and those of the men in power. Public 
opinion, captured in the local press, not only denounced the American abuses, but also 
chastised local authorities for, what was perceived as their insufficient militancy against 
American domination.  
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The local press indicted civil authorities for not taking a firmer stance against the 
Americans. Failure to punish the Americans with sufficient zeal to satisfy the public was 
interpreted in some of the more radical newspapers as betraying the nation. “They would 
sell their honor and dignity for the lucrative position offered them in exchange for 
becoming the evil gravediggers of our independence on the altars of which three 
generations of Cubans have sacrifices themselves […] a constant threat to the public 
tranquility, taking the good care to silence the excesses committed by American soldiers 
who stumble along the streets, who attacked the police, who fired against a defenseless 
population, and who assassinated honorable citizens.”727 While Americans rejected the 
confrontational demeanor of the civil authorities, they sought to silence criticism of their 
actions in the local press. 
When La Tribuna labeled the death of Santa María, who was wounded in the San 
Juan Day shooting, as an “assassination” by the Americans,728 military authorities were 
quick to silence this newspaper. American authorities argued that they “should not permit 
the newspaper to give us trouble,” and directly confronted the editors of La Tribuna.729 
Wilson also prohibited the police from facilitating information about crime to the press. 
This order resulted only in increased antagonism. Several newspapers protested the order. 
The newspaper La Verdad, published an article ridiculing the order as “one of the most 
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original [orders] we have ever known,” and lamenting the sorry fate of “disgraceful” 
regimes that “have to ally themselves with obliged silence.”730 La Tribuna, 
unsurprisingly, also ran a taunting reply, titled, “Boberías, Señor!” (Foolishness, Sir). 
“We are a little bit too old, unfrightenable and convinced of…..well….that we don’t care, 
you know,” read the article jeeringly.731 The intense criticism of the American 
intervention in the local press revealed a divergence between the demands of two groups 
of separatists: one that demanded immediate and absolute independence, and the other 
that sought to negotiate with and even appease the American occupier. 
While the American authorities censored the press, the civil authorities implicated 
themselves in the imperial project through their own inaction and complicity in with 
American abuses. The accusations of complicity with the military occupation levied by 
La Tribuna indeed resulted in some political struggles in which certain civil officers were 
accused of condoning and even agreeing with the radical demands voiced in that 
newspaper. The accusers aimed to undermine the legitimacy of their political opponents 
by labeling them as radicals and anti-Americans, leading to a public rejection of 
radicalism among civil authorities.
732
 
Critics pointed to the disbandment of the Cuban army as yet another example of 
the betrayal of the Cuban cause by civil authorities: “And nobody forgets that they were 
the first to sing the victory song when they saw the Cuban turn in his triumphant arms to 
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the ragamuffin who conserved his own, virgin from struggle, and who had never heard 
the whistle of a bullet.”733 The perceived failures of the civil authorities indicated a 
broader pattern in American occupied Cienfuegos: the increasing complicity—even 
collaboration—of civil authorities with the Americans. 
 The criticisms levied not only Americans, but the very Cuban civil authorities, 
though subtle in the aftermath of the May and June riots, foreshadowed an increasing 
divergence in the interests of those in power and the original goals of Cuba Libre. “It is 
necessary to have descended to the lowest rung of human degradation, to allow space in 
the brain to the vile idea of selling the adored land in which lies the ashes of our elders, as 
if it were a commodity subject to selfish mercantile transactions,” read one article 
critiquing the civil authorities.
734
 Articulating the gulf between the ideals of the 
revolution and the actions of local authorities, the radical press admonished the public to 
“Let those evil ones continue their work, but do not forget that Cubans are free men, that 
they put their honor and dignity before all and above all, and that they would happily die 
before being sold like miserable slaves to a foreign nation.”735 The sharp criticism of the 
perceived alliance between civil authorities and American military authorities in the local 
press suggested diverging expectations about the way Cubans should negotiate their 
contentious relationship with the invaders. As civil authorities sought to distance 
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themselves from these radical political demands, they began to ally themselves more 
explicitly with the occupation, and distance themselves from the masses. 
 
Making the Police Respectable: Whiteness, Fear, and Legitimacy 
 
In order to bolster their claims to respectability and legitimacy, civil authorities 
sought to sever their allegiance to the masses. The municipal police force posed one of 
the most significant obstacles to this goal, because American authorities presumed that 
the racial heterogeneity of the force naturally inclined them to ally themselves with the 
masses. Moreover, the police force was a crucial instrument of government, because it 
was the guarantor of order, and as such, represented the Cuban capacity to self-govern. 
This assumption was often at the root of conflicts between Cuban civil authorities and 
American military officials. Civil authorities endeavored to transform the police force 
from what Americans saw as a racially degenerate agent of disorder into a respectable 
institution that guaranteed order and stability. 
Although no explicit orders were given to whiten the police force of Cienfuegos, 
American officials agreed that the men at that moment employed were not the best-suited 
for the position. Implicit in the assessment of the Cienfuegos police force was a demand 
for change in the personnel. Nevertheless, this would make sense given the horrified 
American reactions to black municipal police in Cienfuegos, and especially because other 
Cuban cities developed similar policies of racial exclusion for law enforcement bodies. 
In Havana, General Ludlow was known to have prohibited the employment of 
people of color in the police force. Informing this policy were contemporary racial 
discourses that linked civilization, modernity and progress to “order,” and to whiteness. 
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The idea of order implicitly signaled racial hierarchy, in which whites occupied the most 
prestigious and power social positions and blacks and other people of color were to be 
controlled, subservient to the white—“knowing their place” in the social hierarchy. 
The police force, being one of the most important institutions of order, in turn, 
had to be composed of whites, who were believed to be the most orderly elements in 
society. “In the police force,” recollected Esteban Montejo, a former runaway slave and 
Cuban veteran, “there was not even one percent blacks, because the Americans got the 
word out that when the black man had power (cogiera fuerza), when he became 
education, he was harmful to the white race. In that way the black man was completely 
separated.” Nor were the Americans the only ones with whom this sentiment resonated. 
“The Cubans of the other race kept quiet, did not do anything, and that is how the 
situation stayed.”736 White police would be more vigilant in protecting the public order, 
and more disposed to punish the disorderly elements, who were most frequently believed 
to be people of color. In contrast, and considering the examples of riots and public 
disturbance in the first months of the military occupation in Cienfuegos, a police force 
composed of people of color would tend to be more sympathetic toward disorderly 
elements, especially those of color, thereby encouraging, and even fomenting disorder.  
Not everyone agreed with this assessment, however. In the aftermath of the war, 
many people of color began to question this implicit link between order and whiteness. 
“In the Island of Cuba the preoccupation of races and of colors is transformed until being 
confused in general with the repairs taking place in civilized countries of differences in 
culture and social status, the colored race is the part of the population that possesses the 
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best elements of information by being intimately mixed with all of the private acts of 
families.”737 According to this critique of the policy of hiring whites to staff the police 
force, blacks were better suited than whites because blacks better than whites were 
familiar with the most intimate parts of private life of both white and black families. 
After all, blacks occupied the majority of domestic positions, such as midwives, domestic 
servants, cooks, coach drivers, seamstresses, laundresses, not to mention most 
occupations of manual labor.
738
 By hiring only whites as police “they have excluded from 
its midst the class [of people] best informed of all the individual particularities of our 
population. It is known that there is not a single family that does not have as confidants 
people of the colored race.”739 
Implicit in the critique of racial hiring policies in the police force were 
fundamental disagreements about the purpose of that law enforcement body. Whereas 
local authorities increasingly believed that the police should protect propertied interests, 
poor and working-class urbanites, among who were many black veterans saw the police 
as protectors of the people, and agents of justice. A police force composed mainly of 
white men would likely not defend the interests of the racially heterogeneous working 
classes.  A white police force served no other purpose than decoration: “In its actual 
composition, the Police [Force] seems more destined to be a public ornament than to the 
exact discharge of its functions.”740 A white police force demonstrated the Cuban 
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authorities subscribed to and obeyed prevailing discourses of criminality linking 
blackness to a predisposition for crime. 
While critics of the policy of whitening the police force were skeptical that whites 
would be better agents of order than blacks, American military authorities were assured 
that  so-called “improvements in personnel” of the police force would ensure that the 
police force “will prove equal to all demands placed upon it.”741 The predictions of both 
the critics and the American authorities were well founded. With the transformation of 
the police force, no significant change in the level of order in the city of Cienfuegos 
resulted. Nevertheless, the types of disturbances that occurred from the second half of 
1899 onward, were, according to American military authorities, more “acceptable” forms 
of violence—that is, they targeted black men who more closely fit the image of 
criminality, rather than white Americans.
742
 
Through violent repression of the black masses, the police force came to define 
itself not as the defenders of the people, but as the guarantors of the status quo, and a 
potent instrument of state control. Violence against blacks, particularly black veterans 
served to consolidate the rejection of radicalism, a political tendency tied to militant 
separatists and blacks that had threatened to undermine the legitimacy of Cuban 
authority. The growing racist current in local political appointments showed up in the 
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“repressive and markedly racist character” of the police force.743 One of the early markers 
of this shift in the policies of the Cienfuegos police force was the assassination of a black 
General of the Liberating Army, Dionisio Gil. 
 
From Defenders of the People to Murderers: The Assassination of Dionisio Gil 
 
The afternoon of December 29, 1899, black Dominican-born veteran Dionisio Gil 
entered Fonda Mariposa, one of his preferred cafés in the Cienfuegos city center, just as 
he had grown accustomed to doing in the months after the war. During his visit, the city 
Sanitary Inspector, Enrique Quintana entered the establishment, demanding that the 
owner, Chinese man Antonio Achón, to make some repairs and clean the patio. 
Overhearing the dispute between the owners of the café and the Sanitary Inspector, Gil 
interposed that imposing the cost of repair on the tenants constituted “an abuse,” because 
the responsibility should lie with the property owners.
744
 
According to some witnesses, Gil assumed “an aggressive insolent attitude in 
words and manner towards Quintana.”745 Gil declared that “he was General Gil, with 
whom [the Sanitary Inspector] could not behave as he had with the Chinese man.” 
Quintana replied that he respected him as a patriot, but that he did not recognize him as 
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his boss. Snapping back, Gil proclaimed that “there, there was no other boss but him.”746 
After a brief exchange of words with Gil, Quintana left the Fonda. 
At around nine o’clock the same night, Quintana again encountered Gil, as he 
passed the café, en route to the barbershop. He suddenly felt a hand around his neck, as 
Gil pulled him into the Fonda. Quintana reported that Gil beat him over the head with the 
butt of his revolver, “hitting him in the temple and making him fall to the ground.”747 
With the intervention of several bystanders, Quintana collected himself and managed to 
get to the street where he blew his whistle for help. Gil, too, turned to flee the scene 
toward Velasco Street, when Eduardo Hernández García, a sworn guard from the nearby 
Dos Hermanos plantation, attempted to stop him.
748
 Breaking away from the sworn 
guard, Gil reportedly shot him in the gut. Gil fled to the northeast, running across a police 
officer Antonio Hernández on Hernán Cortés Street at Vives.
749
  According to one report, 
when Hernández attempted to detain Gil, the latter shot him in the right leg.
750
 Gil fled 
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northeast, along the railroad line, toward the outskirts of the city. Police chief Joaquín 
Oropesa ordered his force to capture Gil.
751
 
 Initial reports justified the shooting as self-defense. General James H. Wilson 
admitted in his report on February 3 that “The first and official [version] is that Gil was 
killed, after committing crimes against the peace of the community, by the police while 
resisting arrest.”752 As police pursued Gil, Sergeant Agustín Rabasa and police chief 
Joaquín Oropesa claimed, Gil had fired three shots at the approaching policemen without 
wounding them, and Rabasa fired in self-defense from his horse.
753
 According to Captain 
F.J. Kernan, if indeed Gil shot at the police, then “the killing is justifiable and all should 
be at [la]rge.”754 Most initial reports on the shooting, based on preliminary questioning of 
the police, justified the killing as self-defense and exculpated the police. 
Some local residents contested the claims that the police were innocent and had 
acted in self-defense. General José Braulio Alemán, the President of the Center for 
Veterans highlighted a number of inaccuracies in the official version of events. Alemán 
addressed the Judge of Instruction in a published newspaper, asserting that Gil had 
actually turned himself in to the police and handed over his weapon peacefully, and listed 
a half dozen witnesses who saw Gil securely in police custody before his death. Gil had 
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not resisted arrest, and the police had not acted in self-defense; they, particularly officer 
Rabasa, had murdered Gil.
755
 
 
Map 3: Events Leading to Assassination of Dionisio Gil, December 1899.  
 
 
Subsequent investigation followed the leads Alemán indicated in his article, 
exposing a plot to cover up police culpability in the murder.
756
 After evading the first 
police officer, Gil did flee northeast out of town. But, contrary to preliminary reports, Gil 
did surrender to police when they confronted him in the north margins of the city. A 
mulatto police officer, Rogelio Celada, and his partner, the white man José Vázquez 
Carreras spotted him on Hernán Cortés Street at Gazel Street. Celada gave him the “alto.” 
--“It is I, General Gil.” 
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--“Will you surrender?” 
--“If you are Cubans, you can advance.”757 
Celada with his partner approached, informing Gil that he was being detained and to turn 
over his weapons. Gil complied, uttering “in a moment of obfuscation, that he had 
wounded the individuals, but that he would go with them because they were Cubans, so 
they could bring him to the station.”758 Having surrendered his pistol, Gil in the custody 
of Celada and Vázquez proceeded back on the same street toward town. They 
encountered a group of police including José Morales, José Fernández and Policarpo 
Lafont, “looked like a white man” all of whom confirmed that Gil went peacefully in 
police custody.
759
 
After walking for ten minutes, they saw a figure at some distance before them: 
Police Sergeant Agustín Rabasa on horseback. Officer Vázquez approached and 
“reported the arrest of Gil, whereupon” Rabasa “rode forward to the prisoner, inquired 
who it was, and on receiving from Gil a reply that it was he, Gil, thrust a revolver in the 
latter’s face and firing killed the prisoner instantly.”760 Subsequent investigation 
confirmed that Rabasa shot Gil point blank, because of the horizontal angle of the entry 
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wound.
761
 The bullet entered Gil just below his left eye, fracturing his cranium and killing 
him “like a lightning bolt.”762 Witnesses noted that Gil had placed his hand “in a 
deprecating manner resting on Rabassa [sic]” right before the later shot him in the face. 
In an attempt to cover up his crime, Rabasa ordered Celada to fire several shots 
from Gil’s revolver, which he had in his hand. “Celada refused and threw the pistol from 
him, whereupon someone picked it up fired several shots and subsequently place it in or 
near the dead man’s hand.”763 When Sergeant Duval arrived on the scene, Rabasa 
admitted killing Gil. Several other men from the police force appeared on the scene, 
including chief Oropesa, and jail warden Pablo Hernández, asking who had killed the 
prisoner. “I was the one who killed him,” replied Rabasa.764  
The testimony of several witnesses revealed that police sought to cover up the 
murder through an elaborate plot designed to give the appearance that Gil had resisted 
arrest. Oropesa and Hernández, who by all reports arrived last to the scene of the crime, 
reported that they were out searching for Gil, when they heard four or five shots fired one 
block away. He proceeded to the place where he heard the shots and saw Gil lying dead, 
Rabasa, Celada and Vázquez standing over him. Chief Oropesa told authorities that when 
he inquired what had happened, that “one of the party, Celada it is thought, answered, 
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‘He was firing at us and we had to kill him.’”765 Celada recanted this statement, claiming 
that he had been forced to sign a statement without knowing what was contained therein. 
José Morales also reported that he had been pressured to make a statement to exonerate 
the police. 
The investigation following the article published by Alemán cast light on the 
changes occurring not only within the police force, but in the dynamics of the 
relationship between the men in power and the masses. After the investigation revealed 
the culpability of Rabasa, he was arrested, tried, and found guilty of murder.
766
 He was 
sentenced to 14 years, 8 months and one day in confinement, indemnification in the 
amount of 5,000 pesos to the family of the late General, and the payment of one-third of 
the costs of legal proceedings.
767
 Despite the guilty verdict, residents of Cienfuegos 
rallied around the death of Gil as a sign of ominous change in the corrupted objectives 
and repressive strategies of local government. Public protest in the wake of the 
assassination highlights the widening gap between the visions of social order of civil 
authorities and those of poor and working-class Cienfuegos residents. 
 
Public Responses to Police Brutality 
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The day after the murder, masses of urban dwellers crowded into the Center for 
Veterans to protest. Prominent veterans, including Bartolomé Masó, Jesús Rabí, and José 
Miró Argenter had arrived from eastern Cuba and gathered in the Center for Vterans to 
address the crowd.
768
 The crowd demanded that the body of the deceased Dominican 
General be turned over to them for embalming, guarding and burying it with honors.” 
Both civil and military authorities emphasized the racial dynamics of the protest. 
Mayor Frías reported considerable agitation among the negroes of the city, labeling the 
crowd of protestors as the “worst classes [of] colored people.” When the courts refused to 
turn over the body, and upon the arrival of Masó and Rabí, “the same colored classes 
made cries in the streets.”769 F.J. Kernan, who was sent to investigate the matter, worried 
that the racial tensions resulting from the murder would lead to disorder.
 770
 Indeed, 
people of African descent across, along with veterans and other residents from the poor 
and working classes in Cienfuegos mobilized to protest the racially motivated police 
brutality and violence against blacks in the aftermath of Gil’s death. 
 Frías assured military officials that civil authorities were competent to ward off 
disaster without military intervention: “Police preserved order, and [the] Generals and I 
recommended people to disperse immediately. Police with modification will preserve 
order, avoiding alteration of [the] public order,” Frías communicated in a redundant and 
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frantic telegram to military authorities.
771
 He pressured the prominent insurgent chiefs at 
the Center for Veterans to disperse the crowd of protesters, which they obediently did.
772
 
While Masó gave a speech promising to take the greatest care in the situation, other 
insurgent chiefs demanded justice, then told the protesters to disperse. Alemán, seconding 
the previous speeches, ordered the people to return to their homes.
773
 
Instructions from respected veterans to disband the crowd of protesters 
highlighted the exact set of circumstances that had motivated the murder. Whereas 
Americans initially viewed all veterans with distrust because of their tendencies toward 
solidarity, certain distinguished veterans, namely, those in positions of power, began to 
distance themselves from the rowdy masses. Instead of reinforcing their ties of loyalty to 
all veterans by defending their interests, veterans in positions of power sought to defend 
their own advantageous positions, while advancing the Cuban claim to sovereignty. They 
did this by presenting themselves as just before the public, while repressing public 
display of discontentment. By urging the protesters to disband, Alemán and his fellow 
political elites presented themselves as agents of order before American authorities. 
The eagerness of the prominent white veterans to disperse the black protesters 
highlighted shifting allegiances among Cuban veterans. Prominent white veterans like 
Alemán, Miró, and Masó collaborated with civil authorities in Cienfuegos to silence and 
disperse black veterans, whose agitation, they knew, would likely provoke American 
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intervention as it had in May and June. In dispersing the protesters, civil authorities and 
white veterans showed a keen awareness and sensitivity toward what they perceived as 
American racial views. 
Cuban authorities became aware prevailing racial views in correspondence with 
military authorities, who conveyed essentially that Gil was no more than a common 
criminal. Cuban veterans including the General Máximo Gómez portrayed Gil as a hero, 
who “honorably defended the liberty of this land and moreover, he was a man of color 
who was able to make many friends.”774 Some American military officials disagreed with 
this assessment, summarily condemning Gil based on a series of assumptions about his 
background, service record, and disposition toward criminality. Alpheus Henry 
Bowman,
775
 of the 2
nd
 U.S. Infantry wrote that Gil “seems to have been a disreputable 
character. I knew the man by sight as a fellow without occupation, of questionable 
reputation, and one liable to be engaged in disorder, his killing was an incident of 
disorderly conduct.”776 This comprehensive attack on the character of Gil mirrored 
typical characterizations of blacks as vagrants and criminals, and likely reflected an 
attempt to justify the initial narrative of events blaming Gil for his own death. 
                                                 
774
 General Máximo Gómez to General Leonard Wood, March 1, 1900. Courtesy of Orlando F. García 
Martínez. 
775
 Alpheus Henry Bowman was born in Virginia, his mother and father hailing from Tennessee and 
Virginia, respectively. He moved to the North, residing in Delaware, then Pennsylvania, where he enlisted 
in Union Army in 1861. He was accused of being too lenient toward Confederates, and his regiment was on 
the verge of mutiny early on. Between the American Civil War and his assignment to duty in Cuba, 
Bowman served in a number of battles against Indians on the plains. “Alpheus Henry Bowman,” 
http://freepages.military.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~pa91/pbowma1.html Accessed on November 28, 2012. 
776
 A.H. Bowman, “Reports circumstances attending the Death of General Gil (negro) late of the Cuban 
Army,” 4 January 1900, Box 42, File 136, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
  
319 
 
Bowman also belittled the military achievements of the black General. He 
described Gil as cowardly rather than valiant: “Gil was in the Cuban Army but appears to 
have acquired a reputation as an expert forager rather than a fighter, appropriating 
property without reference to whom it belonged.”777 Bowman depicted Gil as a natural 
criminal exonerated the police from culpability, because it implied that Gil himself was 
responsible for the disorder. By diminishing his service record, Bowman emasculated 
Gil, presenting him as a coward, and unworthy of honorable burial. By depicting Gil as a 
vagrant and coward, Bowman delegitimized the demands of the protestors to honor Gil 
with a decent burial. 
While employing racial stereotypes to legitimize the death of Gil, American 
officials did point to prevailing public perceptions that the murder was racially-
motivated. Bowman dismissed the protesters as black agitators, reporting that “there has 
been a good deal of inflammatory talk among the negroes growing out of Gil’s 
killing.”778 Despite significant discontent among blacks, Bowman claimed that the 
assassination lacked “any significance, political or otherwise.”779 One American official, 
F.J. Kernan, recognized that race was at the core of this tragedy. “Considerable race 
prejudice is involved in this affair,” he stated outright in a report on the murder.780 
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Certainly, the family of the deceased Gil also recognized the prominent role of 
racism in the death of the black General. The eldest son of General Gil, Perfecto Gil, 
wrote to his Dominican compatriot Máximo Gómez, decrying the poor treatment Cubans 
had given his father: “I believe that being my father a general who defended the Cuban 
cause so much, [they] shouldn’t have given him such bad treatment as they have given 
him only because he was black…”781 For Perfecto, the loss of his father was devastating, 
but the lackluster burial was insulting. “Not only did they kill him,” he wrote to Gómez, 
“but also they who treated him like a dog in that [he did] not even [receive] a burial as a 
Liberating General that he was.”782 Perfecto was indignant at the apparent racism which 
had ended the life of his father and disgraced him in death.   
Perfecto turned to the perpetrators of the crime, harnessing the very language with 
which Americans had condemned his father to describe the murderers. According to 
Perfecto, his father was slaughtered upon the orders of Joaquín Oropesa, then police 
chief, and lieutenant colonel of the Brigade of Cienfuegos.
783
 “Only from a bunch of 
bandits could such an assassination be expected.”784 By calling the white police bandits, 
Perfecto undermined the assumption that hiring white men to serve as police would bring 
about more order in the city. These very men—the agents of order—were a bunch of 
outlaws. 
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He denounced the impunity with which the perpetrators were treated: “the 
murderers are walking the streets of Cienfuegos so satisfied, not knowing the crime they 
have committed.”785 Perfecto referred to the release of two of the suspected accomplices 
in the murder, officers Rogelio Celada and José Vázquez. Years later, the release of these 
two men—murderers in the eyes of many—would loom in the public memory.786 
“Unjustly,” Perfecto wrote, “this has been a stain on the Cuban flag.”787 The assassination 
of General Gil had shattered in the minds of many the utopian dream of a colorblind 
Cuban republic. 
 
Indeed, for many Cienfuegos residents, the assassination of a decorated black war 
hero underscored the failure of the revolution to transform the social order in that city, 
and even marked a return to the repression of Spanish rule. Celebrated as an anti-racist 
struggle as much as for its anti-colonial elements, the Cuba Libre movement had vilified 
Spain for promoting racism and racial inequality in Cuba, while exalting the revolution 
for its supposedly equalizing colorblind principles. The discourse of racial brotherhood 
failed to materialize in the aftermath of the war as white veterans in positions of power 
turned their backs on their compatriots in favor of collaboration with the occupying 
forces. In this complicity, civil authorities had allowed, even condoned, the murder of a 
black war hero. 
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A Failed Revolution 
 
The murder of Gil became a national symbol of the failure of the promises of 
independence. In the weeks after the assassination, Captain Pedro P. Mutos and 
Commandant Juan Sardiñas y Villa, both black veterans, published a leaflet titled “To the 
Colored Race, Glory to General Gil” in Havana. Mutos and Sardiñas outlined two 
potential futures for Cuba. The first was that proposed by José Martí, based on equality 
and justice. The second was a republic “for a certain class, for an oligarchy without 
conscience, that gives people more rights for being white than “to us for being black.” 
Mutos and Sardiñas vehemently rejected the second possibility, asserting that “those who 
thus think are sorely mistaken, because with the blood of Aponte, Plácido, Guillermón, 
Crombet, and the Maceos, we say, we can never, ever, whisper ‘coward!’”788 They 
warned that the republic that Cubans were trying to establish was in grave danger. 
For Mutos and Sardiñas, the murder of Gil revealed the racial prejudice upon 
which certain Cuban veterans sought to build the republic. They proposed to make a 
thorough investigation of the assassination of General Gil, “the great Dominican soldier 
who was our pride as he was a humiliation for some Cubans who were before with the 
Spaniards more Spanish than Santiago, and who are today with the Americans more 
American than Washington itself.”789 Like the editors of La Tribuna, Mutos and Sardiñas 
charged Cuban civil authorities with complicity in the American imperialist project. 
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By collaborating with the Americans in establishing a republic for whites, white 
veterans had betrayed the Cuban cause, and more importantly, they had turned their 
backs on the very people who had made victory against Spain possible: black veterans. 
Blacks had in 1897 stood “alone in defending independence while the revolutionary rank 
was dwindling down by the surrender of the timid ones.”790 The republic was theirs as 
much as it was for whites, Mutos and Sardiñas argued: “They speak of union and 
concord, and yet it cannot be conceived that while they embrace the old enemy and 
partake of their pleasures, and while decorate duplicitous patriots without distinction […] 
that belongs to all of us...” Yet, blacks continued to face exclusion: “black generals, 
chiefs, officers and soldiers are starving, and shamelessly removed from positions, for the 
sole reason of being black.” Mutos and Sardiñas identified a pressing, though 
problematic, contradiction, which would become emblematic of the black struggle for 
inclusion in the new republic throughout the twentieth century: if blacks had been the 
main pillar of the Liberating Army, then they should be entitled to an equal share of 
rights and benefits in the emerging republic.
791
 
The assassination of General Gil highlighted a fundamental continuity in the 
experience of black Cubans from before and after the war: marginality. Mutos and 
Sardiñas harnessed the widespread discontent among blacks in Cienfuegos to mobilize a 
national movement against the emerging state racism: “As General Gil rests in eternal 
glory, we in this valley of bastardized and adulterated ambitions [ambiciones bastardas y 
mezquinas], we will always be disposed to die before consenting to be pariahs in our own 
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land.”792 The emphasis on black militancy and willingness to take up arms to secure 
rights, responded to a moment of acute frustration among blacks in Cienfuegos, but may 
have reinforced white fears of radicalism. Members of the black elite in Cienfuegos took 
a more moderate approach, immortalizing the memory of Gil in a monument that spelled 
in cement the immortal link between Cuban patriotism and anti-racism. 
 
Anti-Racism as Patriotism: The Commemoration of Gil 
 
Well after the immediate public outrage of the murder of Gil had subsided, 
prominent black residents of Cienfuegos sought to harness the memory of the black 
General to articulate a dissident vision of Cuba Libre. This vision, similar to the one 
articulated by Mutos and Sardiñas, placed racial equality at the center of Cubanidad. The 
movement to commemorate Gil in Cienfuegos centered on correcting the undignified 
burial by building a mausoleum and constructing a monument in his honor in a park in 
the predominantly black neighborhood in which he was slayed. 
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Image 17: Monument to Dionisio Gil, Cienfuegos
793
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Among those leading this movement was Nicolás Valverde. A member of the 
local black elite of Cienfuegos, Valverde owned a tailor shop in the downtown, and 
published a weekly newspaper in defense of working-class interests. With a long history 
of combating racism in Cienfuegos, Valverde was a prominent figure among the working 
classes and black Cienfuegos residents more generally. At least since 1894, he had 
pushed the boundaries of what was deemed socially acceptable, and protested for racial 
equality.
794
 Later, American military officials would accuse Valverde of conspiring to 
unify blacks into a solid political block in Cienfuegos in 1907.
795
 
Continuing his tradition of activism, Valverde undertook to erect a monument in 
honor of General Gil in the aftermath of this death. This was no easy feat, especially 
considering the resistance and non-cooperation of some members of the city council of 
Cienfuegos.  In October 1901, Valverde wrote to Juan Gualberto Gómez that he had 
“made it easy to see for Figueredo,” the president of the Ayuntamiento. “I recommended 
that he approve the permit to celebrate a bazaar to collect funds for statue to Dionisio 
Gil,” which was to be placed in the middle of a park dedicated to the late General at the 
end of the month. Valverde planned to enhance publicity for his fundraiser by inviting 
prominent black Cubans to speak. He invited Juan Gualberto Gómez, writing that “If you 
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could speak at the party, much good it would do us!”796 The monument as well as the 
quest to secure funds and construct it would serve as a testament to the accomplishments 
and respectability of black Cubans. 
Despite his energy and enthusiasm in mobilizing support for the monument, 
Valverde faced continuous obstacles in his quest to commemorate Gil. Materials, funding 
and the support of the city council were decidedly lacking for the project of dignifying 
the burial of General Gil. Reluctance to support the public commemoration black 
veterans marked a general pattern across the island after the war, part of a broader 
tendency to “whiten” the national pantheon of heroes.797 Earlier in the year, Valverde had 
petitioned the city council to donate some extra tiles that were stored in the building and 
without any use, so they could be used in the construction of the monument. The city 
council denied this request.
798
  In May 1902, Valverde wrote again of holding a bazaar in 
benefit of the statue, this time on “Saturday of Glory,” suggesting that Figueredo did not 
see the issue as clearly as Valverde might have wanted the previous year.
799
 Lack of 
support from the city council meant limited access to money and resources necessary for 
construction, and delayed the construction of the monument. The statue was inaugurated 
a full 11 years later in May 1911, and is the centerpiece in the park called Panteón de Gil 
in the San Lázaro neighborhood of Cienfuegos. 
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As Valverde struggled to secure support for the momument to honor Gil, he 
lodged a formal complaint against Joaquín Oropesa. Public sentiment had steadfastly 
condemned Oropesa as the one who had ordered Gil assassinated. Although Oropesa no 
longer worked as police chief, he continued to exert significant influence in the city, 
becoming the Auditor of the Ayuntamiento. Valverde did not forget that he had acted as 
police chief when Gil was murdered, and like many, he may have held Oropesa 
responsible for the death of the war hero. Valverde accused Oropesa of abusing his new 
position as a member of the city council by living in the Ayuntamiento building without 
prior permission, and discharging a firearm in the courtyard. One of the bullets that 
escaped his gun, Valverde charged, nearly wounded another employee of the 
Ayuntamiento, Julio Dacosta, he claimed.
800
 
The acting mayor, J. H. Hernández, vehemently denied that any disorder had 
occurred in the Ayuntamiento building under his watch.
801
 Dacosta also wrote to 
undermine the accusations, stating that he had never authorized anyone to make a 
complaint on his behalf or to represent him.
802
 Valverde’s complaint was dismissed, and 
neither civil nor military authorities took any action against Oropesa. Although Valverde 
faced significant obstacles in bringing justice to Gil and his family, his civic activism was 
yet another way in which black Cubans contested the increasing marginalization and 
suppression of the poor and working class that they witnessed under American rule. At 
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the same time as Mutos and Sardiñas and Valverde, among other black activists struggled 
to reverse the subordination of racial equality, civil authorities sought to catalyze this 
development. They again turned to the police as a way to bolster their respectability and 
claims to power. 
 
Policing Political Power after the Assassination of Gil 
 
After the San Jan Day Riot, Americans had labeled the police as inept in large 
part due to their perceived defense of the masses. Indeed, General Wilson even urged the 
mayor to fire chief Oropesa, who, he wrote, had “failed to satisfy me of his capacity to 
command such a force.” Wilson seemed to blame Oropesa for the inadequacies of the 
police, arguing that he was “lacking in energy and in the power to enforce discipline.”803 
By October, 1899, Wilson again wrote to the Provincial governor, José Miguel Gómez, 
urging him to dismiss Oropesa as police chief, to which Gomez responded that he 
authorized an investigation.
804
 He recommended—in good accordance with the 
established pattern of appointing educated white veterans to positions of leadership—that 
Higinio Esquerra replace Oropesa as the police chief. Wilson further suggested that the 
rural guard, then under the command of Esquerra, could be collapsed into the police 
force. For Wilson, then, the problem was the police chief, Oropesa. 
 The low opinion of Oropesa held by General Wilson, and his desire to remove 
him from his position as police chief, placed pressure upon him to prove his competence 
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in guarding order. Dionisio Gil threatened order by asserting black authority, and 
Oropesa saw an opportunity to redeem himself and his force for previous shortcomings. 
The shooting, whether justified or not, was sufficient to compel General Wilson to renew 
his recommendation to remove Oropesa immediately. The removal of Oropesa did not 
become urgent, however, until the discovery that Rabasa had murdered Gil, rather than 
shooting in self-defense. Prior to this both military and civil authorities seemed willing to 
dismiss the death of Gil as self-defense on the part of police. 
The militancy of the masses forced further investigation. José B. Alemán found 
himself in a particularly precarious situation as the mediator between the veterans and 
angry masses and the civil authorities. Alemán himself may have thought that the murder 
of Gil was justified and necessary for the preservation of order. In his appeal to the Judge 
of Instruction, he labeled Gil a delinquent.
805
 Nevertheless, he sought to appease the 
masses by demanding an investigation of police brutality, that corroborating the 
suspicions of the public. With the investigation unveiling the police cover-up, military 
authorities saw an opportunity to oust Oropesa. Civil authorities complied. José Miguel 
Gómez directed mayor Frías to remove Oropesa. Instead of consolidating the rural guard 
and municipal police under the leadership of Esquerra, Frías appointed, Juan José 
Campillo y D’Wolf, a member of the Cienfuegos elite, in January 1900.806 Born in 
Cienfuegos in 1872, Campillo had joined the insurrection in 1895 at age 23. He later 
joined the invasion force of Antonio Maceo. 
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Under Campillo, the police clashed with poor and working-class residents of 
Cienfuegos numerous times. Nicolás Valverde wrote of some of the outrages in his 
weekly publication, Ecos Populares. He accused the police of corruption, cowardice and 
physical abuse of prisoners. “There is not a single child of the town capable of being able 
to wear the police uniform with dignity; on the other hand there are for cowards, who 
raise their hand to slap a handcuffed man in the middle of the police station. Valverde 
also accused Campillo of abusing his force, citing an example “when a poor guard enters 
a café for an indispensable need, they apply a fine of two days salary.”807 Campillo 
showed his despotism by mistreating his men, and targeting poor and working-class 
Cubans for police repression. 
Valverde juxtaposed the misconduct of certain police officials with persecution of 
those who denounced crimes or criticized police brutality. “For that cowardly official, 
who abuses his authority, there is no law. On the contrary, to file charges, a witness is 
required of the person who denounces the deed, which seems to us like a way to 
discourage him from following through, because none of the people in that station would 
lend himself to the case, fearing to lose their job.”808 These obstacles to justice ultimately 
hurt the entire town: “in the meantime, the victim is made to appear every fifteen days in 
the station, to mortify him and make him desist in his right as a citizen, to make claims 
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before the tribunals, against that agent of authority who abused so villainously.”809 
Valverde pointed to the parallels between the repression suspects suffered under Oropesa 
and the treatment they receive under Campillo. Although the appointment of Campillo 
was supposed to improve the performance of the police, repression of the poor and 
working class seemed only to grow worse. 
Campillo was at the center of the political struggles surrounding the 1901 
elections, highlighting two diverging strategies for local governance. One the one have, 
Figueroa sought greater collaboration with the Americans, which he fostered through a 
heavy-handed police force headed by Campillo. Gonzalo García Vieta, on the other hand, 
aligned more with the platform for immediate and absolute independence, a position 
much more appealing to poor and working-class urbanites who police under Campillo 
targeted. Figueroa relied on Campillo to rally support for his candidacy in the weeks 
leading up to the elections. One way he accomplished this was by requiring his police 
force to vote for Figueroa. 
Figueroa lost despite efforts to coerce voters in his favor. With his electoral defeat 
of Figueroa, Figueroa sought to punish those who he suspected had not voted for him. He 
ordered the dismissal of 63 municipal police officers police for voting for his political 
opponents. These men were mostly veterans, at least a portion of them black, including 
Inocencio Sarría, José González González, Francisco Fernández, José Bermúdez, and 
Benigno Ortíz. These former police officers wrote in July 1901, complaining that 
Campillo had denounced them to Figueroa, resulting in their dismissal “for the good of 
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the force.” Campillo withheld their pay, as a form of “revenge.” This was only one of 
numerous abuses that Figueroa had committed against them.
810
 
In his last speech to the city council, Figueroa hinted at his motives for dismissing 
the police. After thanking his men, he turned to “the Municipal police, that is to say for 
the chiefs and officers and individuals who today form part of that body,” announcing 
that they deserved similar thanks. He extended his gratitude to them as “a modest but 
very sincere and deserved recompense for the magnificent and commendable behavior 
they have observed in the fulfillment of their delicate duties, in which they have 
recognized exactly the sacred mission they have to fulfill.” Figueroa ended by praising 
the upstanding services of the police, who “have constituted true safeguards of Society 
proceeding always with justice and with the severest energy.”811  Those who no longer 
formed part of the force, Figueroa implied, had not fulfilled their duties in their failure to 
vote for him as mayor. 
The incoming mayor, Vieta, addressed the petition of the fired police officers, 
resulting in significant animosity between him and Campillo. In addition to reinstating 
the dismissed police officers, he ultimately fired Campillo from his office as police chief 
and several policemen who had who favored Figueroa. He replaced the vacant positions 
with men more closely aligned to his political platform, including men who had been 
fired by Figueroa. One of these men had given an inflammatory speech right before the 
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election “denouncing Americans and proclaiming that he was ready to drive them out of 
the Island.” According to Barker, Vieta had made other appointments “equally 
discreditable as this one.”812 
The dismissal of Campillo provoked a public protest against Vieta. Dismissed 
members of the police force gathered in their uniforms to receive Campillo upon his 
arrival at the train station. Vieta ordered one of his police officers, José Miguel Valle, to 
disarm the protesters. As the few remaining police officers collected the weapons of the 
dissenters, Vieta ordered the rural guard from various stations in the province to help 
conserve order in the city until he could re-populate the police force.
813
 The disbandment 
of the public protest in favor of Campillo was only the beginning of the reaction against 
Vieta by supporters of Figueroa. In early July, several residents presented a petition to the 
city council, protesting the dismissal of Campillo and his subordinates. 
The mayor responded to protests by defending his decision to fire Campillo, 
citing “more than enough reason,” for doing so. According to the mayor, “far from 
deserving protest or censure,” the decision “should have been considered as the most 
brilliant, just and necessary act that could ever have been realized…”814 The conflict 
between the mayor and chief Campillo showed a gradual shift in the police force, which 
increasing supported the needs of the military occupation rather than the civil 
government. Vieta had a long list of complaints against Campillo, who he likely 
considered the pawn of his recently-defeated political rival, Figueroa. In a letter to 
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Barker, Vieta enumerated an exhaustive list of 9 reasons Campillo was unfit to serve as 
chief of police. He cited his “violent temper,” which had been abundantly evident in his 
behavior during a legal Valverde had levied against him. Campillo had been known for 
occasionally arresting citizens. Vieta also accused him of appointing men to the police 
force without the approval of the mayor.
815
 Moreover, Campillo allegedly condoned and 
even attended cockfights, which the military government had outlawed at the beginning 
of the occupation.
816
 
One of the most severe indictments Vieta hurled at Campillo was his alleged 
inability to preserve order. “Apart from the revolutionary achievements of Mr. Campillo, 
as police chief, he has failed completely.” According to the mayor, Campillo was 
incapable of maintaining order, as evidenced by the “repeated and unnecessary 
summoning by the previous mayor, Figueroa, of the American military forces, who he 
bothered without cause, and to the detriment of the town, for which the former police 
chief was responsible.”817 Vieta was referring to the protest Figueroa had staged after his 
electoral defeat in June of that year. 
According to Barker, the tension between mayor Vieta and chief Campillo was a 
result of struggles for local political power. At the bottom of everything was Barker’s old 
nemesis, former mayor José Antonio Frías, who had returned to Havana to teach at the 
University of Havana and later to take up a post as senator after being forced to resign in 
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February 1900. According to Barker Frías still exerted influence over politics in 
Cienfuegos, however: “Senator-elect Frías controls the entire administration, including 
the Civil Governor, who at first backed up Campillo, but Frías made him crawl down.”818 
Indeed, José Miguel Gómez wrote to military authorities urging the removal of Campillo 
in March 1902.
819
 Frías opposed Campillo in part due to the instrumental role he played 
in coercing the police force to vote for Figueroa in the 1901 elections. 
Campillo may not have been popular with Frías and Vieta, but he had certainly 
pleased the American military officials. Barker noted that the police chief was well-
connected: “While the private life of the chief of police is not what it should be, he is 
undoubtedly strong with all the best people.”820 According to Barker, Campillo served the 
“better classes,” exactly the goal Americans sought to promote in civil affairs. The strict 
enforcement of urban order, which translated into the suppression of poor and working-
class urbanites that characterized the mission of the police under Campillo had won 
acclaim among wealthy property owners. Edwin F. Atkins even wrote on his behalf, 
assuring military authorities that Campillo held the “respect of the business community of 
Cienfuegos.”821 Elias Ponvert of Hormiguero Central also wrote on behalf of Campillo.822 
Military officials favored Campillo to such a degree that when mayor Vieta 
dismissed him from office, they reinstated him, citing Military Order Number 156 of 
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June 12, 1901. They argued that they had to investigate the complaints before approving 
the dismissal of Campillo. Until then, they re-instated him. When Vieta refused to 
comply, they forced him to resign as mayor. Some local residents vehemently opposed 
the reinstatement of Campillo by military authorities. Roger Frank wrote to Adjutant 
General Hugh L. Scott in mid-July, alerting him to an impending attack upon Campillo. 
A group “composed of the worse [sic] element of this city,” and organized by former 
mayor Frías, Sixto Roque, and one [José] Camacho, would leave on the night train to 
Havana to attack the supporters of Campillo. The police “openly declare that in order to 
disarm them they will have to be killed.”823 Frías, Vieta and others of their political 
coalition disliked Campillo for his support of their opponent, Figueroa, and for his close 
ties to the military authorities.  
American military officials sought to quell the discontent following the election 
of Vieta by replacing him with Higinio Esquerra. He was another prominent white 
veteran who had been the chief of the brigade of Cienfuegos during the war and had 
served as the chief of the Cienfuegos rural guard in the first two years of military rule. 
Although Esquerra was recognized for his military service, the removal of Vieta met with 
considerable discontent, protest and even violence.
824
 
The removal of Vieta could not erase tensions between the Frías faction and the 
Figueroa coalition. During the first weeks that Esquerra was in power, Frías and 
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councilman Rafael Pérez Morales brought charges against Campillo for a dispute over 
police uniforms, Campillo had decided to outfit the police force with new uniforms 
identical to the ones used under Spanish rule, to match the police force of Havana, 
replacing the uniforms of the Cuban army that they had used up until then. When the 
change of police uniforms entered the attention of the city council, they ordered the chief 
to revert to the old uniforms, as they had not authorized the change.
825
 When Campillo 
did not comply with this order, the city council sought to remove him, once again, from 
his post, and dismissed his subordinates as well. Military officials ruled that the city 
council could dismiss the chief, but not the subordinates, because they were not 
responsible for the dispute, and could not have opposed orders from their chief.
826
 
Military authorities eventually restored Campillo to his post after all.
827
  
The tension between the mayor and the police chief highlights a process of 
negotiation between local civil authorities and American military officials in Cienfuegos. 
Whereas military officials disliked Oropesa because of his hostile attitude toward 
Americans during conflicts, Campillo seemed to present the opposite problem. 
Neglecting the defense of the people, Campillo aimed to please American military 
officials by collaborating with them during public disorder. Consequently, American 
military officials tended to defend Campillo, even when he had alienated the city council. 
By the inauguration of the Republic on May 20, 1902, the police force was composed 
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almost entirely of educated, white men, many of whom had been veterans of what had 
once been a colorblind struggle for independence.
828
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the first half of 1899, the multi-racial police force of Cienfuegos clashed with 
American soldiers and civilian employees, the two most violent encounters occurring in 
May and June. Americans pointed to the incompetence of municipal police, especially the 
impropriety of black authority in that force. As municipal authorities assessed their 
ultimate goal of independence in the face of American rule, they realized that 
cooperation, rather than conflict, with Americans would be most conducive to their 
success. Between late 1899 and the end of American rule, Cienfuegos authorities 
attempted to construct a more honorable police force, one that would command the 
respect of white American and that would prove their capacity to self-govern. One of the 
ways they realized this goal was by employing a greater number of respectable citizens—
whites. 
 The transformation of the mission of the Cienfuegos police force from defenders 
of the people to collaborators with the American resulted in tangible changes in the ways 
police interacted with local citizens. An increasing wave of violence against poor and 
working-class citizens of Cienfuegos, especially people of African descent, developed 
over the course of the American occupation. One example of this violence was the 
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assassination of General Dionisio Gil by a white police officer, Rabasa. The murder of 
Gil in December 1899 was an ominous preview of what was to come in free Cuba. The 
racial unity and the war-time goal of racial equality had been tarnish, even discarded, as a 
white veteran killed a black one. Collaboration with Americans in search of 
independence meant that racial equality was not only sacrificed, but that whites began to 
enforce through violence a new version of the colonial racial order. 
 In response to the assassination of the prominent black general, black activists in 
Cienfuegos and across Cuba harnessed the anger of the masses to criticize the increasing 
tide of racism. Dionisio Gil became a national symbol of the failures of the revolution to 
ensure equal opportunity for blacks. While some activists threatened to again take up 
arms to claim rights for blacks, others used civic channels to commemorate Gil through 
patriotic monuments. Both strategies centered on protesting the increasingly exclusive 
concept of Cuban nationality. Activists using both strategies faced significant obstacles in 
disseminating their message, as black militancy consolidated white fears of black 
radicalism, and white control over government funds and resources meant limited support 
for public memorials. 
 At the same time as black activists protested increasing marginalization from 
Cuban nationality in the form of heightened violence and repression by the police, civil 
authorities sought to continue to mold the police force into a respectable institution. Their 
efforts to reform the police force backfired, however. The police chief appointed to 
replace Oropesa showed a growing allegiance to the occupying government, rather than 
to the interests of the 
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 civil government, resulting in acute conflict between police and civil authorities. Even 
though civil authorities chastised the police chief for flouting their authority and for his 
exceedingly intimate ties with military officials, both bodies participated and collaborated 
in the occupying project at the expense of the masses. With Esquerra succeeding Vieta in 
the office of mayor, the opponents of Campillo had been alienated from local 
government. Under Esquerra, civil authorities continued to collaborate with military 
authorities as they had under Figueroa. 
Ironically, the immediate result of the assassination of black General Dionisio Gil 
was the transformation of the police force into an even more repressive institution and the 
rise of socially-conservative men, like Figueroa and eventually Esquerra, into positions of 
civil authority. As black Cienfuegos elites and radical black nationalists sought to harness 
the memory of Gil to demand racial justice, military authorities and their allies in the 
municipal government supported an increasingly narrow vision of Cuba Libre. The next 
chapters examine how Cuban authorities and American military officials enforced this 
vision of Cuban society by targeting and systematically suppressing the poor and 
working-class black urbanites.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Towards a New Racial Geography: 
Rape, Riots and the Regulation of Vice 
 
Between 1900 and the end of the American military occupation, conflicts between 
Americans soldiers and civilians and poor and working-class Cubans occasionally 
escalated into riots in Cienfuegos. Working-class blacks sought to challenge an 
increasingly unfavorable racial order and a hardening color line that followed American 
expansion into Cuba and the emergence of scientific racism into the mainstream of 
Western intellectual thought. One of the ways they protested increasing marginalization 
was through violent exchange in urban riots. 
 Most of the riots exhibited strikingly similar patterns. Most began in 
predominantly poor and working-class black residential areas, often also known for the 
houses of entertainment and prostitution. Riots frequently started when residents and 
neighbors contested American pretensions of unbridled sexual access to Cuban women, a 
subject especially sensitive after a string of brutal rapes perpetrated by Americans in 
1899. Residents and the local press alike branded Americans as sexual predators against 
Cuban women. Despite the recognition of American sexual transgression, most, perhaps 
all of these riots resulted in the suppression of urban black populations. With the rise of 
socially-conservative Leopoldo Figueroa to the office of mayor in early 1900, civil 
authorities began to play a more prominent role in the suppression of black urbanites as 
part of their increasing collaboration with military authorities. In addition to violent 
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repression of urban blacks, civil authorities sought to transform the urban geography to 
redefine the image of the city as respectable before the eyes of the occupying forces. 
Seeking to eliminate the possibilities for conflict between the black urban masses and 
Americans, civil authorities focused on pushing these troublesome populations to the 
urban margins, creating a white, wealthy urban center.  
Having identified the red light district as an area of confrontation and conflict 
between Americans and poor and working-class Cubans, civil authorities sought to 
eliminate the potential for future conflict by moving that zone from the city center to the 
urban margins. Conflict between Cubans and Americans followed the tolerance zone out 
of the city, but Cuban civil authorities responded to the disorders through collaboration 
rather than antagonism with Americans military officials. By examining two riots, the 
Dancehall Riot of 1900, and the Transvaal Riot of 1901, this chapter charts the 
transformation of the racial geography of Cienfuegos during American rule, as civil 
authorities further pursued their policy of collaboration with American military officials. 
With the disturbances and poor, working-class and black populations relegated to the 
urban margins, order and whiteness prevailed in the urban center, supporting the 
contention of the ruling elite that they could indeed maintain order.  
 
“Racha de Salvajada”: Rape, Racial Protest and Questioning Civilization 
  
Protection of women was a central tenant of Cuban manliness. Over the course of 
the military occupations, however, the quality of women “worth” protecting became 
increasingly narrow. Whereas during the San Juan Day Riot, black Cuban veterans 
rescued a sex worker from the abuse of three drunken Americans, subsequent conflicts 
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focused more intensely on protecting women judged as respectable. This category, which 
became synonymous with Cuban womanhood, largely excluded poor and working-class 
women, especially women of African descent and sex workers. 
In the aftermath of the San Juan Day Riot, the newspapers of Cienfuegos printed 
numerous articles protesting against the American abuses of local residents and 
authorities. One of the many criticisms levied against the Americans involved their 
sexual misconduct and abuse of Cuban women. Charges of American sexual misconduct 
centered on the threat to respectable (white) women and corrupting young virgins. The 
Cienfuegos-based separatist newspaper, La Tribuna, reported a series of rapes and 
attempted rapes perpetrated by American soldiers and officers against Cuban women at 
the eastern city of Santiago de Cuba. First, two American soldiers, one armed with a shot 
gun and the other with a revolver, attempted to rape the wife of a canteen-owner, who 
was absent in that moment. This was apparently the second attempted rape in that 
canteen. Shortly thereafter, an American sergeant brutally raped a 15-year-old girl, 
Leonor, as her younger sister, Inés, was held in an adjacent room hearing her cries. An 
American woman, Katherine, served as an accomplice to the American sergeant. 
Katherine, a friend of Leonor’s mother, convinced her to allow her daughters to go see a 
rental house in Caney. Katherine delivered the two girls to a house near the Plaza de 
Marte, where the American sergeant was waiting. They forced Leonor to drink alcohol, 
and then locked her in a room where the rape took place.
829
 
The population of Cienfuegos was incensed by the article about the rape at 
Santiago. Witnessing the unrest, American military officials sought to censor the article, 
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just as they had suppressed reports that Americans had assassinated Santa María. A. H. 
Bowman was in charge of investigating: “I sent for the two editors of La Tribuna to day 
[sic], José Alemán
830
 and Martin Moruah [sic] Delgado,
831
 (the latter a coffee colored 
man of African origin educated of good address) they reported at one o’clock.” He 
interrogated them regarding the origins of the article and warned them not to publish 
inflammatory statements: “I cautioned Alemán and Moruah [sic] Delgado, they would 
have to be more cautious, intimidating that the patience of the authorities was about 
exhausted, and that they were pursuing a course not in the interest of Cuba.”832 Bowman 
attempted to appeal to the sense of patriotism of both men to censor them from reporting 
unflattering news about the American soldiers, implying that appeasement, rather than 
antagonism, would be the best strategy vis-à-vis the occupation. Indeed, censorship of the 
press became a common strategy through which the United States military government in 
Cuba controlled its image with the Cuban public.
833
 
 Even though these horrible acts did not occur in Cienfuegos, the news fell upon 
very sympathetic ears. After all, just weeks earlier the people of Cienfuegos had united 
before the very same enemy for a similar crime—abuse of local women—that had 
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originally sparked the San Juan Day Riot. Similar incidents were happening frequently in 
cities across Cuba as American soldiers pursued and harassed Cuban women and girls. In 
Holguín, for example, private Frank D. Bennett attempted to rape the wife and sister-in-
law of a Cuban man, Andrés Montero. Bennett attempted first to pay the women for sex, 
offering one, then five dollars. When Montero intervened, Bennett became violent, laying 
his hands on the women.
834
 General James H. Wilson, the commanding officer for 
Matanzas and Santa Clara Provinces, also noted men under his command raping women. 
He wrote of one disturbed soldier, “a reckless fellow” who “forced his way into the bed 
of a sick girl.” That soldier ended up contracting yellow fever, although Wilson reflected 
that he probably became infected during his frequent visits to unhygienic places such as 
brothels: “he was out on a ‘bat’ and frequented places where germs were evidently 
plentiful.” Wilson lamented that “unfortunately he recovered.”835 Numerous rape and 
attempted rape cases against Americans in Cuba caused tension with Cubans, who 
resented American presumptions of unbridled sexual access to Cuban women, as it 
evidently did in the Cienfuegos press. 
 Rape and the specter of sexual abuse became a powerful rhetorical device in 
expression contempt for the American presence in Cuba. No doubt, the sexual politics of 
intervention gained an increasingly prominent role in the antagonism between Cubans 
and Americans, especially when the victims were perceived as respectable. Allegations of 
American abuse of respectable women provided a powerful motive for violent 
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confrontation of a common enemy. Indeed threats made against respectable women 
provoked greater scandal, highlighting a prioritization of the honor of respectable (white) 
women over that of poor and working-class women.
836
 Although the San Juan Day Riot 
began with the defense of prostitutes, subsequent conflicts show hierarchies of honor and 
respectability that more closely mirrored those of colonial times. 
 
“Get your hands off my woman”: Drunken Americans and the Dancehall Riot of 
1900 
 
The anxiety over the sexual misconduct of American soldiers featured in the local 
press provided the framework through which the Cuban public interpreted the disorderly 
actions of American soldiers surrounding Cuban women. Just one year after the San Juan 
Day Riot, on June 3, 1900, another riot broke out in Castillo de Jagua, a town near the 
American military encampment of Pasa Caballos. The circumstances were astonishingly 
familiar: three American soldiers under the influence of alcohol created a disturbance at a 
dance held at the house of Cuban man, Francisco Montaño. The Americans reportedly 
molested one of the women at the party. 
At about 1:30 in the morning, the policeman, Marcelino Soto found the two 
soldiers on the porch of the dancehall, and they “started to jump up and down on the 
porch outside.” Soto reprimanded the rowdy Americans. The soldiers ignored officer 
Soto, and entered the party, scandalizing the attendees. They proceeded straight to the 
canteen, where they used obscene language. Campbell was indecently dressed, with his 
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undershirt exposed, and without a hat, a style that was considered unacceptable in turn-
of-the-century Cuba.
837
 The mayor of Castillo de Jagua, José Alegría, who had been 
summoned to the party on account of the disturbance, reprimanded both of the soldiers 
and scolded Soto for not having taken control of the situation. “[The mayor] said to me 
‘If they don’t obey you, go and get the Corporal that is over in the Castle,” remembered 
Soto. Instead of attempting to arrest the Americans straight away, the police sought out 
military authorities to handle them.
838
 
When Soto returned to the party with the American corporal, the situation had 
deteriorated further. Simpson was sprawled out on the floor of the canteen, and the other 
solider, Campbell was “leaning close to the window vomiting.”839 The corporal dragged 
both Simpson and Campbell out of the party by the arms, reprimanding them along the 
way. Just then, another American solider, Private William Griffin approached them, and 
“created a disturbance by interfering in [the detention and] not allowing the Corporal to 
conduct to the Castle the other two men…” He cursed and insulted the corporal and the 
policeman.
840
  
Soto sought to subdue the unruly private. Griffin resisted arrest, insulting and 
attacking the policeman and assaulting the mayor. Soto bore the brunt of the Griffin’s 
aggression: He “came up and with an empty package of cigarettes [he] rubbed it in my 
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face. I told him to wait, that the Corporal had come, and then for a second time he struck 
me in the face and in the shoulder and called me a ‘son of a bitch.’”841 At that point, Soto 
arrested Griffin and turned him over to the corporal. 
As the confrontation intensified, a crowd began to form around the civil 
authorities, the corporal and the rowdy Americans. Seeing the Griffin disrespect the 
police officer, the crowd grew angry, and “then the struggle began in which a lot of 
people were mixed up and I was standing there near where the fight was going on.” The 
crowd turned on the Americans, especially Griffin: “I was attacked by four or five 
Cubans,” he recounted during his court-martial trial. “They ran in and grabbed me by the 
arms and legs and started to search me. One of them had me by the neck and was choking 
me.” Griffin remembered that “the crowd kept getting bigger all the time, and I just 
fought in self defense [sic]. […] They were at me with machetes, sticks, stones and 
revolvers. They all looked alike to me. I had no friends among them.”842 Just like in the 
San Juan Day Riot, a personal confrontation between a few Americans and Cubans 
became a struggle between “Americans” and “Cubans.” 
Griffin, Campbell and Simpson fled the blows of the crowd, and headed toward 
the docks. The Cubans pursued them, apparently “with reinforcements.” At one point, the 
mob lashed out against him: “One of them walked up and kicked me in the back while 
they both had hold of me.” Once at the edge of the docks, Griffin claimed that “the 
Cubans made their final charge. I got knocked off the dock into the water.” Perhaps the 
irony was not lost upon members of the crowd, that tossing the offending parties into the 
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water seemed to symbolize separatist desires to expel the “Yankees” who had overstayed 
their welcome from Cuban soil. The corporal retrieved his men and brought them back to 
the barracks. 
The presence of the Americans was not so much the problem as were their actions 
with the Cubans at the party. The mayor pointed out that even though he did not think 
these soldiers had any business being at the dance, this was not the source of the problem: 
“I do not know how they [the soldiers] came to be there. It was not a public dance, but a 
dance given among the families over there. In Cuba, nothing is thought of it if strangers 
not invited go to these dances.”843 At the heart of the original conflict was an alleged 
abuse of a female attendee at the party. The mayor confirmed that he had received a 
complaint about the Americans harassing the women of the dance.
844
 Campbell and 
Simpson were accused of “laying hands on a woman” at the party. The mayor and 
policeman seemed to judge that this offense warranted and justified violent reaction by 
the men at the party. The mayor testified that the dance attendees were “orderly people,” 
only provoked to violence by the offensive and abusive actions of the Americans.
845
 
What had perhaps made the conduct of the Americans so offensive to the Cubans 
at the party and the civil authorities was that they interacted with “respectable” people in 
a way they judged was more appropriate for people of the “lower” classes. Cuban civil 
authorities, namely the police and the mayor, intervened in the dispute, not only because 
the Americans were causing a scene outside a dancehall, but because that behavior 
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jeopardized the safe environment for the female attendees, and threatened the honor, 
respectability and status of the families attending the party. That the Americans resisted 
arrest suggests that the conflict was about diverging views of the way Americans should 
interact with “respectable” Cuban women. The reaction of the civil authorities and crowd 
was about guarding the moral purity and honor of the so-called respectable Cuban 
families from the vulgar and “low-class” behavior of the Americans. By defending the 
honor of women of their same social class, middle- and upper-class men asserted their 
own manliness before the American occupying forces. 
The local press also condemned the incident severely. In one article appearing in 
El Siglo, Lt. Colonel Jiménez, a police inspector condemned American soldiers, who 
were “seen daily in the streets of Cienfuegos, or elsewhere, in a drunken condition.” The 
dancehall riot was yet another example of this broader pattern. The article met with a 
harsh response from military officials who sought to silence critical views of Americans 
in Cuba. A. W. Bowman, the commanding officer of Rowell Barracks at Pasa Caballos, 
confronted Carlos García, the editor of the newspaper, El Siglo for an inflammatory 
account of the dancehall riot: “I advised the fellow that his paper would be held 
responsible for false statements.” The editor denied knowledge and responsibility for the 
article, claiming that he did not agree with the views expressed therein, but published it 
“as a matter of current news […] for what it was worth.”846 The editor had conceded, 
promising not to publish future articles defaming Americans, and rather turning them 
over to the military authorities. 
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The Dancehall Riot and the public responses to it encapsulated broader tensions in 
Cuban society: the constant quest to prove to the interveners that Cuban men could in fact 
guard public order, property, and family. While the crowd of Cuban men descended upon 
the three American soldiers to defend women, civil authorities approached the incident as 
an opportunity to bolster their future political power. The cooperation between the mayor 
and the American corporal marked a stark departure from the interaction between the 
mayor José Antonio Frías and captain Walter B. Barker during the San Juan Day Riot. 
Whereas the relations between Frías and Barker had been characterized by unremitting 
hostility and antagonism, Alegría and Soto called upon the corporal to deal with the 
Americans instead of arresting them themselves. By deferring to the American military 
official, Alegría, much like Leopoldo Figueroa across the bay, enacted a new style of 
local governance, which privileged cooperation with the military officials. The best 
indication of manliness for Alegría was his political power, which increasingly relied on 
a positive relationship with American military officials in his area. 
 
Regulating Cuban-American Gender Relations: Prostitution and Venereal Disease  
 
Although the Cuban public at the party and in the press had certainly convicted 
the Americans of sexual misconduct at the party, the judge of the court-martial found 
insufficient evidence to convict Campbell and Simpson of harassing the woman. This 
was probably due to the very limited testimony collected. The investigation relied mainly 
on three witnesses: the mayor, who confessed that he came after receiving a complaint, 
and stayed only 45 minutes, the Officer Soto, who mainly patrolled from outside of the 
dancehall, and the corporal, whom Soto retrieved after having trouble with the 
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Americans. Given none of these witnesses was present to observe the interactions of the 
Americans inside the dancehall, they would not be able to substantiate accusations that 
the Americans had abused the woman. The only witness who mentioned even the 
presence of women was the police officer, Soto. The mayor recounted a conversation he 
had with Soto the day after the disturbance: “…the Policeman next day, after what had 
happened, told me that the Americans while the dance was going on, for a while, were 
jumping up and down, and once in a while bumped into some of the women; but he said 
that it seemed that they were not doing it intentionally.”847 When asked directly, if they 
had seen the Americans harass women at the party, each admitted that they did not know. 
No party-goers, women, or onlookers were included in the investigation, however, and all 
charges for harassing women were dropped. 
Bowman claimed that the American soldiers were very well-behaved in and 
around Cienfuegos, and that all the residents with whom he conferred confirmed that 
relations between soldiers and civilians were amicable. The conduct of the troops in the 
brothels was indeed a sensitive subject for American military officials, as it called 
attention to American preservation of prostitution, an institution that was becoming 
rapidly socially unacceptable in the United States. In the United States, progressive social 
reformers (Balch’s “narrow-minded people”) increasingly targeted urban vice, especially 
prostitution, in a movement to address the social ills arising from industrialization at the 
turn of the twentieth century. This made “tolerated tenderloins” increasingly unpalatable 
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in light of “proper” gender roles, emphasizing female domesticity and male 
breadwinning.
848
 
Downplaying prostitution in Cuba was essential for preserving the legitimacy of 
the military occupation among progressive Americans, and this meant silencing 
references to American misconduct in the Cuban brothels. Major Louis Balch worried 
that “…this subject is one which if brought to public notice in the U.S. would raise an 
outcry from all the religious and narrow-minded people.”849 “I agree with Dr. Balch that 
public sentiment in the United States would not tolerate any legal recognition of 
prostitution except for the purpose of abolishing it,” the Chief Surgeon of Santa Clara 
Province confirmed.
850
 Despite these preoccupations, toleration of the commercial sex 
industry in Cuba very much became a state of exception.
851
 
Although he preferred to deny the misbehavior of the soldiers at Pasa Caballos, 
Bowman had to admit that sometimes they soldiers partook in prostitution, and became 
rowdy in the process. One of his informants “noticed some months ago a soldier who had 
too much beer.” Bowman himself noted that “the U.S. soldiers have occasionally been 
boisterous within the houses of prostitution.” Apparently, the recently discharged solider 
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with his final pay and the recent recruit were “two very fruitful classes for minor 
disorders in the houses of prostitution.”852 The problem, however, was under control 
according to Bowman, who noted that the few culprits were already awaiting court-
martial sentences. He concluded that the Americans who resisted arrest at Castillo de 
Jagua—the very men standing court-martial—probably served as a pretext for the 
article.
853
 In his discussion of the motivations for the article, Bowman seemed to conflate 
American conduct in brothels with their actions in the parties of “respectable” people. 
 As Bowman implied, American military officials focused on prostitution to 
regulate interactions between American men and Cuban women. In late 1898, the 
thousands of soldiers, officers and civilian employees serving the military intervention 
and subsequent occupation breathed new life into Cienfuegos brothels. During the 
occupation, Cienfuegos was the only city in Cuba to have a higher number of prostitutes 
than the provincial capital (See Image 18). There had been a precipitous increase of 
venereal disease among American soldiers in Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces during 
the first several months of the military occupation.
854
 High rates of venereal disease 
among American troops incapacitated large numbers, rendering them unfit for service 
and imposing high costs for treatment. As a result, by January 1899, military officials had 
crafted and put into effect a new code governing prostitution, based in large part on 
previous Spanish codes. 
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Image 18: Number of prostitutes classified by race among Cuban cities, circa 
1902
855
 
 
Americans sought to regulate prostitution by issuing a new reglamento in January 
1899 One of their main objectives was to curtail the spread of venereal disease, especially 
syphilis, among American troops while still offering soldiers an outlet for their 
“necessities.” Thus, it embodied contemporary debates about the causes of prostitutions, 
its moral implications, and ideas about how best to control the negative consequences it 
supposedly brought. Some military officials pointed to the careless sex practices of 
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soldiers as one of the main causes of the explosion of venereal disease during the first 
year of the occupation. They generally looked down upon the ordinary enlisted men, 
judging them as an unruly, unintelligent, and irresponsible lot. “The average enlisted man 
is as a rule careless and reckless as to the women with whom he cohabitates…,” wrote 
one officer of his men. 
Major Frank J. Ives, Chief Surgeon of Matanzas and Santa Clara province, noted 
that enlisted men tended to contract diseases around the time of their pay day. For him, 
this was no coincidence: “I believe that at this season,” Ives wrote in July 1899, “pay day 
exerts a very deleterious effect upon the command, not only on account of the drinking of 
intoxicants incidental thereto, but many men on these occasions frequent those portions 
of the city more liable to contain yellow fever and miasmatic infection.”856 He explained 
that the increase in sick soldiers in July was most likely due his men visiting brothels, 
where hygienic conditions were allegedly so poor as to be focuses of infection.
857
 
Between July 1899 and July 1900, physicians at the military hospital at Rowell Barracks 
(Pasa Caballos) treated 94 cases of venereal disease.
858
 Only malarial fever and diarrhea 
were more common ailments among troops at Cienfuegos during periods without yellow 
fever epidemics. 
Moreover, the infected solider general did not seek treatment from the proper 
sources: “if infected, he is loath to present himself to the Medical Officers for treatment 
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and is liable to prolong the duration of the disease by either taking no treatment at all or 
consulting more or less with irresponsible persons.” Military official observed that 
soldiers generally continued to be intimate with women even after infected: “He also 
places no restraint upon his actions, but whilst infected cohabitates promiscuously, thus 
probably spreading the disease; drinks and carouses thus retarding his recovery.” Soldiers 
would only seek treatment when the disease had progressed so far as to incapacitate him: 
“If some particularly disagreeable duty falls to his lot or his conditions becomes so grave 
as to render it imperative he goes on sick report and the government loses double the time 
than if he had reported to the Surgeon in the first place.”859 American soldiers cost the 
government substantial amounts of money due to their reckless sexual practices and 
neglect of their health. 
Recognizing that at least part of the problem lay in the behavior of American 
soldiers, some military officials suggested they be held accountable. Ives recommended 
“the men should be stripped” for weekly physical examinations, and diseased men 
publically humiliated:  “A list of all the men found infected with venereal troubles should 
be made out under the direction of the Company Commander and posted conspicuously 
on the bulletin board or in the Barracks of each company organization.”860 He also 
recommended that the canteen and leave privileges be denied to infected soldiers, 
asserting that this measure should not be interpreted as punishment, but rather intended 
                                                 
859
 Chief Surgeon, Frank J. Ives to Adjutant General, Department of Matanzas & Santa Clara, March 8, 
1900, Box 34, File 3199, USNA/RUSA/RG 395/E 1331. 
860
 United States Surgeon-General’s Office, Report of the Surgeon-General of the Army, 280; Chief 
Surgeon, Frank J. Ives to Adjutant General, Department of Matanzas & Santa Clara, March 8, 1900, Box 
34, File 3199, USNA/RUSA/RG 395/E 1331. 
  
359 
 
prevent the exacerbation of their afflictions due to “fresh exposures or by the use of 
stimulants.”861 This recommendation was one of the few that targeted men. 
Military officials in Matanzas and Santa Clara disagreed on the accountability of 
American soldiers in spreading venereal disease. The Adjutant General rejected the 
prospect of punishing sick men. He claimed that “venereal disease is a general 
misfortune, and not misconduct,” and therefore should not be punished.862 Others, like 
Ives, recognized that venereal disease was a normal part of military duty: “a certain 
percentage of venereal disease amongst soldiers might be considered unavoidable,” but 
that measure can be taken to reduce disease.
863
 Although military officials implicated the 
recklessness of their soldiers as a key cause of the explosion in venereal disease, 
consumer-centered policies such as humiliation and punishment of diseased men were 
never accepted policies for curbing disease, nor were they mandated on an island-wide 
scale. Instead, military officials in Matanzas and Santa Clara responded to their peculiarly 
high rates of infection by subjecting their troops to physical exams every other Friday, 
which “gave excellent results.”864 
While military officials attempted to protect their men and the government coffers 
from the ravishes of venereal disease, the 1899 reglamento almost exclusively focused on 
controlling public women. Nineteenth-century medical discourses linking female 
immorality and sexual degeneracy to spread of disease meant that the burden of 
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regulation fell disproportionately upon the body of the prostitute.
865
 Accordingly, military 
officials targeted the women of the sex industry as the vectors of venereal disease and 
moral disorder. Americans made few changes to existing laws governing prostitution. 
Rather, they augmented enforcement, which they argued had been lacking under Spanish 
rule. Military officials in Cienfuegos criticized the ineffective enforcement of regulations 
governing prostitution under Spanish rule, noting that the physical examinations of the 
prostitutes under the Spanish law had not been effective in controlling venereal disease. 
“It would appear from this that the inspection which was supposed to be made of 
prostitutes was not thoroughly or carefully done, and like many another public work in 
Cuba was merely perfunctorily performed in order to get the money which was paid for 
it.”866  
Through regulated prostitution, Americans were able to curb the venereal disease 
to a sufficient extent that they could allow the prostitution to remain legal. Increasing 
state control over prostitutes and madams through more rigid enforcement of the laws 
had mixed results. By 1900, American military officials claimed that these behavioral 
issues among their soldiers had been resolved: “The drain on the strength of the 
command for duty,” wrote General Wilson, “caused by venereal affections, made strong 
measures necessary. A bi-weekly inspection of all the men by the Company Commanders 
and the Surgeon, ordered by the Department Commander, resulted in substantial 
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reduction of this kind of disease.”867 Yet, civil disorder involving Americans buying sex 
continued to define the America presence in cities across Cuba, not least of all 
Cienfuegos, as the Dancehall Riot suggests. 
 
An Urban Landscape, Transformed 
 
While Americans focused on prostitution to regulate interactions between 
American men and Cuban women, Cuban civil authorities identified a different problem: 
threats to “respectable” women. This problem had been most clearly encapsulated in the 
Dancehall Riot. The riot marked a turning point for Cuban-American relations in and 
around Cienfuegos. Whereas previous disturbances had targeted sex workers and women 
of the “lower classes,” who middle- and upper-class men already associated with moral 
impurity, the Dancehall Riot underscored the dangers of American sexual misconduct for 
so-called “respectable” women. American abuses of “respectable” women offered a 
challenge to the manliness of middle- and upper-class men, including civil authorities, 
which rested in part upon their chivalric duty to protect women of their same social class. 
This affront to their manliness, in turn, threatened to undermine the claims of civil 
authorities to political power, which implicitly rested upon their ability to represent 
themselves as the highest order of man. 
Civil authorities had to defend their masculine image before two main groups, 
each with a different and often contradictory standard of manliness. One the one hand, 
they had to uphold their revolutionary credentials before a Cuban populace that desired 
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Cuban independence. Patriotism was the most important quality in a man, provided that 
the racial and class standards had already been met. On the other hand, civil authorities 
also had to demonstrate to the Americans that they were “fit” to govern. In this case, the 
ultimate demonstration of manliness was the ability to maintain order. Thus civil 
authorities were forced to reconcile the ideals of socially-radical ideals of patriotism with 
the socially-conservative value for order to consolidate their political power. In the 
context of American relations with Cuban women, this meant simultaneously protecting 
“respectable” women from American soldiers, while collaborating in the projects of 
military authorities to regulate prostitution and promote “hygiene.” 
One way to accomplish both goals was to construct separate spaces for 
“honorable” and “fallen” women. Increasing physical restrictions imposed on prostitutes 
since the late colonial period served as a precursor for the eventual codification of a 
distinct geographical space for prostitution in Cienfuegos under American rule. Between 
1875 and 1886, in the wake of the first anti-colonial war (1868-1878), Spanish colonial 
officials implemented a series of regulations on prostitution. These included the system 
of paid licensing for prostitutes, madams and brothel owners, and bi-weekly pelvic exams 
for prostitutes. By the early 1890s, hygiene administrators mandated the physical 
segregation of prostitutes from mainstream society by declaring that prostitution must be 
confined to a tolerance zone in the capital city of Havana, though the implications for 
other Cuban cities remains unclear.
868
 
On the eve of the American military occupation, Spanish regulation of 
prostitution imposed strict limits on the behavior, visibility, and mobility of prostitutes. 
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Spanish colonial officials issued a reglamento specifically governing prostitution in the 
province of Santa Clara in 1898. The 1898 reglamento prohibited the prostitute from 
entering into the public view. It forbade her from exhibiting herself freely in public view, 
forbidding her to exhibit herself in windows or doors, on streets or walkways. 
Regulations censured scandalous or “indecent behavior” in public places. Prostitutes 
were forbidden from making gestures to entice men to come to them, and they were not 
allowed to “occupy” seats or stages in theatres, places in which under Spanish rule often 
designated marginal spaces for prostitutes to engage in their activities with their clients. 
Prostitutes could not ride in uncovered carriages through town, or enter places of 
recreation where “honest families” gather.869 The 1898 reglamento clearly established 
that certain spaces in cities where prostitution existed were “moral” and others were 
“immoral.” 
The 1898 reglamento also provided some guidelines on distinguishing between 
supposedly moral and immoral women. “The manner of looking, laughing, walking, 
adorning herself, the unashamed way of insinuating herself” serve as indirect signs of 
immorality, while an immoral woman can be recognized directly for “showing her naked 
reserved parts, screaming, proffering blasphemies or morally offensive words, making 
signs or directing provocative words, grabbing, throwing, hugging, kissing a bystander, 
getting together with public women or entering into domestic service of prostitutes.”870 
Indeed, the reglamento of 1898 specified that women who interacted with prostitutes, 
would themselves be defined as prostitutes and registered with the Hygiene police. One 
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way in which authorities could become aware of individual social interactions, was 
through reports from community members.
871
 
The physical restrictions imposed on prostitutes were designed to protect the 
sexual morality of “respectable” women, who were usually, by implication, white. Black 
women were judged as immoral for their alleged promiscuity, their supposedly higher 
propensity to engage in extra-marital sex, and higher rates of concubinage. White 
women, on the other hand, were the symbol of moral purity, which they upheld through 
their chastity, and sexual virtue.
872
 These racialized generalizations about morality would 
seem to suggest that most prostitutes were women of African descent. Available data on 
the racial, education and national background of prostitutes in Cienfuegos, however, 
contradict this assumption. Women practicing prostitution included black, white and 
immigrant women. Indeed, more registered prostitutes were white than black in 
Cienfuegos, as in all other Cuban cities where data exists (See Image 18), although the 
proportion of clandestine prostitutes was reportedly higher among women of African 
descent. Among prostitutes treated at the Quinta de Higiene (Hospital for Prostitutes) at 
Havana, two-thirds of those from the province of Santa Clara were classified as white.
873
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Although prevailing assumptions about the connection between race and morality 
seemed not to reflect the realities of commercial sex, they remained a central tenant of 
American regulation of prostitution during the military occupation. In 1899, American 
military authorities renewed Spanish efforts to remove prostitution from major urban 
centers, but this time in cities across the island. “Brothels would best be confined to some 
one portion of the town and not only be under police supervision and their inmates 
registered at the police department, but physical examinations of the women should be 
made not less than once a week,” wrote the chief surgeon of Santa Clara province in 
February 1899.
874
 This policy of districting prostitution reflected practices in some 
American cities during this epoch. Aimed most directly at improving urban “hygiene” 
and “morality,” this order simultaneously affected the largely black neighborhoods often 
containing the red light districts.
875
 
American military officials recommended the policing of the social and moral 
boundaries of the city through implicit means, rather than any explicit law. The chief 
surgeon in the Santa Clara province recommended exactly this: “While I do not mean that 
a general law or order should be made or issued, the tacit recognition by municipal 
authorities, guided in their action by the governing power, so as to have a uniform rule, 
would have the effect of holding prostitution in check and lessening the evil effects from 
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it.”876 This strategy mirrored prostitution policies in some American cities, where local 
government and law enforcement officials employed explicit documentation, mapping, 
and training to monitor the physical location and social consequences of urban vice.
877
 
The transfer in the jurisdiction over prostitution regulation from the provincial to 
the municipal government under American rule left prostitution regulation in the hands of 
the mayor.
878
 José Antonio Frías largely neglected implementation of American 
recommendations. When he was forced to resign in February 1900, American military 
officials urged the interim mayor, Leopoldo Figueroa, to address the issue of prostitution. 
With the consolidation of his political power in the June 1900 municipal elections, 
military officials reminded Figueroa of his obligation to cooperate with them in 
improving urban hygiene. They expressed disappointment that he had not given “as 
cheerful co-operation in assisting the sanitary authorities to perform their duties, as might 
be desired.”879 Figueroa assured military authorities of his commitment to urban hygiene, 
pointing to the competent doctors on the Board of Sanitation, and also to the successes in 
reducing the death rates from disease.
880
 Evidently, hygiene, of which prostitution was an 
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integral part, provided one source of tension between Figueroa and military officials in 
the first critical months he was in office. 
To be sure, the issue of hygiene concerned Figueroa too, though perhaps for 
different reasons than for American military officials. Prostitution thrived within the 
boundaries of the city despite the de facto segregation by race, socioeconomic status, and 
occupation that already defined the urban social geography to a large extent. Indeed, the 
brothel-lined streets of the historically-black port-side neighborhood of Marsillán were 
located just blocks from the neighborhood where the wealthiest and most “respectable” 
families of the city lived. This presented a problem for Figueroa, because it potentially 
exposed “respectable” women to the sexual whims of American soldiers visiting the 
proximate red light district, implying that he had failed in his manly duty to protect 
women. Simultaneously, it supposedly undermined the moral and social order in the city 
center, an indicator for Americans that he was insufficiently manly to be fit for political 
power. 
Shortly after his election, Figueroa sought to consolidate his political power both 
among American military officials and his Cuban constituency. He used prostitution 
regulation to solidify his image as a member of the “intelligent classes” in the eyes of 
American military officials. This meant he would have to demonstrate his collaboration 
rather than antagonism with the occupying government, reduce tensions between civil 
and military authorities. The suggestions from American military officials to remove 
prostitution from the city center provided the perfect solution to the problem of hygiene, 
as Figueroa conceived of it. It also afforded the mayor the opportunity address another of 
the problems plaguing his administration. Removing the brothels from the city center 
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would help curb the threat of American sexual misconduct against “respectable” Cuban 
women because Americans would be drawn outside the area where these women resided. 
Figueroa sought to reorganize the urban social geography of Cienfuegos to solidify his 
hold on power, reward his political patrons, and appease American military authorities. 
The solution entailed removing “immorality” from the supposedly honorable 
spaces in the city to areas beyond the urban boundaries. Prostitution regulation provided 
one way to target a broad array of “undesirable elements.” Indeed, one of the first orders 
of business Figueroa brought to discussion in the city council in early July was an 
initiative to “improve the hygiene of the houses inhabited by the workers.”881 With this 
initiative, the mayor linked the living conditions of the working class to one of the key 
problems his administration sought to address: the hygiene in the city. Having identified 
one of the supposed sources of the unhygienic conditions as the poor and working-class 
residents, the solution seemed simple: remove these populations from the city. 
All of these goals converged in one policy: the relocation of the red light 
district—the locus of conflict between Cubans and Americans—from the southwest 
corner of the city to the urban margins in the far western liminal zone known as the 
Barriada del Oeste, an un-urbanized peninsula on the far western frontier of the city. This 
place became known as the Transvaal, a name that echoed the struggle of the Boers 
against British imperial incursion during the second Boer War (1899-1902). Likely, the 
irony of this denomination for the emerging neighborhood was not lost on most Cubans. 
Cuban newspapers carefully followed developments in South Africa, often relating their 
own struggle under American rule to that of the Boers. In November 1899, for example, 
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one Cuban newspaper ran a political cartoon depicting the British in the Transvaal in a 
strikingly similar light as a Cubans often portrayed the United States in their Patria. 
“Experience offers a valuable lesson to them and it is that small, worthless and weak 
communities become strong when they struggle to be independent,” the caption read.882 
Applying the name Transvaal to this marginal neighborhood may have reflected a 
popular identification with the Boer cause. The name also may have highlighted the 
parallels between the forced relocation of urban residents to this marginal area and the 
concentrations camps imposed by the British in the Transvaal, where thousands perished 
due to starvation and unsanitary conditions, both of which occurred in the same year, 
1900. 
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Map 4: Relocation of the red light district, 1900
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Image 19: Caricature of Boer War from La Discusión
883
 
 
The Transvaal neighborhood had been a marginal space for much of the 
nineteenth century. It had been the designated place for dumping the refuse of the city 
during the war. The carcasses of horses and other animals, found in great numbers 
throughout the city and on the outskirts, were collected and deposited in this 
neighborhood bringing “grave risks to the public health and principally to the residents 
that already live in that western zone.” Latrines were also emptied in this area, which had, 
according to city council members, “had been the place where they were always 
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thrown.”884 Although the city council resolved to begin incinerating the animal carcasses 
and allotting funds to the guerrillas to facilitate caring for their horses, this western zone 
continued to be the dumping ground of the city. By 1900, the zone was still known for its 
unhealthy conditions. 
 
Map 5: Un-urbanized spaces of Cienfuegos, mid-19
th
 century 
 
 
The Transvaal was isolated from the Cienfuegos city center. Roads from the city 
center toward Reina abruptly ended at railroad tracks on Paseo de Arango, the 
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westernmost street within the city limits. Whereas gas, and in some areas, electric 
lighting illuminated city streets, the Transvaal was consumed by darkness. The lack of 
public infrastructure, the poverty of the residents and the unsanitary history of the 
neighborhood all added to its marginality and undesirability for well-to-do urban 
dwellers. The isolation of the neighborhood made it an ideal location in which to confine 
urban vice. 
By mandating the removal of the tolerance zone from the urban center of 
Cienfuegos, municipal authorities transformed the urban landscape. The confinement of 
the tolerance zone to the western margins had two principal consequences for urban 
residents. First, it resulted in the practical removal of supposedly immoral and unhygienic 
elements from the city center. Indeed, the inspector of hygiene, Abelardo Rodríguez, 
allegedly targeted more than just prostitutes. One anonymous author wrote to military 
authorities in July 1900 charging that Rodríguez “dedicated himself to removing every 
woman who had been a prostitute (even if today she was not)” requiring them to relocate 
to the tolerance zone.
885
 By casting a wide net for the removal of individuals supposedly 
partaking in immoral activities, Rodríguez purged the urban center of populations 
considered undesirable or threatening to public order. Because prostitution had been at 
the heart of many of the conflicts between Americans and Cubans during the first half of 
the occupation, the removal of brothels from the urban center helped municipal 
authorities construct and image of an orderly and well-governed city. 
Second, the forced relocation of the red light district functioned to consolidate the 
legitimacy of the new municipal government among their separatist patrons by 
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redistributing wealth from stakeholders of Spanish rule to the political patrons of the civil 
authorities, most notably the mayor. When prostitutes were forced to rent houses within 
the designated tolerance zone in the Transvaal, a previously under-populated zone with 
low property values was transformed into the heart of a rising commercial district. 
Property values soared and previously vacant properties filled with public women, cafés 
cantinas, and other venues of entertainment.  
Many of the members of the city council had allegedly purchased property in the 
Transvaal, and they benefited greatly from the forced relocation of prostitutes. Civil 
authorities relocated the red light district to extort high rents for previously unrented 
properties in a marginal part of town owned by himself and several of his associates. In a 
complaint letter sent to Wilson, one man denounced the dishonest ways of Figueroa and 
his allies in the municipal government. He charged that the mayor and his friends were “a 
dirty crowd.” As evidence of the corruption of municipal authorities, he claimed that 
“they avail themselves of their influence and do all sort of business to their own benefit. 
The Mayor is a thief.”886 Apart from having interests in the reconstruction of city hall and 
the dispensation of medicines to the city hospital, civil authorities directly benefited from 
the relocation of the vice district. 
Various members of the city council allegedly conspired to exploit their political 
positions to increase their personal wealth. Lino Hernández, secretary of the city council, 
Pedro Modesto Hernández, propriety owner and former mayor of Cienfuegos, and city 
councilman Abelardo Rodríguez “have transacted the most shameful business. They 
obtained from the mayor and order to transfer all the prostitutes to a very unhealthy 
                                                 
886
 Ibid. 
  
375 
 
place…” This reordering of urban space had significant consequences for the real estate 
market, and its stakeholders: “…by that way, the Secretary of the Ayuntamiento could 
sell his houses and lots or rent them. These properties had no value as they were before, 
and at present they are worth a lot of money.”887 The anonymous author, furthermore, 
charged the Inspector of Hygiene with purposely abusing women to secure financial gain, 
forcibly relocating the women “with the idea of populating that [zone] and receiving the 
highest gratification of the property holders.” Rodríguez enjoyed impunity, which 
enabled him to commit “all sorts of abuses with those women, as he is the favorite of the 
Mayor.”888 
While the property owners of the Transvaal benefited substantially from the 
designation of the new tolerance zone there, people who owned property in the former 
entertainment district suffered. “The property owners who have for forty years rented 
their houses to prostitutes today, their houses find themselves unoccupied, as for such a 
long time the prostitutes had resided there, there are very few houses are today rented.”889 
Because this zone had been associated with vice, immorality and poverty for so long, it 
was difficult for property owners to appeal to respectable families to reside there, at least 
in the short-term. 
The property owners most harmed by the relocation of the vice district seemed to 
have been pro-Spanish or Autonomists. Clues to the political affiliation of the author of 
the anonymous letter complaining about the relocation of the red light district betray that 
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he likely belonged to one or the other of those groups. He condemned the civil authorities 
for their anti-American sentiments, a line of argument commonly employed by opponents 
of separatist rule in their petitions to military authorities for political power.
890
 The author 
cited the intentions of the mayor to appoint to local office Rafael Jiménez, “the author of 
a rude and insulting letter to Americans.” In addition, he alleged that municipal 
authorities had made a secret pledge to oppose all orders of the American government, 
were supporting the political aspirations of men known for their “anti-American 
sentiment,” and would exclude from power all Cubans who sympathized with 
Americans.
891
 These were ironic accusations considering the general cooperation and 
amity between Figueroa and American military officials, and the substantial American 
support for the relocation of the red light district. 
Indicting civil authorities for corruption and anti-Americanism, this author 
suggested that the stakeholders in property in the former vice district may have been men 
like him—non-separatists. If many stakeholders negatively affected by the relocation of 
the tolerance zone were opponents of Cuban rule, then the relocation of the vice district 
seemed to have transformed local power structures effectively, shifting the benefits of 
local property ownership to separatists, thereby legitimating their claims to power and 
prestige. 
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Although certain property owners in the old vice district suffered from empty 
houses after the removal of the prostitutes, other stakeholders in the same neighborhood 
benefited from the removal of vice due to their political connections. Apparently, one of 
the benefactors of the relocation of the prostitutes had already secured a government 
contract for one of his properties in the center of town: “Pedro Modesto was able to rent 
an empty house he possessed for a school. He was unable to do it before as it was located 
at the prostitutes’ ward…”892 Moreover, the Sección de Higiene played an important role 
in enforcing this transition, and the property-owning beneficiaries rewarded them 
handsomely: “the Inspector [of Hygiene], Abelardo Rodríguez received a large amount 
for finishing that deal.”893 Apparently Modesto provided a substantial incentive for 
Rodríguez to enforce the Relocation order. The political patrons of civil authorities 
benefited most directly from the re-location of the vice district. 
The relocation of the vice district exacerbated existing divisions between Cuban 
separatists and men who opposed separatist political power. Several months later, 
renewed accusations that Figueroa had committed fraud accompanied demands that he be 
removed from the office of mayor. However, military officials were reluctant to remove a 
man who they so favored. He seemed to embody the perfect balance of revolutionary 
credentials, social-conservatism, and cooperation with the occupying government. After a 
two-month leave of absence, Figueroa continued his full term as mayor.
894
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In addition to privileging the political patrons of the mayor, the relocation of the 
tolerance zone transformed the way urban residents thought about their urban space. 
Whereas before 1900, prostitution had been an unremarkable feature of daily life in 
Cienfuegos, the removal prostitutes seemed to afford urban residents a new-found moral 
righteousness, simply for their residence within the city limits. After the official 
relocation of the tolerance zone, residents of the urban center rejected even the brief 
passage of prostitutes through the city. This became problematic because the hospital 
where prostitutes were required to undergo weekly pelvic examinations was located on 
the far eastern extreme of the city. Arriving there meant that prostitutes had to pass 
through most of the city. In August 1900, residents of the urban center complained to the 
city council about the scandal of public women on the public streets. They urged the city 
council to establish a clinic for prostitutes in their own neighborhood, “in order to avoid 
the spectacle of [them] passing through the entire town.” The city council moved to rent a 
house on Comercio Street between Mar and Paseo de Reina in the heart of the Transvaal 
to establish the hospital. This would keep public women out of the city.
895
 
Confining prostitutes to the Transvaal met with limited success. In January 1901, 
after unsuccessful attempts to confine all the sick prostitutes to their neighborhood, and 
an unresolved push to move the hygiene hospital to the Quinta “La Nacional,” the city 
council sought a temporary solution to reduce the visibility of prostitutes in Cienfuegos. 
Postponing the transfer of the hygiene hospital, civil authorities sought to use the old 
military barracks in back of the aqueduct to remove the prostitutes from the civil hospital, 
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because General Leonard Wood, military governor of the island, would soon visit the 
city.
896
 More than appeasing the delicate bourgeois sensibilities of middle- and upper-
class urban families, civil authorities sought to present an orderly image of the city and a 
modern, civilized image of themselves as authorities to American military authorities. 
The Quinta de Higiene, as the hospital designated to treat sick prostitutes was called, 
opened in May of that year.
897
 
At the same time as civil authorities sought to eliminate supposed instances of 
sexual immorality by relocating the tolerance district, they also enacted policies to 
suppress elements of black and African cultures from the urban center. In 1900, the city 
council perpetually entertained discussions of morality, culture and public order in an 
ongoing effort to present a respectable, white, middle-class image of Cubans. In August 
and September, the city council ordered alcaldes de barrio (neighborhood authorities) to 
punish carretoneros, an occupation commonly held by men of African descent, for using 
profanity in public.
898
 They prohibited African drumming in public, especially the dances 
and parades organized by the cabildos, arguing that these were “contrary to the culture, 
and because they “bother the neighborhood.”899 The city council even refused to grant 
permission when cabildos requested special permits to celebrate religious holidays. For 
example Eulogio Abreu, an 85-year-old African-born property-owner and representative 
of the Cabildo Lucumí petitioned the city council to allow drumming in honor of the 
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“Santo Patrono” (Patron Saint). The city council required all drumming to remain inside 
the Cabildo meeting house, and warned that “in the future, this concession will not be 
made.”900 These policies targeting black urban residents contributed to a broader pattern 
of efforts to remove “undesirable” populations including blacks from the city center. 
The gradual transformation of the former vice district into a “moral” space was a 
critical step in the consolidation of a “respectable” and “orderly” urban center. The 
removal of immorality from the southwestern neighborhood, despite the initial 
inconveniences for the political opponents of the regime, increased the desirability—and 
the property values—of real estate in that area. As property values, and consequently 
rents increased, residing in the urban center became increasingly inaccessible to poor and 
working-class residents. 
Families that had populated this historically-black neighborhood since the 
1830s
901
 relocated to cheaper areas, mainly on the urban margins in neighborhoods such 
as San Lázaro and Pueblo Grifo in the northeast, the eastern margin that would become 
the neighborhood of La Juanita, and not least, the marginal western zone of Transvaal, 
that would become the neighborhood of La Reina. In contrast to the “few residents” 
residing in the neighborhood during the war, in June 1900, the voting district of Paradero, 
which contained the neighborhood of Reina, had 412 registered voters.
902
 
                                                 
900
 Cienfuegos City Council Minutes, December 3, 1900, APHC/AC. 
901
 Orlando García Martínez, Esclavitud y colonización en Cienfuegos, 1819-1879 (Cienfuegos: Ediciones 
Mecena, 2008), 52-3; Bonnie A. Lucero, “Racial Geographies, Imperial Transitions: Property Ownership 
and Race Relations in Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1894-1899,” Journal of Transnational American Studies 3:2 
(2011): 1-21. 
902
 José Miguel Gómez, “Forwards statement of number of voters registered and number voting in each of 
the municipalities, and gives the names of officers elected,” June 25, 1900, Box 35, File 3738, 
USNA.RUSA/RG 395/E 1331. The numbers of registered voters in Cienfuegos, by voting district were as 
follows: Aduana 636, Paradero 412, Recreo 310, Mercado 649, Pueblo Nuevo 430. Official figures 
  
381 
 
The re-location of the red light district seemed to coincide with a shift in one of 
the centers of urban black residence. Many of the residents registered in the district of 
Paradero were part of the urban working classes. Numerous residents were active in the 
port workers’ unions, including mainly men of African descent like Juan de Dios Torre, 
Victoriano Machado, Teodoro Terry and Florentino Pascual y Pérez.
903
 Other residents 
were black veterans of the Liberating Army, like the insurgent chief Benigno Najarro. 
This effective dispersal of a previously autonomous black community within the city 
limits was also politically useful for white elites, because it fragmented black interests 
and removed a black stronghold from an increasingly white area. 
Removing poor families and “immoral elements” from the city tended to benefit 
the financial standing of the new ruling elites, political patrons of Figueroa. Moreover, it 
helped increase property values by making available territories that were previously out 
of reach due to moral and social concerns. Property values and renting possibilities for 
many of the white landholders in the area rose, creating added wealth among the new 
ruling elite, at the same time as ambitious black property interests were motivated to sell 
and capitalize on increased property values and relocate to more marginal settlements to 
expand their holdings. For Figueroa and his administration, this was a crucial step in 
consolidating their political power by showcasing a semblance of patriotism and his 
devoted cooperation with Americans.  
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Taking Back the Transvaal: Vice as Strategy 
 
With the relocation of the tolerance zone to the Transvaal, a formerly marginal, 
isolated dumping zone was transformed into a thriving residential and business district. 
Indeed, the designation of the tolerance zone within the Transvaal contributed to a rapid 
expansion in the population of that neighborhood, as cafés and entertainment venues 
followed the brothels and bawdy houses. Urban residents were quick to recognize that 
they could use entrenched interests of the ruling elite in this marginal community to 
improve their own living conditions. By late 1900, Transvaal residents petitioned the city 
council to improve infrastructure and sanitation, often arguing that these measures would 
help municipal authorities police the vice district. For example, in July, residents 
requested that La Mar street, which ended at the railroad tracks between Paseo de Arango 
and Fomento street, be opened westward. The western neighborhood, they argued, was 
almost completely constructed with buildings, and the population had grown.
904
 In 
October, residents petitioned for public lighting, water service, and street repairs.
905
 
The residents of the Transvaal eventually appealed to the concerns for order and 
morality among civil authorities to support their petitions for improvements in their 
neighborhood. By November residents renewed their requests for lighting, arguing that 
because the neighborhood was home to the prostitutes, “where the police have to be in 
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permanent vigilance, this force cannot lend more effective services” without lighting.906 
Because they voiced appeals in terms of maintaining order, civil authorities seemed to 
respond favorably to these petitions, which additionally afforded increased benefits to 
property owners of the Transvaal. Despite the marginality of the neighborhood because 
of its association with urban vice and immorality, these petitions to the city council show 
that residents embraced the preoccupations of civil authorities to demand better living 
conditions for themselves and their families, though from the marginal space of 
“immorality” on the urban fringes. 
 
Map 6: Urbanization of the Transvaal, circa 1902 
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The geographic pairing of sexual immorality and racial stain worked to reaffirm 
prevailing stereotypes about both black sexual immorality and the racial, moral and 
hygienic threat of prostitution. If prostitution was confined to an urban space civil 
authorities and “respectable” urban residents viewed as already corrupt, such as a black 
neighborhood, hygiene specialists reasoned, then at least the morality of white women 
could be protected from contamination by the prostitutes. Relocating the vice district to 
the marginal western zone of the city also substantially removed the main source of 
conflict between American forces and Cuban civil authorities, helping to construct an 
orderly white urban center, symbolizing the modernity, civilization and competence of 
Cuban authorities. In contrast, all the evils that civil authorities sought to remove from 
the center congregated into the urban margins, eliminating the disorder and conflict that 
continued define the tolerance zone from the immediate view of the respectable center. 
 
Terror in the Transvaal: The Chiquito disturbance of 1901 
 
On the morning of September 11, 1901, about one year after the official re-
location of the tolerance district to the Transvaal, a group of drunken Americans 
wandered into that neighborhood. Two soldiers, Private Louis M. Schaefer, and Private 
James Hynds carried their military-issued revolvers.
907
 They stopped at their preferred 
brothel near the café called “Chiquito,” where ladies knew each man by name. American 
soldiers and civilian employees broke out into a violent encounter among themselves that 
escalated into public disturbance outside the brothel. 
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The disturbance attracted the attention of the municipal police. José G. Vázquez, a 
Cuban police officer who intervened in the squabble, testified that, “I and my companion, 
Vincente [sic] Hernández, were on duty at the Transvaal and a party of Americans, 
composed of two soldiers, one corporal, and two civilians, the two soldiers half 
intoxicated, were having a brawl among themselves, making quite some noise.” The two 
policemen approached the Americans an “asked them in polite terms to desist from their 
quarrel.”908 Like in previous encounters between Americans and Cuban police, the 
culprits of the Chiquito riot did not take kindly to police intervention. “I suppose they 
took this in a bad way, and turned to fight toward us,” remembered Hernández. Several 
Americans pointed revolvers at the police. 
Hynes and an American civilian employee, who had been inside the brothel, went 
outside to intervene in the dispute, leaving his weapon behind, but taking a knife with 
him. The owner of a lunch counter at the “Chiquito” café witnessed the events: “I saw 
when the policeman grabbed the knife from the soldier, and then I closed the doors of the 
coffee house.”909 One of the women who had been in the brothel testified: “when I heard 
the noise outside, I thought they were fighting; I looked out the window, and saw the 
civilian have the policeman’s club in his hand, and the policeman had his pistol in his 
hand,” testified one.910 Police promptly disarmed the Americans. 
Hynds was not deterred, however. He returned to the brothel to collect his 
weapon. “When Hynds came in, he said to me:-‘Give me my belt.’ I gave it to him, and 
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he put it on,” testified one of the ladies of the brothel. As soon as the other solider left the 
room, Hynds again left the brothel to join the fight against the police. When she heard 
loud talking outside the house, the prostitute gazed out the window to see that the 
“policeman had his pistol in his hand, and demanded of Hynds for him to take off his 
revolver; Hynds unbuckled his belt and dropped pistol, belt and holster on the porch.” 
The policeman grabbed the weapon and handed it to a woman in the café, telling her “to 
take care of it until it was called for.” She took it and disappeared into the 
establishment.
911
  
As the police subdued Hynds, Schaefer attempted to rescue his friend. Schaefer, 
who witnesses identified by two distinctive marks, “by a scar on his face, and by a tattoo 
mark on his right arm, resembling a knife with a snake around it,” remained inside the 
brothel. He went into another room in the house with one of the ladies. Upon hearing 
raised voices again a few moments later, Schaefer asked her where his friend was. She 
told him that he had gone out. “He made the remark that he would go out and bring him 
back in again before the police got him, and the remark he made was this:—‘Well, I’ll 
bring the Son of a Bitch back again before the police gets him.’” Florence testified that 
“Hynds was standing on the porch of the café; I turned back from the window, and the 
other soldier asked me whether Hynds was in trouble; I told him he was.”912 As soon as 
Schaefer stepped out of the brothel “he was struck by a policeman before he could get 
into the café door, as he turned to go into the café door, the policeman struck him first in 
the neck, and the back of the head, and that blow knocked him own, and as he turned and 
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fell, he was struck across the face.” Seeing her client subdued by the police, Florence 
retreated into the house.
913
 Policemen Julio Acosta and Rafael Hernández took Hynds, 
who had retreated into the café with a bloody nose, to the public dispensary to receive 
treatment. 
The Chiquito Disturbance highlights two important changes in the relations 
between Cubans and Americans in Cienfuegos. In contrast to previous disturbances, the 
relative absence of direct confrontation between civil authorities and military officials, 
and also between sex workers and Americans, indicates a more collaborative relationship 
had evolved. The testimony of soldiers and sex workers suggest that sex workers 
defended their clients at the court-martial trials. Similarly, this conflict differed 
substantially from previous ones because of the relative lack of attention from the civil 
authorities. The location of the conflict outside the city limits, seemed to have lowered 
the stakes of disorder for civil authorities. 
One of the most striking aspects of the testimony on the riot was apparent 
collaboration between the prostitutes and the Americans, a development glaringly absent 
from the San Juan Day Riot and other disturbances across Cuba between 1899 and 1900. 
For example, on June 25, 1900, Private Louis M. Schaefer, accompanied by one of his 
buddies, Trumpeter Justus W. Lyman,
914
 had a violent encounter with a sex worker at 
Placetas, a town about 50 miles northeast of Cienfuegos. He shot a black prostitute, Luisa 
Moreno, directly in the face at close range, and Lyman shot and killed the rural guard, 
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Lorenzo Rabada, who came to intervene on Luisa’s behalf.915 Just two weeks earlier, at 
9:30 pm, there had been another public disturbance involving American soldiers, 
prostitutes, and Cuban police in the central city of Sancti-Spíritus.
916
 In the San Juan Day 
riot, and the riots in Placetas and Sancti-Spíritus, antagonism and violence defined the 
relationship between prostitutes and American brothel client. 
In contrast, prostitutes and their American clients seemed to collaborate during 
the Chiquito riot and the subsequent investigation and questioning for the Court-martial 
trials. It is evident that Schaefer was a regular client of the brothel in which Florence, 
Caridad and María worked. When asked if she knew Schaefer, Caridad replied quite 
straightforwardly: “I know him,-Schaefer, a soldier.”917 The familiarity between the 
prostitute and her client may have shaped the way she recounted the events of the 
disturbance. 
All three women downplayed the disorderly conduct of their clients. For example, 
even though the Americans clearly carried weapons and ammunition, the sex workers 
claimed that they either did not have them or only carried them for a short time. María 
Contrera, a third woman in the house during the disturbance, recalled the arrival of 
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Schaefer and his companion to her house the day of the scuffle: “Schaefer and his 
companion were half intoxicated, and Schaefer had no revolver, and his companion had a 
revolver, but no shells in it; I know there was none in it, because it could be seen there 
was none in it.”918 Hynds himself admitted that he carried a revolver: “I had been on a 
detachment and had always been in the habit of carrying my gun with me,-we had no 
orders against it; we were camped right in the town, I took mine with me; I was returning 
at the time from a tour of detached service.”919 If he was returning from service, Hynds 
likely carried ammunition for his weapon, in contrast to the claims made by the 
prostitutes. Court-martial testimony also revealed that Schaefer carried a loaded revolver. 
Two of the women, Caridad Cartaya and María, stated that they did not even 
remember a conflict happening outside the house on that day.
920
 Caridad, the “girlfriend” 
with whom Schaefer transacted, testified that she remembered Schaefer coming to her 
house that day, but did not recall any struggle with the police.
921
 The rest of the testimony 
makes this assertion difficult to credit. The prostitutes most likely became aware of the 
scandal occurring right in front of their house, and being of the loud and scandalous 
nature described. It is plausible that the three prostitutes formulated their testimony to 
protect their clients, as a means of securing future business from them. 
Besides protecting their customers by downplaying the disorderly conduct of the 
American soldiers, the prostitutes were also protecting themselves. Laws regulating 
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prostitution assigned prostitutes and madams responsibility for disorder within their 
houses, and prohibited the sale of alcohol therein. Fearing that they would be held 
accountable for the violent and disruptive behavior of their drunken patrons, the 
prostitutes may have tried to downplay the involvement of their clients in the disturbance. 
Moreover, they all clearly stated that all of the men entered the house already intoxicated. 
The prostitutes also tended to emphasize the brutality with which the police 
treated the soldiers during the conflict. María recalled in graphic detail when the police 
clubbed Schaefer: “the policeman struck him with a club, and when he turned his face 
was when the policeman struck him again and felled him.”922 Florence, too, recalled the 
violence with which police treated the soldiers, claiming that Hynds went out of the 
brothel and before he could even get to the café the police had assaulted him. The 
emphasis on the police brutality may have signaled a shift in the attitude of poor urban 
dwellers toward the police. Whereas in the May riot and the San Juan Day Riot, police 
had allegedly protected poor and working-class urban dwellers including prostitutes, the 
increasingly repressive tactics of the force combined with the abuses against prostitutes 
committed during the relocation of the tolerance zone may have led to rising tensions 
between police and the urban poor. 
 While increasing tensions between the police and the urban poor are evident in 
the testimony of the prostitutes, the lack of attention civil authorities afforded to the 
conflict showed a widening gulf between the interests of the ruling elite and those of poor 
and working-class subjects. Previous conflicts had attracted substantial attention from the 
mayor, to the point of causing direct confrontation between military and civil authorities. 
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With the relocation of the tolerance district to the urban margins, the preservation of 
order in the most visible areas of the city—the urban center—and protection of 
respectable citizens therein was no longer threatened by disorder in and around brothels. 
Civil authorities lead by recently-appointed mayor Higinio Esquerra seemed to have little 
direct interest in punishing disorder involving Americans so long as it was contained to 
urban margins where few or no respectable residents resided. Any discussion of the 
disturbance was conspicuously absent from city council meeting minutes, which were 
rather concerned with how to respond to the recent assassination of U.S. President 
McKinley.
923
 Removal of disorderly elements from the city had successfully reduced 
friction between American military officials and Cuban civil authorities, even when 
Americans caused disturbances. 
 
Conclusions: Conflict, Continuity and Change 
 
The series of riots between American and Cuban men in Cienfuegos highlights 
diverging conceptions of masculinity and competing ideas about the future of Cuba 
Libre. Evidently, civil authorities had to perform patriotism to secure the support of the 
Cuban masses. One of the ways they displayed their patriotism was by protecting Cuban 
women from American men, a potent demonstration their chivalric honor. To secure 
American backing for their political power, civil authorities had to cooperate with 
military officials in the preservation of “order” and hygiene in the city. Fulfilling these 
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goals often entailed enacting policies that adversely affected poor and working-class 
urbanites, among who were many men and women of African descent. 
In the first major public disturbances, the May Riot and the San Juan Day Riot, 
local disputes between poor and working-class Cubans and American soldiers and 
civilians erupted into violent confrontations. At the heart of these local disputes were 
black claims to autonomy and authority within a prime urban space, as well as the 
defense of black manliness, often expressed as protection of local women and families 
from Americans. Civil authorities in Cienfuegos confronted American military officials 
over the abusive and disorderly behavior of their soldiers, seeming to support not only the 
police but also the urban poor and working classes most affected by the riots. 
The fragility of this “alliance” between civil authorities and the local poor and 
working classes became readily apparent in the days after the riots. The virulent attacks 
of Americans in the radical press in Cienfuegos were accompanied by scathing critiques 
of the complacency of civil authorities. Veterans with more radical political views 
denounced their compatriots in office for failing to censure American abuses sufficiently. 
In so doing, they revealed a divergence between the interests of civil authorities who 
sought to remain in power, and the goals of the revolution which married absolute and 
immediate independence with the promise of social justice. To preserve their political 
power, civil authorities sought to reduce conflict with the Americans and increase 
collaboration.  
Violent conflicts between Americans and Cubans in and around Cienfuegos 
continued, but after mid-1900, they occurred primarily outside the urban center. The 
responses to these riots suggest increased collaboration between American military 
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authorities and Cuban civil authorities and police officers. For example, in the Dancehall 
Riot of 1900, the mayor instructed the Cuban police officer to summon the commanding 
officer to deal with disobedience from three drunken soldiers. The police officer 
complied with these orders, suggesting a degree of cooperation and collaboration 
between American and Cuban authorities. 
One of the most important realizations civil authorities had as a result of the 
Dancehall riot was that American disorder threatened the safety of respectable residents. 
Prostitution regulation provided a perfect opportunity for civil authorities to protect 
“respectable” women while cooperating in American projects for “order.” A key part of 
preserving order was fostering good “hygiene,” a seemingly benign concept that proved 
to be laden with assumptions about the moral pathologies associated with the poor and 
working-classes, and African-descended peoples. The emphasis on hygiene converged 
most clearly with racial and class divisions in the relocation of the red light district in 
1900, which displaced from the urban center populations considered immoral to the 
marginal western zone known as the Transvaal. With vice relegated to the urban margins, 
conflicts between Americans and poor and working-class Cubans were less visible 
perturbations of the urban order. Consequently, riots like the Transvaal riot of 1901 
received less attention from civil authorities. The transformation of the social geography 
of Cienfuegos purged undesirable populations from the urban center, successfully 
displacing the threat of American disorder to respectable residents, and leading to the 
reduction of tensions between Cuban and American authorities. 
The increasingly benign reactions of Cuban civil authorities to the riots suggest a 
gradual convergence in interests between white Cuban elites and American military 
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authorities. The ultimate goal of many Cuban separatists in power was to gain full 
sovereignty, for which the insurgents had fought for four years. Whereas initially 
advocates of immediate independence, like mayor Frías pursue this goal by attempting to 
assert Cuban authority over civil matters amidst American rule, men like Figueroa and 
later Esquerra pursued a more collaborative strategy. They reasoned that one of the only 
ways to achieve that goal was to convince the Americans that they could protect foreign 
interests from the presumably chaotic and disorderly black masses—preserving “order.”  
Although the efforts of the civil authorities to transform the urban geography of 
Cienfuegos had successfully reconfigured the southwestern neighborhood into a zone of 
white respectability, they recognized “disorderly elements” still remained in other 
sections. The predominantly black port workers posed one of the most substantial threats 
to the newly constructed white urban center. The next chapter charts the struggle of black 
port workers to carve out a space for themselves in an increasingly racialized and classed 
urban center.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
“In this matter of Dignity”: 
Black Labor, Collective Action, and the Urban Order 
 
 
In the very same year that civil authorities mandated the re-location of the 
tolerance zone to the Transvaal, unionized port workers organized a city-wide strike that 
paralyzed the Port of Cienfuegos and immobilized the most powerful sectors of the city. 
Planters, merchants and military authorities refused to accede to the demands of the 
laborers, considering that their concessions in previous strikes had afforded the laborers 
too much control over working conditions, which in turn gave them influence over the 
economies of the wealthy and the commerce of the port. Previous strikes had transformed 
a mass of obedient workers into one of the most powerful and militant labor 
organizations in Cuba. Considering the dire consequences of their past failures to control 
laborers, American military officials turned to repression to quell strikers. 
The wealthy commercial elite and the American military authorities in Cienfuegos 
rejected the demands of unionized port workers. Planter and merchants sought to keep 
wages low to maintain high profit margins. Organized labor threatened to reduce the 
profit margins of the commercial elite, while possibly overturning the social order that 
guaranteed a large, docile work force. Port workers were instrumental in connecting 
planters and merchants to the world of trade, the very basis of their prosperity. Planters so 
closely relied on those men who loaded and unloaded the ships, facilitating the exports of 
sugar and the imports of the machinery. The pliability of this labor force hinged on the 
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vulnerability of the laborer to the whims of the employers, whose low wages ensured 
long-term dependence on the plantation economy and its urban offshoots, such as 
railroads and sea ports. 
Collective action among workers undermined the position of total authority of 
employers, and forced them to reckon with uniondemands for a family wage, at their own 
expense. Yet, in Cienfuegos, the conflict took on an added dimension, as mainly Spanish 
merchants and American planters confronted a racially-heterogeneous union. The port 
workers unions, especially the stevedore union, organized black, white and immigrant 
workers, exhibiting a cross-racial class alliance that was rare in the United States.
924
 
Although the stevedore union counted both blacks and whites among its membership, the 
largest number of members was of African descent, a fact planters and merchants well 
recognized. One American in particular, Edwin F. Atkins, exploited the racial 
composition of the union to delegitimize the demands of stevedores by portraying the 
union as a racial, rather than a class union. Workers, in turn, combated these racialized 
depictions and accusations by consistently employing a language of class to demand 
concessions from capital. Regardless of the internally- and externally-imposed 
“identities” of these workers, they emphasized their role as working-class men over all 
others subjectivities. 
The series of port worker strikes between 1899 and 1902 illustrate the conflicting 
strategies of approaching racial inequality. While merchants turned to racial arguments to 
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encourage the intervention of the American military in labor strikes, port workers 
demanded a living wage, based on their status as working men and heads of household. 
Civil authorities including the mayor and the chief of police served as mediators between 
laborers, merchants and planters, and American military officials. Although elected 
officials relied on the working-class vote for continued political power, they used their 
position to silence the labor unions, showing collaboration with the Americans, while still 
retaining claims to political patronage of urban laborers. Moreover employers used their 
connections to the military government to promote an increasingly repressive agenda 
against labor, while they fostered internal divisions within the union itself. Fragmentation 
within the union combined with collaboration of civil authorities, military officials and 
the commercial elite contributed to the disintegration of the stevedore union as threat to 
elite power in the urban center of Cienfuegos.  
 
The Race-Labor Hierarchy and Post-War Expectations 
 
“At the close of the revolution in 1898 the blacks as a whole dropped into their 
accustomed place and resumed their industries. Some remained in the field until the final 
disbandment in the spring of 1899.”925 This passage appeared in an American newspaper, 
The Herald, in November 1906, shortly after the onset of the second American 
intervention. To a certain degree, this statement rightly points out the overwhelming 
continuities in the social structure before and after the war of independence. Reading this 
statement, Americans might have assumed that blacks willingly returned to the low-
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paying jobs in cane cutting, manual and day labor. More accurately, however, this 
statement suggests how successful American and Cuban authorities were in maintaining 
racial order after the war. 
At the time the war began, planters and merchants in Cienfuegos relied heavily 
upon a workforce that had changed little since the times of slavery. The lives of men and 
women of African descent who acquired freedom during the gradual process of 
emancipation between 1870 and 1886 changed relatively little. Many families remained 
on the plantations on which they were born or had lived most of their lives, and continued 
to work for the same hacendados after they achieved freedom. Sufficient laborers 
remained on sugar plantations in Cienfuegos after emancipation so as not to disrupt the 
sugar production.
926
 If they did not remain as laborers on sugar estates, some enslaved 
men and women sought work as colonos, independent cultivators of sugar, who were 
usually bound to the large mills who bought and processed their raw cane.
927
 While 
planters increasingly employed imported Spanish labor, formerly enslaved men and 
women remained a vital source of labor on the sugar estates (See Table 9).
928
 Numerous 
formerly enslaved people with the last name of Sarría worked as colonos on lands 
surrounding the Soledad estate.
929
 At the ports, black men also provided the labor to load 
the sugar onto steamers destined for the United States and elsewhere since at least the 
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1880s.
930
 The immense wealth generated from sugar production, then relied on the steady 
labor a predominantly black workforce.  
 
Table 9: Race of Workmen on Soledad, by Colonia, January 1899
931
 
 Spaniards Blacks Chinese Native Whites Total 
Factory 215 10 48 37 310 
Railroad 34 - - 4 38 
Belmonte 71 88 69 43 271 
Rosario 27 35 1 22 185 
González 17 231 3 71 322 
Torres 12 98 - 17 127 
Martínez - 6 - 24 30 
Total 376 468 121 218 1183 
% 31.79 39.57 10.23 16.43 100 
 
The war disrupted the labor force in two main ways. First, the Cuban and Spanish 
armies both prohibited work on sugar estates and persecuted laborers who remained on 
the estates. In late 1895, Máximo Gómez ordered the Cuban army to “Destroy all sugar 
estates; burn their cane and defen[s]es at their factories, as well as destroy their railroad 
lines. Every laborer shall be treated as a traitor, who lends any assistance to these sugar 
factories.”932 At one place they found some men working and cut off their hands and feet; 
at another place two days ago they killed seventeen laborers—this by people who are 
appealing to the United States to stop the barbarous warfare of the Spanish troops.”933 In 
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other instances, workers were captured and taken by the insurgents, as was the case of the 
cowboy [boyero] on Soledad in early January, 1896.
934
 
Men of African descent seemed to be especially vulnerable to attack if they 
continued laboring on the sugar estates instead of taking up arms for Cuba Libre. For 
example, the black insurgent chief Claudio Sarría, killed one worker carrying his same 
last name, one which indicated a common link to enslavement on the Soledad estate 
which he shared with Claudio: “One of our monteros was hung the other day; Blas Sarría 
by Claudio Sarría.”935 Another example of war-time violence against working blacks was 
the case of Elias, a vender of bread and sweets, who was slayed on the outskirts of the 
Amistad plantation in Güines owned by the Cienfuegos-based Terry family: “…the 
cadaver of a black man was found machete […] missing the left arm and presenting 
various machete wounds in the body and on the head…”936 “Of the versions collected on 
said estate, it appears that a few days ago the said black man was foraging  in the same 
place where he was killed, the insurgents gave him various blows with flat of a machete 
and threatened to kill him if he returned to that point, and verifying it yesterday they 
consummate the threat they had given him…”937 Work proved to be a dangerous 
undertaking for some rural men during the war. 
Shortly after the Cubans prohibited the sugar harvest, General Pedro Pin, Spanish 
Commander in Cienfuegos, received orders from Valeriano Weyler, Captain General of 
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Cuba, to suspend the harvest until the 15
th
 or 20
th
 of January, as punishment for having 
paid off the insurgents in the previous season.
938
 The Spanish generals ordered that the 
guerrillas arrest workers who attempted to work without passes.
939
 Sometimes passes 
were denied to the workers who requested them, as they were on December 28, 1896 
with a contractor of Soledad, the Chinese man Damian Machado.
940
  Peter M. Beal 
complained to the United States Consul in January 1897 that a Spanish guerrilla unit 
under the command of Severino Pérez declared the passes invalid to prevent 200 laborers 
from working on Soledad.
941
 The persecution of laborers from both Spanish and Cuban 
sides of the war was enough to frustrate workers and discourage them from returning to 
the estates to face more obstacles. 
A second way the war disrupted the labor force was that it transformed some poor 
country dwellers into proud war heroes. This was especially the case for men who had 
ascended in the ranks of the Cuban army. One such example was Claudio Sarría, who had 
lived his entire live on the Soledad estate up until joining the insurrection in 1895. By 
November 1896, he was captain of his own company.
942
 After the war, Sarría did not 
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return to the countryside, partially because his activities during the war earned him the 
passionate hatred of local planters, and perhaps as well because he sought to break free of 
plantation life by moving to the city.
943
 As a result, veterans were more reluctant to return 
to work on the sugar estates if they remained in the countryside, and may have been more 
inclined toward collective action if they took up manual work in the city. 
Planters, who relied on cheap labor in both the countryside and the city worried 
that the war had disrupted the social order to such a degree that it threatened their ability 
to procure a workforce. The situation “is not all one could wish here and the insurgents, 
particularly the negroes do not show a disposition to give up their arms or go to work; 
labor is scarce and uncertain,” wrote Atkins of black veterans.944 In response to anxieties 
expressed by other military officials and local planters in Matanzas and Santa Clara, a 
confident James H. Wilson asserted in June 1899 that “the intelligence and dominating 
tendencies of the white race, aided by the docility and usefulness of the dark races, may 
surely be trusted to settle the race question.”945 Planters and American military officials 
concurred that the natural place of blacks was in the laboring classes. Bartolomé Masó, a 
prominent Cuban patriot reassured Americans that “our negroes will work as before [the 
war] in the cane-fields, and I see no reason to anticipate trouble from them.”946 An 
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American planter, a high-ranking American military official and a Cuban patriot could all 
agree that the proper role for blacks was labor. 
In the city, black veterans had few options for employment. In general, men of 
African descent faced exclusion from politics, education and government employment. 
Some black veterans were able to secure work in the municipal police force, while most 
others poured into the ranks of the working class. It is no mistake that the workers of 
Cienfuegos erected an arch of triumph in celebration of the inauguration of the Cuban 
republic in 1902, celebrating the culmination of the achievement for which many of them 
had fought. Most significant was the placement of this monument representing the 
racially-heterogeneous working-class population of the city in a prominent and highly 
visible space in the central Parque Martí, a zone that catered to the predominantly white 
elite residents who resided there.
947
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Image 20: Arco de Triunfo dedicated to the Cuban Republic y the Workers of 
Cienfuegos
948
 
As the urban working class expanded after the war, so too did the prominence of 
labor unions. Numerous associations of workers—some with roots in the late colonial 
period—emerged with renewed vigor in the first months of the military occupation. 
Between 1899 and 1900, laborers across the trades created organization to represent their 
interests and secure their economic survival, resulting in an explosion of unions during 
the first year of American rule. By early 1900, 26 organizations explicitly labeled as 
unions (gremios) were registered with the police in Cienfuegos. Among the unions were 
diverse trades, skilled and unskilled workers from cow-milkers and tobacco workers to 
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bakers and day laborers. Several other clubs also reflected collective action among 
workers, including the Circulo de Trabajadores, at the same time as other organizations 
under police supervisions sought to provide safety networks for the poor and maintain 
bartering and resource sharing associations.
949
 
It is probable that veterans of color nourished the ranks of a burgeoning number 
of urban labor unions after the war. This was certainly the case for the unions of the port. 
The gremio de lancheros, or lightermen’s union had as its president the prominent veteran 
Antonio Gómez Sosa. Numerous members of the largest and most powerful unions in 
Cienfuegos, the gremio de estibadores, or stevedore union were also veterans. Indeed, 
roughly one of every five men who joined the union between January 1899 and May 
1902 appeared in the roster of Cuban veterans compiled by General Carlos Roloff. Nearly 
as many more men had patronymics too common to ascertain for certain whether they 
participated in the revolution.
950
 There was even variation among the veterans, some like 
Juan Garmendia, having joined in the early months of the war, and others, such as Miguel 
Palacios, enlisting after the American intervention. Some of these men had reached non-
commissioned officer rank in the army. Abraham Castillo, Modesto Madrazo, Pedro 
Mendoza, Juan Álvarez, and Juan Garmendia finished the war as 2
nd
 sergeants, Antonio 
Bacallao was 1
st
 sergeant.
951
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Though not unique to the period of American military occupation, the unions 
provided a vital resource for working men and especially veterans after the war. This was 
a critical time. Food and housing prices were high, and well-paying work was scarce, and 
competition for these jobs was fierce. For example, most working-class families could 
not afford to by meat because of the high prices. Americans estimated that the price of 
food was 30 centenes per capita per day, which they labeled as “high,” as most rations 
were imported from the United States.
952
 At the same time as prices for necessities 
soared, merchants and planters sought to recuperate their financial losses from the war by 
keeping wages low for workers. This led one American military official to the conclusion 
that “the slave idea” still prevailed among certain plantation owners.953 Doubtless, this 
same mentality applied to their dealings with urban laborers. 
Collective action provided workers a greater possibility to securing higher wages 
and more humane working conditions. For example, the self-proclaimed mission of the 
coopers’ union was to “protect the workers of the Union against the unjust demands of 
manufacturers and obtain the highest prices possible for the work.”954 The butchers’ 
union similarly formed “to defend the workers.”955 The painters’ union stated as its 
objected to support the “moral and material good” of its members.956 These among other 
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unions provided workers with a powerful tool with which to navigate the discouraging 
economic conditions after the war. 
At the core of the organized labor movement in Cienfuegos were the workers of 
the Port. Port workers performed a variety of different jobs and were essential in keeping 
the shipment of goods in and out of Cienfuegos. Lightermen operated lighters, boats that 
transported the good between the ships anchored in the Port and the docks. 
Longshoremen loaded and unloaded cargo from the littoral, while stevedores loaded and 
unloaded cargo on the docks located on the southernmost frontier of the city bordering 
the Ensenada of Marsillán. Most aspects of port work involved heavy manual labor and 
required tremendous physical strength, agility and endurance as working hours tended to 
be long. Work was generally dangerous, inconsistent and poorly remunerated, making the 
livelihoods of many laborers precarious. The port workers’ unions aimed to defend the 
interests of workers, secure higher wages, and provide safer working conditions, amidst 
the punishing conditions of port work. These goals seemed to be very attractive to the 
dock laborers. In 1899, over one hundred workers had joined the stevedore union. By 
1901, the union boasted a membership of at least 250.
957
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Map 7:  Docks in the Bay of Cienfuegos
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Image 21: Southward view of Steamer at the Muelle Real (Royal Wharf) circa 
1900.
958
 
Image 22: Northward view of wharf and warehouses, circa 1900
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A Black Union in a White City 
 
Men of African descent were at the core of the port worker mobilization from 
early on. As early as the 1870s, stevedores in Cienfuegos had developed organizations to 
represent the interests of dock workers.
960
 For example, Manuel Soriano, a member of the 
black mutual aid society called San Cayetano, organized a society of stevedores. In May 
1889, his employers took him to court, demanding the disintegration of the society of 
stevedores Soriano had established. Exceedingly polite and conciliatory, Soriano 
requested that a neutral third party inspect the accounts so that the workers could be paid 
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before the society was disbanded.
961
 Although the Soriano attempted to bolster the 
position of laborers by experimenting with collective action, the employer sought to 
undermine their position by disbanding the union. 
 What in 1889 had met failure, became one of the most powerful organizations 
representing the rights of workers during the American military occupation. Stevedores, 
alongside their comrades in other port workers unions including the lightermen and 
longshoremen confronted the wealthiest merchants and planters of the city to demand 
better working conditions, more control over hiring practices, and higher rates of 
compensation. By confronting the commercial elite directly, the stevedores violated 
prevailing expectations of racial etiquette and challenged elite pretensions to perpetuate 
the colonial social hierarchy that they had fought so many years to dismantle. 
In contrast to the other port workers unions, the stevedore union was composed of 
a large proportion of men of African descent.  The stevedore union included men of 
diverse places of origin, including a few European (mainly Spanish) immigrants, and 
even men who had been born in Africa. Nevertheless, the vast majority of union members 
were men of African descent.
962
 Whites did join the union as well, but they were few in 
numbers, and for the most part did not occupy positions of leadership. In 1904, the first 
year for which racial statistics are available, 5 of the 35 men who joined the union were 
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classified as white. These were Wenceslao Rodríguez, Manuel Pérez Albuerme, Manuel 
Delgado Matenz, José de Jesús Zerquera and José Juan de M. Delgado.
963
 
Black men composed the leadership of the stevedore union. Indeed, the president 
of the union for the majority of the military occupation was a mulatto man, Romualdo 
Amezquita. He was from a fairly well-off family. He likely benefited even further from 
his leadership position in the union and through his collaboration with the conservative-
leaning local politicians including José Antonio Frías.
964
 By 1905, he had reached a 
position that enabled him to run for a seat in the senate.
965
 Moreover, delegates and union 
office holders seemed to have enjoyed a certain degree of prestige among local black 
associations and wielded some landed property and a modicum of wealth. Manuel 
Soriano was the president of the Sociedad San Cayetano. The union maintained official 
relations with a variety of African societies and associations of color of Cienfuegos.
966
 
Among the associations of color recognized by the union were the prestigious Sociedad 
Minerva, and the Institución Antonio Maceo. The union also recognized and sustained 
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relations with the African societies including Divina Caridad, Santa Bárbara, and San 
Cayetano.
967
 
Another prominent organization whose membership included several members of 
the union was the Cabildo Congo, though this organization was curiously absent from the 
list of official relations of the union. Francisco Garmendia served as vice president of the 
Cabildo Congo in 1902, at the same time as he occupied the position of cabeza de 
cuadrilla in the Stevedore Union.
968
 Juan de Dios Torres, whose membership in the 
Union was firm until his defection in 1902, also held key leadership positions in the 
Cabildo Congo and a parallel ethnic association called Sociedad de Instrucción y Recreo 
de Africanos Nación de Portugués San Teresa de Meditando.
969
 Members of these and 
other black societies were common among the membership of the stevedore union, 
suggesting that many of the members had reached some level of economic stability, to be 
able to pay the members’ dues of these societies. 
Many more members emerged from more humble origins. During the military 
occupation, many of the members of the union came from several of the largest 
plantations in the area, on which they or their parents had been enslaved. Of those 
workers who joined during the military occupation, five held the patronymic Sarría, 
indicating former slave status on the Soledad sugar plantation once owned by one of the 
most prominent slave-owning families of the region. Another held name with the last 
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name of Pombert is likely to have toiled as a slave on the Hormiguero estate, owned by 
the Ponvert family. Yet another member, Teodoro Terry, probably worked on the Caracas 
estate owned by another wealthy slave-owning family, the Terrys. Other patronymics 
among the union members, including Acea, Tartabull, Abreus, and Quesada suggest that 
formerly enslaved men and their descendants were represented strongly in the stevedore 
union.
970
 At least one of these men was African-born. Manuel Congo kept the typical last 
name assigned to African slaves recognized as Congo.
971
 Surviving photographs of 
stevedores from the early twentieth century suggest that some members may have had 
Chinese ancestry as well, though they retained racial labels showing their African 
descent.
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Image 23: Miscellaneous 
photographs of 
Stevedores, 1904-1921
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The union members occasionally were involved in racial protest. The Union maintained 
official relations with a numbers of local unions in Cienfuegos, some with black memberships.
972
 
Stevedores were active in the struggle to end segregation in Cienfuegos. Stevedore Daniel Rufalé 
known by the alias of “Machete” because involved in a brawl with the owner local café “Primero 
de Artesanos” in 1894.  Rufalé testified in during the trial against him for “maltrato de obra,” 
that the owner of the café Manuel Fernández charged blacks a prohibitively high price for coffee. 
When Rufalé protested, Fernández threw the tray and cups into the street, a scandal which 
attracted a crowd of onlookers. Rufalé left the café quietly.
973
 
The union sometimes extended its solidarity to other workers on issues of racial 
inequality. They worked in conjunction with trade unions across the island—especially the 
provincial capital of Santa Clara and the national capital of Havana, and even internationally.
974
 
For example, the Union sent a delegation to Havana in support of a strike on behalf of the 
tobacco workers. The tobacco workers, according to the stevedores, had a just cause: higher 
wages in the cigar band, and the de-segregation of the schools for children at the tobacco 
factories, to promote the “learning of all Cuban children without distinction of color”975 
Florentino Pascual and Manuel Méndez were sent to Havana as the representatives of the Union 
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in support of the Tabaqueros. Racial solidarity, it seems, was a significant feature of union 
activity. 
Racial solidarity did not equate to racial unity. The union brought together men of 
conflicting political beliefs and histories of service. While numerous members had served in the 
Cuban army, at least two men served Spain. Juan Garmendia, a member of the union in 1899, 
also served Volunteer in Spanish Cuerpo de Ingenieros (Engineer Corps). Máximo Cuesta also 
served as in the same force at least as early as 1894. He appeared among the union ranks in 1901, 
likely having been a member since much earlier. In this capacity, Máximo frequently clashed 
with urban criminals, including several encounters with Magín himself. On one occasion, 
Máximo accused Magín of slapping and threatening him. Magín allegedly “between the insults, 
said offensive words [palabras groseras] because the claimant belongs to the Engineers Corps as 
a volunteer.” 976 The emphasis on political animosity between these two men suggests that even 
if Magín did not directly serve in the Cuban army, he may have enacted his political allegiance to 
the Cuban cause through his resistance to Spanish military officials like Máximo. Magín, it 
seems, was somewhat of an urban variety of social bandit, rather than a common criminal.
977
 
The encounter between these two men illustrates some of the political rivalries entering 
into the union in 1899. The union brought together men who taken up arms for Spain, men who 
fought for or in some way supported Cuba Libre, and men who refused to take sides. What is 
more, most of these men were black, regardless of their political orientation, and including the 
two men who actively served Spain. This contradicts the conventional wisdom that blacks almost 
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unanimously supported the revolution, and may have produced conflict within the union as well. 
Máximo did not get along well with other union members, weather for political or personal 
reasons. “Said compañero each time becomes more undisciplined, fighting with members, 
insulting Delegates when he is not called to work, undermining their instructions when called to 
work, instituting proceedings against the board of the union among other behaviors that reflected 
poorly on the union,” charged Federico Ramírez.978 Máximo was increasingly censured in union 
meetings in 1901 and 1902, including a forced removal from the meeting hall for disruptive 
behavior.
979
 Eventually the members of the union including several Cuban veterans voted to 
expel him from the association altogether.
980
 This incident suggests that while race certainly 
provided a commonality among most of the stevedores, it was insufficient to foster unity amidst 
political and personal fragmentation. 
Although race may not have been the only—or even the most important, for that matter—
motive of union among stevedores, it was a significant feature of union life that workers had to 
confront. The racial composition of the union presented unique challenges for the workers. The 
union boasted a large, organized and militant black membership and powerful black leaders, 
while merchants and planters were white. This gave class-based confrontations between labor 
and capital a semblance of a racial confrontation between blacks and whites. Indeed, with the 
proliferating rumors of black rebellion and the omnipresent specter of “Negro rule” that seemed 
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to define local politics during the American occupation, demands of black workers could easily 
fit within an already-existing framework of racial conflict. 
It probably did not help the stevedores that some of the members had been involved in 
crime in prior years. Workers in more precarious economic circumstances resorted to various 
alternatives to supplement their incomes. Some members dabbled in crime to supplement their 
incomes. One example was Magín Torre, the brother of Juan de Dios Torre. Born in August 
1864 to the emancipated African Josefina, Magín first entered the criminal system in Cienfuegos 
in February 1881, when he was only sixteen.
981
 He began as a petty thief, living on Dorticós 
Street, between Casales and Velasco, the historic port-side black neighborhood and 
entertainment district. During the war, Magín had turned from petty crime and robbery to 
pimping, facing imprisonment numerous times.
982
 Magín, despite various expulsions, remained 
part of the union until his death in 1922.
983
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Arguments and fights were known to occur. Indicative of earlier conflicts between union 
members was one fight that broke out between two union stevedores, Tomás Padrón and Manuel 
Mendez in September 1902.
984
 The fight began with a work accident. Attempting to board a boat 
to return to shore, Tomás threw a plank toward the launch on which Manuel rode. As the plank 
came down, it smashed Manuel in the head. Manuel shouted profane words to which Tomas took 
offense. Tomas “rejected it [the obscene word], saying to the compañero Méndez that he did not 
permit anyone to use those words on him.”985 Manuel replied that he had said the words in “the 
explosion of pain that was caused him by the blow of the said plank that had been delivered to 
him in the head, but without mind to personal offense.” Tomas was not satisfied. He began to 
insult Manuel with offensive words. Uniting action with words, he inflicted upon Méndez a 
wound with an arme blanche, as the verbal exchange escalating into a physical attack.
986
 
The portside neighborhood of Marsillán was an area stevedores and other port workers 
frequented as they awaited the shape-up, took a meal, or gathered after work in one of the many 
cafés and bars that lined the streets closest to the wharves. Their meeting house was located in 
this neighborhood as well. The neighborhood, already known for various forms of vice including 
prostitution, consumption of alcohol, and gambling was also the site of violent conflicts among 
stevedores. The rowdy and violent behavior of some union members reflected poorly on the 
union because it seemed to corroborate prevailing racial ideologies that condemned blacks for 
their innate criminal tendencies. Indeed, the stakes of “respectable” behavior were high, union 
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leaders knew. The behavior considered dishonorable or uncivilized could cost the union success 
in their negotiations for workers’ rights. 
Union leaders recognized that the racial composition of the union could pose unique 
challenges to securing gains for workers. The culture of respectability emphasized among the 
union leadership was one of their key strategies in bolstering the power and influence of the 
union among people who assumed the laborers were just a bunch of brutes.
987
 At the heart of 
protecting the working-class (black) family was the discourse of dignity and prestige. To uphold 
the image of working-class men as respectable, dignified and honorable, union leaders enacted a 
strict code of conduct among its members. The union leadership demanded that its members 
engage in “proper” behavior, etiquette, and order at work and in public. This meant using polite 
language, avoiding profanity and violence, and remaining calm so as to preserve “moral order” 
These prohibitions, leaders claimed, were necessary to protect the prestige of the association.
988
 
The high value union leaders placed on orderly behavior was evident in the strict codes of 
discipline maintained by the union. The union had its own system of surveillance: the Delegados 
supervised all work and were responsible for reporting any incidents or fights. The union also 
had its own justice system in the form of internal courts staffed by members who tried offenders 
of the Reglamento and order. Fights between members, dishonesty and even profanity were 
censured severely in the name of the prestige of the union and its members.
989
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The racial composition of the Stevedore Union of Cienfuegos provided stevedores an 
added challenge in their confrontations with the merchants and businessmen of Cienfuegos. 
While the union demanded higher wages and better working conditions for the workers, planters 
and merchants rejected these demands as excessive, sometimes turning to racial arguments to 
undermine the claims of workers. This ongoing struggle between labor and capital, thus, took 
racial overtones. Workers initially made gains, while avoiding racial language in their claims. 
The series of strikes of the Cienfuegos port workers during the first two years of the military 
occupation paralyzed business and crushed white hopes of a docile black working class. The 
union became powerful challenge to hopes that blacks would simply return to their pre-war 
“place.” 
 
The Strike of April 1899 
 
One of the first signs of the power and militancy of organized labor in Cienfuegos was a 
strike by the stevedores in collaboration with other dock workers, and laborers of the warehouses 
and railroads in early April 1899. Although this was not the first strike during the military 
occupation, it was one of the first to command the undivided attention of local military officials. 
Laborers demanded an increase in their pay by $0.50. Merchants and planters denigrated these 
demands as harmful to their interests, unreasonable, and even excessive. Captain Walter B. 
Barker, Captain of the Port of Cienfuegos, supposedly an arbiter between the two sides of the 
conflict, seemed to be an advocate and spokesperson for the propertied classes during the strike. 
In an investigation of the strike, he reported that “for the past two days I have made a thorough 
investigation of their grievances and I am constrained to say that the claims of the laborers are 
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unjust.”990 American military authorities, in communication with sugar and shipping interests, 
justified their refusal to negotiate with the laborers by calling attention to their low status of in 
implicit comparison with the supposed respectability of the property owners. 
Barker was particularly forthcoming with his contempt for the workers, which he 
expressed in unfavorable descriptions of them. “Investigation proves that this movement was 
instigated by a rabble element acting in the guise of a labor union which had no organization at 
the time the strike took place,” wrote Barker of the laborers. He emphasized the disreputable 
character of the strikers, suggesting that they not only threatened wealth but also menaced order. 
“This movement is inspired by a low, disorderly element, and unless checked instantly will lead 
to serious trouble,” wrote Barker urgently.991 The depiction of the union workers as a “rabble” 
and a “low, disorderly element,” possibly encompassing certain racial undertones, highlighted an 
assumption that stevedores were incapable of forming a real union. This characterization of the 
workers “acting in the guise of a labor union,” served to delegitimize their demands. 
Certainly, the position taken by Barker in the preliminary negotiations suggests that he 
had already decided who was “right” before talks even began. While property owners stood to 
lose profits if sugar was not shipped, laborers risked extreme hardship and even starvation of 
their families in order to demand better working conditions. Both laborers and property owners 
refused to stand down from their respective positions, and intervention from military authorities 
proved futile. After the failed attempt to resolve differences, conditions were becoming desperate 
for the property owners. The collective action of laborers across the trades paralyzed work in the 
Port, resulting in financial losses for sugar planters among others. Barker again voiced the 
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concerns of merchant and planters to his superiors: “Due to the strike all available transportation, 
both in the harbor and on the railroad is useless. Lighters and tugs are being loaded with sugar. If 
a transport arrives here within the next three or four days and laborers do not resume work at 
once we are very helpless to make any movement.”992 The language Barker employed in his 
communications to his military superiors was almost identical to the language property owners, 
especially Atkins employed in his later protests.  
Due to the militancy of the laborers, Barker recommended “drastic action” to suppress 
the strikers. He encouraged a military solution to a civil dispute, suggesting that American troops 
be called in to end the strike. Even as he awaited an answer to his request for military 
intervention, Barker was eager to take matters into his own hands. He informed his superiors that 
he would preemptively detain the lead strikers: “While awaiting instructions I shall, if able to 
apprehend them, hold in custody the men who have assumed to represent the strikers.”993 Barker 
contended that violence was the most effective method to control the laborers. 
Revealing his more private sentiments toward the strikers, Barker sent a hand written, 
seemingly unofficial note to his commanding officer, Louis V. Caziarc. He confessed how he 
had actually handled the strike at Cienfuegos: “I put it to them that unless the lighters were 
unloaded at once and other necessary work required to enable me to proceed with the work 
before me, I was [going to] ‘shoot ‘em on the spot.’”994 This note reflected an increasing 
willingness among military authorities across the island to use violence to control poor and 
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working-class Cubans. Military action and summary detention of strikers would become the 
principal methods for controlling labor across the island. 
The April strike ended when employers agreed to increase the wages of laborers by 
$0.50.
995
 On a holiday or at night, the wages were doubled. No military force was allowed to 
suppress the strikers. Nevertheless, the gains achieved by the union were marred by the ominous 
precedent Barker had set with his demands for military action. Indeed, the strike of April 1899 
highlights the project of certain ambitious military men, namely Barker, to play a more dominant 
role in civil affairs under the occupying government. Even though a civil government had been 
established in January, and technically had legal jurisdiction over municipal matters, “each little 
jackass seemed to feel that he was called upon to command the people, manage their public 
business, and supervise their daily duties,” as James H. Wilson put it.996 
The increasingly prominent role of American military officials in local affairs would 
become evident subsequent conflicts with laborers. Just one month after the settlement of the 
strike, quartermaster employees under Barker engaged in a violent dispute with stevedores 
contracted by the captain of the port. This conflict, the May riot, resulted in questions about how 
Barker had come to occupy the position as captain of the port.
997
  The self-appointment of 
American military officials to civil posts reflected a broader pattern under the rule of General 
John C. Bates, the commander of Cienfuegos, a development that Cuban civil authorities 
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resented.
998
 In the coming months, civil authorities would play in increasingly prominent role in 
negotiation with organized labor interests. Indeed, the civil authorities would act as the mediators 
between American military authorities of the port and property owners on the one hand, and 
union leaders on the other. 
 
The Dock Workers Strike of February 1900 
  
In February 1900, the tension between capital and labor again came to a boiling point in 
Cienfuegos, as dock workers struck work for the seventh time within one year. Rallying the 
powerful network of labor unions and associations of color, the dock workers successfully 
paralyzed business in the port, and even threatened the ability of planters on the adjacent sugar 
plantations to export their products. While dock works demanded higher wage, commercial elites 
sought military suppression of the workers, and the forced disbandment of the unions to secure 
their position and control of business in the port. 
In this strike, Cuban civil authorities played an active role in mediation between capital 
and labor. They sought to prevent American military intervention in civil affairs, not only to 
preserve their image as fit to govern, but also to secure public support for their candidacy in the 
upcoming June elections. At the same time as the proximate elections reduced their willingness 
to accede to military action, civil authorities also had to keep up the appearance of 
“respectability” and “intelligence” by defending the interests of property owners. Civil 
authorities served as the mediators among labor, capital and American military officials, while 
balancing their own dual need for working-class votes and legitimacy with Americans. 
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The events leading up to the strike begin several weeks earlier when lightermen 
demanded higher wages and to be paid in American gold instead of Spanish currency. In a letter 
to the owners of lighters on February 5, 1900, Antonio Gómez Sosa, president of the 
Lightermen’s union wrote: “I have the pleasure of enclosing you a copy of the new tariff by 
which this association is to be governed hereafter. In sending you the new tariff, we beg you 
notify us before the 8
th
 of your views, as the desire of this association is to harmonize your 
interests with ours.”999 The language and tone of the letter seemingly leveled the status of 
humble workers and wealthy elites. Gómez Sosa who had rendered distinguished services as the 
commandant of the Gómez regiment in the Cuban Army.
1000
 The transformative experience of 
combat perhaps instilled him with a semblance of the revolutionary goals of social justice, as he 
confronted some of the wealthiest and most powerful men and firms of Cienfuegos.  
Merchants did not respond well to such a firm challenge to their authority. On February 
8, Nicolás Castaño of Castaño & Co., replied to the letter from the lightermen: “we have to state: 
That we cannot agree to what that association by itself has made, without consulting, discussing, 
or consenting previously with the owners of lighters, consignees, freighters, and merchants, as 
naturally and reasonably it should have been done.” Moreover, Castaño refused to pay the higher 
wages: “The undersigned cannot admit nor will admit [an]other tariff for the payment of day 
wages to pilots and sailors than what the present one orders,” Castaño wrote. He made clear his 
resentment of the demands of the workers, pointing out that the previous rates had been 
“imposed a few months ago at the free will of that association, who considers itself owner and 
arbitrator of the interests of all this city.” Castaño feared that any further concessions to the 
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laborers would lead only to the rising power of the union: “Inasmuch as the demands greater day 
by day endear life in general and cause notable damage to commerce without caring a straw 
about one thing or the other.”1001 Castaño perceived the growing influence, power and exigencies 
of the laborers in Cienfuegos as a threat to the social order that provided a strict division and 
power differential between capital and labor. 
According to Castaño, the workers exceeded their role by demanding a higher wage. He 
expressed this idea in terms of rights: “Neither can we, nor should we consent to impositions of 
any kind, and much the less to tolerate that what belongs to us be governed  and regulated by 
whom for the same is unauthorized nor has any right to.” An ardent defense for the necessity of 
economic stratification, Castaño argued that the business interests were the only ones with the 
authority to change the terms of work, because their interests were at stake. He signed off with a 
menacing warning to the Union. He would not hesitate to defend what he perceived as his rights: 
“To conclude, I remind you, expecting you will not forget the warning, that our laws forbid 
menace and coaction, and that we are disposed to defend our rights and interests at all costs, even 
with sacrifices and costing whatever it may cost.”1002 By expressing his interests in terms of 
rights, Castaño revealed a vision of Cuban society that centered on the social and economic 
subordination of the working classes. 
Image 24: Esteban Cacicedo y Torriente
1003
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Property owners pointed to the recent history of labor unrest to bolster their claims that 
the demands were excessive and unreasonable. Two dozen merchants and businessmen of 
Cienfuegos, including Esteban Cacicedo, an ardent defender of Spanish rule, and members of the 
Huike and Terry families, petitioned General Wood to dissolve the labor unions. Just weeks 
earlier, dock workers of Cienfuegos organized a strike to protest the importation of foreign 
workers by shippers to unload the vessels.
1004
 “Strike of Shore Laborers stevedores and the Bay 
Cartmen and others as lightermen connected with the Commercial Trade which gives the life to 
this town have happened so frequently and [it] is taking place again today,” a group of merchants 
and businessmen wrote to the military authorities in Cienfuegos. The merchants could not 
understand why the laborers were striking, because they considered that the work was so “well 
remunerated.”1005 It seemed that a settlement with the stevedores had just been brokered with the 
lightermen were issuing new demands. 
Under what they claimed was the constant threat of strikes, the merchants appealed to 
General Wood for help: “we consider ourselves at the mercy of the Laborers association existing 
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here which cause[s] a general trouble with their regulations formed by themselves without 
having consulted the paying classes…”1006 Appealing to the implicit mission of the military 
occupation, merchants and businessmen begged the military government to defend the interests 
of the wealthy, many of whom were American, American-financed, or proponents of American 
rule. We “beg you very respectfully to dissolve the laborers association until new regulations 
have been formed with General approval of the paying classes and governments [sic] authority,” 
they pleaded to General Wood.
1007
 
The dissolution of the unions, the merchants claimed, would benefit everyone involved. 
Certainly, their plan would “protect our interests as well as all concerned of the general trade and 
also avoid a decreasing condition of prosperity of the harbor and town of Cienfuegos which may 
be the consequence of high tariffs and continuous strikes.” They also argued, though, that the 
dissolution of the unions would be the best outcome for the workers as well. It “will, we 
consider, result in their own benefit for a better march of their association.”1008 With this rather 
paternalist argument, the merchants may have been referring to what they perceived as the 
damaging consequences of high expectations and agitation among labor leaders, inciting the 
fancies of workers and resulting in strikes. 
 No one more than Edwin F. Atkins bristled before the labor demands. He approached the 
strike with two main strategies. First, he sought to undermine the claims of the workers by using 
racial arguments. Second, he simultaneously criticized the way civil authorities handled the 
strike in order to compel American military intervention in the strike. According to Atkins the 
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strike provided proof that Cuban separatists were unfit for self-government, as they could not 
preserve order. 
Atkins argued that the strike was yet another manifestation of racial disorder. Similar to 
the way Barker depicted laborers during the April 1899 strike, Atkins attributed the increase in 
the demands of laborers in 1900 to agitators. He wrote frantically to General Wood pointing out 
the fragmented interests within the lightermen’s union: “Careful inquiry satisfied me that the 
lightermen who are Spaniards are satisfied as a class with present wages, and would go to work 
did they not fear to disobey the orders of the union, which seems to be dominated by certain 
Cubans.”1009 According to Atkins, the Spaniards “were afraid of the negroes and Cubans who, 
they said, would kill them if they disobeyed orders or refused to join their associations…”1010 He 
seemed to suggest that blacks were responsible for the trouble. 
 Barker concurred with Atkins. He interpreted the strike as yet another example of 
agitators inciting the lower classes: “As far as I can ascertain facts their claims [are] not founded 
on justice but an imposition on merchants and apparently the work of a few agitators for no other 
purpose than to keep themselves in prominence.”1011 Barker echoed Atkins, claiming that most 
of the laborers wanted to return to work, but that the leaders of the union had threatened to 
prosecute the laborers if they did. Although it was not uncommon for strikes to become violent, 
especially when strikebreakers undermined the cause of the laborers,
1012
 the strikes in 
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Cienfuegos had for the most part been peaceful. Nevertheless, members of the commercial elite, 
eager to complete their shipments and guarantee their profits, requested military intervention to 
protect the strike-breakers. 
Atkins insisted that conceding to the demands of workers would only serve to legitimize 
their authority. He cited the tumultuous history of organized labor in Cienfuegos, growing more 
powerful each day since the beginning of American military rule. “This is the seventh strike 
within a year,” Atkins complained. In 1898, wages for lightermen were fixed at $2.50-$3.50, and 
the captains of the lighters received $3.50-$5.25, Spanish gold, per round trip from landing to 
ship anchored in bay and return.
1013
 “Wages having been fixed in previous settlements, the 
merchants feel they cannot submit to further demands, without serious consequences, and there 
are possibilities of matters taking a critical turn.”1014 With ever-increasing demands for higher 
wages, the unions jeopardized the high profit margins of the property owners. 
While the demands of the laborers troubled him, Atkins most vehemently protested 
against what he saw as the failures of civil authorities to defend propertied interests. Claiming 
that the civil authorities were not acting with sufficient force against the strikers, he demanded 
the presence in Cienfuegos of the commanding general of the province, General Wilson: “The 
civil authority is timid and unable to cope with the situation, and U.S. officers cannot move 
without authority of the commanding officer. Allow me to suggest that conditions are too 
delicate to be handled from Matanzas.” Atkins characterized the strike as an emergency, and 
urged military authorities to use U.S. troops to quell the strike: “the Department Commander 
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should be on the spot, and prepared for an emergency, or authority should be vested in some 
local U.S. officer.”1015 Atkins suggested that military intervention would be the only viable way 
to end the strike. 
As a result of the multiple letters from Atkins and Barker, General Wilson issued orders 
to mayor Frías to have the municipal police force protect strike breakers. Mayor Frías complied. 
He ordered the police to “protect efficaciously all persons, whether they belong or not to the 
labor corporations, that are doing the work of those on the strike, since it is the duty of the 
authorities to guarantee the liberty to work.” He also ordered the police to prevent the strikers 
from marauding around the port: the force should likewise “avoid that the unoccupied workmen 
be hanging about the places and wharves where work is being done.” These, he affirmed “are 
duties that under your strict responsibility are recommended to you and subordinates.”1016 The 
police were thus ordered to protect the strikebreakers. The municipal police played a critical role 
in undermining the demands of labor unions in the February 1900 strike, underscoring the 
transformation of the force from agents of urban justice to a defenders of the commercial elite. 
For Atkins, though, police supervision was insufficient to quell anxieties. Instead, it 
actually augmented his anxieties. He claimed that the police were defending the laborers, as they 
supposedly had during the May riot the previous year. In a desperate telegram, General Wood 
wrote to the Civil Governor of Santa Clara Province, probably in response to the appeal of 
Atkins: “Situation [in] Cienfuegos demands your serious attention and presence in that city. […] 
the Chief of Police is in active sympathy with it. The interests of your people are suffering 
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severely as the demands of the strikers are excessive.”1017 This frantic communication, Atkins 
referenced existing fears among military officials in Cienfuegos that police collaborated with 
disorderly elements, to argue for the necessity military action against strikers. 
In addition to indicting the police for conspiring with labor, Atkins also charged the civil 
authorities with complicity in the strike. Atkins wrote to Wood, informing him that the president 
of the lightermen’s union, “who is directing strikers is an employee of Municipal Gov’t here, 
who was discharged by US officials last year” for dishonesty and later the mayor named him 
sanitary inspector.
1018
 He referred to Gómez Sosa. If the civil authorities supported the workers 
and even served as union leaders, Atkins reasoned, they could certainly not be trusted to protect 
business interests. “The strikers rightly or wrongly feel they have the support of the Civil 
Authorities and a cartman was arrested by a policeman two days since and threatened with fine 
for working, contrary to order of the union.”1019 Even if a settlement was reached, Atkins 
doubted that the Cuban authorities could enforce it, for lack of common sense: “I hesitate to 
make recommendations [Not True] but what I think is most needed is a little determination and 
what we in Massachusetts know as ‘Horse sense’”1020 This is something Atkins judged could not 
be found in the Cubans. According to Atkins, the civil authorities were as much of a problem as 
the strikers, a not-so-subtle argument for military action to suppress the strike. 
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Atkins could no longer point to the racial similarities between municipal officials and the 
so-called disorderly elements to support his claims. After all, the civil authorities including the 
mayor, chief of police, city council, and most other important municipal posts were filled by 
whites. Nevertheless, civil authorities were sensitive to the demands of urban workers, a 
sufficient number of who would have been able to vote, even under restricted suffrage because of 
their literacy or service in the war. Atkins argued that the Cuban authorities had no interest in 
upsetting the strikers because they were trying to ensure their re-election the following year: 
“The Civil authorities are looking for the support of these strikers at the coming elections.”1021 
Even though the restricted suffrage probably excluded many of the poorer and less educated men 
who had not served in the Cuban army, Atkins effectively harnessed ties of political patronage to 
argue that even white Cuban separatists represented the unruly masses, and therefore posed a 
grave threat to American and commercial interests. 
Wilson eventually permitted military action. After several days, the strike affected more 
than just sugar planters and merchants and began to inhibit government business. When Barker 
found that the strike prevented him from shipping government goods, he wired General Wilson, 
requesting permission to call in the troops. Wilson “who was at that time was apt to favor the 
Cubans,” acceded to this request. Civil authorities at the municipal and provincial level appealed 
to military authorities to refrain from sending in troops. Indeed, dozens of letters and telegrams 
from mayor Frías, José Miguel Gómez, the Civil Governor of Santa Clara Province, José de 
Jesús Monteagudo, the Chief of the Rural Guard and Commanding General Wilson to General 
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Wood and the Adjutant General repeatedly confirmed that there was never any threat to 
order.
1022
  
The threat of military intervention “seemed to alarm the alcalde,” Frías most of all.1023 He 
assured military authorities that he and his men could maintain order without U.S. military 
interference. He again pledged to protect strike-breakers, affirming that “full protection is given 
to all laborers who desire to work.”1024 He made it clear to the Adjutant General that his orders to 
the police force were sufficient to maintain order in Cienfuegos and that intervention rom 
American troops would be unnecessary: “The police force is sufficient to cover all emergencies 
and I consider un-necessary any aid from other forces though I thank you for your offer.” Frías 
reminded General Wood that order was maintained and no disturbances had occurred, and that 
the strikers were entirely “pacific.”1025 Frías emphasized the peaceful nature of the strikers, and 
the ability of police to maintain order to prevent military intervention in the strike. These letters 
confirming the maintenance of order in Cienfuegos were appeals to the military authorities to 
refrain from heeding the requests of wealthy merchants like Atkins who demanded violent 
suppression of labor by U.S. troops.
1026
 Civil authorities sought to avoid the tensions arising 
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from calling in the troops both to bolster their own authority, and to ensure the political 
allegiance of the working classes by avoiding a repeat of the deadly disturbances of May and 
June 1899. 
Civil authorities played a central role in negotiating an end to the strike. Mayor Frías 
reported that the workers had agreed to return to work the following morning if their claims were 
considered by a commission of six, including himself, Barker, two laborers, and two 
merchants.
1027
 The commission resolved to deny the request for higher wages but did stipulate 
payment in American currency rather than Spanish gold.
1028
 On February 27, strikers, the union 
presidents Antonio Gómez Sosa, Joaquín Pompa and Romualdo Amezquita, signed the 
agreement with the merchants, shippers, and agents of the sugar estates.
1029
 The strike was over, 
and the most substantive demands of the laborers had been defeated.  
The port workers of Cienfuegos had returned to work, and business again resumed its 
usual rhythm, but profound changes were underway. Civil authorities effectively repelled 
military suppression of the workers, but police served decidedly in the favor of the commercial 
elite. Civil authorities engaged in a delicate balancing act while navigating the strike. One the 
one hand, they relied on the support of the workers to renew their claims to power in the coming 
elections, then just three months away. This may have made them more reluctant to crush the 
strike by force. On the other hand, they simultaneously relied on a tenuous and often contentious 
relationship with American military authorities for their political power. Appeasing military 
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officials meant responding to the demands of the commercial elite, and defending the interests of 
the wealthiest residents of the region. This entailed controlling labor unions. Ultimately, Frías 
and his cabinet failed this balancing act in the eyes of Atkins and Wood, who judged his late and 
timid intervention as evidence of his collaboration with labor.  
 
“The incarnate enemy of Cuba” and Union Breaking 
 
Although the strike had been defused by February 27, the underlying issue—the 
collaboration between labor and civil authorities—remained, according to Atkins. He reiterated 
his previous charges that civil authorities collaborated with the strikers: “It is the general belief 
of those best informed that the Alcalde was in a large measure responsible for the trouble. The 
President of the [lightermen’s] union, one Gómez [Sosa], holds a position under the Municipal 
Government, and was the one to direct the strikers.”1030 He chastised union leaders of approving 
wage increases before the contractors were even notified. The alleged support of Frías and 
Gómez Sosa for the laborers made it so “the strikers felt sure of the support of the civil 
authorities.”1031 To a certain extent, Atkins correctly identified key relationships of political 
patronage tying Frías to key labor leaders, including Gómez Sosa and the president of the 
stevedore union, Romualdo Amezquita. The workers of the port after all were a key constituency 
for securing election, not only in the municipal government, but also at the national level. Frías 
himself soon run for a seat in the senate. The labor leaders provided the key to obtaining the vote 
of the workers. 
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Atkins pointed out the political bonds between labor leaders and civil authorities to indict 
Frías and foster a change in the municipal political leadership. For him, the lessons to be learned 
from the strike were quite clear: the separatists in power were incompetent for self-government, 
and Americans were the only authority that could guarantee order and prosperity in Cuba. The 
strike “would not have ended but for the interference with Government business,” he claimed.1032 
Atkins further undermined the role of civil authorities in resolving the dispute. “I feel confident 
that the Commanding General, had he been on the spot and disposed to do so, could have 
stopped the trouble at the outset, without using force; as could any one of the half dozen 
excellent officers here, had they been vested with authority,” Atkins asserted in a letter to 
General Wood after the strike ended. With his usual false humility, he closed the letter by 
suggesting more direct American control over civil affairs: “I do not think it proper for me to 
make suggestions without being asked, but there are some things here which should be corrected 
and will not be attended to unless investigated direct from Havana, through local officers and the 
business community.”1033 American military authorities acceded to his request and conducted an 
investigation, which resulted in Wood ordering the removal of both the Frías and Gómez Sosa 
from their government positions.
1034
 
The centrality of Atkins in demanding American military intervention in the strike earned 
him the title of the “incarnate enemy of Cuba.” Atkins noted that “the alcalde was very angry 
with me for the part I took during the strike.” As a consolation to the bad press, Atkins seemed to 
believe that the replacement of mayor Frías by Figueroa would benefit his interests more than the 
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former administration: “I hope the new man will do better,” he confessed to his wife, “There 
seems a general feeling of relief at the change, and the better class of Cubans are coming to the 
front.”1035 Although both Frías and Figueroa came from similar educated, elite urban 
backgrounds, Americans favored the more collaborative attitude of Figueroa with regard to the 
American military government. 
A test of the new mayor came in early 1901, when port workers again struck work, 
demanding higher wages and a shorter work day. The strike in Cienfuegos was part of an island-
wide labor movement organized by port workers and including other workers such as railroad 
workers and lumbermen. According to Gerardo A. Cárdenas, the president of the stevedore union 
of Matanzas, explained that “the jobs are too heavy (demasiados fuertes) and frequently it 
happens that the merchants have the union members from 4:30 in the morning until 9 at night, 
not having but one hour to eat, and said work not being compensated.”1036 In Cárdenas, 
longshoremen (playeros) and stevedores went on strike, requesting higher wages. They 
complained that the cost of food, clothing, and rents was rising, making the lives of working men 
harder than ever before: “We are hopeful and are blinded by deceiving glimpses and false hopes. 
We have peace, but we do not have everything to reach our desires to live comfortably with our 
work on a clear conscience. We lack what is necessary: money.”1037 There were rumors that 
other workers would follow, and that a general strike of railroad workers would ensue as 
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well.
1038
 Stevedores at Trinidad and Ciego de Ávila, railroad workers in Santa Clara, and 
lumbermen in Santa Cruz similarly demanded higher wages and struck work.
1039
 
In Cienfuegos, the conflict between port workers and merchants in 1901 was part of a 
longer trajectory of labor militancy. “We are going through a hard time here with the labor 
unions of Cienfuegos, who are making the most absurd demands, which so far we have resisted,” 
Atkins complained to General Wood in January 1901.
1040
 Stevedores again threatened to strike 
work. They demanded more than four cents per bag of sugar they loaded, and refused to allow 
captains to use their own crews to load the cargo. According to Atkins, “this is going too far, and 
I have notified Gen. Wood in order to be prepared in case of a lighterman’s strike, or any 
interference on the part of the stevedores.
1041
 “I am expecting trouble with the lightermen at 
Cienfuegos within a few days. Upto [sic] the present time all their demands have been acceded 
to, and the more they get the more they want.”1042 Atkins vowed to “take a stand” against the 
excessive demands of the laborers: “[I] decline to pay the stevedores over four cents per bag and 
insist upon the captain’s right to employ his own labor,” he wrote to Wood. 1043 
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The demands of the laborers were getting out of control, Atkins thought: “their demands 
are increasing day by day, and are being carried beyond all reason”1044 Unless the unions were 
disbanded, Atkins feared that he would not make any progress.
1045
 The stevedores in other 
central Cuban cities were also making demands upon their employers. In Trinidad, laborers 
threatened to strike work for similar causes: higher wages and extended jurisdiction over loading 
and unloading freight.
1046
 Atkins vowed to cable Wood with the first word of a strike. He feared 
that a strike in Trinidad would provoke a strike in Cienfuegos as well.
1047
 Even outside of 
striking work, the Stevedore union forced merchants and planters to consider labor at every step 
of their business. “At these prices I am disposed to sell as fast as sugars are made, or a little 
ahead if prudent, but labor conditions are so uncertain that we can not [sic] but take them into 
account when selling ahead.”1048 Through collective action, stevedores had effectively 
challenged the monopoly of wealthy businessmen over their labor conditions and over commerce 
in the Port. 
Atkins was not alone in criticizing the labor unions. Juan Rios, a man of unidentified 
location and occupation, complained to General Wood about the unions following the series of 
1901 strikes. “For some time now, I have noted that the strikes of the lightermen, stevedores, and 
wharf peons happen frequently, without ever being resolved in the favor of capital, which is not 
the cause of these [strikes].” The union leaders were corrupt, he charged, taking advantage of the 
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large membership to live comfortably, while continually demanding higher wages. Rios 
considered the demands unreasonable because the wages requested were “excessive” and 
because not all the workers were “apt to earn it.” He suggested that the unions be dissolved and 
their leaders and secretaries exiled, because “they were the ones who perturb the social order to 
live without working.” He claimed that “real workers” would not require unions to survive, as 
the market would ensure the selection of those fittest to earn wages.
1049
 In Havana, unionized 
workers were labeled as “rebellious,” due to their frequent strikes, which some merchants judged 
were without reason.
1050
 
Atkins was determined to crush the threatened strike in Cienfuegos. First, he requested 
the intervention of the military authorities: “I fully realize that I cannot accomplish anything 
without some support, for the united gremios will undoubtedly call a strike on the part of the 
lightermen and laborers in this way tying us up,” he wrote to General Wood in February 
1901.
1051
 When military authorities did not send in the troops to suppress the strikers, Atkins set 
in motion his own plan to undermine the unions. He bypassed the union leadership and dealt 
directly with individual laborers. 
This strategy was not altogether new for merchants and property owners in Cienfuegos. 
They had employed strike breakers in previous conflicts with the port workers unions. Atkins 
especially had exploited his personal relationships with certain laborers in the past to end strikes. 
For example, in 1899 Atkins negotiated a compromise with one labor leader, who he called “the 
mulatto president of the lightermen’s union” (Not Gómez Sosa). This lighterman “used to be a 
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slave in the Jova family,” who owned a sugar estate near Soledad. Atkins had known him since 
he was a boy because he had visited that estate frequently. He bribed the lighterman to convince 
his comrades to return to work: “…you take my advice and call this strike off and I will get that 
little concession, but I want you to go to work again,” Atkins told the laborer.1052 Through 
negotiations with an individual rather than the union leaders, Atkins secured a group of strike 
breakers. 
His willingness to deal with more malleable black workers suggests that Atkins may have 
employed the racialized language denouncing the unions to the military authorities strategically. 
By depicting the conflict between capital and labor in terms of race, he targeted fears of black 
rule that would have been easily recognizable to American military officials, many of who had 
served in the American Civil War. It certainly found resonance with Barker. Race, after all, had 
been a useful tool for dividing workers in the United States, especially in the 1890s with the rise 
of Jim Crow.
1053
 In Cienfuegos too, it seemed to be a much more powerful tool for 
delegitimizing the stevedores, rather than class. Discourses of class struggle, with which Atkins 
and American military officials would have surely been familiar considering the tumultuous 
renegotiations between capital and white labor unions in the late nineteenth century, seemed to 
be much more tenuous, especially considering the growing role of the American government in 
mediation in the early twentieth century, as part of a growing Progressive agenda. 
In January 1900, shippers tried bypass the union by using imported labor to load and 
unload freight. Planters, merchants, and other property owners had resorted to (and would 
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continue to rely on) immigrant labor because supplied cheaper workers. Moreover, with the 
application of American immigration laws banning “the landing of undesirable” aliens including 
most black and Chinese immigration meant that eligible immigrants more racially-acceptable.
1054
 
As one American military official would later remark, imported laborers were “white and 
desirable.”1055 The use of immigrant workers undermined domestic labor unions, as it certainly 
did in 1900. Dockworkers responded by organizing a strike. Although they allowed the crew of 
the ship to unload cargo onto the edge of the wharf, and even onto lighters, they refused to allow 
any further handling of the freight by anyone but members of their union.
1056
 The strikers 
claimed they had been unloading the ships for 27 years and it was their “recognized right.”1057 
Military authorities confirmed that the union of dockworkers (lightermen, stevedores, 
cartmen), which “has been in existence for a long time” had a recognized monopoly on loading 
and unloading freight. Judge Advocate Edgar S. Dudley recommended negotiation and 
compromise to resolve the strike, instead of military force, which “can only in cases of need, be 
controlled at times by force.”1058 While military authorities cited the convention that unionized 
dockworkers would handle freight on the docks, they noted that no law protected this custom. 
                                                 
1054
 G.D. Meikeljohn and L.S. Gage, “Letter from Assistant Secretary of War enclosing one from the Secretary of 
the Treasury, both in relation to the entry of Chinese in Cuba,” January 17, 1899, Box 1, File 486, USNA/MGC/RG 
140/ E 3; Colonel Tasker H. Bliss, “Enclosing a telegram in which he acknowledges receipt of copies of U.S. 
immigration laws which are to be applied to the island of Cuba” April  27, 1899, Box 11, File 2772, 
USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
1055
 Collector of Customs, “Telegram: states Spanish American Iron Company and The Cuba Company request 
authority to import 620 laborers, Porto Ricans, white, able-bodied, selected,” July 17, 1901, Box 185, File 2837, 
USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
1056
 Castaño, Cacicedo, Huike, Terry and twenty others to General Leonard Wood, February 21, 1900, Box 61, File 
504, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
1057
 Collector of Customs, Cienfuegos, “Telegram,” January 18, 1900, Box 61, File 504, USNA/MGC/RG 140/E 3. 
1058
 Ibid. 
 446 
 
The absence of any law protecting the sole right of union laborers to perform the loading and 
unloading work provided shippers an opportunity to undermine union interests without direct 
military force. 
 Atkins combined his experience securing strike breakers with his business connections in 
the port to neutralize the port workers unions in 1901. In April, he negotiated a deal with a group 
of laborers: “I have a special rate with one of the best men in Cienfuegos, who for a long time 
has loaded all my vessels and steamers.” Atkins claimed that the main benefit in employing his 
stevedores was that he had more control over them: “The ship gets the benefit of the rate as I 
make nothing out of it, but it is an advantage that our chartered steamers employ our man, as I 
have control over him and he reports to me once or twice a day.”1059 Control over laborers, better 
than a commission on the work they performed, ensured that his products would be loaded onto 
ships, thereby guaranteeing his continued profits from sugar. 
Atkins tried to mandate that his stevedores be employed on ship charters. Finding out that 
one shipper, Alonso, did not wish to employ his stevedores, he resorted to guilt as a means of 
persuasion: “You will gain nothing by employing another man, and you will put me to a good 
deal of inconvenience if you do so. I hope that you will not, and that you will give the necessary 
instructions to Alonso.”1060 Recognizing that the use of his stevedores was not required as per the 
charter, he resolved to include it in the ship charter that his stevedores be employed to avoid 
future disputes. The process of hiring workers to perform the duties of the port became one of the 
most critical points of contention between unionized workers and merchants in Cienfuegos. 
                                                 
1059
 Edwin F. Atkins to E.P. Searle, April 7, 1901, Volume II.23, MHS/EFA. 
1060
 Edwin F. Atkins to E.P. Searle, April 7, 1901, Volume II.23, MHS/EFA. 
 447 
 
The nature of hiring practices prevailing among port workers in turn-of-the-twentieth-
century Cienfuegos afforded employers great influence over the lives of workers. During most of 
the colonial period and even into the American military occupation, the contractors had the 
authority to select the workers. Under this system, often called the shape up, the laborers were 
forced to compete fiercely with their fellow workers, friends, and even family for the favor of the 
employer. For the worker, this could be a humiliating experience, one that they had to face every 
day with the hope of contracting work to earn a living.
1061
 This process, reminiscent of a slave 
market, may have seemed familiar to some of the laborers who had recently gained freedom in 
the 1870s and 1880s.
1062
 
The island-wide port worker strikes in the first months of 1901 seem to have catalyzed a 
re-adjustment in the relationships between workers and merchants, especially the mechanism for 
hiring workers. In Havana, for example, military officials sought to streamline the flow of goods 
and reduce the price of labor by creating a single organization to take charge of the collection, 
dispatch and turning in of merchandise in the port. “It would go a long way toward putting a stop 
to strikes and would make impossible the petty pilfering which constantly goes on upon the 
wharves and in the lighters.”1063 Workers opposed the creation of this entity, which they labeled 
a trust and a monopoly that would “take away our daily bread, which we have earned with so 
much fatigue.”1064 While consolidating the process of hiring workers into one institution may 
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have benefited merchants, workers equated the loss of control over hiring to reduced living 
conditions. 
 In Cienfuegos as well, merchants began taking more control over working arrangements. 
Atkins was at the center of this shift. By guaranteeing work to certain stevedores who were 
willing to cooperate with him, Atkins undermined the solidarity binding laborers to the union. 
When Atkins began to co-opt certain labor leaders, this system became problematic and led to 
extreme inequality in the distribution of work. This set in motion a process of internal struggle 
within the stevedore union. Inequalities in access to work combined with the precarious 
economic situation of many working-class families combined to exacerbate existing cleavages 
within the union, whether political, personal, or professional. Union leaders recognized the 
favoritism of employers in hiring certain stevedores, but certain workers, especially those who 
benefited from the new arrangements sought to preserve the status quo. After 1901, the stevedore 
union of Cienfuegos became consumed with debates on how workers would be hired. Indeed, the 
manipulation of hiring patterns marked the beginning of the end for the stevedore union in 
Cienfuegos. 
Stevedores in Cienfuegos sought to address the severe fragmentation in their own union 
by demanding control over hiring. This occurred amidst a series of changes negotiated between 
port workers and commercial elites in the Port of Havana. Negotiations following the February 
1901 strike resulted in two key military orders, one lowering the tariffs of port work, and a 
subsequent decree affording unions control over hiring. At the core of demands over hiring 
practices in Cienfuegos was Military Order #59 (MO 59), which applied all agreements, 
regulations and tariff current in the Port of Havana, to Cienfuegos.
1065
 This effectively meant the 
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reduction of pay for port workers in Cienfuegos. Some stevedores in Cienfuegos sought to offset 
the lower wage by securing some of benefits secured by Havana workers, namely control over 
hiring. 
Serious debates ensued in the meeting hall of the stevedore union with this proposal. The 
union meeting on April 5, 1902 was perhaps typical of the dissention and arguments that 
pervaded the union between 1901 and 1904. Federico Ramírez, a union delegate, explained that 
because MO 59 had imposed the lower tariff rates reigning in Havana onto the Port of 
Cienfuegos, the Cienfuegos workers should at least receive some of the benefits Havana workers 
had won, namely the power to select their own workers. The imposition of lower tariffs was due 
to the “unbridled desire of those who presented themselves to the military government with a 
proposition to lower the tariffs that applied to this Union, and as a result, he is of the opinion that 
since the Delegates are supposedly the ones who nominate the personnel in Havana, that this 
Union makes [the order] apply in all its parts.” In Havana, the delegates chose the workers, 
therefore, Federico concluded that in Cienfuegos they should do the same.
1066
 
Other union members argued that the current hiring arrangements should remain in 
effect. Felipe Santana, for example, begged his fellow workers to consider the possible discord 
that has emerged from the competition over jobs. “…if in contrast to what several other 
comrades sustain, another group obsesses itself with the Delegates being the ones who nominate 
the personnel, discord will always prevail until we could lament this tense state with one or 
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another group, even killed, because one and others resort to force.”1067 Florentino Pascual, 
another delegate, agreed. Santana and Pascual highlighted the high stakes of the debate at hand: 
if the union could not agree on the right decision, competition and tensions among workers for 
work could become so heated that conflict and even death could result. It seemed that some 
workers were unwilling to confront capital over the issue of hiring. 
 Ramírez again took the floor, arguing that the Delegates should name the workers “by 
law and logic of convenience, to avoid the vengeance of the Contractors on those who know how 
to reclaim their rights against the foreigners who oppose a law by the government and the 
union.”1068 Ramírez identified a potent source of tension among the workers—that some 
members were more militant and more committed to the union cause than were others. Perhaps 
he also alluded to a difference in the perception of militancy: whereas black labor militancy was 
rapidly criminalized and chastised by white contractors and merchants, white labor was typically 
viewed as more rational and reasonable.
1069
 With this suggestion, “a great number of associates 
abandoned the hall without prior permission from the Presidency, manifesting themselves to be 
offended by the last words of compañero Ramírez…”1070 The pointed debate and strong 
reactions among union members underscore the extent of the divisions over the issue of hiring. 
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Francisco Salcerio “in very brilliant phrases,” stated the need for the conversations 
among union members to be “measured and without controversy or heatedness.”1071 Just then 
several members, including Solozábal, Pérez, Pascual, Padrón, among others, proposed a new 
solution: “to resolve [the issue], a commission be sent to Havana demanding justice before the 
Military Government to get the right for the personnel for the jobs to be named by the Union 
Delegates, just like is done in that Port.”1072 The commission would be composed of three 
members, chosen by the directorate, and supported by 100 pesos Spanish gold extracted from the 
Union treasury for expenses.
1073
 The union resolved to demand control over hiring. They 
appealed to Havana, and Adjutant General Hugh L. Scott seemed to have acceded to their 
request by June 1902. 
Securing control over hiring, however, did not end dissent within the union. Even after 
the inauguration of the republic in May 1902, stevedores would vacillate over how best to 
distribute work among the members. By 1904, fragmentation within the union reached the 
breaking point when the union president mandated that delegates control hiring.
1074
 Shortly 
thereafter, rumors that a group of former union stevedores had broken away from the union and 
formed a separate organization, reached the halls of the Stevedore Union.
1075
 Union leaders 
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rightly worried that the establishment of the new union could destroy the position of the workers 
after the union had worked so hard toward the “emancipation of the Stevedores of this Port.”1076 
 
Conclusions: The Demise of the Union and the Consolidation of “Urban Order” 
 
In 1899, the stevedore union of Cienfuegos flouted the expectations of wealthy planters, 
American military officials, and even some prominent Cuban patriots by refusing to assume 
positions of servitude vis-à-vis commercial elites. The stevedore union presented a potent 
challenge to the relationship between capital and labor with its militant demands for higher 
wages and better working conditions. Simultaneously, the union challenged the urban order in 
Cienfuegos by denying commercial elites absolute control over the urban spaces straddling the 
port and bordering the city center. 
The racial background of many of the stevedores presented unique problems for the 
union. Fortified by the influx of numerous Cuban veterans in the months after the war, the union 
had a diverse and multi-racial membership, but was composed primarily of men of African 
descent. From the perspective of merchants and planters the stevedore union was more than an 
association of workers. It was a union of blacks, Cuban veterans, and worst of all, black veterans. 
The organization of a large number of black men and veterans fit comfortably into an already-
existing framework of an allegedly impending race war, an idea based upon fears that an armed 
black population with military experience would overthrow white rule on the island. 
Confrontations between the union and the commercial elite took on racial undertones, as 
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property owners like Atkins delegitimized labor demands based on racial arguments. Stevedores, 
however, avoided references to race almost completely. The language of class, specifically the 
idea of being a respectable working-class man, provided black stevedores a way to dispel 
racialized imaginings of union activities, even if they were port-paralyzing strikes. In 1899 and 
to a certain extent in 1900, the union was able to secure various gains for workers, in the face of 
fierce petitioning from merchants and planters to disband the unions by force. 
By 1901, however, tides began to turn. Atkins began to exploit already-existing divisions 
among workers to dismantle the unity in the labor organization. By affording some workers 
greater access to employment than others, Atkins and his associates set in motion of process of 
intense conflict within the union, stemming primarily from the way workers were hired. These 
debates immobilized the union and debilitated organized action to secure benefits for workers. 
Eventually the intense fragmentation emerging therefrom led to the formation of a separate 
stevedore union in 1904, spelling the end of a united front against capital in the port of 
Cienfuegos. 
The gradual dismantling of the stevedore union beginning in 1901 seemingly marked the 
close of an epoch in Cienfuegos. The stevedores were one of the last strongholds of black 
authority in the urban center, in the vital portside neighborhood of Marsillán. With internal 
dissention consuming the union, commercial elites were able again to consolidate their control 
over the port and commerce. Although the men of African descent still composed the majority of 
port workers, the authority of organized labor had been severely compromised. The demise of 
the stevedore union contributed to the demographic transformation of the city center that had 
begun with the persecution of black veterans like Dionisio Gil and the relocation of the vice 
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district. These three key changes brought the city of Cienfuegos closer to realizing Wilson’s 
1899 claim that “the white man is in the majority and in absolute control.”1077
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EPILOGUE 
Under the Veil of Racial Brotherhood: 
Consequences and Lessons from American Rule 
 
Of course strenuous objections would be made to annexation at this time, even if the Cubans were 
unanimous in desiring it, by all who believe that a state based solely upon the Roman Catholic religion 
would not be a desirable acquisition; by all who believe that Cuba is tropical and barbaric; by all who 
believe that the Spanish-American is revolutionary; by all who believe that the population is mongrel and 
constitutes a part of ‘Niggerdom’; by all who believe that we have enough territory and cannot properly 
govern any more; By all who are afraid of ‘expansion’ and ‘empire’, and by a great part of the Democrats 
who are naturally opposed to every measure brought forward by the Republicans. –General James H. 
Wilson, 1899.
1078
 
 
What hurt them [Cuban separatists] the most was the Americans putting them in checkmate. It seems that 
they thought that those people were coming for hell of it. Then it was proven they had not, that what they 
wanted was to take the crème of the cake. The population allowed those things to happen. There were 
people who were happy that the Americans were calling the shots. They were saying, and still there are 
those who say, that the best part of the whole war was the American intervention. –Esteban Montejo, 
1963.
1079 
 
 
 
On May 20, 1902, the Cuban Republic was born. It looked quite different than some 
Cubans had imagined it would in 1899. Cuba Libre was transformed from a political and social 
revolution to a campaign aimed at preserving the social hierarchy had prevailed under Spanish 
rule and bolstering the political goals of certain white separatists. Initially a racially-inclusive 
project, the separatist agenda became ever more racially-exclusive to the extreme that 
maintaining patronage relationships with blacks and appealing to them as voters condemned 
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white politicians in the eyes of Americans. Even the political posturing of separatists took on 
racial implications, with demands for immediate and absolute independence allegedly implying 
“Negro Rule,” while pro-American platforms suggested the preservation of racial order, thereby 
gaining greater political clout. All this seemed to have occurred in the span of a few short years. 
Between 1895 and 1902, Cubans confronted a world of change and uncertainty. With the 
anti-colonial struggle erupting anew in 1895, the twin goals of independence and social justice 
challenged the social order that had prevailed for centuries under Spanish rule. With the 
announcement of the American intervention in 1898, the Cuban army swelled with new recruits 
emanating from the most privileged sectors of society. This shift exacerbated the struggle for 
military prestige as different factions of separatists sought to lay claim to future political power. 
The American military occupation and the evacuation of the Spanish army from the island 
confounded the political tensions among separatists and other men vying for political power, 
such as Spaniards and Autonomists. One of the principle conflicts among political hopefuls was 
determining the role men of African descent would play in the emerging republic. Under 
American rule, racial order became a precondition for separatist political power—and for Cuban 
self-government more generally—in a time when national self-determination and citizenship 
were synonymous with whiteness and manhood.  
Separatists confronted this whirlwind of uncertainty by consolidating their own political 
power, a feat that increasingly hinged upon preservation of racial order. Racial exclusion became 
evident during the first months of the military occupation. Opponents of Cuban rule attempted to 
undermine separatist political pretensions by connecting the revolution to racial disorder. They 
portrayed black men, especially black separatists, as hypermasculine by implicating them in 
banditry, alleged military uprisings against American rule, and sexual aggression. Because 
 457 
 
opponents of Cuban rule defined the Cuban army as “mostly black,” the threatening image of 
black hypermasculinity seemed to undermine even white separatist claims to political power. 
White separatists, in turn, responded by excluding blacks from political power to bolster their 
own candidacy. Americans, on the other hand, found political exclusion insufficient. They 
responded to the threat of black hypermasculinity with attempts at discursive emasculation—
attempting to exclude them from manhood suffrage, disbanding the Cuban army, and disarming 
the police, for example. Radical separatists initially rejected these actions as contrary to the 
colorblind tenets of Cuba Libre. Political exclusion by white separatists themselves was 
acceptable, but American attempts to disenfranchise Cuban blacks were not. 
Although whiteness and social prestige were initially enough to qualify certain Cuban 
separatists for political power, these qualities eventually became insufficient to warrant 
American favor. Americans realized that the mere condition of whiteness did not correlate to a 
single political platform. White separatist defiance of American attempts to disenfranchise blacks 
in the first year of American rule was the ultimate example of this. Political radicalism, namely 
nationalist demands for independence and solidarity against the occupying force, became 
increasingly associated with social radicalism, which triggered the specter of black rule. Political 
hopefuls who did not submit to American authorities fully faced intense conflict with them, 
which ultimately cost them their political power. Through creative political engineering, 
Americans promoted the candidacy of politically- and socially-conservative white veterans to 
positions of power in the Cuban government. These were men who would preserve the racial 
order. They would also collaborate with the military government.  
The rise of socially-conservative separatists into political power especially after the first 
year of military rule compounded black political exclusion with campaigns to “cleanse” the city 
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of “undesirable elements.” In Cienfuegos, civil authorities used violence to subdue black 
veterans who sought to extend their military authority to civil affairs. They transformed the 
urban social geography by relocating the tolerance district, resulting in the removal of poor and 
working-class blacks from view and the reduction of direct conflict between Americans and 
black Cubans in the city center. They forcibly dismantled the organized labor movement, the 
final obstacle to the consolidation of white supremacy in the city. The assassination of the black 
insurgent general Dionisio Gil, the relocation of the red light district, and the gradual dismantling 
of the stevedore union suggest that civil authorities targeted perceived centers of black authority 
within the city limits. By crushing black urban strongholds, civil authorities consolidated their 
political power by demonstrating to the Americans their ability to preserve racial order. In effect, 
civil authorities sanctioned and carried out the racial exclusion that Americans had initially 
attempted in 1899. 
The persistence of racial inequality after what had promised to be such a transformative 
war prompted some Cubans to contemplate the culpability of the Americans in this development. 
They were, after all, known for their racist views.
1080
 Esteban Montejo reflected on the American 
presence in Cuba over a half century later. “To tell the truth,” he said, “I prefer the Spaniard to 
the American; but the Spaniards in his [own] land. Each one in his land. Now, the American, I 
don’t even like him in his [land].”1081 For all the contempt that Montejo held for Americans, he 
recognized that white separatists also played a prominent role. “The majority of people say that 
the Americans were the most rotten. I agree. They were rotten,” he wrote. “But one has to think 
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that the white creoles were just as much to blame because they allowed themselves to be bullied 
in their own land.”1082 Bullied. 
Although a certain degree of coercion is perhaps undeniable in the context of a military 
occupation, Montejo implicated the “white creoles” in the consolidation of American rule, the 
adulteration of Cuban sovereignty, and the intensification of racial inequalities. Indeed, the 
preceding chapters do suggest that there was a degree of complicity between Cuban political 
elites and the American occupiers. Political elites exchanged support for American visions of 
urban racial order for the promise of political power, seeking to convince the occupiers that they 
were capable of self-government. Amidst heightened racial discrimination, violence and 
exclusion, black Cubans began to vocalize their disenchantment with civil authorities. These 
same civil authorities recognized that the stakes of racial discontent were high: their political 
futures depended upon silence about racial issues. Owing to the necessity of pacifying an 
increasingly marginalized and suppressed urban black population, civil authorities attempted to 
uphold the discourse of racial brotherhood by expressing inequalities in terms of masculinity 
rather than race. This meant that expressions of racial grievance became unpatriotic and even 
criminal. 
Some poor and working-class black urbanites quickly abandoned racial language in their 
demands for justice. Instead, these black men appropriated the very language of masculinity that 
had formerly justified their racial exclusion, to fight against it. Veterans emphasized their 
military honor to validate their claims to employment and positions of authority. Poor and 
working-class residents of the red light district petitioned the city council as the protectors of the 
neighborhood to improve the sanitary conditions, infrastructure and law enforcement therein. 
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Black workers justified their demands for higher wages and better working conditions upon their 
status as heads of household. These varying articulations and diverse matrices of black manliness 
commonly abandoned racial language to demand racial justice. By voicing their claims in terms 
of masculinity, black men were sometimes able to secure small concessions from civil authorities 
in an otherwise exclusive political and social environment. At the same time, black emphasis on 
masculine qualities as a discursive strategy to fight racial exclusion may have contributed to 
fears of black hypermasculinity, evidently used as a justification for their marginalization. 
Although civil authorities effectively dismantled black authority and silenced racial 
protest, Americans retained their doubts about the Cuban capacity to self-govern. Domestic 
political considerations in the United States, rather than the behavior or demands of Cuban 
political elites, determined how the occupation would end. The self-imposed restrictions of the 
Joint Resolution guaranteeing Cuban independence, the anti-imperialist fervor, and negative 
racial stereotypes of Cubans made outright annexation a contentious option. Yet, the perceived 
Cuban incapacity for self-government required prolonged period of American tutelage. The Platt 
Amendment (1901) laid the groundwork for a nominal acknowledgement of radical Cuban 
demands, while consolidating American supremacy on the island. The emergence of socially-
conservative white separatists as the guarantors of American interests in Cuba compromised both 
revolutionary goals of absolute independence and social reform. Racial exclusion persisted under 
the veil of racial brotherhood. 
Cuba thus emerged on the world stage with limited sovereignty, severe social inequality, 
and profound political fragmentation. Yet, the silence on the increasing degree of racial 
exclusion did not last long. The overwhelming social frictions mounting since the end of the war 
in 1898, and especially since the inauguration of the Republic in 1902, reached a boiling point in 
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1905. Members of the recently-formed Moderate party perpetrated a wave of political repression 
and violence targeting Liberal Party candidates in the approaching December elections. In 
Cienfuegos and the surrounding area, Moderates assassinated Liberal leader Enrique Villuendas 
and attacked the Liberal meeting houses. These, in addition to other tactics of intimidation, 
persecution and outright violence, forced many Liberals to withdraw their candidacy from the 
December elections. As a result, the Moderate Party swept the Legislature and presidency amidst 
allegations of fraud and repression. 
The re-election of pro-American president Tomás Estrada Palma provoked a political 
uprising led by Liberal supporters of rival presidential candidate and former governor of Santa 
Clara province, José Miguel Gómez. The August Revolution, as this uprising was called, relied 
on the disproportionate participation of black veterans, who equated the continued rule of the 
conservative-leaning Moderate Party with the frustration of the revolutionary goals of absolute 
independence and social justice. Pressured by reports of racial unrest in Cuba, Americans rushed 
in to “pacify” Cuba, inaugurating the second American occupation, which lasted until 1909. 
For Americans, the August Revolution provided proof that the Cubans were incapable of 
preserving racial order and therefore were unfit to self-govern. One of the main pillars of the 
second American campaign in Cuba was the strict surveillance of black populations. Cienfuegos 
and the surrounding villages like Lajas and Palmira became core sites of surveillance in Santa 
Clara, a province defined by political and racial agitation. “It is known that there is considerable 
uneasiness among the negroes in the vicinity of Palmira, Cruses [sic] [and] Lajas, and that 
negroes leaders are moving from place to place and holding secret meetings,” reported an 
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American investigator in August 1907.
1083
 During the second American military occupation, the 
jurisdiction of Cienfuegos became a center of black political mobilization and a home base to the 
black political party called the Independent Party of Color (PIC). 
The PIC broke with the pattern of black silence on race issues. The party was known for 
its militant political discourse and explicit condemnation of racism. Its adherents had witnessed 
first-hand the injustices of the post-war period, as their white compatriots secured well-paid 
government jobs while they could only turn to manual labor or cane cutting as a means for 
subsistence. PIC activists addressed these very concerns with a 1907 political manifesto directed 
at the black men of Lajas. During the war “… there was no separation between the black soldier 
and the white soldier,” they proclaimed. But “after the war finished, us blacks are abandoned 
while the whites are sucking the figs that the majority of us blacks have conquered.”1084 To 
Americans this manifesto only served as further proof of the “swashbuckler spirit” of blacks in 
Lajas and the vicinity of Cienfuegos.
1085
  
At the same time as some black veterans flocked to the PIC as a new source of hope for 
their claims to political inclusion, other groups of black men and women devised alternate 
strategies to challenge their exclusion while still upholding the social convention of racial 
silence. For example, in 1908, women who allegedly worked as prostitutes in Lajas protested 
American demands for racial segregation by organizing an armed uprising in their neighborhood 
                                                 
1083
 W.D. Beach to Chief of Staff, “Confidential Report,” August 23, 1907, Box 1, File 14, United States National 
Archives, Records of the Army of Cuban Pacification, Record Group 199, Entry 5 (Hereafter cited as 
USNA/RACP/RG 199/E 5). 
1084
 “Manifiesto al pueblo de Lajas y a la raza de color,” September 13, 1907, Box 1, File 14, USNA/RACP/RG 
199/E 5. 
1085
 “Manifiesto al pueblo de Lajas y a la raza de color,” September 13, 1907, Box 1, File 14, USNA/RACP/RG 
199/E 5. 
 463 
 
known as Little Africa, or “the land of congos,” (Barrio Guinea).1086 This was a neighborhood 
composed of a conglomeration of “Negro Shacks.” Formerly enslaved men and women had 
purchased land and settled along the city margins marked with the passage of railroad tracks 
beginning in the late 1870s from the wealthy plantation owner Emilio Terry.
1087
 Many of the 
people who first settled in Little Africa were formerly enslaved women, including Mónica and 
Victoria de la Torre, Antonia Terry, Natalia Fortún and even the grandparents of the famous 
Cuban musician, Beny Moré.
1088
 
Although military reports reveal little about the precise actions of the prostitutes, it is 
clear that the women played a central role in planning and executing this uprising. The women, 
one American military officer wrote “planned this attack, which when started assumed 
proportions quite unexpected.”1089 These women rejected American demands for two main 
reasons. First, the “removal” of black men from the neighborhood conflicted with the ability of 
the sex workers to maintain relationships with their partners. Second, the American presence hurt 
the livelihoods of the public women by reducing the clientele who frequented the brothels. “As 
the Cubans would not come about while the Americans were at hand, the women lost much in 
their services,” informed Furlong. “So they determined to free their houses of the unprofitable 
Americans.”1090 What began as a failed negotiation between prostitutes and their American 
clients, escalated into a violent conflict as two groups competed to impose their vision of order 
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on Little Africa. Whereas Americans sought to foster white sexual privilege and racial 
segregation in this black neighborhood, the prostitutes rejected American demands in favor of 
local authority and dignity in their own urban space. 
In 1908, public women in Lajas emerged as powerful political agents by assuming 
informal local positions of authority within their neighborhoods. Prostitutes in Lajas addressed 
the decidedly local issues emerging from the presence of Americans in their neighborhood, 
namely, sexual subjugation and racial discrimination. These women began their fight with their 
own bodies, a potent means of reclaiming ownership over not only the self, but over their 
livelihoods, families, and community. They defended their rights as workers to control the 
conditions of their labor. At the same time as they defended the role of black men in the 
neighborhood, the prostitutes also asserted female authority over a space that American men had 
claimed for themselves. They regulated their own sexuality by defining who would have access 
to their bodies and under what terms, rejecting the assumption of white sexual privilege to the 
black body. The central role of women in planning and carrying out a violent uprising against 
men articulated a cogent rejection of the prescription of female docility and black marginality in 
Cuban society. 
As these women reclaimed their bodies and their barrio, they also entered into a political 
debate that defined Cuban society from the beginning of the first American military intervention 
in 1898 until the abrogation of the Platt Amendment in 1934. The gender and occupation of 
prostitutes in Lajas, on the other hand, helped disguise the multiple layers of their protest, which 
escaped American labeling as a race riot. They articulated some of the same racial issues as did 
the men of the PIC, but employed a language of labor. Radical demands of dignity and control 
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over their industry helped veil an implicit racial protest, one which rejected American visions of 
racial segregation as un-Cuban.  
Admittedly, this 1908 uprising of prostitutes was far from an everyday occurrence. Yet, it 
likely indicates an emergent pattern of racial protest in early Republican Cuba. As explicit 
articulation of racial grievances in terms of race seemed to have failed, black men and women 
were able to escape the condemnation of their protests as “race war” by couching their demands 
in terms of gender and employing gendered language. Another characteristic of this pattern of 
protest was that it was likely to be local, rather than national in nature. While large scale political 
organization among blacks threatened racial order, a local dispute involving only a small number 
of people on the urban margins would be more difficult to portray as a race riot. 
These localized forms of protest seemed to voice demands for black autonomy within 
already-peripheral urban areas, which were often out of sight from the wealthy residents of the 
city centers. The physical marginality of these smaller local protests also potentially allowed for 
a greater degree of autonomy among local blacks than if they had claimed central urban spaces 
as they had during the first American military occupation. By asserting authority within their 
marginal neighborhoods, poor and working-class blacks may have resisted further 
marginalization from the city. The reliance on localized forms of protest that avoided direct 
racial language likely allowed racial inequality to persist beneath a veil of racial brotherhood. 
The local and intentionally non-racialized claims of some black Cubans during the 
second military occupation certainly proved safer and may have even been ultimately more 
effective than the explicit racial protest. The trajectory of the PIC between 1908 and 1912 
illustrate this. Upon discovering the black political mobilization of PIC activists in late 1907 and 
1908, Americans were determined to neutralize black political pretensions and restore socially-
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conservative whites to power. White liberals, too, had an interest in subduing the PIC, which 
threatened to steal black votes, thereby favoring the Conservative Party that had emerged after 
the August Revolution to replace the Moderate Party. Liberals, finally united under Gómez, 
sought to attract black votes by placing blacks on the party rosters, securing victory over 
Conservatives in 1908. The fragmentation of the Liberal Party into the miguelista and zayista 
factions and the subsequent Liberal mobilization against the PIC resulted in the election of an 
unprecedented fourteen black politicians to Congress in 1908.
1091
 
While the participation of the PIC in the 1908 elections forced mainstream political 
parties to actively fight for black voters, the victorious Liberals under Gómez halted their support 
of black politicians at that. The Liberal Party refused to employ blacks in public positions, and 
Gómez pursued a severely repressive policy against black dissenters during his presidential term. 
This culminated in 1912 with the brutal massacre, when PIC activists sought the abrogation of 
the 1910 Morúa Law that banned political organization by race. Thousands of PIC activists and 
black civilians were assassinated and mutilated by Cuban forces, white civilian brigades and 
American military personnel. By condoning the 1912 massacre, Gómez continued the pattern of 
exchanging repression of blacks for American political support.
1092
 
The 1912 massacre of the PIC activists became a symbol of a political and racial order 
than had been conceived in 1899 with the inauguration of the first American military occupation. 
White politicians, including Gómez himself, justified the massacre by depicting the black 
activists as un-Cuban because of their racial allegiances. The massacre highlights an explicit 
rejection of racial organization amidst an implicit and violently-defended vision of Cuban 
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nationality as white. So profound and pervasive is the belief in an inherently race-less Cuban 
nationality, that even contemporary historians condemn the PIC for their activist strategies.
1093
 
While many scholars have honed in on the 1912 Massacre as a rupture in Cuban history, 
this project has demonstrated that systematic state-sponsored violence against men and women 
of African descent had earlier origins. Indeed, I have argued that in order to understand the 
intense racial inequality of the early republic, including the racial violence of 1912, and the 
culture of silence on issues of race characterizing the Cuban republic, we must return to the 
inception of American military rule in 1899. Such ruthless and bloody repression of black 
activists and civilians by white separatists in 1912 effectively hushed black expressions of racial 
discontent, at least in the most explicit forms using racialized language. Silence on issues of race, 
in turn, allowed the myth of racial brotherhood to reign, unchallenged, despite the practical 
realities of intense racial discrimination, exclusion and marginalization. American rule 
effectively equated Cuban patriotism with silence on racial issues. The relationship between 
Cuban politicians and Americans forged during the American occupation helped consolidate 
Cuban nationality as outwardly race-less but implicitly white, and marked racial dissent as un-
Cuban. 
The persistence of racial discrimination in republican Cuba casts light on a broader 
pattern of social stratification in Latin America and the Caribbean. Cuba may not be the racial 
paradise some have claimed it to be. Scholars have long speculated about the inherent 
differences between Iberian and British models of race relations.
1094
 Some historians have argued 
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that the discourse of racial brotherhood so common throughout Latin America indicates a less 
virulent form of racism than in former British colonies, like the United States were the racial line 
is imprinted in physical space as deeply as it is carved into the law. The case of Cuba 
demonstrates that silence on racial issues does not indicate their absence from social relations. 
The societies of the Spanish Caribbean continue to be riddled with racial inequalities. While 
some may argue that these vestiges of racism are but legacies of an ugly history of slavery, the 
violence is much more recent. In order to begin to address the contemporary problem of racism, 
it is first necessary to acknowledge the continued propagation of ideas of racial difference, and 
the contemporary complicity in the ideal of racial brotherhood. 
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